# AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

SEPTEMBER 1987
VOLUME 81 NUMBER 3

## MANAGING EDITOR

**Samuel C. Patterson**
Department of Political Science
Ohio State University, 112 Derby Hall
Columbus, Ohio 43210-1373

## BOOK REVIEW EDITOR

**Robert H. Salisbury**
Department of Political Science
Washington University, Campus Box 1063
St. Louis, Missouri 63130

## EDITORIAL BOARD

**Suzanne Berger**
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

**David W. Brady**
Stanford University

**Charles V. Hamilton**
Columbia University

**John R. Hibbing**
University of Nebraska, Lincoln

**Harold Jacobson**
University of Michigan

**Milton Lodge**
State University of New York
at Stony Brook

**John M. Orbell**
University of Oregon

**G. Bingham Powell, Jr.**
University of Rochester

**Harvey Starr**
Indiana University

**Dennis F. Thompson**
Harvard University

**John C. Wahlke**
University of Arizona

**Raymond Wolfinger**
University of California,
Berkeley

**Susan C. Angel**
**Jean P. Kelly**
Assistant Editors

**Michael K. Lane**
Copy Editor

**Michael S. Bailey**
**Valerie J. Martinez**
*APSR* Interns

**Helen E. Hoelker**
Editorial Assistant

The *American Political Science Review* (ISSN-0003-0554) appears in March, June, September, and December of each year. It is published by the American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, and sent to all members. Dues: Regular Members with income: under $20,000, $40; $20,000-$29,999, $50; $30,000-39,999, $65; $40,000 and over, $75; Student Members (limited to 5 years), $15; Retired Members, $20; Life Members, $1,000; Institutional Members, $100. Dues allocated for a subscription to the *APSR*: $10 for individual members, $80 for institutional members. Changes of address sent to the Membership Secretary of the APSA. Postmaster: Please send notification regarding undelivered journals to address above. Second-class postage paid at Washington, D.C. and at additional mailing offices. Copyright © 1987 by The American Political Science Association.

# AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

## CONTENTS

ARTICLES

War Cues and Foreign Policy Acts
**Francis A. Beer, Alice F. Healy, Grant P. Sinclair & Lyle E. Bourne, Jr.** . . . . . 701

Crisis Bargaining, Escalation, and MAD
**Robert Powell** . . . . . 717

Fleeing the Iron Cage: Politics and Culture in the Thought of Max Weber
**Lawrence A. Scaff** . . . . . 737

The Individual Political Economy of Federal Tax Policy
**Michael R. Hawthorne & John E. Jackson** . . . . . 757

The Dynamics of Structural Realignment
**Stuart Elaine Macdonald & George Rabinowitz** . . . . . 775

State Political Culture and Public Opinion
**Robert S. Erikson, John P. McIver, & Gerald C. Wright, Jr.** . . . . . 797

Television News and Citizens' Explanations of National Affairs
**Shanto Iyengar** . . . . . 815

Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-theoretic Analysis
**Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour** . . . . . 833

Bureaucratic Politics in Radical Military Regimes
**Gregory J. Kasza** . . . . . 851

Stacking the Deck: Bureaucratic Missions and Policy Design
**Jonathan Bendor, Serge Taylor & Roland Van Gaalen** . . . . . 873

Asymmetric Information and the Coherence of Legislation
**David Austen-Smith & William H. Riker** . . . . . 897

CONTROVERSIES

Liberalism, Human Rights, and Human Dignity
**Neil Mitchell, Rhoda E. Howard & Jack Donnelly** . . . . . 921

Why are Congressional Committees Powerful?
**Keith Krehbiel, Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast** . . . . . 929

RESEARCH NOTES

Guns and Butter and Government Popularity in Britain
**Helmut Norpoth** ........ 949
Nationalization of the Electorate in the United States
**Laura L. Vertz, John P. Frendreis & James L. Gibson** ........ 961

BOOK REVIEWS

Political Theory ........ 973
American Politics ........ 990
Comparative Politics ........ 1016
International Relations ........ 1039
Political Economy ........ 1054

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF THE
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

SEPTEMBER 1987
VOLUME 81 NUMBER 3

# AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

PRESIDENT:
**Samuel P. Huntington**
*Harvard University*

PRESIDENT-ELECT:
**Kenneth N. Waltz**
*University of California, Berkeley*

VICE PRESIDENTS:
**Beverly Blair Cook**
*University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee*

**Charles O. Jones**
*University of Virginia*

**Lucian W. Pye**
*Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

SECRETARY:
**Paul Dawson**
*Oberlin College*

TREASURER:
**Helen Ingram**
*University of Arizona*

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR:
**Thomas E. Mann**

PROGRAM CHAIR:
**Robert Jervis**
*Columbia University*

MANAGING EDITOR, *APSR:*
**Samuel C. Patterson**
*Ohio State University*

COUNCIL, *1985–87:*
**John W. Kingdon**
*University of Michigan*

**Stephen D. Krasner**
*Stanford University*

**Paula D. McClain**
*Arizona State University*

**Karen O'Connor**
*Emory University*

**Carole Pateman**
*University of Sydney*

**G. Bingham Powell, Jr.**
*University of Rochester*

**Kenneth Shepsle**
*Harvard University*

**Nancy H. Zingale**
*College of St. Thomas*

COUNCIL, 1986–88:
**Robert H. Bates**
*Euke University*

**David W. Brady**
*Rice University*

**Demetrios Caraley**
*Barnard College, Columbia University*

**Francis M. Carney**
*University of California, Riverside*

**Margaret Karns**
*University of Dayton*

**David Morgan**
*University of Liverpool*

**Mitchell Rice**
*Louisiana State University*

**Robert M. Rosenzweig**
*Association of American Universities*

• GUNNELL • RIKER • ACHEN • LYNN •

WALKER • CONLAN • BEAM • HANSEN • BAUM • RUSSETT • EPSTEIN •

INGLEHART • GITHENS • KEOHANE • REISELBACH • SHALALA • STOKES

# APSA

announces the publication of

## Political Science: The State of the Discipline

**edited by**

**Ada W. Finifter**

*"a remarkable glimpse of a profession at work... An invaluable resource for any student or practitioner of current politics and policy-making in the U.S. — and indeed elsewhere in the world."*

***Choice* (February 1984)**

19 Chapters by many of the country's leading political scientists reviewing the present state and future directions of research in the subfields of the discipline.

614 pages with a detailed index to authors cited.

| | |
|---|---|
| Paper: | $15.00* for APSA members<br>$25.00 for non-members<br>ISBN 0-915654-58-X |
| Cloth: | $35.00<br>ISBN 0-915654-57-1 |

*This rate effective for classroom adoptions placed through bookstores.

(Please include $2.00 to cover the costs of postage and handling)

Send your **prepaid order** to:

**State of the Discipline**
American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

• HANCOCK • MIGDAL • ASHER • KINDER •

# ARTICLES

# WAR CUES AND FOREIGN POLICY ACTS

FRANCIS A. BEER
ALICE F. HEALY
GRANT P. SINCLAIR
LYLE E. BOURNE, JR.
*University of Colorado*
*Boulder*

*Cognitive psychological theory and research suggest that specific actions are primed or potentiated by prior related cues. Thus violent cues should influence subsequent conflictual action choices. Laboratory subjects were given one of two written vignettes recalling either the slaughter of World War I or Allied weakness before World War II. A control group received no vignette. Subjects were then asked to specify foreign-policy choices from an inventory of possible cooperative-conflictual acts, relevant to a dispute between two fictional countries, in five sequential rounds. Both war vignettes produced more subsequent conflictual choices for subjects with dominant (i.e., aggressive) personality traits, and less conflictual choices for subjects with submissive personality traits. The findings suggest that priming activates underlying personality predispositions that enhance cooperative or conflictual action choices. The results also point to the potential importance of prior cues in shaping foreign-policy decision makers' and mass-public responses to international events.*

National decisions to go to war or to maintain peace are gradually being understood in a much more comprehensive way. This new understanding takes into account powerful psychological factors, in addition to more standard political variables.

Traditional analysis of international relations has long held that calculation of material factors, defined in terms of reason of state or national interest, are the primary determinants of decisions to go to war or make peace. Formal models of foreign-policy making also hold that such decisions stem from the calculation of national utilities in an interdependent system where all actors are rational, or at least behave as though they are.

Peace-war decisions, however, have other important dimensions, including psychological ones. For example, cognitive psychology suggests that schemata provide important filters for perception and its translation into decisions and actions. According to schema theory, general knowledge and environmental events are stored in long-term memory as frames or scripts that can be retrieved and used as analogues of current events and, as such, serve as a guide to action. They allow extrapolation from past experiences to current or anticipated reality (see Anderson 1980; Gilovich 1981; Johnson-Laird 1983; Read 1984; Roediger 1980; Waterman and Hayes-Roth 1978).

A popular aphorism holds that those who do not remember history are condemned to repeat it. Our perspective suggests that those who do remember history apply it selectively. Particular foreign-policy makers recall different past events in different shading and detail; for exam-

**AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW**
**VOL. 81 NO. 3 SEPTEMBER 1987**

ple, the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo, Germany's invasion of its western European neighbors, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Korean War, the Cuban missile crisis or Vietnam. And they see contemporary events, for example the Libyan crisis, as analogues of such earlier historical prototypes (see Alker, Bennett, and Mefford 1979; May 1973; Neustadt and May 1986).

Activation is the process by which memory representations become available. Such activation implies recall of, and attention to, a particular schema. The schema is connected or applied to a current or anticipated situation. It is mentally rehearsed or practiced. And eventually it is used as a concrete model for action (see Anderson 1983; Anderson and Pichert 1978; Bargh et al. 1986; Bargh and Pietromonaco 1982; Glenberg et al. 1983; Higgins and King 1981; Higgins, King, and Mavin 1982).[1]

Of course, other psychological factors are also significant in this activation process. For example personality attributes supply important qualifications to perception and behavior. People with different personalities may see, remember, or use the same schema in different ways, give different weights to various schema dimensions, and draw different action conclusions (see Cartwright 1974, chap. 21).

## Laboratory Experiment

These concerns led us to develop a laboratory analogue of peace-war decision making in which to examine the influence of war-related primes on selected foreign-policy acts. The basic idea was simple. One group of subjects would be primed with a written vignette describing the horrors of trench warfare in World War I, which we believed would enhance the subjects' cautiousness about acts of violence. The second group would get a vignette reminding them about Allied appeasement of the Nazis prior to World War II and of the resulting costs of this passivism. This group, we thought, would be primed to conflictual acts. A control group would receive no prime prior to decision making.

We decided to complicate the experiment by examining other variables that might influence cooperative or conflictual behavior. Prior knowledge or information about international relations seemed especially likely to be important (see Ruben 1986).

We also wished to examine the role of personality in determining foreign-conflict behavior. Specifically, we focused on two personality dimensions, dominance-submission and experimentation-conservatism. Dominance-submission is especially relevant to a willingness to use forceful means to settle problems. Furthermore, previous research has established dominance as an important personality characteristic helping determine major U.S. foreign-policy decisions (see Etheredge 1978). While there is less extant evidence, an experimenting-conservative factor seems likely to be related to liberal versus conservative political ideology, again suggesting alternative approaches to solving international problems.

Our object in this experiment was to determine whether certain variables would allow us to predict action choices for cooperation or conflict in a simulated international setting. We decided to use a context modeled after the Falklands-Malvinas crisis. Thus, after they had been primed by one or none of the vignettes, the subjects would be given a scenario like the one existing at the beginning of this crisis. We would then ask them what a particular national actor did next, asking them to select one from an inventory of possible cooperative or conflictual actions.[2] We wanted to give this part of the experiment a dynamic cast in order to study the development of these choices over time. We, therefore, iterated the process, alternating the identity of the national actor and asking subjects to make choices over five successive turns.[3]

## Method

Our subjects were sixty University of Colorado introductory-psychology students, who participated as part of a class requirement. The subjects were run in a single-group session that took less than one hour.

Each subject was given a booklet containing the nine parts outlined below:

1. The "sixteen-personality-factor" (16 PF) questionnaire, "factor E" (dominant–submissive) and "factor Q1" (experimenting–conservative)
2. a political-knowledge test constructed by the authors
3. a priming vignette
4. a fictional scenario describing the activities of two countries at war
5. five pages, each specifying an alternating national identity and containing 15 possible political-action choices
6. a true-false memory test for the vignette
7. a true-false memory test for the scenario
8. a recognition-memory test for the political-action alternatives
9. a question concerning the subject's recognition of the similarity between the scenario and recent political events

Each of these parts was used in a separate phase of the experiment. Phase 1 examined selected personality attributes. The first part of the booklet was taken from the 16 PF test. It contained 13 multiple-choice questions focusing on factor E. Individuals on one end of this scale were "dominant, assertive, aggressive, stubborn, competitive, bossy." Those at the other extreme were "submissive, humble, mild, easily led, accommodating." There were also 10 questions centering on factor Q1. Responses that were "experimenting, liberal, critical, open to change" opposed those that were "conservative, respecting of traditional ideas." The questions from each scale were intermixed with 13 neutral filler questions. All questions had three alternative answers (see Institute for Personality and Ability Testing 1979).

Phase 2 measured political knowledge, particularly in the area of international relations. It included 16 multiple choice questions developed by the authors to test the subjects' knowledge of political events preceding, during, and following both world wars. Each question had five alternative answers.

Phase 3 primed the subjects with a particular schema, presented as a written vignette. One-third of the subjects received Vignette A (Appendix). This described the costs involved in war, using as an example the high number of British and German casualties during the trench warfare of World War I and the effects of these losses on postwar morale.

Vignette B (Appendix) was given to a second one-third of the subjects. It described the events leading up to World War II. This scenario discussed the policy of Western statesmen in dealing with Germany's invasion of Czechoslovakia. It stated that appeasement of aggression was a mistake and led eventually to a much wider and longer conflict. This scenario emphasized the point that when a country becomes aggressive, war is inevitable and hence any attempts at peace are futile.

No vignette was given to the last one-third of the subjects, the control group.

Phase 4 presented the decision scenario that provided the basis for the subjects' actions (Appendix). It was modeled on the Falklands–Malvinas crisis of 1982. The vignette described two fictional countries, Afslandia and Bagumba, and the claims each had on a set of small islands. Afslandia represented Great Britain and Bagumba took the place of Argentina.

Phase 5 gave the subjects sets of alternative actions that the protagonists might take in the Afslandia-Bagumba situation. Five separate pages in the questionnaire each contained 15 different actions. These ranged on a scale from 1 to 15 in cooperation/conflict intensity. A scale value of 1 represented the most peaceful attempt to resolve the tensions; 15 constituted an all-out military retaliation. The actions in each set were presented in a random order. The appendix contains the five sets of actions given to the subjects, with actions in each set ordered along the cooperation-conflict dimension.[4]

On the first page that contained 15 alternatives, subjects were instructed to choose the action they felt Afslandia would take in response to Bagumba's invasion of the islands. On the second page, the subjects were instructed to choose the action that they felt Bagumba would take, given that Afslandia had taken the action chosen on the first page. This procedure continued through all five pages, with the actions alternating from one to the other country. Hence, Afslandia was given three actions, and Bagumba two.

The next three phases tested the subjects' memory. Phase 6 included 10 true-false questions about the priming vignette read in phase 3. No test was included for the control group of subjects who had not read a vignette. Phase 7 included 10 true-false questions about the Afslandia-Bagumba scenario presented earlier in phase 4. Phase 8 presented the five pages from phase 5 but with the action alternatives on each page in a different random order. The subjects were instructed to recall their previously chosen alternative by circling it on each of the five pages.

In phase 9 subjects were asked whether the Afslandia-Bagumba situation reminded them of any recent events in history. This question allowed us to determine whether the subjects recognized the situation as being similar to the Falkland Islands crisis.

## Results

In addition to the three conditions differing in the vignette read during phase 3 (World War I, World War II, control), subjects were further subdivided into personality subgroups. This was done on the basis of a median split of subject scores on the dominant-submissive questions from the 16 PF questionnaire administered in phase 1. The questions were scored in accordance with the criteria outlined in the manual such that one of each of the three alternative answers received no points, one received one point, and one received two points. When more than one subject in a condition obtained the median score, those subjects were randomly assigned to the high and low groups.

A four-way mixed *analysis of variance* (ANOVA) was conducted on the alternative action choices made in phases 5 and 8. The score used for each choice was equal to its value on the 15-point scale, with 1 being most cooperative and 15 most conflictual. There were two "between-subjects" factors included in the ANOVA, *priming condition* (World War I, World War II, control) and *dominant-submissive personality group* (high, low). There were also two "within-subjects" factors, *phase* (original, phase 5; memory, phase 8), and *selection* (first, Afslandia; second, Bagumba; third, Afslandia; fourth, Bagumba; fifth, Afslandia).

The scores on which our analysis was based are summarized in Table 1, in which we break down the mean scale values for the two dominance groups in each of the three priming conditions as a function of phase and action selection. Subjects in the low dominance group yielded lower, more cooperative score values ($M = 8.99$) than did those in the high dominance group ($M = 10.45$), $F(1, 54) = 5.83$, $MSe = 55.36$, $p = .018$.[5]

**Table 1. Mean Cooperation-Conflict Scale Scores by Priming Condition, Dominance Group, Phase, and Action Selection**

| Priming condition and dominance group | Action Selections | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | A | B | C | D | E | Mean |
| Phase 5: Original | | | | | | |
| World War I | | | | | | |
| Low | 10.8 | 9.0 | 9.0 | 7.5 | 6.2 | 8.5 |
| High | 12.0 | 11.0 | 10.7 | 10.3 | 11.5 | 11.1 |
| World War II | | | | | | |
| Low | 9.5 | 8.1 | 8.4 | 7.7 | 7.3 | 8.2 |
| High | 11.8 | 9.1 | 11.3 | 11.4 | 10.0 | 10.7 |
| Control | | | | | | |
| Low | 11.3 | 10.3 | 11.1 | 8.9 | 9.3 | 10.2 |
| High | 10.7 | 8.7 | 10.2 | 9.4 | 9.2 | 9.6 |
| Mean | 11.0 | 9.4 | 10.1 | 9.2 | 8.9 | 9.7 |
| Phase 8: Memory | | | | | | |
| World War I | | | | | | |
| Low | 10.8 | 9.0 | 9.0 | 7.5 | 6.2 | 8.5 |
| High | 12.2 | 11.1 | 10.7 | 11.0 | 11.6 | 11.3 |
| World War II | | | | | | |
| Low | 10.0 | 7.8 | 8.3 | 8.4 | 7.2 | 8.3 |
| High | 12.2 | 10.4 | 10.6 | 10.1 | 9.6 | 10.6 |
| Control | | | | | | |
| Low | 11.3 | 10.1 | 11.9 | 8.7 | 9.0 | 10.2 |
| High | 10.7 | 8.7 | 9.4 | 9.1 | 8.9 | 9.4 |
| Mean | 11.2 | 9.5 | 10.0 | 9.1 | 8.8 | 9.7 |

There was no main effect of the priming condition or the vignette, taken by itself, but we did observe a significant interaction of priming condition and dominance group, $F(2, 54) = 3.18$, $MSe = 55.36$, $p = .048$. Figure 1 illustrates this relationship.

Subjects in the two priming conditions that included war vignettes showed expected differences. The high-dominance group was more conflictual (World War I: low, $M = 8.50$; high, $M = 11.21$; World War II: low, $M = 8.27$; high, $M = 10.65$). Subjects in the control group, who did not read a vignette about war, did not show the expected difference between the two dominance groups (low, $M = 10.19$; high, $M = 9.50$). This finding is particularly interesting because subjects in the nonprimed condition tended to behave in a direction opposite to what we expected. More submissive unprimed subjects were more conflictual; more dominant subjects who did not receive the preliminary vignette were more cooperative. Our overall results thus suggest that subjects' propensity towards conflictual or peaceful behavior is activated by the general war scenario, regardless of whether the scenario itself specifically discusses the costs of war or the futility of attempts for peace.

There were negligible effects of phase on the scale values; subjects' selections in the memory phase ($M = 9.72$) were quite close in value to those in the original

**Figure 1. Mean Cooperation–Conflict Scale Score ("Conflict Score") as a Function of Dominance Group and Priming Condition**



phase (M = 9.72), $F(1, 54) < 1$. The scale value did vary considerably, however, as a function of selection, $F(4, 216) = 9.56$, $MSe = 10.07$, $p < .001$. In Figure 2, we show that the subjects' first selection was usually most conflictual (M = 11.11) and last selection was generally the most cooperative (M = 8.83). Moreover, the second (M = 9.44) and fourth (M = 9.17) selections, those involving Bagumba, were also somewhat less conflictual than the third selection (M = 10.05), which involved Afslandia. Thus, subjects became less conflictual with successive selections concerning a particular country, and they were generally more conflictual in their selections for Afslandia than for Bagumba.

Two other variables on which subjects were divided were experimenting–conservatism personality attributes and prior knowledge. Neither had significant effects on subjects' choices. We used subjects' scores on the 10 questions from factor Q1 of the 16 PF personality test to separate them into two experimenting–conservatism groups, again using a median-split rule. We did not find a significant overall difference in action choices between more experimenting subjects who scored high (M = 10.12) and more conservative ones who scored low (M = 9.32), $F(1, 54) = 1.52$, $MSe = 63.16$, $p = .221$. Further, this personality dimension did not enter into any significant interactions with the factors of condition, phase, and selection.

We also formed two groups of subjects for each condition on the basis of their scores on the knowledge test presented in phase 2. To score this test, we gave one

**Figure 2. Mean Cooperation–Conflict Scale Score ("Conflict Score") as a Function of Successive Selection**



point for each correct answer to the 16 five-alternative, multiple-choice questions; subjects' knowledge scores ranged from 2 to 13. Like the division into experimenting-conservative personality groups, the division into low and high knowledge groups did not yield any significant main or interactive effects; the scale values for subjects of low knowledge (M = 9.75) were equivalent to those for subjects of high knowledge (M = 9.69), $F(1, 54) < 1$.

Although only the division of subjects into low and high dominance groups yielded significant effects in the analyses of cooperation-conflict scale values, there was a significant positive correlation between scores on the dominance and experimenting questions of the 16 PF personality test, $r = .45$, $p < .001$, and between scores on the knowledge test and the experimenting questions of the personality test, $r = .28$, $p = .017$. There was, however, no significant relation between scores on the knowledge test and the dominance questions of the personality test, $r = -.08$, $p = .261$.

Scores on the 10 true-false questions given in phase 7 concerning memory for the Afslandia-Bagumba scenario were quite high (M = 8.02), ranging from 4 to 10 correct responses, thereby indicating that subjects did read and remember the scenario when making their action choices. As we should also expect, subjects in the World War I and World War II conditions produced high scores in phase 6 on the 10 true-false questions concerning those vignettes. The scores ranged from 4 to 9 for the World War I vignette (M = 6.75) and from 2 to 10 for the World War II vignette (M = 7.20).

We asked subjects in phase 9 whether the Afslandia-Bagumba situation reminded them of any recent events in history. Twenty-seven of the 60 mentioned the Falklands-Malvinas crisis: 9 from the World War I group, 8 from the World War II group, and 10 from the control group. An analysis of variance showed a significant interaction on mean cooperation-conflict of dominance-submissiveness and recognition of the Falklands-Malvinas crisis, $F(1, 48) = 6.30$, $MSe = 49.15$, $p = .016$. There was little difference between the low dominance group (M = 10.41) and the high dominance group (M = 10.13) for those subjects who recognized the crisis. On the other hand, subjects who did not recognize the crisis responded in very different ways. Subjects from the high dominance group were substantially more conflictual (M = 10.78) than those from the low dominance group (M = 8.14). Subjects who identified the crisis seemed to react at least partly from their memory of actual historical events, rather than their personal inclinations. Personal predispositions, however, were a major influence for the subjects who did not recognize the crisis. No other effects involving recognition of the crisis were statistically reliable. In particular, the three-way interaction of crisis recognition, dominance group, and priming condition was not significant, $F(2, 48) < 1$.

## Discussion

Our experiment supported the importance of priming with historical analogues for action choices in a simulated international environment, but not quite in the way that previous theory and research had led us to expect. We initially assumed that subjects reminded of the horrors of World War I trench warfare would generally be more inclined to cooperative-action choices and more cautious about initiating conflict. On the other hand, those reminded of the costs of appeasing Nazi Germany should have been less cooperative overall and more likely to act conflictually. The results suggest that priming has less specific effects. The particular context or meaning of the vignettes had no apparent influence by itself. Instead, there was a more complex, interactive result; war-related stimuli of either kind predisposed subjects to act in accordance with their dominant-submissive personality traits.[6]

We had expected that personality would also play an overall dispositional role, that is, that dominant subjects would be more conflictual, and submissive subjects more cooperative. This was true, but again in a more complicated way than we had anticipated. Personality was important only when activated by appropriate priming. War stimuli triggered personality dispositions and provided them with force and direction. Dominant personalities became conflictual, and submissive personalities cooperative, mainly when stimulated in a war-related context. Without such activation, personality dispositions seemed latent at best and without any significant influence on action choices. Further, personality differences only emerged among subjects who did not recognize a historical referent. Dominant-submissive tendencies were inhibited or not activated if subjects identified the decision scenario as the Falklands-Malvinas crisis.

A priori, and on intuitive grounds, it seemed reasonable that the experimenting-conservatism trait would have effects like those of dominance-submission. This aspect of personality seemed roughly isomorphic with liberal-conservative political ideology. But priming activated personality traits selectively; contrary to what we anticipated, conservatism was not associated with conflictual behavior, even when stimulated by war cues.

Another variable that we had thought might be important was not. The general level of prior political knowledge had no observable influence. This result, though negative, is consistent with our other findings. Knowledge, like personality, is a reservoir, potentially linked with action. By itself, however, the level of knowledge does not have a specific valence toward cooperation or conflict.

Two other sets of findings merit discussion: the more conflictual choices for Afslandia than for Bagumba and the declining conflict behavior through the set of five selections. Recall that the decision scenario of phase 4 ends with Bagumba undertaking a set of overtly conflictual acts. For this reason, it is not surprising that it evoked conflictual responses for subjects considering the appropriate action for Afslandia. Beyond this point, however, there were no more external conflict triggers. Without such stimuli, the impetus for conflict thus gradually wound down to lower levels, though the mean choices did not ever cross over to cooperation.

The results document an activation process for dominant or submissive personality predispositions, which, in turn, incline the subjects to conflictual or cooperative actions. This process may exist in many different contexts, from interpersonal to international.

Psychological priming may be important in shaping public responses to foreign-policy events through modern mass communications. Historians have long been aware of mass priming effects, for example the influence of "yellow journalism" on Western imperialistic adventures during the nineteenth century. Thus, the newspapers owned by William Randolph Hearst, Jr. had a particularly striking effect in promoting the Spanish-American War (see Dierks 1970, 4).

Priming may also be important in molding foreign-policy decision makers' responses to international events. It may seem that undergraduate psychology subjects, especially dealing with a fantasy world symbolized by the unlikely names of Afslandia and Bagumba, are a far distance from the corridors of real international experience and power. Nevertheless, subjects and decision makers share a common human identity, and we believe that the same psychological dynamics exist, to some extent, in both laboratory and real-world settings.

Our experiment suggests that peace/war actions are not necessarily taken only on the basis of rational calculation of benefits and costs (see Kahneman and Tversky 1979). We do not deny that such calculations are involved and may have an important influence. At the same time, they and the subsequent decisions may also be significantly influenced by immediately preceding cues. In our experiment, the priming vignettes provided such cues. In the real world of foreign-policy making and mass-opinion formation, this priming occurs as formal and informal, obvious and subtle, signals flow through the stream of political culture. These cues include prior conversations or conferences among decision makers; bureaucratic memoranda, for example, position or plannng papers; public speeches; newspaper or magazine reports; popular television and movie entertainment.

Alternative cues may help explain how multiple actors with apparently similar interests may react differently to what appear to be the same foreign-policy events. The Libyan crisis of early 1986 provides a recent example. U.S. and European citizens were faced with the same terrorist stimuli; yet their responses were markedly different. The United States took a relatively conflictual line, mounting two separate military strikes. Most European political leaders and publics were much more cautious, failing to support and even opposing United States actions. Many underlying factors resulted in divergent reactions by the United States and Europe. Our research suggests that variable priming, in conjunction with disparate personality dispositions, may be one of these underlying causes.

## Appendix

### Vignette A: War Involves Terrible Costs

World War I was not a war of mobility and maneuver; it was a war of attrition—an organized, four-year attempt by both sides to gain victory simply by bleeding each other to death. It was an unsophisticated strategy and the losses were catastrophic. A British attempt to pierce German lines in 1916 resulted in the five-month Battle of the Somme. Although they pounded the German lines for eight days with artillery before the troops were even sent into battle, the British gained only 120 square miles—at the cost of 420,000 men, that is, 3,500 men per square mile. German losses were even greater: 445,000 men. Some estimates place the total Somme casualties at 1.2 million men, the highest for any battle in history. At Ypres in 1917 the British bombardment lasted nineteen days; 321 trainloads of shells were fired, the equivalent of a year's production by 55,000 war workers. That time the British forces captured forty-five square miles—at the cost of 370,000 men, or 8,222 men per square mile. By comparison, total British Empire casualties during the six years of World War II were almost 1.25 million, including 350,000 dead and 91,000 missing. Approximately 9 million men in uniform were killed during the four years of the Great War, and the number of dead civilians totaled several million more.

But the impact of war cannot be measured by citing statistics of the dead. The real impact can be understood only psychologically. Losses are not just quantitative; they are qualitative as well. A nation can ill afford to lose millions of its men. It can even less afford to lose almost its entire youth. Is it any wonder that the nations of Europe, having lost so many of their men—and especially their young men and the children they would have fathered—also lost their élan, their self-confidence, their hope for the future? For the men who would have supplied this vigor and optimism—had they grown up and become the leaders of government, business, labor, and science—lay dead in Flanders fields. And those who returned from the battlefields, where they had left the corpses of their comrades in arms, were haunted by the war. In the interwar period they remained politically passive, withdrawing into their private worlds, avoiding public involvement. Erich Maria Remarque dedicated his famous novel *All Quiet on the Western Front* to this "generation of men who, even though they may have escaped its shells, were destroyed by the war." (Spanier 1975, 19)

### Vignette B: Appeasement of Aggression Leads to War

The most famous example of appeasement was the Munich conference, at which the Sudetenland was transferred from Czechoslovakia to Germany. Hitler had used a branch of the Nazi Party to stir up trouble in the Sudetenland, telling them always to ask for so much that they could never be satisfied. He then used these incidents as a pretext for demanding that the Sudeten Germans be put under German rule. The Czechs refused to be bullied and mobilized their reserves, but the rest of the world was afraid of war and insisted on an international conference instead. The conference, so eagerly sought as an alternative to war by Western leaders (including the American president), was far from a model of impartiality. It was held in the German city of Munich, site of the Nazi Party's headquarters. It was attended by Britain, France, Italy, and Germany but not by the country most directly threatened, Czechoslovakia. As a result of the conference, the Czechs were ordered to hand over the Sudetenland, including border fortifications and economic resources as well as about 700,000 Czechs who would now go under German rule. Yet Neville Chamberlain, the British prime minister, came back from Munich with his black umbrella in one hand and a piece of paper in the other, saying, "I believe it is peace for our time." The paper was important because Chamberlain had on it Hitler's own promise that this was his last territorial demand in Europe. And it was reasonable to believe him. The German claim to rule Germans in the Sudetenland and Austria was justified by the principle of national self-determination. The issue of Germans in South Tyrol and Germans in the areas along the Polish border remained, but Hitler had concluded treaties with both Italy and Poland.

The Western statesmen quickly discovered that their appeasement policy was mistaken when, only six months later, Hitler took over the rest of Czechoslovakia in clear violation of his pledges at Munich. War had become inevitable. In retrospect most Western policy-makers agreed that they should have gone to war to aid Czechoslovakia. But it was too late for that. The next country to be threatened by Hitler was Poland. Its cause was less just, its regime less compatible with Western ideas of democracy or even human decency, and its terrain a lot harder to defend. It was, in fact, as Hitler calculated, irrational for the French and British to get into a major war with Germany over Poland. Nevertheless, the British and French leaders made that irrational choice and World War II began. (Ziegler 1977, 36–37)

### Decision Scenario

Two nations have been arguing about the possession of a set of small islands for several hundred years.

*Afslandia* is located about 5,000 miles away from the islands. One of its explorers discovered and took possession of the islands at the end of the 16th century. Colonists from Afslandia settled on the island, which adopted the institutions and way of living of the mother country. The islands were the basis for a lucrative fishing industry. In addition they served as a resupply port for ships and also as a base for the exploration of neighboring natural resource deposits. Afslandia has undertaken negotiations with the government of Bagumba, seeking ways to settle the dispute while safeguarding its own rights, as well as those of the residents of the islands. It has also been willing to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice. Finally, when necessary, Afslandia has defended its possession of the islands through military means.

*Bagumba* is located much closer to the islands, about 25 miles away. Bagumba was, in an earlier time, a colony itself of a distant power. It achieved independence at the beginning of the 19th century. Shortly thereafter, it made its first attempt to proclaim its sovereignty over the islands, sending a number of small military expeditions, which were repulsed. Bagumba has consistently asserted its "indisputable right" to the territory. It has sought to achieve its claims through political negotiation. These negotiations, however, have been without success. Bagumba has consistently rejected Afslandia's attempt to submit the dispute over sovereignty to the International Court of Justice.

Last week, fishermen and scrap merchants from Bagumba landed on some remote parts of the islands and set up camps. Yesterday, troops from Bagumba landed on the islands, defeated the small military garrison of Afslandia, and declared that their armed forces had recovered the islands for the nation, and that sovereignty over the islands was now assured. It declared that it had finally achieved the legitimate rights of the people of Bagumba which had been patiently deferred for over 150 years. Finally it declared that the long series of fruitless negotiations to obtain what Bagumba had always considered to be its inheritance had finally ended.

**Alternative Actions: A**

1. Afslandia accepts the Bagumban head of state as its own head of state.
2. Afslandia and Bagumba form a joint military high command.
3. Afslandia gives Bagumba a new cruise missile system.
4. Afslandia grants disaster relief to Bagumba.
5. Afslandia announces its full support of Bagumba's new established government.
6. Afslandia announces that it favors Bagumba's new economic policies.
7. Afslandia sends revised draft of policies and programs to Bagumba.
8. Afslandia's broadcasting makes no special provision for reporting on the Bagumban situation/peace talks with Bagumba.
9. Afslandia's government requests a change in Bagumba's policy.
10. Afslandia's National Broadcasting System makes verbal accusations accusing Bagumba of unethical conduct.
11. Afslandia imposes extremely high tariffs on Bagumba products.
12. Afslandia breaks diplomatic relations with Bagumba.
13. Afslandia's border police kill 4 Bagumban soldiers who trespass inside border lines.
14. Afslandia's troops capture two of Bagumba's border provinces.
15. Afslandia firebombs 5 of Bagumba's major cities.

**Alternative Actions: B**

1. Bagumba joins, and becomes a province of, Afslandia.
2. Bagumba's air force joins Afslandia's

air force in extended joint maneuvers.
3. Bagumba army officers spend six weeks in Afslandia training with their officers.
4. Bagumba lifts economic restrictions on trade with Afslandia.
5. Bagumba's farmers invite Afslandia's farmers to join in committees concerning new strains of plants.
6. Bagumba apologizes to Afslandia for untruthful accusations.
7. Bagumba sends a special Ambassador to Afslandia.
8. Bagumba's government allows Bagumba civilians and tourists to enter Afslandia, but only for certain periods of time.
9. Bagumba accuses Afslandia of unethical business practices.
10. Bagumba condemns Afslandia's foreign policy.
11. Bagumba's government allows no travel in or out of Afslandia.
12. Bagumba provides sanctuary to anti-Afslandia terrorists.
13. Bagumba's terrorists kidnap Afslandia's Ambassador.
14. Bagumba sinks 7 of Afslandia's commercial vessels.
15. Bagumba drops a nuclear bomb on Afslandia's largest industrial city which kills 1.5 million people.

**Alternative Actions: C**

1. Afslandia and Bagumba form a political confederation.
2. Afslandia joins Bagumba in forming a new international organization.
3. Afslandia invites Bagumba to conclude a military agreement.
4. Afslandia provides large loans to Bagumba.
5. Afslandia's scientists confer with Bagumba's scientists over a new discovery in medicine.
6. Afslandia raises the status of Bagumba's diplomatic legation to that of an embassy.
7. Afslandia sends its chief negotiator to facilitate "peace talks" with Bagumba.
8. Afslandia's President has no comment about Bagumba's foreign policy.
9. Afslandia denies accusations of mistreating Bagumba's prisoners.
10. Afslandia recalls its Ambassador to Bagumba.
11. Afslandia cuts off all financial aid to Bagumba.
12. Afslandia finances paid agitators in Bagumba's capital.
13. Afslandia mines three of Bagumba's bridges and important industrial plants.
14. Afslandia bombs Bagumba's agricultural areas.
15. 100,000 Afslandia soldiers invade Bagumba.

**Alternative Actions: D**

1. Bagumba and Afslandia form a new federal system.
2. Bagumba joins Afslandia in establishing a comprehensive common market.
3. Bagumba provides Afslandia with land to station troops in Bagumba.
4. Bagumba sells grain to Afslandia.
5. Bagumba proposes a friendship treaty with Afslandia.
6. Bagumba accepts Afslandia's terms for negotiation.
7. Bagumba accepts an invitation by Afslandia to have talks.
8. Bagumba carefully words its telegram to Afslandia, not committing itself at all.
9. Bagumba insists that Afslandia's foreign policy is unfair.
10. Bagumba refuses to participate in an upcoming conference because of Afslandia's presence.
11. Bagumba suspends economic treaties and agreements with Afslandia.
12. Pro-Bagumba marchers demonstrate

violently outside Afslandia's embassy.
13. Bagumba shells a small island controlled by Afslandia.
14. Bagumba's ships drop mines in Afslandia's territorial waters.
15. Bagumba drops nerve gas bombs on 30 of Afslandia's major cities.

**Alternative Actions: E**

1. Afslandia joins, and becomes a province of, Bagumba.
2. Afslandia and Bagumba form a joint military alliance.
3. Afslandia sells Bagumba top secret information concerning nuclear power plants.
4. Afslandia offers financial aid to Bagumba for development.
5. Afslandia opens its borders to Bagumban citizens with little or no restrictions.
6. Afslandia offers aid to Bagumba to help put down riots by Bagumba's leftists.
7. Afslandia invites Bagumba to undertake negotiations.
8. Afslandia refuses any special acknowledgment of Bagumba's policies at the economic meetings and conferences.
9. Afslandia refuses Bagumba's protest note.
10. Afslandia's Foreign Minister postpones a state visit to Bagumba, denouncing its recent hostile actions.
11. Afslandia refuses all scientific exchange with Bagumba.
12. Afslandia's secret intelligence agency financially supports guerrilla attacks on Bagumba.
13. Afslandia places water barriers to interfere with shipping in a Bagumba port.
14. Afslandia shells border cities in Bagumba.
15. Afslandia poisons water supplies in 5 of Bagumba's major cities.

## Notes

The work for this paper was done in the Program on Peace and War, Center for International Relations, and the Institute of Cognitive Science at the University of Colorado, Boulder. The authors would like to thank a number of people who participated at different stages of the project. Michael D. Ward provided advice about the Conflict and Peace Data Base (COPDAB) scale and suggested the sequential examination of action choices. Lisa Garlanger generated the alternative-action scale items. Robert Niles helped select and score the personality questions. Antoinette Gesi and Paul Peralis assisted with the data analysis. Desmond Cartwright, O. J. Harvey, Bernadette Park, and Walter Stone provided useful comments.

1. Bordin (1986), Bosman (1986), Gilovich (1981), and Thomas and Sigelman (1984) describe experiments that relate prior activation specifically to political choice.

2. Although the wording of the question requested the subject to choose the next action undertaken by the national actor, we infer the subject's own action propensities from the responses.

3. This iterated approach to cooperation and conflict connects our work with earlier research on the prisoner's dilemma. See Axelrod 1984.

4. The scale was taken from the COPDAB project (Azar 1980). The project used the scale as a basis for coding an inventory of international events and interactions covering 135 countries since 1948, derived from over 70 journalistic sources.

In our experiment, an undergraduate student assistant, Lisa Garlanger, invented the names for the fictional countries. She used the 15 major COPDAB categories of cooperation and conflict as a framework and guide to generating a fictional set of events-interactions. Each of these items was then evaluated. The 45 items judged most faithful to the original COPDAB categories were retained for administration to subjects.

We used the 15 original COPDAB categories as a scale in its own right. Azar and Havener (1976) discuss some of the scaling issues and report the results of psychometric efforts to achieve more precise interval measurement. Their study generally supports the validity of the original 15-point scale.

A separate experiment was conducted to ensure that the 15 political actions chosen for each of the five sets were ordered accurately in terms of cooperation and conflict. Fifteen introductory psychology students from the University of Colorado were asked to rank the 15 actions from each of the five sets on a scale from 1 to 15. They were then asked to rate each of the 15 actions from each of the five sets on a scale from 1 to 100.

In the ranking task, 13 subjects (2 subjects failed to follow the instructions) were presented with the five sets of 15 actions one set at a time. For each set, they were instructed to read each of the 15 actions and then rank the actions from 1 to 15 with a 1 being given to the action they considered to be the most peaceful and a 15 being given to the action they considered to be the most aggressive. They were instructed that each action was to be given one number and that each number 1 through 15 was to be used only once.

In the rating task, 15 subjects were presented with the five sets of 15 actions one set at a time. For each set they were instructed to consider each action and then rate it on a scale from 1 to 100 with a 1 indicating the action was extremely peaceful and a 100 indicating the action was extremely aggressive.

The mean ranking and mean rating were then calculated for each action within each set across all subjects. For each set of 15 actions, Pearson product-moment correlations between these means and the scale values were calculated. The resulting correlations between the mean rankings and the scale values are as follows: set 1, $r(11) = .85$, $p < .001$; set 2, $r(11) = .92$, $p < .001$; set 3, $r(11) = .95$, $p < .001$; set 4, $r(11) = .93$, $p < .001$; and set 5, $r(11) = .92$, $p < .001$. The resulting correlations between the mean ratings and the scale values are as follows: set 1, $r(13) = .91$, $p < .001$; set 2, $r(13) = .91$, $p < .001$; set 3, $r(13) = .95$, $p < .001$; set 4, $r(13) = .92$, $p < .001$; and set 5, $r(13) = .88$, $p < .001$. These high correlations indicate that the ordering of the 15 actions within each set was appropriate for the subject population employed in the main experiment.

The same experiment was conducted again using eight political-science graduate students considered to be more knowledgeable about international affairs than the undergraduate subjects. The resulting correlations between the mean rankings and the scale values are as follows: set 1, $r(6) = .91$, $p < .005$; set 2, $r(6) = .95$, $p < .005$; set 3, $r(6) = .97$, $p < .001$; set 4, $r(6) = .97$, $p < .001$; and set 5, $r(6) = .96$, $p < .001$. The resulting correlations between the mean ratings and the scale values are as follows: set 1, $r(6) = .91$, $p < .005$; set 2, $r(6) = .93$, $p < .005$; set 3, $r(6) = .96$, $p < .001$; set 4, $r(6) = .97$, $p < .001$; and set 5, $r(6) = .96$, $p < .001$. All of these correlations are equal to or higher than those found with the undergraduate subjects.

5. The mean value presented here and in the subsequent analyses is the grand mean, including both phases 5 and 8. As we note below, phase did not significantly affect the scale values. Inconsistencies with Table 1 result from rounding errors.

6. It is conceivable that the vignettes or scenario stimulated prior knowledge, understanding, or memories of peace-war dynamics that overrode personality. This seems to have occurred for subjects specifically reminded of the Falklands-Malvinas crisis. For other subjects, there is no evidence that supplemental cognitive effects existed, unless they were strongly linked with personality to begin with. The lack of effects connected with our political-knowledge test reinforces this inference.

## References

Alker, Hayward R., Jr., James P. Bennett, and Dwain Mefford. 1979. *Generalized Precedent Logics for Resolving Security Dilemmas.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Center for International Studies.

Anderson, John R. 1980. *Cognitive Psychology and Its Implications.* San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

Anderson, John R. 1983. A Spreading Activation Theory of Memory. *Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior* 22:261–95.

Anderson, Richard C., and James W. Pichert. 1978. Recall of Previously Unrecallable Information Following a Shift in Perspective. *Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior* 17:1–12.

Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation.* New York: Basic Books.

Azar, Edward E. 1980. The Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) Project. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 24(1): 143–52.

Azar, Edward E., and Thomas N. Havener. 1976. Discontinuities in the Symbolic Environment: A Problem in Scaling. *International Interactions* 2: 231–46.

Bargh, John A., Ronald N. Bond, Wendy J. Lombardi, and Mary E. Tota. 1986. The Additive Nature of Chronic and Temporary Sources of Construct Accessibility. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 50:869–78.

Bargh, John A., and Paula Pietromonaco. 1982. Automatic Information Processing and Social Perception: The Influence of Trait Information Presented outside of Conscious Awareness on Impression Formation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 43:437–49.

Bordin, Jeffrey T. 1986. The Effects of Irrelevant Imagery and Historical Lessons Experienced during Young Adulthood on Present-Day Decision-Making. Paper presented at the ninth annual scientific meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Amsterdam.

Bosman, J. 1986. Political Metaphors. In *Political Psychology in the Netherlands: The Nijmegen Papers,* ed. Marten Brouwer, Jaap van Ginneken, Louk Hagendoorn, and Jos Meloen. Nijmegan, Netherlands: University of Nijmegen.

Cartwright, Desmond S. 1974. *Introduction to Personality.* Chicago: Rand McNally.

Dierks, Jack C. 1970. *A Leap to Arms: The Cuban Campaign of 1898.* Philadelphia: Lippincott.

Etheredge, Lloyd S. 1978. Personality Effects on American Foreign Policy, 1898–1968: A Test of Interpersonal Generalization Theory. *American Political Science Review* 72:434–51.

Gilovich, Thomas. 1981. Seeing the Past in the

Present: The Effect of Associations to Familiar Events on Judgments and Decisions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 40:797–808.

Glenberg, Arthur M., Margaret M. Bradley, Thomas A. Kraus, and Gary J. Renzaglia. 1983. Studies of the Long-Term Recency Effect: Support for a Contextually Guided Retrieval Hypothesis. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition* 9: 231–55.

Higgins, E. Tory, and Gillian King. 1981. Accessibility of Social Constructs: Information Processing Consequences of Individual and Contextual Variability. In *Personality, Cognition, and Social Interaction*, ed. Nancy Cantor and John F. Kihlstrom. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Higgins, E. Tory, Gillian King, and Gregory H. Mavin. 1982. Individual Construct Accessibility and Subjective Impressions and Recall. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 43:35–47.

Institute for Personality and Ability Testing. 1979. *Administrator's Manual for the 16 PF.* Champaign, IL: author.

Johnson-Laird, Philip N. 1983. *Mental Models.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1979. Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision and Risk. *Econometrica* 47:263–91.

May, Ernest R. 1973. *"Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Neustadt, Richard E., and Ernest R. May. 1986. *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers.* New York: Free Press.

Read, Stephen J. 1984. Analogical Reasoning in Social Judgment: The Importance of Causal Theories. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 46:14–25.

Roediger, Henry L. 1980. Memory Metaphors in Cognitive Psychology. *Memory & Cognition* 8: 231–46.

Ruben, Brent D., ed. 1986. *Information and Behavior.* Vol. 1. New Brunswick: Transaction Books.

Spanier, John. 1975. *Games Nations Play: Analyzing International Politics.* 2d ed. New York: Praeger.

Thomas, Dan, and Lee Sigelman. 1984. Presidential Identification and Policy Leadership: Experimental Evidence on the Reagan Case. *Policy Studies Journal* 12(4): 663–75.

Waterman, Donald A., and Frederick Hayes-Roth, eds. 1978. *Pattern-Directed Inference Systems.* New York: Academic.

Ziegler, David W. 1977. *War, Peace, and International Politics.* Boston: Little, Brown.

Francis A. Beer is Professor of Political Science, Alice F. Healy is Professor of Psychology, Grant P. Sinclair is a Graduate Fellow in Psychology, and Lyle E. Bourne, Jr. is Chairman and Professor of Psychology, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309.

# CRISIS BARGAINING, ESCALATION, AND MAD

ROBERT POWELL
*University of Michigan*
*and*
*Harvard University*

*Although incomplete information is recognized to be an essential feature of crises, game-theoretic formulations have not generally modeled this explicitly. This paper models a mutually assured destruction (MAD) crisis as a game of sequential bargaining with incomplete information, sufficiently simple that its equibria may be found. These provide better game-theoretic foundations for the notions of* resolve *and* critical risk *and their role in crises and also make it possible to compare the bargaining dynamics of this model with those of descriptively richer, but incompletely specified models, revealing several inconsistencies: several analyses of MAD conclude that the state with the greatest resolve in this contest of resolve will prevail. Many models based on critical risks suggest that a state is less likely to escalate, the greater its adversary's resolve. In our model, however, the state with the weakest resolve sometimes prevails, and some states prove* more *likely to escalate if their adversaries' resolve is greater.*

Those who have used game-theoretic formulations of varying degrees of rigor to study international crises and nuclear deterrence theory have generally viewed crises and escalation as a bargaining process in which uncertainty and the lack of complete information play an essential role (Brams 1985, 34; Brams and Kilgour 1985, 128; Ellsberg 1959; Jervis 1972, 1978; Schelling 1960, 187–203; Schelling 1966, 92–125; Snyder 1971, 1972; Snyder and Diesing 1977; Wagner 1982, 1983). But despite its recognized importance, the formal games underlying these analyses do not model incomplete information explicitly. To the extent that they are well defined, these games have been ones of complete, not incomplete information.

This essay extends previous studies of international crises and nuclear-deterrence theory by explicitly formalizing the lack of complete information. A mutually assured destruction (MAD) crisis is modeled as a game of sequential bargaining with incomplete information. The game is sufficiently simple that its equilibria may be found, and this makes it possible to begin to analyze the bargaining and escalatory dynamics of this crisis within a well-defined game. This analysis furthers two ends. The first is to provide more secure game-theoretic foundations for the concepts of *resolve* and *critical risk* and the part they play in crises. These concepts are defined precisely in the game presented below, and the game's equilibria clarify their role in the crisis. The second end is to compare the escalatory dynamics described by the equilibria with the dynamics inferred from other less formal or more historically oriented studies of bargaining and escalation. The comparison reveals

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
VOL. 81 NO. 3 SEPTEMBER 1987

several points of agreement and some troubling inconsistencies. The model, for example, agrees with Jervis (1972, 1976, 1978), Snyder (1971, 1972), Snyder and Diesing (1977), and Wagner (1982, 1983) in that the uncertainty created by incomplete information is an important cause of crisis and war. If there were complete information in the model, there would be no crisis and no danger of escalation. As for the inconsistencies, models based on critical risks suggest that the greater an adversary's resolve, the less likely a state is to escalate (Ellsberg 1959; Jervis 1972, 1978; Snyder 1971, 1972; Snyder and Diesing 1977). And many analyses of MAD see crises as a competition in taking risks (Jervis 1979a, 1979b, 1984; Schelling 1960, 1962, 1966; Snyder and Diesing 1977; Waltz 1983). In these crises, "the state that is willing to run the greatest risks [i.e., the state with the greatest resolve] will prevail" (Jervis 1979b, 631). In the model developed below, some states are more likely to escalate when facing an adversary with greater resolve. Moreover, the state with the least resolve may sometimes prevail. Bluffing sometimes succeeds.

The analysis begins by identifying some of the essential elements of a MAD crisis, which will subsequently be modeled. There follows a brief review of some existing models of MAD and deterrence. This review describes some of the central issues that these models have tried to explain and some of the theoretical difficulties they have encountered. The essential elements of a MAD crisis are then incorporated in a game with complete information. Although the emphasis of this essay is on bargaining with incomplete information, analyzing the complete-information version of the game will help to clarify and overcome some theoretical difficulties. Despite solving many theoretical problems, there are, ironically, no crises in the game with complete information. Crises require incomplete information. Incomplete information is then included in the game and the equilibria are found and discussed.

## Some Essential Elements of MAD

In the arcane lexicon of nuclear strategy, *MAD* has many meanings. It denotes a technological state of affairs in which at least two states have secure second-strike forces. It also denotes any one of a number of distinct strategies with which a state may try to cope with this state of affairs. This essay focuses on a crisis in which the states have second-strike forces and in which each state seeks to further its ends through a strategy based on what Schelling (1960, 1962, 1966) has called "threats that leave something to chance."

The strategy-that-leaves-something-to-chance is a direct descendant of the doctrine of massive retaliation. The sanction in both is that the crisis will end in an unlimited nuclear exchange between the superpowers. As Jervis puts it, the proponents of MAD "believe that any nuclear war will be all-out" (1979b, 617).

What distinguishes the strategy-that-leaves-something-to-chance from the doctrine of massive retaliation is the particular way in which this strategy seeks to overcome the doctrine's incredibility. Once the United States was perceived to be vulnerable to a Soviet nuclear retaliation, the doctrine of massive retaliation became incredible even if used only to try to protect vital U.S. interests like Western Europe. If the Soviets could reply with a devastating nuclear counterattack, the cost to the United States of carrying out its threat seemed to be greater than the cost of letting the Soviets have their way. When MAD is the technological state of affairs, the doctrine of massive retaliation is inherently incredible.

Schelling (1960, 1962, 1966) tried to solve the credibility problem through "threats that leave something to chance."

He agreed that once MAD had become the technological state of affairs, the cost of imposing the sanction of an unlimited nuclear attack was greater than the cost of not imposing it. Accordingly, a state could not credibly threaten to impose the sanction deliberately. But, a state might be able to take steps that created a risk that the crisis might somehow "go out of control" and escalate to an unlimited nuclear exchange. Because no step was certain to lead to this outcome and only created a risk of it, the expected cost of taking such a step would be less than the expected cost of deliberately imposing the sanction. More importantly, if a state's stakes in the crisis were large and the risk small enough, then the expected cost of taking the step might be less than the expected cost of giving in to an adversary's demands. Thus a state might credibly threaten to take such a step.

Moreover, generating varying risks of disaster might provide a state with a means of exerting coercive pressure on its adversary. By raising the risk of an unlimited nuclear exchange, a state also raises the expected cost to its adversary of continuing the crisis. Indeed, a state might be able to force its adversary into submission by making it believe that the expected cost of continuing was greater than the cost of submitting.

Schelling (1960, 118; Schelling 1966, 92–125) and others (e.g., Snyder and Diesing 1977, 209–43) realized that the credibility of threats-that-leave-something-to-chance depends on the existence of a certain type of risk. Because engaging in an unlimited nuclear exchange is assumed to be the worst possible outcome, no rational actor would knowingly trigger this exchange. But deterrence in the strategy-that-leaves-something-to-chance rests on the possibility of a crisis ending in this way. Accordingly, there must be what Snyder and Diesing call an "autonomous" risk of this outcome (1977, 210) That is, there must be some chance that the crisis will end in an unlimited nuclear exchange despite every actor's unwillingness to initiate it. It must be possible for this exchange to result directly from something beyond the actors' control, such as a technical failure or an unauthorized act. The risk of this exchange "must come from somewhere outside the threatener's control. . . . [I]t is an ingredient in the situation that neither we nor the party we threaten can entirely control" (Schelling 1960, 118). If there were no risk of the crisis "going out of control" in this way, there would be no danger of the crisis ending in an unlimited nuclear exchange because there would be nothing for the threats-that-leave-something-to-chance to leave to chance (Powell 1985, 83–86).

The last essential element to be examined is the meaning of credibility. The problem of credibility arises because the strategy-that-leaves-something-to-chance relies on the sanction of an unlimited nuclear exchange. The credibility of threats to impose this sanction in turn requires that states be able to manipulate an autonomous risk of this outcome. But precisely what makes a threat credible? The criterion suggested by the evolution of nuclear doctrine and the one assumed in this essay is that a threat is credible if the decision to carry it out is rational. And a decision to implement a threat is rational if, at the same time the decision is made, the expected cost of implementing the threat is less than the expected cost of not doing so.

This criterion accounts for the incredibility of the threat in the doctrine of massive retaliation. It might be perfectly rational to *say* that one would retaliate massively in response to a limited provocation. But when, after a limited provocation, the decision of whether or not to retaliate massively actually has to be made, the expected cost of acquiescing would be less than the expected cost of carrying out the threat. Thus, the decision

**Figure 1. MAD as Two-by-Two Chicken**

|  |  | II |  |
|---|---|---|---|
|  |  | Stand Firm | Submit |
| I | Stand Firm | $d_I, d_{II}$ | $w_I, s_{II}$ |
|  | Submit | $s_I, w_{II}$ | $c_I, c_{II}$ |

to carry out the threat would be irrational and the earlier threat to do so incredible. This criterion of credibility also explains the motivations for Schelling's threats-that-leave-something-to-chance and how they solve the credibility problem. The expected cost of taking a step-that-leaves-something-to-chance varies with the level of the autonomous risk that taking the step creates. If, therefore, the risk is sufficiently small, the expected cost of taking the step may be less than the expected cost of submitting.[1]

The image of crisis reflected in the strategy-that-leaves-something-to-chance is that of a competition in taking risks (Jervis 1979a, 1979b, 1984; Schelling 1960, 1962, 1966). Because both states can destroy each other even after absorbing a first strike, relative military strength does not matter. Crises are no longer a contest of military strength but of resolve, where resolve is defined as a willingness to run the risk of an unlimited nuclear war. During the crisis each state attempts to coerce its adversary into submission by manipulating this risk. By taking steps-that-leave-something-to-chance such as imposing a blockade, committing troops, or engaging in limited demonstrations, a state hopes to raise the risk to a level that its adversary finds intolerable or to convince its adversary that the risk will be raised to this level. In this way, "the state that is willing to run the greatest risks will prevail" (Jervis 1979b, 631).

## A Review of Some Existing Models of MAD and Deterrence

The game of chicken has been used more or less formally in many analyses of MAD and deterrence (e.g., Brams 1985; Brams and Kilgour 1985; Jervis 1972, 1976, 1979a; Schelling 1966; Snyder 1971; Snyder and Diesing 1977). The simplest form of chicken, which is a two-by-two game, has often been used as a point of departure. This game is shown in Figure 1. There are two actors, *I* and *II*, which are usually taken to be states. Each must choose between standing firm and submitting. If both stand firm, the crisis ends in disaster. If one stands firm and the other submits, the former prevails. If both submit, the crisis ends in compromise. Letting $w$, $s$, $c$, and $d$ denote the payoffs to prevailing, losing, mutual compromise, and disaster respectively, the payoffs satisfy the relations $w_I > c_I > s_I > d_I$ and $w_{II} > c_{II} > s_{II} > d_{II}$.

These relations are intended to capture the dilemma created by second-strike forces.[2] Prevailing is still better than losing. But unlike the era before the development of second-strike capabilities, when standing firm might still be preferred to submission even if one's adversary also stands firm, the dilemma created by second-strike forces is that submission is now preferred to standing firm if one's adversary stands firm.

The game in Figure 1 has two equilibria in pure strategies. In the first, *I* stands firm and *II* submits. In the second, *II* stands firm and *I* submits. These equilibria are unaffected by changes in the payoffs so long as the payoffs continue to satisfy the preceding relations. For example, as long as $w > c > s > d$, $I$'s standing firm and $II$'s submission remains an equilibrium even if the payoff to the "cooperative" outcome is only slightly worse than the payoff to prevailing.

The insensitivity of these equilibria to changes in the payoffs is troubling. Intuitively, it would seem that the level of a state's resolve[2] in a crisis should be affected by these payoffs and that changes in a state's resolve would be reflected in the outcome of the crisis. Yet, if these equilibria are taken to represent the potential outcomes of the crisis, then resolve has no role. The balance of resolve plays no part in affecting the outcome of a crisis. Worse, there is no way to decide which equilibrium ought to be taken to represent the outcome of the crisis.

The introduction of critical risks may be seen as an attempt to bring resolve into the game. A state's critical risk is generally described as the greatest risk of an adversary's standing firm that a state would be willing to accept. This notion has been formalized in several ways. Jervis (1972), for example, defines it, in terms of the game in Figure 1, as the probability of an adversary's standing firm that leaves a state indifferent to standing firm and submitting. Letting $r_I$ be $I$'s critical risk, it makes the expected return to standing firm, $r_I d_I + (1 - r_I)w_I$, equal to the expected cost of submission, $r_I s_I + (1 - r_I)c_I$, and is given by $r_I = (w_I - c_I)/[(w_I - c_I) + (s_I - d_I)]$. The states' critical risks clearly depend on their payoffs. Thus, if the game's outcomes can be related to these critical risks, then the outcome will be sensitive to the states' payoffs. Jervis argues that if a state believes that the probability of an adversary's standing firm is less than the state's critical risk, then the state will stand firm. Accordingly, the greater a state's critical risk, which is taken as a measure of its resolve, the more likely a state is to stand firm (Jervis 1972).

Jervis's formulation does bring the states' payoffs and their levels of resolve back into the model. Indeed, if his decision rule is applied to the game in Figure 1, in which there is complete information and, therefore, each state knows both states' critical risks, then, following Jervis's rule, the state with the greatest critical risk will stand firm and its adversary will submit. The balance of resolve will have determined which state prevails. Jervis, however, relaxes the assumption of complete information. In fact, a fundamental assumption in his discussion of the bargaining process is that each state is uncertain of the other's resolve. Unfortunately, this type of uncertainty is not present in the game in Figure 1, and its absence seriously weakens the game-theoretic foundations underlying his discussion of crisis bargaining.

Snyder (1971, 1972) and Snyder and Diesing (1977) formalize the notion of critical risk differently. They assume that if a state submits, it can be certain of obtaining the payoff to losing, $s$. Thus, $I$'s critical risk is the probability of $II$'s standing firm that leaves $I$ indifferent to standing firm, which has an expected payoff of $r_I d_I + (1 - r_I)w_I$ and to submitting with its certain payoff of $s_I$. Hence, $r_I = (w_I - s_I)/(w_I - d_I)$. As Snyder and Diesing realize, this formulation is inconsistent with the game in Figure 1 in at least two important ways. First, the states in this game must choose their strategies independently. This means that even if $I$ submits, it cannot secure $s_I$ with certainty. Its expected payoff is $rs_I + (1 - r)c_I$, not $s_I$, where $r$ is the probability that $II$ will stand firm. The game Snyder and Diesing have in mind is a sequential game in which a state does not commit itself to a strategy independently of what its adversary does. "Our players move in sequence; thus the second player's choice is taken in full knowledge of what the first has already chosen" (1977, 44). But as Wagner (1982) has emphasized, sequential play is not present in the formal models that they analyze, and this has important consequences.

Wagner (1982) also notes that Jervis's and Snyder and Diesing's formulations of a state's critical risk are inconsistent. Some algebra shows that Snyder and Diesing's measure is always greater than Jervis's. Consequently, a state's belief about the probability of its adversary's standing firm may be between these two measures. When this happens, a state will stand firm in Snyder and Diesing's model and submit in Jervis's.

The second aspect in which Snyder and Diesing's formulation is inconsistent with the two-by-two game of chicken is the assumption of complete information. Like Jervis, uncertainty about the opponent is crucial to their analysis. "A central assumption of the model is that, although each party knows its payoffs, it does not know its opponent's" (1977, 46). Yet, in none of the well-defined games they discuss is incomplete information modeled explicitly. The absence of incomplete information, as well as that of sequential play, weakens the game-theoretic foundations of Snyder and Diesing's examination of crises.

More recently, Brams (1985) and Wagner (1982) have extended the analysis of deterrence theory and MAD by considering extensive games that explicitly describe the sequence of play. Brams allows states to precommit themselves to particular strategies and thereby to carry out threats when the decision to do so is irrational (1985, 18, 35). As Brams realizes, the solutions to his games do not satisfy the credibility criterion described above. But he suggests that the strategies in his games may still be credible because there is always an autonomous risk that these strategies will lead to disaster. There is, however, no autonomous risk in his models and no way for the states in them to take this risk explicitly into account when formulating their strategies. Moreover, both Brams (1985, 22, 34, 44) and Wagner (1982, 345) recognize the importance of incomplete information and want to allow for it. Yet, incomplete information is not explicitly modeled in their games.

The ranking of the outcomes in the two-by-two game of chicken seems appropriate in that it captures the dilemma created by second-strike capabilities.[3] But despite the appropriate ranking of these three outcomes, the fact that the game's equilibriums in pure strategies are unaffected by changes in the states' payoffs is troubling.[4] Somehow the balance of the states' resolve, that is, their relative willingness to run the risk of disaster, ought to influence, if not completely determine, which state prevails. Furthermore, a state's resolve should depend at least in part on its payoffs. Finally, this review also suggests that the game-theoretic foundations of these conclusions are problematic.

## The Game with Complete Information

The essence of the strategy-that-leaves-something-to-chance is that during a crisis each state attempts to coerce its adversary into submission by manipulating an autonomous risk of disaster. This section tries to capture this in a game of complete information that is sufficiently simple that its equilibria may be found. The section also compares this game to critical risk and two-by-two chicken models of deterrence. The comparison shows that treating crises formally as a sequential process yields many of the conclusions suggested by these models in a way that avoids many of the theoretical difficulties that rigorous formulations based on the models have encountered.

**Figure 2. The Game with Complete Information**



The game with complete information is illustrated in Figure 2. Again, there are two states, *I* and *II*. The game begins with *I*'s having to decide whether to exploit an opportunity or not, *E* and ~*E*, or to launch a massive nuclear attack, *A*. If *I* does not exploit the situation, the game ends with the status quo payoffs of $(q_I, q_{II})$. Attacking ends the game in disaster with payoffs $(d_I, d_{II})$. If *I* exploits, then *II* must choose among the options of submitting, continuing the crisis, or launching a massive attack, *S*, *E*, and *A*. If *II* submits, the game ends with *I*'s prevaling and the state's receiving $(w_I, s_{II})$. If *II* attacks, the game again ends in disaster with $(d_I, d_{II})$. If *II* continues, it does so by deciding to generate an autonomous risk *f* that the crisis will "go out of control" at this point and end in disaster. The autonomous risk is modeled as a move by Nature. That is, if the game continues with *II*'s decision to escalate, Nature moves next and plays disaster with probability *f*. If there is a disaster, it, as always, yields $(d_I, d_{II})$. If there is no disaster, the onus of escalation shifts to *I*. It must select among submitting, escalating, or attacking. Submission ends the game with $(s_I, w_{II})$, and attacking ends the game with $(d_I, d_{II})$. If *I* escalates, then by assumption it can do so only by bidding up the risk of disaster by the increment *f*. The autonomous risk that *I* creates if it escalates at this point is 2*f*. If *I* does escalate, Nature then moves by playing disaster with probability 2*f*. If disaster is avoided, the onus of escalation shifts back to *II*, which now must generate an autonomous risk of 3*f* if it chooses to escalate. The game continues in this way until one state submits or launches an attack or until there is a disaster.

The game can end in one of four ways, $(q_I, q_{II})$, $(w_I, s_{II})$, $(s_I, w_{II})$, or $(d_I, d_{II})$. Because prevailing is better than submitting, and submitting is better than disaster, $w_I > s_I > d_I$ and $w_{II} > s_{II} > d_{II}$. Because the status quo is also better than submitting, $q_I > s_I$ and $q_{II} > s_{II}$. For *I*, it must also be that prevailing is better than the status quo: $w_I > q_I$. Otherwise, *I* could obtain its highest payoff at its first move by not exploiting the situation, and there would be no crisis. Hence, $w_I > q_I > s_I > d_I$. The relation between $q_{II}$ and *II*'s other payoffs is ambiguous but also inconsequential because by the time *II* has to make its first decision, $q_{II}$ is already in the past.

The risks escalation creates in the crisis follow the pattern *f*, 2*f*, 3*f*, . . . *Kf*, where $Kf = 1$ and, for convenience, *K* is taken to be an integer. If *K* is even, *I* has the last move in the game because to escalate for the *K*/2 time, it must generate a probability of disaster equal to one. If *K* is odd, *II*'s $(K + 1)/2$ move is the last possible move. Although some analyses (e.g., Schelling 1966; Snyder and Diesing 1977;

Wagner 1982) have discussed the bargaining disadvantage that accrues to the side with the last possible chance to avoid disaster, who actually has the last physical move in the game tree has no affect on the solution to this game, as will be shown. For now, $K$ is merely assumed to be even.

An obvious generalization of this game would be to permit the states to continue the crisis by letting them generate any level of autonomous risk they wish instead of restricting them to continuing in only one way, namely, to bid up the risk in increments of $f$. This generalization would allow states to move up the escalation ladder by increasing the risk and to move down the ladder by decreasing the risk. Unfortunately, expanding the strategy space in this way makes the game immensely more complicated.

It will prove convenient to adopt the following notation for labeling the states' information sets, which, in this game of complete information, are singletons. Let $\Theta_{II}(n)$ be the information set at which *II* must decide whether or not to escalate for the *n*th time where $1 \leqslant n \leqslant K/2$. Thus, $\Theta_{II}(n)$ presents *II* with the choice of submitting, attacking, or escalating by creating an autonomous risk of $(2n - 1)f$. (Recall that because the onus of escalation shifts back and forth, *II* only makes bids of odd multiples of $f$.) Similarly, $\Theta_I(n)$ for $1 \leqslant n \leqslant K/2$ is the information set at which *I* must decide to submit, attack, or escalate with a probability of disaster of $2nf$. $\Theta_I(0)$ is the information set at which *I* has to choose among attacking, exploiting the situation, or not exploiting it.

At each information set $\Theta_I(n)$ and $\Theta_{II}(n)$ for $1 \leqslant n \leqslant K/2$, a state has a choice among the three alternatives of submitting, attacking, or escalating. Accordingly, a behavioral strategy for *I* at any information set $\Theta_I(n)$ for $1 \leqslant n \leqslant K/2$ may be described by the probability of attacking at that set, $a_I(n)$, and the probability of escalating, $e_I(n)$. For $n = 0$, *I* may attack with probability $a_I(0)$, exploit the situation with probability $e_I(0)$, or not exploit the situation. The probability of submission for $1 \leqslant n \leqslant K/2$ and of not exploiting the situation for $n = 0$ is given by $1 - a_I(n) - e_I(n)$. A behavioral strategy for *II* at any information set $\Theta_{II}(n)$ for $1 \leqslant n \leqslant K/2$ may be described by the probability of attacking, $a_{II}(n)$, and the probability of escalating, $e_{II}(n)$.

The notion of a "crisis equilibrium" will play an important role in the analysis of the game with both complete and incomplete information. For Snyder and Diesing, "there is no crisis unless one state challenges another and this challenge is resisted" (1977, 13). Formalizing this, a crisis equilibrium in the game will be taken to be an equilibrium in which there is some positive probability of *I*'s exploiting the situation at $\Theta_I(0)$ and some positive probability of *II*'s escalating or attacking at $\Theta_{II}(1)$. The positive probability of *I*'s exploiting the situation at $\Theta_I(0)$ means that in a crisis equilibrium there is some chance of *I*'s challenging *II*. Similarly, the positive probability of *II*'s escalating or attacking at $\Theta_{II}(1)$ implies that there is some chance that a challenge will be resisted. Crisis equilibria are the only equilibria of this game in which there is a positive probability of a challenge leading to disaster. This is also in keeping with Schelling (1966, 92–105) and Snyder and Diesing (1977, 6–21), who believe that there must be some risk of war for there to be a crisis.

Finally, the credibility criterion discussed above will be formalized by requiring the game's equilibria to be sequential. That is, starting from any place in the game tree, a state's equilibrium strategy is an optimal strategy for the rest of the game, given the state's information and beliefs at that point in the game and given the strategy of the other state. In a sequential equilibrium, a state cannot improve its payoff by deviating from its equilibrium strategy anywhere in the game, given its beliefs about where it is in the game.[5] Sequential equilibria thus require a state to decide to act in a way that minimizes its expected cost when it must actually make the decision, given its information and beliefs at that time. Accordingly, a state can never act "irrationally," and this seems to capture the essence of the credibility criterion.[6]

One might object that requiring the states' strategies to be sequentially rational and then relying on Nature to impose the irrational sanction does not really solve the credibility problem. I agree with this criticism. But it is important to realize that this is not so much a criticism of the model as it is a fundamental criticism of the way that the strategy-that-leaves-something-to-chance has attempted to overcome the credibility problem. The model only exposes this weakness.

The analysis of the extensive game begins by recalling that the two-by-two chicken models had two Nash equilibria in pure strategies in which one or the other state stood firm while its adversary submitted. These equilibria were insensitive to changes in the payoffs, and this seemed to leave no role for resolve to play. The obvious analogy in the game in Figure 2 to the strategy of standing firm in the two-by-two game of chicken is the strategy of always escalating. That is, a state escalates at every one of its information sets regardless of what the other state does. The equally obvious analogy to submitting is for a state to end the crisis by submitting at the first opportunity it has. For *I*, this occurs at $\Theta_I(0)$ when it can decide not to exploit the situation. The earliest time that *II* can submit is at $\Theta_{II}(1)$.

Given these definitions of standing firm and submitting, the combination of them is a Nash equilibrium in the extensive game. If *I* stands firm by always escalating, that is, $e_I(n) = 1$ for $0 \leqslant n \leqslant K/2$, *II* can never prevail. The best it can do is avoid running any risk of disaster by submitting at $\Theta_{II}(1)$ and obtaining $s_{II}$. Given *II*'s strategy of submitting at $\Theta_{II}(1)$, *I* can do no better than standing firm, which offers a payoff of $w_I$. Neither state can gain from deviating from its strategy, given the strategy of the other. A similar argument shows that *I*'s submitting at $\Theta_I(0)$ and *II*'s standing firm is also a Nash equilibrium.

These two equilibria, like their analogues in the two-by-two game, are insensitive to changes in the states' payoffs as long as $w_I > q_I > s_I > d_I$ and $w_{II} > s_{II} > d_{II}$. The balance of resolve does not affect them. So far, resolve plays no part in this model either, but, as will be seen, there is also something wrong with these equilibria. They are not sequential and, accordingly, are incredible. However, when the game is solved for its sequential equilibria, resolve begins to play a role. Indeed, the state with the greatest resolve prevails.

To demonstrate this, *resolve* must finally be defined. Recall that resolve in the critical-risk models is the greatest risk of disaster that a state is willing to run. But the greatest risk that a state is willing to run at any point in the crisis would seem likely to vary during the crisis depending on what the state believes about its adversary's willingness to run risks.[7] Nevertheless, it is possible to specify a simple upper bound on the risk of disaster a state is willing to run. A state's resolve, *R*, is the probability of disaster that makes it indifferent between the payoffs of submitting and of escalating, given that the state believes its adversary is certain to submit at its next opportunity. *R* satisfies $Rd + (1 - R)w = s$ and is given by $R = (w - s)/(w - d)$, where the subscripts have been dropped because the formulae apply to both *I* and *II*. The expression for *R* is the same as that in Ellsberg 1959, Snyder 1971 and 1972, and Snyder and Diesing 1977, as one might expect because their analyses are based on sequential play. But here, *R* is only an upper bound because in general a state cannot be sure that its adversary will submit at its next opportunity, and this uncertainty reduces the expected return to escalating.

A state's resolve may be used to determine an upper bound on the number of times that a state will escalate in a crisis, and this upper bound will be crucial to finding the game's sequential equilibria. A state clearly will not escalate if to do so it must generate an autonomous risk greater than its resolve. Thus, for $I$, the greatest integer $n$ that satisfies the relation $2nf \leqslant R_I$ is an upper bound for the number of times that $I$ can rationally decide to escalate. Similarly, the largest integer satisfying $(2n - 1)f \leqslant R_{II}$ is an upper bound for $II$. Let $N_I$ and $N_{II}$ denote these upper bounds and, to avoid some technicalities, assume $2nf < R_I$ and $(2n - 1)f < R_{II}$. Then, the following proposition may be demonstrated:

PROPOSITION 1: *The extensive game with complete information has a unique sequential equilibrium. If $N_I \geqslant N_{II}$, I prevails in this equilibrium, and if $N_{II} > N_I$, II prevails in the sense that I does not exploit the situation at $\Theta_I(0)$.*

Before proving this, it is worth noting that because of the simple bidding structure of the game in which bids must be made in increments of $f$ and must alternate between $I$ and $II$, it is not quite true that the state with the greatest resolve prevails. To see this, recall that $N_I$ and $N_{II}$ must satisfy $2N_If \leqslant R_I \leqslant 2(N_I + 1)f$ and $(2N_{II} - 1)f \leqslant R_{II}$ $(2N_{II} + 1)f$. Hence, $[2(N_{II} - N_I) - 3]f \leqslant R_{II} - R_I \leqslant [2(N_{II} - N_I) - 1]f$. Now if $0 \leqslant N_{II} - N_I \leqslant 1$, both small positive and negative values of $R_{II} - R_I$ can satisfy these inequalities. Thus, because of the discrete bidding structure, if $N_I$ and $N_{II}$ are sufficiently close together, it may be the case that $R_I > R_{II}$ while $N_{II} > N_I$.

This issue may be finessed by defining the state with the greatest "effective resolve" to be the state that is willing to make the last bid. So, $I$ has the greatest effective resolve if $N_I \geqslant N_{II}$, and $II$ has the greatest effective resolve if $N_I < N_{II}$. Proposition 1 may now be rephrased to say that the game has a unique sequential equilibrium and that in it the state with the greatest effective resolve prevails.

*Proof of Proposition 1.* A sequential equilibrium is a set of beliefs and strategies that is consistent and sequentially rational. Because all of the information sets in the game are singletons, there is a unique set of consistent beliefs. Accordingly, finding the sequential equilibrium amounts to finding a strategy for each state at each of its information sets, that is, specifying $a_I(n)$ and $e_I(n)$ for $0 \leqslant n \leqslant K/2$ and $a_{II}(n)$ and $e_{II}(n)$ for $1 \leqslant n \leqslant K/2$, such that at no place in the game tree can a state gain by deviating from its strategy, given its beliefs and its adversary's strategy.

The sequential equilibrium is found through backwards induction. Assume $N_I \geqslant N_{II}$ (the proof is identical if $N_I < N_{II}$). For any information set $\Theta_I(n)$ for $N_I < n \leqslant K/2$, $I$'s unique best reply is submission: $a_I(n) = 0$ and $e_I(n) = 0$. Similarly, $II$'s unique best response at $\Theta_{II}(n)$ for $N_{II} < n \leqslant K/2$ is submission: $a_{II}(n) = 0$ and $e_{II}(n) = 0$. Given $II$'s strategy of submitting for $n > N_{II}$, $I$'s only best reply at $\Theta_I(n)$ for $N_{II} \leqslant n \leqslant N_I$ is to escalate: $e_I(n) = 1$. Given $I$'s best reply of escalating for $N_{II} \leqslant n \leqslant N_I$, $II$'s only best response at $\Theta_{II}(N_{II})$ is to submit. Given $II$'s strategy of submitting for $n \geqslant N_{II}$, $I$'s only best reply at $\Theta_I(N_{II} - 1)$ is to escalate: $e_I(N_{II} - 1) = 1$. Given $I$'s only best reply of escalating for $N_{II} - 1 \leqslant n \leqslant N_I$, $II$'s only best reply at $\Theta_{II}(N_{II} - 1)$ is to submit. This process eventually yields a combination of strategies in which $I$ escalates with probability one for $0 \leqslant n \leqslant N_I$ and submits with probability one for $N_I < n \leqslant K/2$ and in which $II$, foreseeing that $I$ is willing to escalate to higher levels than $II$, submits with probability one for $1 \leqslant n \leqslant N_{II}$. Because all of the best replies are unique and there is only one set of consistent beliefs, this combination of strategies is also the unique sequential equilibrium. QED[8]

Thus, modeling the autonomous risks of disaster generated by escalation explicitly as Nature's moves and requiring equilibria to be sequential in a well-defined game yields many of the conclusions suggested by previous analyses of MAD and deterrence. First, note that in the equilibrium strategies, no state gives a positive probability to launching a massive nuclear attack: $a_I(m) = 0$ and $a_I(n) = 0$ for all $m$ and $n$. No state ever deliberately attacks. Moreover, the sequential equilibrium depends on the states' payoffs. Indeed, the game is a contest of resolve in which the state with the greatest effective resolve prevails.

There is, however, a problem with the game as it has been developed so far. There are no sequential equilibria that are also crisis equilibria. If the balance of effective resolve favors *I*, then in the sequential equilibrium, *II* does not resist *I*'s challenge and there is no crisis. If the balance favors *II*, *I* never challenges *II*, and there is no crisis. On reflection, the lack of any crisis is hardly surprising. If a crisis is truly a bargaining process, then there must be something to bargain about and something to be communicated. But in a game with complete information, there is by definition no private information. Each state knows what the other state knows, and there is nothing to be communicated. As has so often been recognized, crises require incomplete information.

## The Game with Incomplete Information

The game with incomplete information is illustrated in Figure 3. To simplify matters, there is only one-sided incomplete information: only *I* is uncertain of the type of adversary that it is facing. *I*'s adversary is certain that it is facing *I*. Although *I* is uncertain of the type of its adversary, there are only two possibilities. *I* is either facing an irresolute adversary denoted by *II* or a resolute adversary *II'*. Moreover, *I* believes that it is facing the irresolute adversary with probability $p$ and the resolute adversary with probability $(1 - p)$ where $p$ is common knowledge.

*I*'s uncertainty about the type of the adversary it is facing is modeled by letting Nature start the game by choosing the type of adversary *I* will face and by assuming that *I* does not know the actual type that Nature selects. After Nature's initial move, the order of play, the alternatives open to the two states at each move, and the simplified escalatory process in which the autonomous risk must be increased in increments of $f$ are the same as in the game with complete information. The only difference between the games of complete and incomplete information is that when *I* decides what to do with incomplete information, *I* does not know whether it is facing *II* or *II'*.

The levels of resolve of all three types of states differ. Indeed, this is the only characteristic that distinguishes the irresolute from the resolute adversary. Assume that *I* is willing to escalate, at most, once: $N_I = 1$. Recalling that $R_I$ and $N_I$ are related as $2N_I f < R_I < 2(N_I + 1)f$, $N_I = 1$ implies $2f < R_I < 4f$. Also assume that the irresolute adversary is willing to escalate, at most, once, and the resolute adversary is willing to escalate, at most, twice. That is, $N_{II} = 1$ and $N_{II'} = 2$. $N_{II} = 1$ implies $f < R_{II} < 3f$, and $N_{II'} = 2$ means $3f < R_{II'} < 5f$.

Uncertain of the resolve of its adversary, *I* faces a dilemma. If *I* were certain it was facing an irresolute adversary, then by Proposition 1 and the fact that $N_I \geqslant N_{II}$, *I* would prevail. But if *I* were certain

Figure 3. The Game with Incomplete Information



that it was facing a resolute adversary, it would not challenge *II′*. *I*'s behavior in this situation depends on its initial belief that it is facing *II*, that is, on the value of *p*, and on what it may learn about the type of its adversary from its behavior in the crisis. The sequential equilibria of the game formalize this dependence.[9]

PROPOSITION 2. *If the incomplete-information game has a sequential crisis equilibrium, then the strategies are given by*

$a_I(n) = a_{II}(n) = a_{II'}(n) = 0$ *for all n*

$e^*_I(0) > 0$

$e^*_I(1) = [R_{II} - f]/(1 - f)\,[(1 - 2f)\,R_{II} + 2f]$

$e^*_I(n) = 0$ *for* $n > 1$

$e^*_{II}(1) = [\beta^*(1 - p)]/p(1 - \beta^*)$
*where* $\beta^* = [1 - (1 - 2f)\,(1 - 3f)]\,[1 - R_I]/(1 - 2f)\,[(1 - 3f)R_I + 3f]$

$e^*_{II}(n) = 0$ *for* $n > 1$

$e^*_{II'}(n) = 1$ *for* $n \leqslant N_{II'}$

$e^*_{II'}(n) = 0$ *for* $n > N_{II'}$

*And at* $\Theta_I(1)$*, I believes it is facing II with probability* $\beta^*$*. Finally, for any particular values of the payoffs, a sequential crisis equilibrium exists for some p.*

Proposition 2, a proof of which may be found in the Appendix, suggests the following description of the crisis: For there to be any chance of a challenge, $e^*_I(0) > 0$. If there is a challenge and *I* happens to be facing an irresolute adversary, then this adversary escalates with probability $e^*_{II}(1)$. If *I* is facing a resolute adversary, then *II′* escalates with probability one. If the crisis does not go out of control at this point, the onus of escalation shifts back to

*I*. *I* began the crisis believing that the probability that it was facing an irresolute adversary was $p$. *I* now reassesses its belief in light of its adversary's response to *I*'s challenge and concludes that the probability that it is facing an irresolute adversary is $\beta^*$. Given this new belief, *I* escalates with probability $e^*_I(1)$. If the crisis remains under control, *I*'s adversary must now act. If this adversary is irresolute, it finds the risk of disaster too great and submits. If, however, *I*'s adversary is resolute, then *II'* escalates with probability one and shifts the onus of escalation back to *I*. Knowing that an irresolute adversary would not have escalated, *I* concludes that it is facing a resolute adversary and submits.

## Results and Analysis

The explicit and relatively simple equilibrium strategies in Proposition 2 make it possible to compare the bargaining process they describe with the bargaining processes described in other analyses. The comparison reveals points of both agreement and disagreement.

As noted above, many analyses of crises have argued that incomplete information about an adversary plays a crucial role (e.g., Jervis 1972, 1976, 1978; Snyder 1971, 1972; Snyder and Diesing 1977; Wagner 1982, 1983). Indeed, "it is largely because of the lack of complete information that crises occur at all" (Snyder and Diesing 1977, 8). The models in this paper support this conclusion. As the proof of Proposition 1 shows, there are no sequential crisis equilibria in the game with complete information. These may exist only if there is incomplete information. Incomplete information is a prerequisite to crisis.

If there is no uncertainty, there is no crisis and no risk of disaster. How does the risk of disaster vary with the level of *I*'s uncertainty about the type of its adversary and, in particular, what level of uncertainty creates the greatest risk of disaster? The probability of disaster, $P_d$, which is the probability of reaching a node with payoffs $(d_I, d_{II})$, is given by

$$P_d = pe^*_I(0)(e^*_{II}(1)\{f + (1 - f)[e^*_{II}(1)2f]\})$$
$$+ (1 - p)e^*_I(0)(f + (1 - f)\{e^*_I(1)$$
$$[2f + (1 - 2f)3f]\})$$

Substituting the expression from Proposition 2 for $e^*_{II}(1)$ shows that $P_d$ varies linearly in $(1 - p)$ when $e^*_I(0) > 0$. When $e^*_I(0) = 0$, $P_d$ drops to zero, as there is no longer a crisis. $P_d$ is largest and the risk of disaster is greatest when $p$ is just large enough to make *I* confident enough that it is facing an irresolute adversary to exploit the situation.

The intuition behind this is that because a resolute adversary pushes harder in the crisis than an irresolute adversary, the crisis is more dangerous, the greater the chances that *I* is facing the resolute adversary, that is, the smaller $p$ is. If, however, the chances of facing a resolute adversary are too great, *I* does not exploit the situation because the status quo payoff of $q_I$ is better. The crisis is most dangerous when the prospect of facing an irresolute adversary is just good enough to induce *I* to begin the crisis by exploiting the situation.

Perhaps the most interesting conclusions suggested by Proposition 2 are those that conflict with other analyses of MAD and deterrence theory. In these analyses, MAD crises are a competition in taking risks in which the state "willing to run the greatest risks will prevail" (Jervis 1979b, 631). In this essay's formulation of a MAD crisis based on the strategy-that-leaves-something-to-chance, sometimes the state with the least resolve prevails. Sometimes bluffing succeeds.

To see this, note first that the existence of autonomous risk means that the claim that the state with the greatest resolve will prevail must be qualified. Because the autonomous risk of disaster is genuine, there is some chance that no state will prevail, regardless of which has the greatest resolve. At most, one might make the conditional claim that if one state prevails, it will be the state with the greatest resolve.

Proposition 1 might be seen to support this conditional claim. The Proposition shows that in the complete-information game, the state with the greatest effective resolve always prevails. But remember that because of complete information, there are no sequential crisis equilibria in this game. When incomplete information is included, sometimes the state with the least resolve prevails. In this incomplete-information game, the effective resolve of $I$ is greater than that of an irresolute adversary because $N_I \geqslant N_{II}$. But there is some chance that an irresolute adversary will prevail. Indeed, this chance is equal to the probability of the game's reaching an outcome with payoffs $(s_I, w_{II})$. Given that $I$, although uncertain of its adversary, is actually facing $II$, this probability is $e^*_I(0)e^*_{II}(1)\ (1 - f)\ (1 - e^*_I(1)) > 0$. Thus, in the contest of resolve, the state with the least resolve may prevail.

Many analyses based on critical risks suggest that a state is less likely to escalate the greater it perceives its adversary's resolve to be (e.g., Ellsberg 1959; Jervis 1972, 1978; Snyder 1971, 1972; Snyder and Diesing 1977). In the present game this is the case for $II$. But it is not the case for $I$. $I$ is more likely to escalate, the greater the resolve of its adversary $II$.

To understand that $II$ is less likely to escalate, the greater $I$'s resolve, consider the expression for $e^*_{II}(1)$, which is the probability that $II$ will escalate. The partial derivative of $e^*_{II}(1)$ with respect to $I$'s resolve, $R_I$, is negative. Thus, as long as $e^*_{II}(1)$ is differentiable, an increase in $R_I$ reduces $e^*_{II}(1)$. $II$ is less likely to escalate.[10]

Unlike $II$, $I$ is more likely to escalate if the resolve of its adversary is greater. The partial derivative of $e^*_I(1)$ with respect to $R_{II}$ is positive. Hence, $e^*_I(1)$ increases as $R_{II}$ increases as long as $e^*_I(1)$ is differentiable. $I$, therefore, is more likely to escalate, the greater $II$'s resolve.

The mathematics of this result is easy to see. Suppose that in the initial equilibrium, $e^*_{II}(1) < 1$. Thus, $II$ is randomizing over the alternatives of escalating and submitting at $\Theta_{II}(1)$. Randomization implies that $II$ is indifferent to submitting and to escalating. Now let $R_{II}$ increase because, say, $w_{II}$ increases. The expression for $e^*_{II}(1)$ is independent of $R_{II}$, so $e^*_{II}(1)$ remains less than 1. $II$ continues to randomize and, therefore, to be indifferent to submitting and escalating in the new equilibrium. The expected payoff to submitting is $s_{II}$ in both equilibria, so the expected payoff to escalating at $\Theta_{II}(1)$ in both equilibria must be the same. But the increase in $w_{II}$ makes the return to $I$'s submission at $\Theta_I(1)$ greater in the new equilibrium. If, therefore, the expected return to $II$ of escalating at $\Theta_{II}(1)$ is to remain the same in the two equilibria, the increased value of $I$'s submission must be offset by a lower probability of $I$'s submitting. Consequently, the probability of $I$'s escalating must increase.

The intuition behind this counterintuitive outcome begins by considering the dilemma confronting $I$. During the crisis, $I$ attempts to determine whether it is facing an irresolute or a resolute adversary by testing its adversary's resolve by forcing it to run various levels of risk. The greater the level of resolve of the irresolute adversary, the more $II$ is like $II'$. Discriminating between the two types is thus more difficult and requires a more stringent test. A more stringent test, in turn, means that $I$ must pose a greater, not a smaller, risk of disaster if $I$ is to force a more determined irresolute adversary to backdown.

An immediate corollary follows from the relation between the probability of a state's escalating and the resolve of its adversary. Differentiating the expression for $P_d$ shows that the greater the resolve of *I*, the smaller is the probability of disaster and the less dangerous the crisis. But the greater the resolve of *II*, the greater the probability of disaster and the more dangerous the crisis. Sometimes having more resolve makes disaster less likely and at other times, more likely.

## Conclusions

Many studies of bargaining and escalation have recognized the importance of incomplete information. But to the extent that these analyses have used game-theoretic models, they have not modeled the lack of complete information explicitly within a well-defined game. This essay has attempted to extend those analyses, at least in so far as they apply to a MAD crisis in which states follow the strategy-that-leaves-something-to-chance, by modeling the bargaining process in the crisis as a sequential game with incomplete information. This essay has also tried to provide more secure game-theoretic foundations for previous analyses of this type of crisis that have been based on the notions of *resolve* and *critical risk.*

The games developed here are very simple. Because the formulation is so simple, the game's sequential crisis equilibria may be characterized explicitly. This, in turn, makes it possible to compare the bargaining dynamics in this simple but well-defined game with the dynamics examined within the context of models that, although richer, tend not to be completely specified. The comparison reveals several inconsistencies.

A MAD crisis is a contest of resolve, and several analyses of MAD conclude that the state with the greatest resolve will prevail. This is not the case in the model developed in this essay. Sometimes the state with the weakest resolve prevails: sometimes bluffing succeeds. And, although many models based on critical risks suggest that a state is less likely to escalate if its adversary's resolve is perceived to be greater, this need not be the case. Some states are more likely to escalate if their adversaries' resolve is greater.

## Appendix

*Proof of Proposition* 2. Proposition 2 will be proved through backwards induction. Finding the sequential equilibria entails specifying a strategy for *I*, *II*, and *II′* at each information set $\Theta_I(m)$, $\Theta_{II}(n)$, and $\Theta_{II'}(n)$ for $0 \leqslant m \leqslant K/2$ and $1 \leqslant n \leqslant K/2$ and a set of consistent beliefs for *I* about the type of its adversary. As before, no state can attach a positive probability to attacking in equilibrium, for otherwise it would be possible for the state to improve its expected return by deviating from its strategy. Thus, $a_I(m) = 0$ for $0 \leqslant m \leqslant K/2$ and $a_{II}(n) = a_{II'}(n) = 0$ for $1 \leqslant n \leqslant K/2$. Finding the strategies in the sequential equilibria amounts to determining $e^*_I(m)$ for $0 \leqslant m \leqslant K/2$ and $e^*_{II}(n)$ and $e^*_{II}(n)$ for $1 \leqslant n \leqslant K/2$.

For any $n > N_I = 1$, *I*'s only best reply is to submit: $e^*_I(n) = 0$. For any $n > N_{II} = 1$, *II*'s only best reply is to submit: $e^*_{II}(n) = 0$. And for any $n > N_{II'} = 2$, the only best reply for *II′* is to submit: $e^*_{II'}(n) = 0$. *I*'s strategy of $e^*_I(n) = 0$ for $n > 1$ means that if *II′* escalates at $\Theta_{II'}(2)$, *II′* will have to run a risk of $3f$ of disaster. But if there is no disaster, *I* will then submit. Accordingly, the expected return to escalating at $\Theta_{II'}(2)$ is $3fd_{II'} + (1 - 3f)w_{II'}$. Recalling that $R_{II'} = (w_{II'} - s_{II'})/(w_{II'} - d_{II'})$, the assumption that $R_{II'} > 3f$ ensures that the expected value of escalation is greater than the payoff from submitting, that is, $3fd_{II'} + (1 - 3f)w_{II'} > s_{II'}$. Hence, *II′* will escalate at $\Theta_{II'}(2)$: $e^*_{II'}(2) = 1$. The only decisions that remain to be specified are those made at $\Theta_I(0)$, $\Theta_I(1)$, $\Theta_{II}(1)$, and $\Theta_{II'}(1)$.

Two observations show that in a crisis equilibrium, *II′* escalates with probability one at $\Theta_{II'}(1)$. Recall that in a crisis equilibrium there must be some chance of a challenge leading to disaster. This means that $e_I(0) > 0$ and that $e_{II}(1) > 0$ or $e_{II'}(1) > 0$ in equilibrium. The first observation is that $e_{II}(1) > 0$ in a crisis equilibrium. To see this, suppose the contrary. That is, assume $e_{II}(1) = 0$. From the definition of a crisis equilibrium, if $e_{II}(1) = 0$, then $e_{II'}(1) > 0$. But if $e_{II}(1) = 0$ and $e_{II'}(1) > 0$, then $I$ is certain that it is facing $II'$ if $I$ reaches $\Theta_I(1)$. $I$'s best reply at $\Theta_I(1)$ is, therefore, $e_I(1) = 0$. If, however, $e_I(1) = 0$, then because $I$ is certain to submit at $\Theta_I(1)$, $II$'s best response at $\Theta_{II}(1)$ is to escalate, not to submit. $II$'s best reply is $e_{II}(1) = 1$, not $e_{II}(1) = 0$. Hence, $II$'s strategy of $e_{II}(1) = 0$ is not a best reply to $I$'s unique best reply to $II$'s strategy, since $II$ can gain by deviating from its strategy if $I$'s strategy is $e_I(1) = 0$. This means that $e_{II}(1) = 0$ cannot be part of an equilibrium that is also a crisis equilibrium. Having reached a contradiction, it must be that $e_{II}(1) > 0$ in a crisis equilibrium.

The second observation is that if $e_{II}(1) > 0$ in equilibrium, then $e_{II'}(1) = 1$ in equilibrium. Informally, this merely says that if an irresolute adversary would escalate, so would a resolute adversary. More formally, let $\hat{e}_{II}$ be the value of $e_I(1)$ that leaves $II$ indifferent to escalating at $\Theta_{II}(1)$ and to submitting. Thus, $\hat{e}_{II}$ satisfies $fd_{II} + (1 - f)\{(1 - \hat{e}_{II})w_{II} + \hat{e}_{II}[2fd_{II} + (1 - 2f)s_{II}\} = s_{II}$ and is given by $\hat{e}_{II} = (R_{II} - f)/(1 - f)\ [(1 - 2f)\ R_{II} + 2f]$. Because $f < R_{II} < 3f$, $\hat{e}_{II} < 2f/(1 - f)\ [1 - (1 - 2f)\ (1 - 3f)]$. Now let $\hat{e}_{II'}$ be the value of $e_I(1)$ that leaves $II'$ indifferent to escalating at $\Theta_{II'}(1)$ and to submitting. Then, $\hat{e}_{II'}$ satisfies $fd_{II'} + (1 - f)((1 - \hat{e}_{II'})\ w_{II'} + \hat{e}_{II'}\ \{2fd_{II'} + (1 - 2f)\ [3fd_{II'} + (1 - 3f)w_{II'}]\}) = s_{II'}$ and is given by $\hat{e}_{II'} = (R_{II'} - f)/(1 - f)\ [1 - (1 - 2f)(1 - 3f)]$. Because $3f < R_{II'} < 5f$, $\hat{e}_{II'} > 2f/(1 - f)\ [1 - (1 - 2f)\ (1 - 3f)]$. Therefore, $\hat{e}_{II'} > \hat{e}_{II}$. From the definition of $\hat{e}_{II}$, $II$ can escalate in equilibrium, that is, $e_{II}(1) > 0$, only if $e_I(1) \leqslant \hat{e}_{II}$. But if $e_I(1) \leqslant \hat{e}_{II}$, then $e_I(1) < \hat{e}_{II'}$ and from the definition of $\hat{e}_{II'}$, this implies that $e_{II'}(1) = 1$.

In sum, the first observation says that $e_{II}(1) > 0$ in a crisis equilibrium. The second observation shows that if $e_{II}(1) > 0$, then $e_{II'}(1) = 1$ in equilibrium. Hence, $e^*_{II'}(1) = 1$ if a sequential crisis equilibrium exists. Only the strategies at $\Theta_I(0)$, $\Theta_I(1)$, and $\Theta_{II}(1)$ remain to be determined.

$II$'s strategy at $\Theta_{II}(1)$ depends on what $I$ does at $\Theta_I(1)$. Recall that $\hat{e}_{II}$ is the value of $e_I(1)$ that leaves $II$ indifferent to submitting and escalating at $\Theta_{II}(1)$. Thus, $II$'s best response to $e_I(1)$ is 0 if $e_I(1) > \hat{e}_{II}$; 1 if $e_I(1) < \hat{e}_{II}$; and anything in the interval $[0, 1]$ if $e_I(1) = \hat{e}_{II}$. $II$'s best-reply correspondence, $br_{II}[e_I(1)]$, is graphed in Figure 4, assuming that $e_{II'}(1) = 1$, which is true over the region $0 \leqslant e_I(1) \leqslant \min\{1, \hat{e}_{II'}\}$.

$I$'s best-reply correspondence to $e_{II}(1)$, $br_I(e_{II}(1))$, can be found by considering its payoffs to escalating and submitting at $\Theta_I(1)$. If $I$ escalates when facing $II$, it will have to hazard a $2f$ risk of disaster. But if there is no disaster, $II$ will then immediately submit. $I$'s expected payoff if it is facing $II$ is $2fd_I + (1 - 2f)w_I$. If, however, $I$ escalates when it is facing $II'$, $II'$ will escalate and, as long as there is no disaster, $I$ will then submit. In this case, the expected return to escalation is $2fd_I + (1 - 2f)\ [3fd_I + (1 - 3f)s_I]$. Thus, the expected return to escalation is $\beta[2fd_I + (1 - 2f)w_I] + (1 - \beta)\ \{2fd_I + (1 - 2f)\ [3fd_I + (1 - 3f)s_I]\}$ where $I$ believes that it is facing $II$ with probability $\beta$. Let $\beta^*$ be the belief that leaves $I$ indifferent to submitting and escalating. Then, $\beta^*$ satisfies $\beta^*[2fd_I + (1 - 2f)w_I] + (1 - \beta^*)\ \{2fd_I + (1 - 2f)\ [3fd_I + (1 - 3f)s_I]\} = s_I$ and is given by $\beta^* = [1 - (1 - 2f)\ (1 - 3f)]\ (1 - R_I)/(1 - 2f)\ [(1 - 3f)R_I + 3f]$. Algebra shows $0 < \beta^* < 1$. So, if $\beta > \beta^*$, $I$'s best reply is to escalate: $e_I(1) = 1$. If $\beta > \beta^*$, $I$'s optimal strategy is to submit: $e_I(1) = 0$. And if $\beta = \beta^*$, $I$ does not have a unique best reply and may choose any value in the interval [0, 1] for $e_I(1)$.

In a sequential equilibrium, beliefs are consistent with Bayes's rule where this rule may be applied. Thus, $\beta$ is given by the probability of $I$ facing $II$ at this information set, $pe_I(0)e_{II}(1)\ (1 - f)$, divided by the probability of reaching this information set, $pe_I(0)e_{II}(1)\ (1 - f) + (1 - p)\ e_I(0)e_{II'}(1)\ (1 - f)$. Recalling that $e_{II'}(1) = 1$ in a sequential crisis equilibrium, $\beta = pe_{II}(1)/[pe_{II}(1) + (1 - p)]$. Because $I$'s best reply is to escalate if $\beta > \beta^*$, $e_I(1) = 1$ is $I$'s best reply when $e_{II}(1) > \beta^*(1 - p)/p(1 - \beta^*)$. If $e_{II}(1) < \beta^*\ (1 - p)/p(1 - \beta^*)$, then $\beta < \beta^*$ and $e_I(1) = 0$ is $I$'s best reply. And if $\beta \doteq \beta^*$, $I$'s best reply can be any point in the interval [0, 1]. Figure A-1 also shows $I$'s best-reply correspondence.

As Figure A-1 suggests, there is a unique combination of $e_I(1)$ and $e_{II}(1)$ that is a best reply to itself when $\beta^*(1 - p)/p(1 - \beta^*) < 1$. If this condition is not satisfied, or if, equivalently, $\beta^* \geqslant p$, then, as will be seen below, there is no sequential crisis equilibrium. Accordingly, $e^*_I(1) = \hat{e}_{II}$ and $e^*_{II}(1) = \beta^*(1 - p)/p(1 - \beta^*)$ in a sequential crisis equilibrium. (Note also that because $e^*_{II}(1) > 0$, $e^*_{II}(1)$ satisfies the condition assumed above in the first observation.)

The only strategy left to be specified is $e^*_I(0)$. But by the definition of a crisis equilibrium, $e^*_I(0) > 0$. If a sequential crisis equilibrium exists, the equilibrium strategies are as described in Proposition 2.

Figure A-1. Best-Reply Correspondences



It remains only to be shown that $p$ may be chosen to ensure the existence of this equilibrium. From the construction of the equilibrium strategies, a sequential crisis equilibrium will exist if $e^*_I(0) > 0$. This inequality will be satisfied if

$$q_I \leqslant p\{[1 - e^*_{II}(1)]w_I + e^*_{II}(1)\ [fd_I + (1 - f)s_I]\} + \{(1 - p)\ [fd_I + (1 - f)s_I]\}$$

Substituting the expression for $e^*_{II}(1)$ gives $p \geqslant 1 - (1 - \beta^*)\ (w_I - q_I)/(w_I - d_I)\ [R_I + f\ (1 - R_I)]$. If $\beta^* \geqslant p$, this inequality cannot be satisfied, and there is no sequential crisis equilibrium. This justifies the assumption made above that in a sequential crisis equilibrium, $\beta^* < p$. Substituting for $R_I$ shows that the second term on the right side of this inequality is between 0 and 1 for any $w_I > q_I > s_I$ and $1 > \beta^* > 0$. Thus, there exists a $p$ that satisfies this inequality, and this ensures the existence of a sequential crisis equilibrium. QED

## Notes

I should like to thank James D. Morrow and R. Harrison Wagner for their comments and criticisms of this paper. I also gratefully acknowledge the generous support of an award from the Social Science Research Council of a MacArthur Fellowship in International Security.

1. This credibility criterion does not exclude the possibility of setting deterministic or probabilistic tripwires, which some analyses of deterrence (e.g., Brams 1985; Schelling 1960, 1966) have suggested may be used to solve the problem of the inherent irrationality of retaliating massively in response to a limited provocation. Tripwires solve this problem by eliminating the decision of whether or not to retaliate massively. That is, the supreme national authorities are no longer confronted with this deci-

sion because the tripwire makes it. Thus, the question of this decision's rationality is moot. The credibility criterion requires only that the decision to set a tripwire be rational when it is set, not that the tripwire, once set, act "rationally."

2. This term will be defined formally below.

3. Zagare (1985) argues that the preference pattern implicit in MAD is that of a prisoner's dilemma and not of chicken. Although this may be so of some strategies that come under the rubric of MAD, the preference pattern of prisoner's dilemma is not the pattern in the strategy-that-leaves-something-to-chance, for nothing in this strategy is worse than suffering the sanction.

4. Of course, the game's mixed equilibrium is sensitive to the states' payoffs. Indeed, in this equilibrium, $I$ stands firm with probability $r_{II}$, and $II$ stands firm with probability $r_I$ where $r_I$ and $r_{II}$ are computed according to the formula Jervis uses.

5. See Kreps and Wilson 1982 for a complete definition of a sequential equilibrium.

6. Brams (1985) concludes that because it is never rational to launch a massive attack deliberately in response to a limited provocation, MAD "cannot lead to what is called a '[subgame-] perfect equilibrium'" (1985, 35). This is true of his models. If it were also true of the models developed in this paper, then, because all sequential equilibria are also subgame perfect, there would be no sequential equilibria in these models. As will be seen, Brams's conclusion does not apply to the models in this essay because these models explicitly include autonomous risk whereas Brams's models do not.

7. In fact, the manipulation of the states' critical risks is at the center of Snyder and Diesing's critical-risk model (1977, 48-52).

8. If $2N_I f = R_I$, then $I$ no longer has a unique best reply at $\Theta_I(N_I)$. $I$ may mix at this node, and this generates infinitely many sequential equilibria.

9. Letting $N_I = 1$, $N_{II} = 1$, and $N_{II'} = 2$ is the smallest and simplest combination of $N_I$, $N_{II}$, and $N_{II'}$ that satisfies the relations $N_{II} \leqslant N_I < N_{II'}$ where $II'$ is the potential adversary with the greatest resolve. If $N_I$, $N_{II}$, and $N_{II'}$ satisfy these relations, $I$ will prevail against one type of adversary with complete information and lose against the other type with complete information. Moreover, values satisfying these relations are the only interesting cases to consider in this game. An easy generalization of the proof of Proposition 1 shows that if $N_{II} \leqslant N_I$ and $N_{II'} \leqslant N_I$, then $I$ knows that its resolve is greater than its potential adversary, regardless of type, and $I$ will prevail. If $N_I < N_{II}$ and $N_I < N_{II'}$, then $I$ knows that its resolve is less than its adversary and will never challenge.

10. This conclusion must be interpreted carefully. It does not say that if $I$ takes steps that increase its resolve, then $II$ will be less likely to escalate. To say this, these steps would have to be included as options in a new game and the new equilibria would have to be found. The conclusion only says that if two games of the type in Figure 3 were compared, $II$ would be less likely to escalate in the game in which $I$'s resolve is greater.

## References

Brams, Steven J. 1985. *Superpower Games.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Brams, Steven J., and D. Marc Kilgour. 1985. Optimal Deterrence. *Social Philosophy and Policy* 3:118-35.

Ellsberg, Daniel. 1959. The Theory and Practice of Blackmail. In *Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiations,* ed. Oran Young. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Jervis, Robert. 1972. Bargaining and Bargaining Tactics. In *Coercion,* ed. James Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton.

Jervis, Robert. 1976. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Jervis, Robert. 1978. Cooperation under the Security Dilemma. *World Politics* 30:167-214.

Jervis, Robert. 1979a. Deterrence Theory Revisited. *World Politics* 31:289-324.

Jervis, Robert. 1979b. Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter. *Political Science Quarterly* 94: 617-33.

Jervis, Robert. 1984. *The Illogic of American Nuclear Security.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Kreps, David M., and Robert Wilson. 1982. Sequential Equilibria, *Econometrica* 50:862-87.

Powell, Robert. 1985. The Theoretical Foundations of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence. *Political Science Quarterly* 100:75-96.

Schelling, Thomas C. 1960. *The Strategy of Conflict.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Schelling, Thomas C. 1962. Nuclear Strategy in Europe. *World Politics* 14:421-32.

Schelling, Thomas C. 1966. *Arms and Influence.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Snyder, Glenn H. 1971. "Prisoner's Dilemma" and "Chicken" Models in International Politics. *International Studies Quarterly* 15:66-103.

Snyder, Glenn H. 1972. Crisis Bargaining. In *International Crises,* ed. Charles Hermann. New York: Free Press.

Snyder, Glenn H., and Paul Diesing. 1977. *Conflict among Nations.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Wagner, R. Harrison. 1982. Deterrence and Bargaining. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 26:329-58.

Wagner, R. Harrison. 1983. Theory of Games and the Problem of International Cooperation. *American Political Science Review* 77:330-46.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1983. Towards Nuclear Peace. In *The Use of Force.* 2d ed., ed. Robert Art and Kenneth Waltz. Lanham: University Press of America.

Zagare, Frank C. 1985. Toward a Reconciliation of Game Theory and the Theory of Mutual Deterrence. *International Studies Quarterly* 29: 155-70.

---

Robert Powell is Assistant Professor of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138.

# FLEEING THE IRON CAGE: POLITICS AND CULTURE IN THE THOUGHT OF MAX WEBER

LAWRENCE A. SCAFF
*University of Arizona*

*The problem of politics and culture emerged in European thought from Kierkegaard to Freud the encounter with modernity. In this paper I examine a major instance of that encounter in Weber's "science of culture" and his analysis of the cultural significance of capitalism. In Weber's work the most important and politically relevant responses to modern, subjectivist culture lie in attempts from within the ethical, aesthetic, erotic, and intellectualist life orders or value spheres to escape from the "iron cage" constructed by Western rationalism. I investigate the relative autonomy and paradoxical nature of these different attempts, and conclude with an explanation of Weber's choices with respect to the sphere of knowledge, or "science."*

The theme of this essay is extensive and monumental, and it can be summed up in the question, what is the relationship between politics and culture? In its most modern statement, this question should be understood to refer to both the use of cultural forms of expression for political purposes and the political criticism of modern cultural forms. Briefly, I want to show that the relationship between politics and culture is defined by critical and adaptive responses to Western rationalism or, in the terms of my essay, by the search for alternatives to the "iron cage." I shall argue that these alternatives disclose specific, politically relevant "solutions" to the discontents associated with modern rationalist culture.

I have chosen to define the range and shape of the encounter between politics and culture through an investigation of Max Weber's thinking in the context of his intellectual milieu, for the relationship I want to discuss is essentially an expression of the stresses and strivings of a modern, post-Nietzschean experience that Weber shared, observed, and criticized. My emphasis will be upon interpretation. By placing Weber at the center of this inquiry I want to arrive at a new interpretation of a problem underlying his work, directed as it is toward understanding what he variously called "the fate imposed upon us" or "the fate of our times" (1897, 108; 1968, 612; 1946, 155), and I also want to contribute to reflection upon the larger theme that is so integrally connected with the meaning and consequences of modernity.

## Statement of the Problem

There may be countless ways of approaching the relationship between politics and culture in order to make it intelligible, but in the present context two appear especially fruitful. In the first place, the critique of emergent modern

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
VOL. 81 NO. 3 SEPTEMBER 1987

culture in its various guises (including the materialist culture of capitalism) becomes a dominant *general* theme of European thought that assumes different forms: a political revolt against the "modern"; a break with the liberal historicist outlook and moral order; a flight from politics into a "sphere" of culture, such as the aesthetic or the erotic, and sometimes back again to a "new" politics; an exercise in transcending the historically given via utopia; or a reflection upon humanity's "technique for fending off suffering" (Freud 1961, 26), for using "life *against* life" (Nietzsche 1967, 120). Regardless of its particular statement, the central problem appears the same in every case: a sense that unified experience lies beyond the grasp of the modern self and that malaise and guilt have become inextricably intertwined with "culture." It is within this general problem and movement of thought from Kierkegaard and Marx, through Nietzsche, Tolstoy, and Freud, to contemporaries like Lyotard (1984) and Habermas (1985; see Bernstein 1985) that Weber's reflections are to be located.

There is a second, *specific* setting for the problem, found in the writings and activity of Weber's most perspicacious colleagues: Simmel, Sombart, Tönnies, Lukács, Michels, and Rickert. Among these figures, surely Simmel develops the key ideas, the analysis of a specifically urban, aesthetic, ahistorical, and amoral *Gefühlskultur* or "culture of feeling," out of which grew a special sensitivity to psychic states, emotional nuance, and the public power of "personality" and personal style. In Simmel's conception, "the essence of the modern is above all psychologism," that is, "the experiencing and interpretation of the world according to the reactions of our inner selves . . . the dissolution of stable contents in the fluid element of the soul" (1983, 152). The question for him then became, What forms of expression would follow from this "inward turn" in which, since Nietzsche, "life itself can become the purpose of life" (1907, 5)? At the first meeting of the German Sociological Association, Weber took up precisely this question: because the self encounters "all sorts of apparently inexhaustible possibilities for the conduct of life," culture now emerges as either "protest" or "adaptation," as an attempt to find "specific means of escape from this reality" through "the highest aesthetic abstractions, deepest dream-states, or most intensive kinds of intoxication" or as an effort to invent "defenses against this reality's fantastic, intoxicating rhythms" (1911, 98). Psychologism ushers in the reign of subjectivity and "interiority" with all their hidden and explosive potentialities.

The range of possibilities for Weber and his contemporaries can thus be most succinctly conceptualized, in line with Schorske's analysis of Freud's Vienna (1981), as established by the revolt of a new aestheticism against the liberal historicist culture of "progress." It would be mistaken, of course, to suggest that *every* aspect of this revolt was reflected in Weber's writings. But the theme that emerges from the cultural crisis does in fact bring us into Weber's world, even to the heart of his most famous Viennese declarations in 1909, of which the "modernist" content is unmistakable:

> We know of no scientifically demonstrable ideals. To be sure, our labors are now rendered more difficult, since we must create our ideals from within our chests in the very age of subjectivist culture. But we must not and cannot promise a fool's paradise and an easy street, neither in the here and now nor in the beyond, neither in thought nor in action, and it is the stigma of our human dignity that the peace of our souls cannot be as great as the peace of one who dreams of such a paradise. (1910, 585)

Because Weber had just seen a performance of *Faust* in the *Burgthealter*, one is tempted to read his soliloquy as a fin de siècle reflection on Goethe's creation, one that points toward the intensified struggle within ourselves (our "souls") occasioned by the rootless "age of subjectivist culture." The most serious modern motifs are accentuated: self-conscious creation of meaning, the psychological burdens of consciousness, the explosion of subjectivity, our feeble efforts to choose among competing "gods" under conditions in which the "will to truth" has become a *problem*. But this is admittedly a dense passage whose meaning will become clearer as the discussion unfolds. It illustrates the leading question emerging from an encounter with modern culture: what stance is one prepared to take and defend vis-à-vis the new aesthetics of a culture of "sensation" and "experience"? It is this question that leads to the deeper levels of Weber's work.

## Weber's "Science of Culture"

Weber was, to be sure, many things to many different people: political economist, legal scholar, sociologist, historian, student of the world religions, organizer, politician, journalist, a man who "loved science as passionately as a young bride" (Michels 1927, 109). But the most consistently applied identification Weber used for himself from among these possibilities was political economist or *Nationalökonom* (e.g., 1968, 582; 1946, 129). As a scholar of political economy concerned with the subject matter of the social sciences generally, Weber chose as his starting point the view that the fields of inquiry within such a domain were "sciences" in two closely related senses: they were (to use his terminology) *Wirklichkeitswissenschaften*, "sciences of actuality" and *Kulturwissenschaften*, "sciences of culture."

Undoubtedly the best-known single comment to this effect appears in the 1904 "Objectivity" essay as a statement of editorial policy for the *Archiv*. Unfortunately, Weber's original is distorted in the standard translation, which ought to read:

> The social science that *we* want to promote is a *science of actuality*. We want to understand the surrounding reality of life in which we are placed *in its uniqueness*—that is, on the one hand, the relationship and cultural *significance* of its individual appearance in its present configuration and, on the other hand, the basis of its being historically so and not having become otherwise. (1968, 170–71; cf. 1949, 72) (my translation)

In this statement, whose subject is the "actuality" of life, Weber wanted to suggest that social science sought to comprehend the "uniqueness" of the historically given world in terms of (1) contemporary *cultural* meanings and (2) *historical* reasons that could be advanced for the presence of just this cultural "reality" and not some other. The movement in thought in these sentences is absolutely crucial to understanding Weber's reasoning: science of the "actual," the "uniqueness" of a form of life, cultural meaning, and historical explanation are all necessarily connected.

That the conception of a science of the "actually existing" could not be separated from an attempt to establish specific cultural content was underlined even more emphatically in the little-known "preface" also written by Weber upon assumption of coeditorship of the *Archiv*. Alluding to the distinctive contribution of the journal from 1888 to 1904 under its founding editor, the socialist Heinrich Braun, Weber noted,

> the step which distinguished the "Archiv" from its predecessors was that it placed the problems identified under the heading "the question of labor" [*Arbeiterfrage*] in the most general context, that it grasped the "question of labor" in its *cultural significance* as the outwardly most clearly visible expression of a much larger complex of phenomena: the fundamental process of transformation experienced by our economic life and thus by our cultural existence as a whole through the advance of capitalism. (1904, 1–2) (my translation)

And the "new direction" announced by Weber and his colleagues, starting from the ubiquitous labor question, was even more firmly anchored in the cultural problem:

> Above all today the research domain of the "Archiv" must be fundamentally expanded. . . . Our journal will have to consider historical and theoretical knowledge of the *general cultural significance of capitalist development* as the scientific problem whose understanding it serves. (1904, 5) (my translation)

One cannot imagine a more concise and unambiguous statement of the specific direction charted by this new science of the "actual" as a "science of culture." The posing of familiar questions in relation to "cultural significance" and "cultural existence" gave this form of knowledge its basic claim to preeminence.

If the science of society was conceived as a *cultural* science, then the most urgent question became, What could one expect to find in its *particular* contents? Stated somewhat differently, What was the "uniqueness" of Weber's own culture? What was the central problem he considered worth investigating?

## The Uniqueness of Modern Culture: Capitalism

The answer to these questions that is closest to the inner dynamic of Weber's thought commences from the "fact" of modern capitalism, and it moves toward an interpretation of what I shall call the *cultural discontents of modernity.* This unfolding pattern of interpretation and argumentation takes numerous forms and directions, only the most important of which can be considered here. In every case, however, as Weber says, "it is a question of the specific and peculiar 'rationalism' of Western culture" (1920, 11; 1958a, 26) and the responses to it. Paradoxically, this "rationalism" is emphatically not necessarily "rational" but is persistently called into question by variations on the formula, What is rational is not actual, and what is actual is irrational (with apologies to Hegel).

Weber's first analysis of the "general cultural significance of capitalist development" is found, like numerous aspects of his thought, in embryonic form in the 1890s studies of the East Elbian territories' agrarian "organization of labor relations" (*Arbeitsverfassung*). In the context of the problem of culture, what is important to notice about these studies is their invocation of a traditionalist world, the "unmodern patriarchal organization of labor" (1984, 895), collapsing under the onslaught of new capitalist productive forces; they tell the story of sociocultural, and *therefore* political, dislocation. The process of capitalist rationalization not only puts an end to the historically articulated relations of social stratification in the East; it also creates a new propertyless class of "formally free" labor *and* dissolves the centers of authority that had previously served as carriers of "culture." A change of such magnitude will reverberate throughout the social and political order, Weber maintains. But his conclusion in the early studies of the agrarian world leaves undefined the precise character of the culture that might emerge through this irreversible process.

That "definition" of the cultural significance of capitalism appears as the keystone to Weber's developing argument most clearly and powerfully in the essays of 1905-6, that is, in the second part of "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism" and in the essays on Russia. The central passages are well known, although Weber's meaning is obscured by Parsons's translation (which I have therefore altered):

> The Puritan *wanted* to work in a vocation [*wollte Berufsmensch sein*]; we *must* do so. For when asceticism was carried out of monastic cells into vocational life and began to dominate innerworldly morality, it helped to build the tremen-

> dous cosmos of the modern economic order. This order is now bound to the technical and economic presuppositions of mechanical, machine-like production, which today determines with irresistible force the life-style [*Lebensstil*] of all individuals born into this mechanism, *not* only those directly engaged in economic enterprise, and perhaps will determine it until the last ton of fossil coal is burned. In Baxter's view the care for external goods should only lie on the shoulders of the saint like "a light cloak, which can be thrown aside at any moment." But fate [*Verhängnis*] decreed that the cloak should become an iron cage. (1920, 203; 1958a, 181) (my translation)

The infamous "iron cage," perhaps Weber's most telling Epimethean metaphor, is formed out of the objectification of material culture and its "inexorable power" but also out of the projection of asceticism into the external world of production, labor, and above all, "style of life." For the modern individual, action and existence are regimented by the necessities of *vocational* activity, now stripped of its sustaining structures of meaning. We are all, as it were, conscripted as unconsenting participants in a universalized vocational culture, our horizons limited to the rationalized, inwardly meaningless certainties of "vocational humanity" (*Berufsmenschentum*). For one to attempt, as a "cultural being" (*Kulturmensch*), to "advance" this culture from the standpoint of its own assumptions, is only to advance farther along the path of modern discontents. For Weber, as for Nietzsche, asceticism is not only our "fate" but our "fatality."[1] We are left with the demand of calling forth our own ideals from within ourselves, of transvaluing our values. Anything else is weakness.

It is this problem of the modern orientation toward life, so characteristic of Weber's interpretation of the deepest meaning of capitalism for culture, that also informs the essays on Russia. For historical and cultural reasons, the Russian case reveals in particularly strong form the clash occurring everywhere between capitalist rationalism as an "economic inevitability" and the cultural values firmly rooted in a premodern Western tradition—the values of a "democratic" and "individualistic" character—which, in Weber's conception, become increasingly difficult to realize.

> Those who live in constant anxiety lest there might in the future be *too much* "democracy" and "individualism" in the world, and too little "authority," "aristocracy" and "respect for office" or the like, may take heart; all too much care has been taken to make sure that the trees of democratic individualism do not grow to the skies. . . . It is utterly ridiculous to suppose that it is an "inevitable" feature of our economic development under present-day advanced capitalism, as it has now been imported into Russia and as it exists in America, that it should have an elective affinity with "democracy" or indeed with "freedom" (in *any* sense of that word), when the only question to be asked is: how are all these things, in general and in the long term, *possible* where it prevails? (1906, 347; 1978, 282)

In Weber's view no one can be exempted from this final question. "Everywhere," he wrote, "the cage for the new serfdom is ready" (1906, 347; 1978, 281) and every "developmental tendency" points to its perfection and permanence. But can the question Weber poses—the most political expression of the cultural dilemma—in principle be answered? For the moment let us say only that for Weber an adequate and, above all, honest answer requires in his phrase "swimming against the stream of material developments." It can have nothing to do with obediently following the course determined by the inexorable flow of "historical laws."

Weber's analysis of capitalism reaches its apogee in invoking the imagery of the "iron cage." But as a cultural analysis, a search for the significance of a unique process, it does not end there. Modernity is characterized not just by a kind of petrifaction and homogenization of external conditions of life but in addition by inescapable conflict among the contents of different value spheres, life orders, and powers—each with its autonomous and internally coherent "lawfulness" (*Eigengesetzlichkeit*)—that recur at critical junctures throughout Weber's work. Not only are different value spheres, such as the political and the ethical, *not* identical, but it is also the case that *within* a sphere of value a system of uniform rules *cannot* be found that will "solve," once and for all, the problems of action and choice. Instead, "ultimately everywhere and always it is really a question not only of alternatives between values but of an irreconcilable death-struggle like that between 'god' and the 'devil.' Between these there are no relativizations or compromises" (1968, 507; 1949, 17-18). If the first theme —the cultural significance of capitalist development—is intertwined with Marx's thinking, then this second one—the "struggle among the gods"—is woven from materials discoverable in Nietzsche. If the implications of the first line of thought are external and political, then the implications of the second are internal and ethical; the latter touch the conduct of life itself.

It is interesting to note, furthermore, that what can be said about "ethics" can also be said about "modern culture"; that is, it, too, is not exempted from Weber's line of reasoning but rather becomes only a part of the "deadly struggle." This is why, according to Weber, "culture" is for the person who derives life meaning from it alone, who treats it as a "vocation," never in actuality a source of personal "salvation." It must instead be associated with "guilt" or, in the specific case of aesthetic culture, with "the persistent presence of conscience in the temple of Narcissus" (Schorske 1981, 10).

The cultural significance of capitalist development thus finds final expression in the great tensions and conflicts—in a word, the *discontents*—of modern life. Having perceived this outcome, Weber appears on balance committed to a twofold response: on the one hand, he is prepared to consider certain attempts from *inside* modern culture to overcome the problem posed by that culture, although for Weber it is undeniably true that all these attempts are paradoxical and questionable, whether they are judged to be "authentic," or not. But on the other hand, Weber offers a path toward meaning for the individual who stands face-to-face with such a culture, arguing in the last analysis "that every single important action and finally life as a whole . . . signifies a chain of ultimate decisions, through which the soul, as in Plato, *chooses* its own fate—that is, the meaning of its doing and being" (1968, 507-8; 1949, 18). This disguised reference to the *Phaedrus* demarcates a realm of existential choice, of Weberian authenticity. But the meaning and combination of both responses—the searches for alternatives to the "iron cage" or for "the demon who holds the fibers" of one's life (1968, 613; 1946, 156) —are far from self-evident. How can they be understood in relation to the problem of culture that has now emerged out of the analysis of capitalist rationalism?

## Culture and Its Discontents

The answer to this question is found at the very center of Weber's thinking in the "Zwischenbetrachtung," or as it is commonly known, "Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions." In theme and problem the leap from the essays of 1905-6 to this "Intermediate Reflection" of 1915, appended to the first volume of the *Sociology of Religion*, is deceptively short, for it is in the latter that Weber begins to confront the most serious responses to the threatening constraints of the "iron cage." According to Weber (1920, 237) and to Lukács's testimony (1982, 362), at least portions of the text were read to Weber's Heidelberg circle before World War I—probably, therefore, in 1913—partly in reply to Lukács's "eschatological hopes" for "salvation from the world" through creation of a new "socialist society founded upon an ethic of brotherliness" (Marianne Weber 1926, 474; 1975, 466). This context announces Weber's principal intention in the "Reflection," namely, to provide a commentary on the relentless struggles waged among different life orders and value spheres in their attempts to cope with the historically given "world" through adaptation, rationalization, manipulation, and escape. Although other aspects of the text are important, they are subordinate to the cultural theme —the great tensions among the various orders of life in confronting "the fate of our times"—that builds the groundwork for Weber's entire inquiry.

The "Reflection" contains not only the basic elements of a comprehensive analysis—parts of which surface elsewhere in Weber's essays—of the "internal and lawful autonomy" of the familial, religious, economic, political, aesthetic, erotic, and intellectual (scientific) life orders or spheres of life activity and value, but it also contains the rudiments of Weber's own evaluation of each in relation to the problem of culture, modern culture in particular. In Weber's terminology, so-called religious rejections of the world are characterized in terms of an "ethic of brotherliness" (*Brüderlichkeitsethik*), which is a species of an absolutist ethic of ultimate ends or convictions (*Gesinnungsethik*). Although the ambiguous category *ethics* cannot in itself be a sphere of value with its own "lawful autonomy," Weber's entire treatment of the religious sphere of action and valuation can be interpreted as suggesting that there are distinctively "absolutist ethical" paths, sharing an affinity with the ascetic religious life yet (as with syndicalism) political in their consequences, that some choose to follow as a way of counteracting the dilemmas of worldly action.

While the sphere of absolutist ethics is thus fundamental, it is far from exhaustive; there are alternative responses to the "iron cage" as well, especially in the aesthetic, erotic, and intellectualist value spheres. The first two, which above all others Weber treats "developmentally," tend increasingly, as they become more differentiated, to be absorbed into the escapist "culture of feeling" of pure experience and "inwardness." Once this has occurred, the intellectualist culture so characteristic of modernity then tends to *substitute* one sphere of value for another, one life order for another, based upon the principle that the most subjective judgment is the most authentic and "valid." Citing Weber's example, "the refusal of modern men to assume responsibility for moral judgments tends to transform judgments of moral intent into judgments of taste ('in poor taste' instead of 'reprehensible')." The consequence of such a shift is to reinforce the transcendent claims of subjectivity, for "the inaccessibility of appeal from aesthetic judgment *excludes discussion*" (1920, 555; 1946, 342; italics added). That is its function. One thereby arrives at the complete victory of aesthetic culture in the age of intellectualization.

What of the economic and political life orders, the most soulless and diabolical of powers? In this schema they may be said to represent the paradigm cases for adaptation, the conditions of action given on the one hand by the abstract rationalism of the money economy and on the other by the "inescapable pragma of violence" (1920, 549; 1946, 336). The economic sphere merely recapitulates the problem of capitalism's cultural significance: in a phrase, "Money is the most abstract and 'impersonal' element that exists in human life" (1920, 544; 1946, 331) and is thus for Weber, as for Georg Simmel in *The Philosophy of Money* ([1900], 1978), the source par excellence of all objectifications, human self-alienation, material gratification, and plain misery. If there is meaning to the acquisitive quest, then it is found simply in analogies with games and sport. Not so the political sphere, Weber's "old secret love" (Baumgarten 1964, 671), where matters are more serious both because of the threat of violence and because of the contradictory invasion by moral purposes and sublimated eros—the action of those who, in Weber's paraphrase of Machiavelli, love their native city more than the salvation of their own souls (1958b, 546; 1946, 126). The modern rebel, repelled by the depersonalized orders of the bureaucratic state, can not only flee *from* but also *into* politics. He will never find salvation there, but he may find a close second, "a pathos and a sentiment of community" (1920, 548; 1946, 335).

Given this interpretation of the life orders and value spheres and the *directions* taken by action within them, let us consider the specific avenues that open up in Weber's reflections on the uniqueness of his own modern culture, which is still ours to comprehend.

## The Ethical Alternative

The most important first-order problems are those appearing on the large and differentiated terrain of ethics, serving under the heading *ethic of brotherliness* as the nodal point against which all spheres of value are placed in tension and from which, to a great extent, the various orders of life derive their meaning. The issue of "ethicism" had in fact occupied Weber on many occasions, from early critical comments on "ethical culture" to the later disputes over value judgments. Keeping in mind his Vienna statement from 1909 concerning the absence of "scientifically demonstrable [ethical] ideals," one can sharpen the issue further by quoting Weber's challenge to Michels on the same theme:

> There are *two* possibilities: either (1) "my kingdom is not of this world" (Tolstoy, *or* syndicalism *thought to its conclusion,* which is *nothing more* than the sentence "the goal means nothing to me, the *movement* everything" translated into a *revolutionary-ethical, personal* statement . . . or (2) *affirmation* of culture (that is, *objective* culture, expressing itself in *technical* and other "achievements") through *adaptation* to the sociological conditions of *all* "technique" [*Technik*], whether it be economic, political, or whatever else. (Such adaptation is embodied *most often* precisely in "collectivist societies.") In the *second* case all talk of "revolution" is a farce, *any* thought of *replacing* the "domination of man over man" by *any* kind of "socialist" society or ingeniously devised forms of "democracy" is a *utopia.* In this respect your own critique surely doesn't go far enough. Whoever wants to live as a "modern man," if only in the sense that he has his newspaper, railroads, trams, etc. every day, *renounces* all those ideals which hover darkly around you as soon as he completely *abandons* the revolutionary standpoint *for its own sake, without* any "goal," indeed without the *conceivability* of a "goal." You are a thoroughly honest fellow and will on your own . . . complete the critique that has long since brought me to this way of thinking and *thereby* stamped me as a "bourgeois" politician, *so long as* the least that one as such *can* want doesn't get pushed into the limitless distance.[2]

In the entire corpus of Weber's writings there is no more pointed and compact statement of the either/or alternatives pushed to their logical extremes.

It should be noted that the statement of alternatives is presumed valid at two levels. On the first level one must choose, Weber insists, between two fundamentally opposed possibilities for the general conduct of life: rejection of the world, or world abnegation, (*Weltablehnung*) on the one hand and affirmation of the world or of its objective culture (*Kulturbejahung*) on the other. In this context, "objective culture" means for Weber exactly what it meant for Simmel, namely an autonomous order of values external to the self, although produced by it, whose contents presuppose a process of spacial and temporal "distancing" between ourselves and the forms of our activity (Simmel 1978, 59–78, 446–48). By selecting the former possibility of world abnegation, one must be prepared to live with "fictions" in order to achieve ethical unity of belief; for the latter case one must be prepared to live with "antinomies" or "tensions" in order to achieve clarity about the world as it "is."

On the second level, one must choose between value spheres: either an absolute ethic of brotherliness that promises to end all forms of domination or acceptance of the relative conditions of political conduct. If the former, one must be prepared to live with the maddening incongruities between "ideal" and "real"; if the latter, one must be prepared to live with the diabolic uncertainties of responsibility for consequences of action. Weber insists upon a necessary alignment among these alternatives: there is an "elective affinity," so to speak, between world abnegation and an absolute ethics and between world affirmation and an ethics of (political) responsibility. Efforts to recombine alternatives are the breeding ground for both intellectual confusion and practical catastrophes.

Ignoring for the moment Weber's deceptive and ironic "bourgeois" affirmation of modern culture, we can readily use his statement to delineate the most formidable world-abnegating ethical alternatives: pacificism (Tolstoy); revolutionary syndicalism, or an ethically oriented commitment to "pure democracy" (the position Michels toyed with); and a kind of "socialist" credo affirming the possible elimination of all relations of domination (the early Lukács). There was another concrete variant of ethicism as well, visible in some versions of radical feminism, as Marianne Weber acknowledged in several of her essays and in an exchange with Simmel on the possibility of an autonomous "female culture" (Simmel 1983, 207–41; Marianne Weber 1919, 95–133). For if feminism could be conceived as an alternative to the constraints of everyday life organized in vocational work, then it could also be thought to foreshadow a qualitatively different world: "Perhaps womankind will succeed better" than have men "in unifying the dissonances between knowledge and action," thus keeping humanity from ending "in torpidity and sheer vocational specialization" (Marianne Weber 1919, 9). Max Weber left this fourth possibility to his wife's and Simmel's diligence, but he did, as promised, grapple with the first three as "directions of world abnegation" or as ideological ethics of "ultimate ends" or convictions.

Absolute internal consistency was the sine qua non for these ethical positions, according to Weber, and it required an unflinching determination to suppress any "compromises" with the realities of the existing world. All consistent ethical alternatives shared some postulate of absolute justice—in effect, *fiat justitia, pereat mundus* ("Let justice rule, and the world perish")—at the level of both collective and individual ethics. They also shared complete indifference to rational "ends," and to any rational calculation of the consequences of an act. Demonstration of the purity of moral conviction, motive, or intention qualified as the exclusive criterion of justification.

But what does all of this have to do with the cultural problematic of capitalist development? For Weber and his contemporaries, capitalist development was bound up with "technical progress," with the working out of purposive-rational or instrumental orientations toward action, with the standardization and routinization of life activity, and with control of the conditions of existence through calculation. Compared to what Tolstoy (and following him, Weber) conceived as the "organic cycle of life," these forces created an endlessly "progressive" life of specialization, dislocation, and fragmentation. Every "ethical" school of thought sought, in opposition, to recreate the world as an "organic and natural whole" (Tolstoy), a "totality of being" (Lukács), or an ethically "rational" unity (Michels). The spirit of these views is perfectly captured in Lukács's later observation that his pre-1917 position as summarized in *The Theory of the Novel* expressed "the hope that a natural life worthy of man can spring from the disintegration of capitalism and the destruction, seen as identical with that disintegration, of the lifeless and life-denying social and economic categories" (1971, 20). Not only must the capitalist productive system be destroyed, but so must its modes of language, thought, and being. Lukács was at least sufficiently honest to see in such views "a highly naïve and totally unfounded utopianism."

The utopianism of a rigorous and consistent ethical alternative certainly accounted for one of Weber's objections (though perhaps the least persuasive) to ethicism. After all, a "science of actuality" was already in conception a science *of* the historically given world, not apart from it. In addition, from the standpoint of the *political* sphere, utopianism meant "irresponsibility" or the complete repudiation of Weber's preferred "ethic of responsibility." On the other side of the issue, Weber could still honor the dignity of an absolutely consistent *Gesinnungsethiker*—a source, no doubt, of his interest in Tolstoy or in Lukács's apocalyptic and Michels's syndicalist convictions. But the brunt of Weber's rejoinder to ethicism lay elsewhere, in a remarkable critique, filtered through Tolstoy, of the *meaning* of modern culture under conditions of "technical progress." The essence of Weber's reflection on Tolstoy's protest was to show, first, that the search for meaning in "technical progress" and everything associated with it, engaged in by the modern "cultural being," could never, from the ethical standpoint, be successful: culture, "necessarily burdened with guilt," would "become ever more meaningless" (1920, 571; 1946, 357). However, Weber also wanted to show, secondly, that the alternative construction of "meaning by the ethical escape route would just as surely prove to be an illusion; it would, in his words, "succumb in the end to the world dominion of unbrotherliness."

Why is this the case? The most interesting reasons are found toward the conclusion of the "Reflection" and "Science as a Vocation" (see esp. 1920, 569–71; 1968, 594–95, 609–13). A comprehensive ethic for the totality of life conduct presupposes a genuine prophecy, which, Weber insists "is simply not there" and cannot be given "the technical and social conditions of rational culture" "for purely external reasons." (It is well known in any case that Weber rejected all forms of modern prophecy, whether stemming from Marx, Nietzsche, Tolstoy, Wagner, or even Sombart.) Furthermore, in this culture, ethicism has economic presuppositions: only among those privileged to exist outside the vocational world—to remain economically independent as rentiers or otherwise—can it become a comprehensive and consistent life order, a clear allusion to Tolstoy and to some members of the George circle (notably Stefan George himself). Finally, in so far as it aims for universality, the ethical alternative must founder on a contradiction: in Weber's words it is "*not* accessible to everybody" and therefore "definitely means aristocracy" (1920, 571; 1946, 347). Ethicism then faces the unenviable and impossible task of achieving the new order of equality (i.e., eliminating the "domination of man over man") through the inequality of aristocratic domination. Whatever form it takes, the ethical alternative seems to run afoul of a kind of "reality principle" embedded in capitalist development. It represents a possible choice, available to a few, capable of renewal from generation to generation, but always at the mercy of the unrelenting pressure of the "fateful" forces of culture continually calling it into question.

### Socialism as Cultural Criticism

The "socialist" alternative was intriguing to Weber because of its mixture of contradictory elements: organizational imperatives, allegedly "scientific" principles, prophetic vision, and above all, criticism and reconstruction of modern culture. Given these varied dimensions, from Weber's standpoint the modern proletariat's "most magnificent" task was "its attempt to represent itself as a cultural community," to develop a political movement that "fostered the rapturous hope of opposing from within itself the bourgeois world with completely new values in *all* areas" of culture (Weber 1911, 97–98). Robert Michels, Weber's close friend and junior colleague, had of course emphasized the undermining of democratic purpose by organizational necessities within socialism, partly in reply to Weber's persistent questioning. But when Weber recruited Michels to write an article on "the international socialist movement" for the *Outline of Social Economics,* it was with the understanding that he instead give priority to the problem of culture: "I assume that you will analyze . . . Social Democracy or the socialist movement above all as a party of *culture* [*Kulturpartei*]. The movement certainly wanted to create and *believed* it *had* created *not* only its own *social* outcomes, but also its own *cultural* content. *What* content? From which *ultimate* ethical or other standpoints? It *wanted* a substitute for *religion,* even to be a religion itself. In what *sense*? Is this still the case?"[3] Despite his critical inspiration, Michels remained too much the participant to follow these questions to their conclusion.

Clearly for Weber, however, not merely party programs and organizational forms but the deeper "spirit of socialism" mattered most in what he called "a universal history of culture" (1920, 10; 1958a, 23). In effect, his proposal called for nothing less than a study of socialism parallel to his own earlier cultural investigations of the "spirit of capitalism." Were socialism in general to lose its peculiar "spirit," conjured by the sorcery of capitalism's revolutionizing of actually existing culture, then it would likely also lose its uniquely attractive and critical powers.

What might have gone into a study of this kind remains open to speculation. However, in those scattered passages where Weber addresses his own questions a clear line of argument emerges: as a movement of cultural criticism, socialism is both a specific product of the forces that have produced modern culture and a wishful negation of those forces. As it moves seriously to implement its critique, it undercuts the conditions for its own existence and appeal. But this formal paradox, although interesting, is less significant than socialism's actual substantive rationalizations. For to the extent it adapts to "technical progress," *any* style of socialism, regardless of "ethical" overtones, will tend to reify the forces of industrialization unleashed by capitalism into everyday culture. In such experiments, Weber argues, "it is the dictatorship of the official, not that of the worker, that for the present at any rate is on the advance" (1924, 508)—and not only for the present! Combined with "submissive attitudes" and "spiritual apathy," resulting partly from the abortive "eschatological" politics of the movement (1906, 121; 1978, 283), this seems in Weber's eyes a ready-made formula for multiplying the constraints of vocational life. What this socialism has in fact brought forth (which is all to the good) is new subjects and problems for culture. But it has not and will not ever create new cultural *forms,* for to do that would require renouncing the world of "objective culture" that it desires to inherit. As a positive movement, socialism is set against itself, trapped in what Weber (following Sombart) once called its "two-souled character" (1906, 54). It is at its best as cultural critic.

## The Flight into Aestheticism

Weber characterizes the aesthetic and erotic value spheres as "inner-worldly powers of life" whose fundamental essences are "arational or antirational" and which are therefore opposed per se both to the acosmic "ethic of brotherliness" and to the rationalization of the world through intellectualism, technical "progress," or any of the various forces aligned with modern capitalism. Within the region of the aesthetic it is music, the most "inward" form of human expression, that can set itself against moral and scientific culture as a "diabolical" power, as the finest and highest expression of amoral and irrational interiority. Of all the arts, music is capable of immediately awakening an inwardly authentic and plastic expressiveness, not merely in sharp contrast to the dull beat of technical rationalization and the vocational life world but as "a surrogate for primary religious experience" (1920, 556; 1946, 343)! However, in Weber's view "art" in general develops in a peculiar relationship to the modern: it "becomes a cosmos of more and more consciously grasped independent values" that "provides a *salvation* from the routines of everyday life, and especially from the increasing pressures of theoretical and practical rationalism" (1920, 555; 1946, 342). With such a breakthrough to a core of unique meaning the aesthetic becomes a distinctive, autonomous sphere of value.

It is instructive to notice that Weber's line of reasoning, with its characteristic juxtapositions and dialectics, is in important ways representative for the entire fin de siècle milieu. Among contemporaries engaged with the aesthetic, Simmel, for example, offers numerous representative commentaries of a similar kind, in which "salvation from the confusion and turmoil of life" is proposed as "the essential goal of art" (1983, 153). In Weber's, as in Simmel's, thought the aesthetic comes to be endowed with such significance *because* it is grasped by the mind in dialectical opposition to the grinding forces of routinization and rationalization. Translated into the idiom of philosophical idealism, it henceforth stands for the positive "moment" in which the modern "cultural being" is lifted out of the shadowy cage and into the brilliant sphere of "transcendental truth," with the "transcendent" now conceived as a category of aesthetic *culture*.

Among Weber's contemporaries the intrusion of aesthetic *criteria* into science and politics was a widespread phenomenon, and itself suggests that we are in the presence of the modern. However, aestheticism's attempted conquest of other value spheres, including the political, presents a rather different problem: the appropriation of the aesthetic as a genuine sphere of redemption bearing cosmic significance. In the latter sense for Weber it was without a doubt the meteoric rise of Stefan George and the amazing transformation of his circle that demonstrated the overpowering spell of aestheticism, for in this case the aesthetic of poetry was transformed into a cult, a temple of devotion, with George as prophet, high priest, and savior. Carried beyond the community of devotees, his flight from the world's rationalization became the original model for an entire generation.

What was most noteworthy about George, however, was the combining of aestheticism with the drive toward ascetic world mastery. To Weber's mind, George's poetry showed that he "himself steps out of the aesthetic cloister in order to renew and rule the world from which he had at first fled as an ascetic (with aesthetic rather than with ethical characteristics), following the pattern of so many other ascetics."[4] But the path to "ecstatic rapture" through deployment of aesthetic "forms" resulted not in any sort of substantive political message of salvation from objective culture, judged in terms of *content,* but rather in a "purely formal prophecy" with "nothing positive to offer" except the usual platitudes concerning the (formal) need to overcome "rationalism, capitalism, and so forth." The very attempt to substitute form for content then led, in Weber's judgment, to subverting original aesthetic purposes:

> One perceives most clearly how strongly this undermining of content affects artistic form, if one hears the poems read in the artistically correct manner by a disciple of the school, that is, in a liturgical monotone that acoustically shakes one up. It is a violent and completely unartistic exertion. Here the work of art is steeped to its last pore in a purpose that lies beyond the work of art—a powerfully ironic comment on the original strict exclusion of all non-artistic purposes.[5]

Such prophetic ambitions seemed in the end not to derive from the poet's expected sources of inspiration—experience, mystical revelation, myth, memory—but rather from an inner need or "necessity" that was essentially reactive, an agitated counterthrust against the new forces of objective culture. George's aesthetic politics was all movement and motion, as if in imitation of the very world it rejected. Instead of vanquishing the forces of rationalization, this new aestheticism spiraled back within them and became their hapless captive.

## Eroticism as Escape

Of all the life forces, eros deserves for Weber to be labeled "the most irrational" and in its sublimated expression as "eroticism" the most capable of pressing to the limits of the extraordinary. The escape from the "everyday" is to be understood in Weber's idiom as an unfolding process of separation from "the organic cycle of peasant existence" that leads finally in the "intellectualist culture" of vocationally organized humanity to a peculiar characteristic of the modern era: eroticism becomes *the* source of "innerworldly salvation from the rational" or the *only* power "which still bound humankind to the natural source of all life" (1920, 560; 1946, 346).

The choice of language for designating eroticism as a specific characteristic of the modern is significant for two reasons. First, more so than the discussion of other value spheres, it contains an explicit demonstration of developmental "stages" in the rationalization of *Erotik,* starting from the fiction of an "organic cycle of life" and ending in the paradoxical "eroticism of intellectualism." Second, whether historically permissible or not, the fictional possibility borrowed from Tolstoy's novels becomes logically appropriate as an anchor for Weber's mode of argumentation: it represents "natural" eros without the heightened sensibility and tension of eroticism. Given such a starting point, Weber's line of interpretation then proceeds through a radical opposition between the "cold skeleton hands of rational orders" and deadening "banality of the everyday" on the one side and the "natural," the "real," the "irrational," and the "truly living" on the other (*das Lebendigste*). The latter four-part configuration, a transposition of the "organic," must be fashioned in the crucible of the modern consciousness: eroticism is *experienced* as closest to the real and natural because eros has been reconceived as the ultimate source of "life" or as life's most *irrational* force. Precisely these connections in thinking, which appear so self-evident to modern humankind, already disclose a uniquely modern conception of "life": only in the secret, "inward" sphere of the "irrational," far beyond the banalities of routine existence, can one directly sense life's pulsating forces. In order to assume its fullest meaning, "life" in this world, the only world there is, must be lived "beyond good and evil." Only under such conditions can its irrational core—eroticism—ever be imagined to offer an avenue of eternal renewal. This view of eros—Weber's view—is of course itself fully dependent upon the fin de siècle experience of desublimation, of release from repressive culture.[6]

Where does the paradox lie in this last embrace of eroticism in "intellectualist culture"? Despite all rationalization under conditions of "technical progress," the "eroticism of intellectualism," in its deadly seriousness, "affirms precisely the natural quality of the sexual sphere again, but consciously, as an embodied creative power" (1920, 561; 1946, 347). The possibility of a *conscious* affirmation of the natural—defying the material culture that is historically so and not otherwise—is the essence of this most modern of eroticisms. But as Weber well knows, "modern humanity," precisely because of the sources of its identity, has lost all direct knowledge of the "natural" as an immanent "creative power." Our affirming consciousness is a feat of imagination and will, and whatever "meaning" it can acquire is generated as a rebellious reply to nature's negation. The one thing reserved to humanity is self-consciousness of a refined sort, that is, a realm of inwardness, of Simmel's "lived experience." Importantly, residing in this realm is an eroticism Weber can affirm—if only because it expresses what one might call a heroic pathos of *distance*, aware of repetition coupled with lost natural innocence—"again, but consciously."

Weber's attempt to grant some dignity to the life-sustaining but guilt-ridden value sphere of eroticism emerges from the background of his deep reservations concerning the erotic life cult (*Lebenskult*) of the age. From Schwabing to Monte Verità and eventually Heidelberg, the disciples of eros, personified for the Weber circle by the "Freudian" Otto Gross, began to propagate a new *Weltanschauung* of liberation derived from a specific clinical practice. But instead of the promise of sexual-personal liberation followed by a new community of "brotherliness," Weber foresaw a reign of confusion, disappointment, and self-deception. Any thought, no matter how ingenious, of deducing a personal morality or practical world view from scientific investigation was greeted by Weber with extreme skepticism. In this case, he observed,

> the Categorical Imperative, "Go to Freud, or to us his pupils, to learn the historical *truth* about yourself and your actions, or else you are a coward" not only reveals a kind of childish "departmental patriotism" of the psychiatrist and the modern type of professional *"directeur de l'âme,"* but also totally debases itself from the ethical point of view because of the fatal admixture of purely "hygienic" motives. (Baumgarten 1964, 647; Weber 1978, 386).

In addition, under the motto *know thyself*, pursuit of the erotic *as a value* ended not in unbounded human brotherhood but rather in the exact opposite—an exclusive and incommunicable possession of the individual other; ineradicable conflict characterized relations between these two value spheres. No doubt the recommended therapy of freeing oneself from psychic mechanisms of "repression" in order to promote "health" (or moral traits such as "honesty") could be interpreted as a revolt against inner-worldly asceticism *tout court*. But the question was, could the new "freedom," based upon a critique of sexuality and the erotic life, in a positive sense be anything more than an age-old hedonism? Only a fine line might be seen to separate the escape into eroticism from the nihilistic enjoyment of pure sensuality. Eroticism as pleasure seeking led not to higher self-knowledge, but to those "last men who invented happiness," the "sensualists without heart" excoriated in the closing pages of *The Protestant Ethic*. In this form, eroticism as a path of escape from the rational and the everyday ceased to be humanly interesting.

The decisive characteristic of what

Weber called "subjectivist culture," with its ubiquitous "searches" and confused arrogance, was in sum a carefully cultivated, redemptive inwardness. Not only was modernity characterized by technical "achievements" of world-historical significance; it was also characterized by reactive flights into the obscure interior spaces of the modern subject re-presented as ascetic, aesthete, ethicist, and erotic. To chart these psychic spaces in a new soteriology of "inwardness" became for the convinced "cultural being" a calling of the highest order, a dare to live at the "height of the times," which was itself symptomatic of modern discontent and inseparable from it. Modern culture was thus deeply divided against itself: the "objectivist" strain appeared to erode the sources of "subjectivist" inspiration, while the latter lived in a condition of permanent hostility toward all purely purposive-rational *Technik*. Sociologically considered, in Weber's diagnosis the deepest paradox emerged from subjectivist culture's essential dependence on its objectivist counterpart. That is, the blossoming of an inwardness of cultural redemption was scarcely imaginable without the new technologies of publication and communication, the cultural hothouse of the modern city, new possibilities for economically independent urban existence—in short the complete intellectualization of even the most sacred value spheres of subjectivity. For the privileged creators and guardians of "subjectivist culture" this was simply a paradox that could not be resolved.

But what of Weber's own position in relation to this paradoxical endpoint? What is one to make of his cryptic references to choosing one's own fate and to "affirming" modern, objective culture through adaptation to the "conditions" of its existence? Where did Weber's choices lie, and why?

## The Requirement for Choice in the Age of Subjectivist Culture

In "Science as a Vocation" Weber denied himself the possibility of giving a comprehensive answer to the Tolstoyan question, How should we live and what should we do?, a question that begged for new prophetic solutions that he considered illusory. But in confronting the critique of culture at the turn of the century, he did seek clarity as to the ways in which such a question might be provisionally answered given the economy of choice posed by the struggles among rival value spheres and life orders. The dynamics of this provisional answer were set by the contrast between the conditions of the "modern" and the cosmos of the "organic." Stating the matter boldly, the latter choice never appeared as an issue, as meaning was prescribed by ethical unities, which were actually projections by modern memory of what might have been had Western culture followed a different course. But for those striving for the fabrication and possession of rationalized knowledge and culture, there was a responsibility to choose in the context of a plurality of value spheres, none of which could be universally preeminent. This Weberian "perspectivism" rested not on metaethical or metaphysical postulates but rather on a claim about the nature of action and experience in modern culture. No doubt it asserted that one *ought* to side with the historical present, with a "disenchanted" world from which there can be no magical escape but from which contingently hopeful futures might emerge. Why this particular choice, however? What reasons lie behind Weber's affirmation? In the last analysis there seem to be three kinds of answers, or if one prefers, three "levels"—psychological, political, and scientific—to a complete answer to this last and most fundamental of all questions.

First of all, Weber frequently enough expressed his *personal* choice for understanding, as he put it, "what is": "I am not an astrologer and not rash enough to attempt to satisfy those craving belief. My most decisive inner need is 'intellectual integrity:' I say 'what is.' "[7] This "decisive inner need "—which appears so strongly accentuated in all of Weber's discussions of "vocation"—from the religious to the scientific and the political, certainly underlies the "pathos of distance" that characterizes his most brilliant work. But it should also be said, simply with respect to the personal conduct of life, that the values Weber objectified for himself and others, particularly the need for "integrity" and "matter-of-factness," strove for the same kind of "distancing" effects. No better illustration of what might be called the "therapeutic" implications of such objectification can be found than in his advice concerning his sister Lily:

> What would *objectively* do her some good is the most straightforward acceptance of life and fate in the spirit that life not only wants to be lived as it is, but also again and again *deserves* to become lived, not emotionally but rather in plain sincerity with respect to persons and things, in uncomplicated simplicity with all of its "problematics" —in short, all that which lies in the opposite direction from the modern chase after "experience."[8]

The dualism operative in such a formulation—the stance of an unpretentious directness against the emotionally alluring and exhausting search for genuine experience—contains a plea and a strategy for fending off the demons of "inwardness" and "subjectivism" that must for cultural reasons hover around every modern individual (at least around those who are not, in Weber's words, "spiritually dead") and determine the entire problem of life's purposes. The personal significance of "integrity" then lies in the struggle for the mastery of self within a world in which the manifold of "experience," the testing ground for self-expression, has come to challenge the very possibility of an "integrated" self. Weber's choice for the world that is historically "as it is" can in this sense represent a way of coping with discontent brought about by fundamental contradiction. Only by repudiating its own presuppositions could Weber's analysis be expected to have a different character.

Beyond the personal, Weber's choice also rested upon reasons having to do with his conception of the political. The affirmation of "objective culture" expressed through "technical achievements" had practical-political consequences: it led, above all, to a political stance (and reputation) widely, if misleadingly, characterized as "bourgeois." But if Weber accepted the historical results of the sociocultural transformation inaugurated by ascetic Protestantism, it was not because of a secure faith in progress through technological development or belief in the inherent superiority of new forms of economic rationalization and their salutary political and cultural effects. Rather, the essential rationale of his position was found in (1) the choice in favor of a "politics of responsibility" toward the future of history; and (2) the search for a political dynamic adapted to the culture of modernity, an arrangement of powers and orders that would measure up to the irreversible facts of "bureaucratization" of institutions on the one hand and the demand for "democratization" on the other. These twin pillars of argument implied a politics anchored in the historical world of causes and consequences, means and ends, facts and explanations. Weber even radicalized this assessment to the point of seeing in the most plausible self-proclaimed "political" alternatives, such as revolutionary socialism, a mirror image of the present: the call for revolution often meant merely the introduction of state socialism (i.e., the reconstruction of the state as "rational" entrepreneur) and thus a social order still encased in the constraints of the "iron cage," but now without even the "freedoms" permitted by voluntary association. Those who elected politics as a vocation, regardless of ideological persuasion, were in Weber's idiom condemned to bear the burden of action within the world as it is, informed by a "knowledge of tragedy" (1958b, 535; 1946, 117). All attempts through politics to deny this burden altogether would predictably have precisely the reverse effect and make the state's dominion even more complete, unbearable, and unaccountable.

Finally, faced with the turn-of-the-century cultural problem, Weber sought clarity above all in the diagnostic powers of *scientific* reflection, or in what could be called "the sphere of intellectual knowledge" (1968, 564; 1946, 350), surely one of Weber's most openly expressed passions. Like the political, the aesthetic and the erotic, knowledge or *Intellekt* was conceived in the terminology of the "Reflection" to be a particular value sphere possessing an internal logic and a self-sustaining commitment to "intellectual integrity," which set it in opposition to any "ethic of brotherliness" but whose own presuppositions it was nevertheless prevented from justifying:

> Rational knowledge, which has followed its own autonomous and inner-worldly norms . . . has fashioned a cosmos of truths which no longer had anything to do with the systematic postulates of a rational religious ethic. . . . Although science has created this cosmos of natural causality and has seemed unable to answer with certainty the question of its own ultimate presuppositions, in the name of "intellectual integrity" it has come forward with the claim of representing the only possible form of a reasoned view of the world. Thus the intellect, like all cultural values, has also created an unbrotherly aristocracy of the rational possession of culture [*unbrüderliche Aristokratie des rationalen Kulturbesitzes*], one that is independent of all personal ethical qualities of humankind. (1920, 569; 1946, 355) (my translation)

Undoubtedly one of Weber's most passionate choices—the flight into the "unbrotherly aristocracy" of rational scientific culture—represented a specific, permanent, and comprehensive answer to the various "escape routes" of modern discontent. In the words Weber borrows from *Faust*, this "devil is old; grow old to understand him." If the impersonal, disenchanting rationalism of "knowledge" could not possibly solve the Tolstoyan problem of "meaning" while remaining true to its own critical premises, it could nevertheless minimally fulfill the "duty of bringing about self-clarification and a sense of responsibility," helping the willing human agent give "an account of the ultimate meaning of his own conduct" (1968, 608; 1946, 152). On this ground and this ground alone, the option for "science" could be "justified" within the total economy of choice.

Having distinguished among three kinds of reasons for Weber's choice in the "age of subjectivist culture," it is necessary to emphasize in the end the logical consistency and substantive unity among all three. Again and again Weber returns to the same configuration of principles: responsibility, integrity, self-discipline, clarity of vision, the pathos of distance, and objectivity toward self and world. With these ideas we have touched the foundations of Weber's evaluative response to the sensuous, emotive, inward culture of modernity. It does not seem possible to go beyond them to anything more fundamental.

## Conclusion

Weber's fully articulated position is open to criticism from other value positions or value spheres, but its strength lies precisely in its having accounted already for these alternatives, their assumptions, and their paradoxes. There are, as it were, no unanticipated surprises left to startle and derail the inquiring mind. Whether we can share Weber's formulation of the issues, his juxtaposition of the antinomies and ironies of existence, and his choice for personal-political responsibility *and* knowledge or whether we are attracted instead to the rival claim of an alternative will depend not merely on those "demons" who "hold the fibers of our lives" cited in the closing sentence of "Science as a Vocation" but also on our understanding and judgment of the culture that surrounds us. This is itself preeminently a task for knowledge, whose performance would lead far beyond the scope of this paper.

However, to the extent that we continue to share the larger problem of politics and culture with Weber and his fin de siècle generation, to the extent that modernity and the adaptive maneuvers and protests provoked by it continue to pursue us, we should at least be able to gain in understanding through recovery of an analysis prepared to heed the warning in Goethe's lines,

> Day is still upon us,
> while we remain active;
> But the night approaches,
> where none can be productive.

One would like to think that remembrance of what has gone before and might yet lie ahead can provoke a modest step away from the shadows of silence, forgetfulness, and self-deception.

## Notes

This paper was written in connection with a seminar taught jointly with Wilhelm Hennis at the University of Freiburg, and it has benefitted greatly from his helpful suggestions.

1. *Verhängnis* carries this crucial double meaning, as in Nietzsche's use of the term in *The Gay Science* (bk. 5, sec. 371) and in the discussion of asceticism as "our fate" or "fatality" in *The Genealogy of Morals* (e.g., "First Essay," sec. 11), a text Weber knew well; see the provocative remarks in Hennis 1986.

2. Weber to Michels, 4 August 1908, Archivo Max Weber 59, Turin (my translation); Weber is replying to Michels's *Archiv* article (1908), the earliest published statement of the thesis developed in *Political Parties.*

3. Weber to Michels, 30 May 1914, Archivo Max Weber 116a, Turin.

4. From a programmatic letter on the George circle to Dora Jellinek, 9 May 1910, reprinted with omissions and errors in Marianne Weber (1926, 465–67; 1975, 457–59); the original typescript is in the Zentrales Staatsarchiv Merseburg, Nachlass Weber [the Weber Papers] 30/6, 6–8; Dora Jellinek, the daughter of Weber's Heidelberg colleague, and not Margarete Susman (as Harry Zohn suggests), is the "gifted woman" who inspired this exchange.

5. Nachlass Weber 30/6, 6–8 (my translation).

6. Most recently H. N. Fügen (1985, 118–22) has interpreted the passages on eroticism containing the most extensive 1919–20 revisions in the "Reflection" as a sublimated expression of Weber's relationship with Else Jaffé-Richthofen—a plausible suggestion that must await publication of Weber's correspondence in the *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe* for fuller discussion.

7. 15 July 1909; Nachlass Weber 30/4, 85–86 (my translation).

8. 1 January 1917, Nachlass Weber 30/8, 6–9 (my translation.

## References

Baumgarten, Eduard. 1964. *Max Weber, Werk und Person.* Tübingen: Mohr.

Bernstein, Richard J., ed. 1985. *Habermas and Modernity.* Cambridge: MIT Press.

Freud, Sigmund. 1961. *Civilization and Its Discontents,* ed. James Strachey. New York: Norton.

Fügen, Hans N. 1985. *Max Weber.* Hamburg: Rowohlt.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1985. *Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne.* Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Hennis, Wilhelm. 1986. Die Spuren Nietzsches im Werk Max Webers. In *Jahrbuch der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen 1985.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Lukács, Georg. 1971. *The Theory of the Novel.* Trans. A. Bostock. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Lukács, Georg. 1982. *Georg Lukács Briefwechsel 1902–1917.* Stuttgart: Metzler.

Lyotard, Jean-Francois. 1984. *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Michels, Robert. 1908. Die oligarchischen Tendenzen der Gesellschaft. *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* 27:73–135.

Michels, Robert. 1927. *Bedeutende Männer, Charakterologische Studien.* Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1967. *On the Genealogy of Morals.* Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage.

Schorske, Carl E. 1981. *Fin-de-siècle Vienna, Politics and Culture.* New York: Vintage.

Simmel, Georg. 1907. *Schopenhauer und Nietzsche.* Munich: Duncker & Humblot.

Simmel, Georg. 1978. *The Philosophy of Money.* Trans. T. Bottomore and D. Frisby. Boston: Routledge.

Simmel, Georg. 1983. *Philosophische Kultur.* Berlin: Wagenbach.

Weber, Marianne. 1919. *Frauenfragen und Frauengedanken, Gesammelte Aufsätze.* Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck).

Weber, Marianne. 1926. *Max Weber, Ein Lebensbild.* Tübingen: Mohr.

Weber, Marianne. 1975. *Max Weber, A Biography.* Trans. H. Zohn. New York: Wiley.

Weber, Max. 1897. Diskussionsbeitrag zum Vortrag Karl Oldenberg, über Deutschland als Industriestaat. In *Verhandlungen des Achten Evangelisch-socialen Kongresses.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Weber, Max. 1904. Geleitwort. *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* 19:1-7.

Weber, Max. 1906. Zur Lage der bürgerlichen Demokratie in Russland. *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* 22:Beilage, 6-125.

Weber, Max. 1910. Diskussionsbeitrag über die Produktivität der Volkswirtschaft. *Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik, Verhandlungen der Generalversammlung.* Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, vol. 132.

Weber, Max. 1911. Diskussionsbeitrag zu dem Vortrag von Werner Sombart, Technik und Kultur. *Verhandlungen des Ersten Deutschen Soziologentages 1910.* Tübingen: Mohr, 95-101.

Weber, Max. 1920. *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie.* Vol. 1. Tübingen: Mohr.

Weber, Max. 1924. Der Sozialismus. In *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik.* Tübingen: Mohr.

Weber, Max. 1946. *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology.* Trans. and ed. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills. New York: Oxford.

Weber, Max. 1949. *The Methodology of the Social Sciences.* Trans. and ed. E. Shils and H. Finch. New York: Free Press.

Weber, Max. 1958a. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.* Trans. T. Parsons. New York: Scribner's.

Weber, Max. 1958b. *Gesammelte Politische Schriften.* Tübingen: Mohr.

Weber, Max. 1968. *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre.* 3d ed. Tübingen: Mohr.

Weber, Max. 1978. *Max Weber, Selections in Translation.* Ed. W. G. Runciman and trans. E. Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Weber, Max. 1984. *Die Lage der Landarbeiter im ostelbischen Deutschland 1892. Gesamtausgabe I/3.* Ed. M. Riesebrodt. Tübingen: Mohr.

---

Lawrence H. Scaff is Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721.

# THE INDIVIDUAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FEDERAL TAX POLICY

MICHAEL R. HAWTHORNE
*Grinnell College*

JOHN E. JACKSON
*University of Michigan*

*Public policies are the product of conflicting demands within society. These demands are both collective in nature and the product of individual interests. Individuals must balance these conflicting interests in developing their policy preferences. We estimate the role of collective and individual interests in preference formation, using tax policy as a substantive example. Survey data are used to estimate the model for evaluations of several tax policies debated during consideration of the 1978 Tax Revenue Act. Our analysis indicates that individual preferences for tax policies are greatly affected by attitudes towards collective issues—particularly redistribution attitudes—and by self-interest considerations. We also find that aggregate variables measuring individuals' local economies have significant effects on symbolic and self-interest preferences.*

Public policies are the product of many conflicting demands and interests within society. One source of conflict is disagreement over collective goals, such as how wealth is to be distributed among individuals and generations, how to balance competing economic objectives, how individual rights will be constrained by society to achieve common goals, and even how collective decisions are to be made. It is no surprise that decisions on policies designed to achieve these goals can generate a great deal of conflict. Individuals will disagree about the proper goals of society and about the proper means to achieve those goals.

A second source of conflicts is the result of personal interests and the effect of society's policies upon each person. Public policies are not likely to treat individuals identically. Some individuals will be advantaged by a policy while others are not, or some will share more of a policy's cost than others.

A model of attitudes towards public policies must reflect both collective and individual interests. Preferences for a particular policy are influenced by three factors: the policy's effect on collective attributes, the value individuals place on the collective attributes, and the policy's personal impacts. If these factors conflict, the individual must decide what weight to give each. People who support a policy's general objectives but oppose its personal impacts must decide which interests are more important, collective or personal, and their willingness to make personal sacrifices to achieve the desired collective objectives.

We begin with the statement that public policies affect both collective and private interests simultaneously. The analysis of policy preferences first identifies people's collective values and the conflicts among those values. Our first concern, for example, is to estimate the relative values individuals place on such collective values as the aggregate income distribution, the level of environmental quality, or the level of racial integration.

The second part of the analysis identifies the impact of alternative policies on personal interests. This is accomplished by estimating how individual incomes or life styles will be altered by a particular public action. These individual interests are often very difficult to enumerate and measure, as they are determined by a complex set of individual and organizational behaviors. Their assessment, however, is central to any effort at estimating individual preferences. Finally, we assess the relative strength of collective values and private considerations in individual policy evaluations by examining choices in specific situations.

We apply this approach to the study of preferences for federal tax policy using survey data collected during debate on the Tax Revenue Act of 1978. Tax policy is an excellent subject for this analysis for several reasons. First, it is a policy that affects all citizens and on which most people have opinions and some knowledge. Thus, we can be less concerned about nonattitudes producing biased responses to the survey questions, though such concerns are addressed within the model. Second, the individual impacts of alternative tax policies can be easily evaluated by comparing the resulting change in tax burdens. Questions about tax changes can be written so that individuals perceive their personal interests more clearly than with many other survey items. Thus, we should be better able to ascertain the relative influence of collective values and personal interests in forming individual policy preferences.

Our analysis is presented in four sections. One describes the general dimensions of tax policy. Following this, we develop a formal model of individual policy preferences. The third section discusses the estimation of the model through analysis of survey data. Finally, the implications of the model are discussed. Throughout these discussions, our principle focus is the utility of this model as a means of describing and analyzing issue preferences and policy conflicts.

## Individual Preferences and Tax Reform

In developing the model of individual preferences for changes in tax policy, we first discuss the public objectives served by tax policy. We then present a discussion of individual interests and how they are related to any tax change.

### Public Objectives

Tax policy has four collective objectives: to (1) finance public services, (2) redistribute income, (3) promote economic growth, and (4) maintain economic stability. We present a brief discussion of each objective, including consideration of the conflicts within each objective (see Musgrave 1959, chap. 2 and Musgrave and Musgrave 1976, chap. 8, for discussions of these objectives).

*Financing public services.* The most obvious objective of tax policy is to raise money to pay for publicly provided goods and services. An important issue is how to determine both the amount of goods and services to be produced and who will pay for them. Individuals differ in the value they place on public services, and thus will differ in their assessment as to whether taxes, in general, are too high or too low. For example, people opposed to additional federal services are more likely to favor tax cuts than people who favor more services (the level of public services is denoted as $G$ and the value a person places on additional services as $U_G^i$).

*Income redistribution.* A second objective of tax policy is to achieve a particular distribution of income within society. Although we have several different ways to redistribute income, the most economically and administratively efficient means is through the tax system. Naturally, an important source of conflict is disagreement over what is the proper distribution of income within society and whether more redistribution is needed (society's income distribution is denoted by $R$ and the value of a more progressive distribution is $U_R^i$).

*Promoting economic growth.* Another important objective of tax policy is to promote economic growth and increased productivity, particularly through encouraging capital investment. Taxes are commonly used to discourage current consumption and promote savings by offering deductions for money spent on capital investments or by exempting income from capital investments. However, in recent years, as typified by the Kemp-Roth and Reagan tax packages, tax cuts are used to increase certain individuals' income, with the hope that this additional income will be used for investment rather than private consumption and that lower marginal rates will encourage greater work effort (the country's growth rate is symbolized by $r$ and the value of increasing that growth rate by $U_r^i$).

*Stabilizing the economy.* The final public objective of tax policy to be discussed here involves economic stabilization. Changes in tax policy can be used to reduce demand, and thus inflation, or to stimulate demand and boost aggregate output. Debate about the proper stabilization policy and thus the proper tax changes becomes clouded when high inflation rates and falling demand exist simultaneously, as in the late 1970s, generating a great deal of conflict over whether economic stimulation or restraint is needed (the nation's employment level and inflation rate are denoted by $E$ and $p$ respectively, while $U_E^i$ and $U_p^i$ indicate the values placed on increasing employment and decreasing inflation).

## Private Interests

The private interests associated with proposed tax changes are derived from the effect of the tax change on disposable incomes, where disposable income, $I_i$, is gross income minus tax payments, for example, $I_i = Y_i - t_i(Y_i - D_i) = (1 - t_i)Y_i + t_iD_i$. Personal deductions and average tax rates are denoted by $D_i$ and $t_i$ respectively, and the $t_iD_i$ shows that the value of any deduction depends upon the person's tax rate (for simplicity of exposition, we assume a proportional income tax so that average and marginal tax rates are identical). Changes in disposable income arise in three ways: changes in individual deductions, $\Delta D_i$; changes in pretax incomes as a consequence of the aggregate economic effects of the tax change, $\Delta Y_i$; and changes in individual marginal tax rates, $\Delta t_i$. The total change in disposable income from these three different effects can be approximated by

$$\Delta I_i = t_i\Delta D_i + (1 - t_i)\Delta Y_i - (Y_i - D_i)\Delta t_i$$

How individuals value expected change in disposable income depends upon their marginal utility for private consumption, which we denote as $U_I^i$.

## Individual Preferences

To model individual support for or opposition to any proposed tax change, we must model how people weigh preferences for the different collective objectives and for changes in their personal income. We denote by $\Delta G$, $\Delta R$, $\Delta r$, $\Delta E$, and $\Delta p$ the expected changes in each public objective as a consequence of the tax alteration. The evaluation of each changed collective outcome can be approximated by multiplying the value placed on a change in the public objective by the change in that objective expected to result from the tax alteration. For example, the evaluation of any change in the income distribution is $U^i_R \Delta R$. Obviously, any tax change is likely to affect all public objectives and the person's income. To get the overall evaluation we need to sum each of these individual evaluations (the Appendix derives this statement from a simple utility maximization model). This expression is

$$\Delta U^i = U^i_G \Delta G + U^i_R \Delta R + U^i_r \Delta r + U^i_E \Delta E + U^i_p \Delta p + U^i_I \Delta I_i \qquad (1)$$

If $\Delta U^i > 1$, we expect the person to favor the proposed alteration, and, conversely, if $\Delta U^i < 0$, we predict they will oppose the change.[1]

Our model of tax-policy preferences is constructed in three recursive blocks. The first block models variations in individual evaluations of the public objectives as a function of exogenous variables measuring individual and contextual economic and demographic factors. We discuss the specification of these variables subsequently but for now simply denote their existence by $X_1$. We specify one equation for each public objective (and for convenience drop the $i$ superscript):

$$U_G = X_1 B_{1G} + V_{1G} \qquad (2)$$

$$U_R = X_1 B_{1R} + V_{1R} \qquad (3)$$

$$U_r = X_1 B_{1r} + V_{1r} \qquad (4)$$

$$U_E = X_1 B_{1E} + V_{1E} \qquad (5)$$

$$U_p = X_1 B_{1p} + V_{1p} \qquad (6)$$

These are reduced-form linear equations in which the elements of $B_1$ estimate how evaluations of different public objectives vary among individuals described by the variables in $X_1$.

The second block in the model specifies the relationship between the public-objective evaluations and the responses to survey questions, with separate equations estimated for each question. Responses to any one question, regardless of its format, will reflect considerations specific to that question and possible response biases, as well as positions on the public objectives (see Jackson 1979 and 1983 on these two points and Franklin and Jackson 1986 on the general issue of measurement error). In addition, in several cases we have more than one question that can serve as a measure of a specific public objective, such as several questions about attitudes towards redistribution. In this case, we want to model responses to each question separately and use one of the multiple indicator statistical methods (such as LISREL) to estimate both the underlying model for public objectives and the relationship between these evaluations and the survey response. If we denote by $Q_j$ the responses to question $j$, by $U_*$ the public objective evaluations associated with that question, and by $X_{2j}$ the exogenous factors that are also likely to affect these responses ($X_{2j}$ includes factors that might produce any systematic response bias), we have the following model for the survey response:

$$Q_j = U_* A_{*j} + X_{2j} B_{2j} + e_j \qquad (7)$$

The third part of the model estimates the preferences for specific policies, as shown in Equation 1. Included in this equation are the estimated individual evaluations of the public objectives, which are obtained from Equations 2–6, and variables measuring expected changes in disposable income, multiplied by the appropriate tax-rate variables. This model is shown as follows:

$$Z_k = U_G C_{1k} + U_R C_{2k} + U_r C_{3k} + U_E C_{4k} + U_p C_{5k} + (1 - t) X_3 B_{3k} + t^* D B_{4k} + t^* Y B_{5k} + V_k \qquad (8)$$

Figure 1. Schematic of Tax-Preference Model


EXOGENOUS VARIABLES
INDIVIDUAL & LOCAL CONTEXT
X1
B1
X2
B21
B22
B23
B24
B25
B26
B27
B28
B29
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5
Q6
Q7
Q8
Q9
A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
A6
A7
A8
A9
REDISTRIBUTION
GROWTH
EMPLOYMENT
INFLATION
PUBLIC SERVICES
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
Zk
B3
B4
B5
LOCAL ECONOMY: X3*(1-t)
DEDUCTIONS: D*t
TAX RATES: t*Y
QUESTIONS
PUBLIC OBJECTIVES
POLICY
PRIVATE INTERESTS

$Z_k$ is the person's stated preference on policy $k$, as measured by an appropriate survey question; $t$, $Y$, and $D$ represent individual tax rates, gross incomes, and deductions respectively; and $X_3$ is a set of variables measuring the local economy and how tax changes are likely to alter individual gross incomes. The coefficients $C_{1k}$–$C_{5k}$ assess the relative importance of collective considerations in setting preferences on specific tax-policy changes while the coefficients $B_{3k}$–$B_{5k}$ measure the importance of personal considerations in these preferences. If people are purely sociotropic, the coefficients $C_{1k}$–$C_{5k}$ will be large with small values for $B_{3k}$–$B_{5k}$. A purely private-regarding model of preference formation predicts just the opposite pattern. Significant coefficients for both $C$ and $B$ in Equation 8 indicate that people combine both sociotropic and personal elements in their preferences.

These three blocks, with their appropriate variables and coefficients, are depicted in Figure 1. Evaluations of collective objectives and their relationship with exogenous variables, Equations 2–6, are shown in the center of the diagram. To the left are the multiple indicators of the evaluations of collective objectives. As represented in Equation 7, these responses are also related to specific exogenous variables that may affect responses. Lastly, the effects of collective evaluations and personal interests on specific policy preferences (Equation 8) are shown on the right for a representative policy, $Z_k$. Our next task is to relate this structure to some specific tax proposals and to survey data assessing preferences for these proposals.

### The Tax Revenue Act of 1978

We can estimate this model using proposals that arose in the debate over the Tax Revenue Act of 1978. The 1978 legislation is particularly interesting because it reversed a number of trends in tax legislation.

The Act

1. created tax cuts that were much less progressive than those passed in the late 1960s and 1970s;
2. reversed the trend in increasing capital-gains taxation;
3. represented the debut of the Kemp-Roth proposal;
4. demonstrated a conscious attempt by the minority party, the Republicans, to develop a package of policy proposals to serve as an alternative to those pushed by the Carter administration and the Democratic leadership.

We can observe how collective and personal interests are involved in individual preference decisions by analyzing several specific tax changes proposed during the 1978 tax debate. One change is the Carter administration's proposal for a stimulative package of progressive personal-income-tax cuts and expanded-investment tax credits. We will also consider the Republican Kemp-Roth plan and the proposal for a reduced capital-gains tax. Finally, we analyze some special proposals that made their way into the 1978 debates, such as tax credits for college tuition, a change in the taxation of corporate dividends, and changes in certain other deductions. Individual evaluations of public objectives and the influence of collective and personal considerations in their positions on the specific taxes are estimated with data collected by the Roper Organization during spring 1978.[2]

## Evaluation of Public Objectives

The questions used to measure preferences for each public objective, the objectives they are presumed to measure, and the distribution of responses to each question are shown in Table 1. The responses for these questions are trichotomous and scored on a 0./0.5/1.0 basis, with the *don't know* response defined in our analysis as a middle category. Consequently, we can measure the signs, but not the magnitude, of the marginal utilities in Equation 1. For example, we know that 47% of the respondents say the poor pay too much in taxes. However, we are unable to determine by how much each of these respondents would change tax rates for the poor or for which respondents this preference might be very important and outweigh a personal income loss associated with a specific tax proposal directed towards this objective.[3]

Also included in our analysis is a general measure of individual dissatisfaction with the amount of income tax paid. There was considerable speculation during 1978 that the public was simply fed up with and was revolting against any and all taxes. Much of this speculation was sparked by the approval of Proposition 13 in California. Although there are numerous explanations for the passage of this referendum (see Sears and Citrin 1983; Proceedings 1979), it was widely believed in 1978 that voters displeased with the amount of taxes they were paying would vote to reduce their own taxes whenever they had the opportunity. However, they were also seen by some as "free-riders," unwilling to reduce government services to compensate for these tax cuts. Dissatisfaction, if it is a broad symbolic attribute, predicts support for any tax reduction, regardless of personal interests. Dissatisfaction is measured with a 10-point scale.[4] Respondents rated their feelings about the amount of income taxes they paid on a 10-point scale, with 1 being perfectly

**Table 1. Distribution of Preferences for Tax Objectives (%)**

| Questions | Favor | Oppose | Don't Know |
|---|---|---|---|
| Redistribution | | | |
| 1. Poor people pay too much in taxes? | 47 | 4 | 50[a] |
| 2. Redistribute income? | 60 | 32 | 8 |
| 3. Redistribute income with taxes[b]? | 30 | 62 | 8 |
| Stimulation of Economic Growth | | | |
| 4. Use business tax credits to create jobs? | 24 | 68[c] | 8 |
| 5. Use taxes to help depressed firms? | 27 | 62 | 11 |
| Stabilization | | | |
| 6. Most important to control inflation[d]? | 38 | 62 | — |
| 7. Most important to lower unemployment[e]? | 12 | 88 | — |
| Spending for Services | | | |
| 8. Purpose of tax system not just to raise money? | 46 | 41 | 12 |
| 9. Increase government services[f]? | 86 | 14 | — |

[a] Includes the 37% who feel the poor pay the right amount of taxes.

[b] Uses the same question as "Redistribute income." This separates those who would use other means from those who favor using taxes to redistribute income.

[c] Includes the 48% who preferred government-created public-service jobs and the 11% who favored direct business subsidies to combat unemployment and welfare problems.

[d] Question asks whether respondent feels that controlling inflation is the first or second most important thing that needs to be done in our country.

[e] Question asks whether respondent feels that lowering unemployment is the first or second most important thing that needs to be done in our country.

[f] Half of the sample was given a short list of government programs and asked which they would be willing to pay more taxes to have increased. The 14% opposed said no to all programs.

satisfied and 10 meaning extremely angry; 16% of the respondents gave an answer between 1 and 3, 60% between 4 and 7, and 24% between 8 and 10.

Responses to the questions in Table 1 and, presumably, perceptions of tax policy goals are dominated by evaluations of the redistribution objective. In Figure 1 and Table 1, responses to each question are treated as multiple indicators of the objective with which the question is grouped and a LISREL procedure was used to estimate the basic preference structure represented by Equations 2–7. These estimates produced two important results. The statistical fit indicated that our expectations were likely incorrect and that a very high degree of similarity existed between the equations for each objective (the statistical fit indicated that our hypotheses, if correct, would produce by chance results with a worse fit less than 10% of the time).[5] A likely explanation for the poor fit and for the equations' similarity is that responses to several of the questions are related to a single basic objective as well as to the hypothesized objective. For example, if responses to the question about using taxes to help depressed businesses were strongly influenced by demands for redistribution, our model would obviously fit poorly. Furthermore, the statistical method used would attempt to estimate demands for business support that are highly correlated with redistribution preferences (this result is the classic specification bias resulting from omitted variables found in any linear model).

Based on these results, we respecified

**Table 2. Estimated Model of Preferences for Collective Objectives**

| Demographic Variables | Redistribute Income | Finance Services | Stimulate Growth | Control Inflation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Individual Measures | | | | |
| Income[a] | -.078** | -.021 | | |
| Income > $25,000 | .001 | .025 | .032 | |
| Non-white | .199** | -.005 | | |
| Age[a] | -.124** | -.245** | | .218** |
| Years of schooling[a] | -.079 | -.035 | .477** | |
| Union | .005 | -.045** | -.057** | |
| Economic Context Measures | | | | |
| Tax rate[a] | | .011 | | .089* |
| East/Midwest | .103** | .005 | .036 | |
| South | .052** | -.006 | -.024 | |
| Unemployment[ab] | .154** | -.308** | | .003 |
| Percent non-white[ab] | -.014 | .038** | | |
| Income per capita[ab] | .291** | .130 | | .457** |
| Number of cases = 1,922. | | | | |

[a] Variable in logarithmic form.

[b] Variable based on respondent's county.

*Coefficient larger than 1.65 times estimated asymptotic standard error.

**Coefficient larger than 1.96 times estimated asymptotic standard error.

and reestimated the model, incorporating the hypothesis that redistribution demands influence the responses to most questions. This model change is accomplished by including redistribution evaluations, $U_R$, in all but the inflation (Question 6) and government services (Question 9) equations. The model discussed and rejected above also implied that desires to promote economic growth influenced responses to the inflation question. Based on this result we included the growth preference in the inflation equation (Question 6). This respecification led to a new model. In the respecified model, certain exogenous variables are omitted from the growth, unemployment, and inflation equations because they have no relationship with these evaluations once the effects of redistribution and growth preferences are included (the exact specification of each preference equation will be seen in Table 2). Responses to the unemployment question are solely a function of redistribution preferences, so that equation is omitted. The statistical fit of this model is quite good, in that we could expect a worse fit by chance 40% of the time. We first discuss the models for each collective objective and then show how these preferences affect the responses to the questions shown in Table 1.

## Preferences for Public Objectives

Individual preferences for public objectives are related to two types of factors, as shown in Table 2: (1) characteristics of the respondents and (2) measures of respondents' local economies and communities. Each column in the table is a regression equation. The table entries give the expected change in each collective preference for a unit change in the associated explanatory variable (tables of standard errors are available from the authors on request). All of the continuous variables —income, education, age, tax rate, the area's per capita income, and the area's black population (as percentage of total population) are expressed in logarithmic form.

There are several important relationships explaining people's evaluations of public objectives. Given the central role of redistribution preferences, we will concentrate our discussion on that equation. As is to be expected, support for more income redistribution decreases with income. What is surprising is the weakness of the relationship (the survey response variables are scaled from 0 to 1, so coefficients can be interpreted in terms of the resulting difference in the probability of favoring more redistribution). The variables are in log form, so the coefficient of −.078 implies that support for more redistribution decreases by .02 with each doubling of income and that the difference between a person earning $10 thousand and someone earning $50 thousand in 1978 dollars is only .05. By contrast, support decreases by .04 with a doubling of respondent age, and being black is associated with a .20 increase in support.

The variables associated with the largest differences in redistribution preferences are the contextual variables describing respondents' communities and local economies. To illustrate, an individual living in a wealthy county with a high unemployment rate (a per capita income of $6 thousand and 12% unemployed) is .18 more likely to favor redistribution than the "same" individual living in a low-income county with a low unemployment rate ($3 thousand per capita income and 3% (unemployed). This probability difference could increase to .29 if we consider the regional difference between the North and Midwest and the West regions. The magnitude of the contextual differences is much greater than the individual variations cited above.[6]

There are several notable results in the other equations. The only evaluation that is not strongly related to the contextual variables is the wish to use tax policy to promote economic growth. Variations in this preference are strongly related to education and weakly to union membership but not to other variables in any significant or substantial way (inclusion of the contextual variables in this equation indicated they had little or no effect). Increasing age was strongly associated with opposition to increased federal-government services and with support for controlling inflation. Finally, the only strong but counterintuitive result is the opposition to any increased federal-government services in areas with high unemployment. We have no obvious explanation, or rationalization, for this outcome.

These findings highlight an important methodological conclusion concerning the typical omission of contextual variables from models estimating policy attitudes. Studies that include only respondent attributes assume that people are homogeneous in all respects other than those individual variables in the analysis. Our results show the weakness of this assumption. Individuals sharing personal characteristics—such as age, education, income, or race—do not maintain similar policy preferences as they are "placed" within different local economic and social environments.

## Preferences and Question Responses

In Table 3 we give the equations modeling the responses to each question shown in Table 1. Again, each column should be read as a separate regression equation relating responses to collective-objective preferences, to personal considerations, and to evidence of interest in, and knowledge of, tax policy. The latter two variables are included to represent the effects of any systematic bias from nonattitudes. It is apparent from these entries that redistribution preferences influence responses

Table 3. Model of Question Responses and Relationship to Tax Objectives

| Variables | Questions (See Table 1) | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q5 | Q6 | Q7 | Q8 | Q9 | Q10 |
| Collective-objective Preferences | | | | | | | | | | |
| Redistribution | .46** | 1.00 | .67** | -.50** | .46** | | 1.18** | .44** | | .30** |
| Business growth | | | | 1.00 | -.07 | .88** | | | | .08 |
| Inflation | | | | | | 1.00 | -.03 | | | .15* |
| Services | | | | | | | | | 1.00 | |
| Personal Considerations | | | | | | | | | | |
| Income | -.04* | | | | | | | | | .12** |
| Income > $25,000 | -.03* | | | | | | | | | .02* |
| Tax rate | .05* | .07* | -.06* | | -.13** | | | -.08* | | .08** |
| Age | | | | | | | | -.21** | | |
| East/Midwest | | | | | | | -.10** | | | |
| South | | | | | | | -.04* | | | |
| Local unemployment[a] | | | | | .22** | | | | | |
| Percent non-white[a] | | -.05* | | | | | | | | |
| Interest and Knowledge of Tax Policy | | | | | | | | | | |
| No interest | .04** | .02 | .04* | -.03* | -.01 | -.06* | .04 | .04* | -.06** | .00 |
| No knowledge | .02* | .02 | .05** | -.05** | -.02 | -.04* | -.01 | .03* | .02 | .01 |

[a] Variable based on respondent's county.

*Coefficient larger than 1.65 times the estimated asymptotic standard error.

**Coefficient larger than 1.96 times the estimated asymptotic standard error.

to most of the questions about public objectives. Only responses to questions about additional spending and about the importance of halting inflation are not affected by the redistribution component. The influences of redistribution preferences are also quite large, as indicated by the magnitudes of the coefficients. Respondents who desired a more progressive income distribution wanted to use taxes for reasons other than just to raise money, reduce unemployment, and help distressed businesses, and they opposed tax subsidies for businesses as a means to attack welfare and unemployment problems. These results support the arguments that policy preferences are rooted in basic, fundamental values (or symbols) and that attitudes towards a small set of values influence a broad set of preferences, or at least responses to questions about preferences (Sears et al. 1980).

Average tax rate was the only variable representing personal economic interest that was consistently related to question responses and then only when the question contained a reference to using taxes for some specific purpose. Individual tax rates were strongly and negatively related to a desire to use taxes to subsidize depressed business, for purposes other than raising money, and to redistribute income. They were positively related to the desire to redistribute income by any means and to the belief that poor people should pay lower taxes. The other variables included to assess personal interests were occasionally important but not systematically so. Income was negatively related only to the proposition that the poor pay too much in taxes, after controlling for redistribution preferences. Similarly, local unemployment levels played an important role in individual

**Table 4. Preferences for Specific Tax Policies (%)**

| Tax Policy Options | Responses | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Favor | Oppose | Don't Know |
| Capital-gains exemption | 43 | 40 | 17 |
| Gasoline-tax deduction | 76 | 19 | 5 |
| Mortgage-interest deduction | 88 | 7 | 5 |
| College-tuition tax credit | 23 | 70[a] | 7 |
| Index rates for inflation | 57 | 32 | 11 |
| Carter's $25-billion tax cut to stimulate economy | 53 | 37 | 11 |
| | Only Corporation | Only Those Receiving Dividends | Both and Don't Know |
| Where corporate dividends should be taxed | 35 | 15 | 50 |
| | Increased Revenue | Leave the Same and Don't Know | Decrease Revenue |
| Tax cuts will stimulate more federal revenue or raise deficits | 18 | 59 | 23 |

[a] Includes the 34% of the sample who favored making more people eligible for loans, the 20% who wanted more direct grants to college, and the 16% who opposed any form of aid.

preferences, once redistribution demands were controlled.

Expressions of dissatisfaction with personal taxes were significantly related to both collective and personal interests. Responses to this question were included to represent either some broadly based dissatisfaction with the nation's income-tax system or self-interest (free riders wishing to reduce their own taxes without making any compensating changes in other policies). We found no evidence of any broad-based dissatisfaction of the tax-revolt sort. Self-interests were clearly present, as indicated by the positive coefficients on the income and tax variables, but so were public concerns. Dissatisfaction was significantly related to interests in redistribution and controlling inflation. These results have two implications for our subsequent analysis. They clearly point out the importance of collective considerations in evaluating questions about tax policy, even one supposedly loaded with self-interest. Secondly, we will omit "dissatisfaction" from our consideration of specific tax proposals. It does not constitute a broad public concern about taxes in general nor does it supply information about private interests beyond that represented by the income and tax-rate variables, which are already included in Equation 8.

## Positions on Specific Tax Policies

The specific tax policies studied are shown in Table 4, along with the support each received from the respondents. Support or opposition to the specific taxes and tax reforms is estimated with a linear-regression model. The explanatory variables are individuals' estimated preferences for collective objectives (obtained from the equations in Table 2), measures of direct self-interest, and measures of local economies.[7] (The survey included questions about respondents' average tax rates and their use of specific deductions, from

Table 5. Model of Attitudes Towards Specific Tax Policies

| Variable | Corporate Dividend | Kemp-Roth | Carter Tax Cut | Capital Gains | Index Taxes | Tuition Credits | Mortgage Deduction | Gax Tax Deduction |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Collective-objective Preferences | | | | | | | | |
| Redistribution | -.17 | .24** | .34** | -.43** | -.02 | -.21* | -.42** | -.26** |
| Business growth | .22 | .03 | .34* | -.07 | .17 | .01 | .06 | .18 |
| Inflation | .38* | .12 | .11 | .42 | -.93** | -.03 | -.09 | .22 |
| Services | .06 | -.21 | -.07 | -.13 | -.62 | .23 | -.08 | -.20 |
| Personal Variables | | | | | | | | |
| Own stock[a] | .24** | | | .22* | | | | |
| Only salary income[a] | | | .42** | | | | | |
| Own home[a] | | | | -.15 | | | .22** | |
| Own × housing price change[a] | | | | .54 | | | | |
| Deduct mortgage interest[a] | | | | | | | .19** | |
| Deduct gas tax[a] | | | | | | | | .47** |
| Child < 13 | | | | | | .02 | | |
| Child 13-18 | | | | | | .00 | | |
| Child > 18 | | | | | | .08** | | |
| Income and Tax Rates | | | | | | | | |
| Tax rate × income | -.04 | -.02 | .03 | -.02 | .27** | .05 | -.07 | .01 |
| Tax rate × income > $25,000 | | | -.44** | | | | | |
| Economic Context Measures | | | | | | | | |
| Population change[b] | .18** | .08* | -.07 | .31** | .14* | .12* | .02 | .07 |
| Per capita income change[b] | .04 | -.22* | .40** | -.05 | .02 | .61** | .01 | .08 |
| Unemployment rate change[b] | 1.29** | -1.57** | 4.22** | 1.74** | -3.13** | 1.26* | .14 | .78 |
| Per capita income[b] | -.01 | -.00 | .01 | .01 | .07** | .03 | -.01 | .00 |
| Partisanship | | | | | | | | |
| Republican | -.05** | -.00 | -.03 | .03 | -.02 | .03 | .01 | -.01 |
| Independent | -.03 | .04 | -.01 | -.03 | -.02 | .05* | .01 | -.04 |
| No party | -.05** | .02 | -.05* | -.07** | .04 | .02 | .02 | -.04 |
| Interest and Knowledge of Tax Policy | | | | | | | | |
| No interest | -.00 | -.02 | -.02 | -.03 | -.02 | -.04 | -.03 | -.04 |
| No knowledge | -.00 | -.04** | -.04* | -.01 | -.05** | -.01 | -.02 | -.05** |
| Constant | .22 | .57 | .05 | .18 | .77 | -.23 | .91 | .45 |
| $R^2$ | .022 | .014 | .051 | .051 | .035 | .035 | .049 | .042 |
| Number of Cases = 1,965 | | | | | | | | |

[a] Variable multiplied by individual's tax rate.

[b] Variable multiplied by (1 - tax rate).

*Coefficient larger than 1.65 times estimated asymptotic standard error.
**Coefficient larger than 1.96 times estimated asymptotic standard error.

which we construct the primary self-interest measures.)

## Collective Concerns

Individual redistribution preferences are important determinants of preferences for specific tax changes. The estimated equations of these preferences are shown in Table 5, with each column being a separate regression equation explaining the variable listed at the top of the column. The coefficients assessing the influence of redistribution preferences are statistically significant at the .05 level in five of the eight equations and their magnitude exceeds .2 in six cases. The coefficients measuring the influence of desires to use taxes to promote business, to increase federal spending, and to control inflation are statistically significant in three equations. Again, we see the dominance of redistribution interests in positions on different tax issues.

*Redistribution.* Individuals desiring a redistribution of income quite strongly oppose mortgage interest and gasoline-tax deductions, capital-gains exemptions, and tuition tax credits, all parts of the tax code vigorously attacked as favoring wealthier taxpayers. These same individuals favor Carter's proposed tax cuts, which provided greater tax relief for the poor than the wealthy. Surprisingly, they agree with the supply-siders' hypothesis that reduced taxes will increase federal revenues. Overall, the impact of preferences for this fundamental objective is large and in the expected direction for tax issues that were clearly discussed in redistributional terms in 1978.

*Other Objectives.* Positions on the other public objectives have less systematic influence on evaluations of specific tax changes than do redistribution preferences. Desires to use taxes to promote business activity have their largest influence on support for Carter's tax package. In spite of symbolic attacks on three-martini lunches and other business expenses, Carter's proposal liberally expanded investment tax credits and other allowances designed to stimulate investment by large, capital-intensive firms. Respondents who favor more government spending strongly oppose indexing and mildly oppose other policies that reduce revenue, such as exemptions, deductions, and the Kemp-Roth hypothesis. These people do favor direct tuition tax credits, suggesting that that plan may appear more as an expenditure than a tax policy. The effects of demands to control inflation do not follow any particular pattern. These demands are very strongly related to opposition to indexing, as Keynesian economics would require. Otherwise it is hard, on both statistical and substantive grounds, to reject the null hypothesis that inflation concerns did not effect positions on individual tax changes.

## Personal and Local Economic Interests

One should not infer that individual evaluations of specific tax proposals are devoid of self-interest. We will present clear evidence to the contrary. Self-interest attitudes stem from the direct effect of a tax change on individual after-tax incomes by altering tax rates or deductions and from the indirect effect of the tax change on expected gross income through impacts on local economies.

*Personal income and tax effects.* Self-interest effects are best exemplified by the role of personal deductions. People who own homes and take the mortgage-interest deduction and those who use the gas-tax deduction are far more supportive of these deductions than are people who do not use them. Support for the capital-gains exemption is higher among people who own stocks and who own their own homes. The effect of homeownership increases the size of local housing price increases between 1972 and 1978. The larger the price increase and the larger the potential capital gains for homeowners, the higher the approval for the exemption.[8] Variables measuring the use of these deductions and exemptions are multiplied by tax rates because marginal tax rates determine the value of any deduction or exemption. Thus, support for each deduction and for capital-gains exemptions equals the appropriate coefficient shown in Table 5 times tax rates (technically, marginal tax rates rather than average tax rates should be used, but this information was not included in the survey). Respondents with college-age children are 8%

more likely than those without to favor the college-tuition tax credit. This term is not multiplied by tax rates because the value of a tax credit does not vary with rates. Lastly, support for Carter's tax plan, which tried to reduce taxes for earned (but not unearned) income, was considerably higher among those who receive all their income from salaries.

Tax rates had their greatest effect on preferences for the proposals that promised to alter rates across the board. Indexing, which decreases tax rates by extending the range of current tax brackets to offset inflation, receives more support as tax rates and incomes rise, as would be expected from the self-interest model. Respondents with larger incomes in higher brackers will gain far more after-tax income than those with low incomes and in low brackets. Carter's highly progressive plan received significantly less support among upper-income people, and this support decreased as tax rates increased. Tax rates and incomes had little or no effect on evaluations of the other tax proposals, which did not attempt to directly alter tax rates.

*Aggregate-income effects.* Many of the tax measures debated in 1978 were designed to alter investment patterns that will have varied impacts on local economies, thus differentially altering individual incomes. The influence of aggregate economic effects on attitudes is substantial, except for evaluations of the mortgage-interest and gas-tax deductions, which were not debated in aggregate economic terms. Residents in areas with increasing unemployment strongly favor Carter's tax cut, which was advertised as a plan to stimulate stagnant industries. They oppose the capital-gains exemption, indexing, and the Kemp-Roth hypothesis that reducing taxes would increase revenues, all of which are likely to aid growing local economies. Residents of areas with increasing population and, presumably, future increases in wealth support the capital-gains exemption, indexing, tuition tax credits, and the taxation of corporate profits at the corporation, all of which are likely to increase personal incomes in growing areas.

### Partisanship

There is little evidence of partisan differences in tax-policy preferences.[9] The differences between the preferences of Republicans and Democrats for specific tax policies are .03, or less, in all but one case (Republicans are .05 more likely than Democrats to prefer collecting corporate taxes from individual investors). The largest party effects are between Democrats and those preferring "No party," with the latter respondents more likely to oppose both Carter's tax cut and capital-gains exemptions (the magnitudes of these differences are less than .07). These results suggest there is an absence of partisan cue giving and cue taking on tax policy and that individuals' preferences are much more guided by redistributive preferences and their own economic stake in any change.

### Knowledge and Interest

We have also included in the preference equations assessments of individuals' interest in current events and knowledge of tax policy. These variables help correct for any systematic response biases contained in individuals' answers, attributable to cues provided by the questions and to individuals' perceptions of the "right" answer. The lower a person's interest and knowledge, the more likely he or she is to give the expected or correct answer rather than a true preference. As shown in Table 3, the uninterested and less knowledgeable are more likely to give affirmative answers to the redistribution questions and negative responses to questions about support for business. For the questions about specific policies, as displayed in Table 5, interest has very little effect and lack of knowledge has only small effects. The less knowledgeable are more likely to oppose Carter's cut, the Kemp-Roth hypothesis, indexing, and the gas-tax deduction. These interest and knowledge effects are generally small, with coefficients of .05 or less.

## Conclusions

The empirical results of our analysis of tax-policy preferences have broad implications in three different areas, all of which have been alluded to above but warrant additional emphasis and clarification. One point derives from the importance of aggregate economic variations on individual preferences. As mentioned earlier, this result has methodological and substantive implications for studies of individual policy preferences. The other two points are substantive, relating to how we think about the development of individual preferences and their possible importance in the political process.

The importance of collective considerations in structuring individual preferences is mentioned again here only to reaffirm a conceptual point made in the introduction. We distinguished collective objectives, or interests, from private considerations on the basis of whether the results affect the welfare of more than one individual. This definition makes it possible to have disagreement and conflict over public interests as well as conflict arising from competing private interests. Our evidence suggests that individuals have differing views about objectives that are public in nature, such as the proper income distribution, and that these views create conflicts about specific public-policy choices. Thus, some of the conflicts confronting our political institutions are those generated by differing evaluations of what collective activities society should undertake.

The public objective basic to preferences for tax policies is individual views on income redistribution.[10] The central place of redistribution preferences is demonstrated in their effect on other possible tax objectives and on evaluations of specific taxes and possible changes in the tax law. Responses to questions about the importance of fighting unemployment, using taxes to support depressed businesses, the correct purpose of taxes, and even about how dissatisfied people are with their tax payments are all influenced by redistribution views. Some of these attitudes were originally set out as reflecting independent tax objectives, yet these objectives turn out to be primarily derivations of redistribution preferences. As expected, evaluations of particular parts of the tax structure, such as tax cuts, capital-gains exemptions, and certain other deductions are strongly affected by attitudes towards income redistribution. It is not possible, then, to discuss the politics surrounding individual taxes or changes in the tax structure without addressing the redistribution issue.

The central role of redistribution preferences in evaluations of specific tax changes has significant implications for our notion of political debate and for efforts to build support or opposition for policy initiatives. People evaluate policy actions in terms of how those actions are likely to affect public objectives as well as by how they will be affected personally. Appeals to individual economic interests are obviously a part of politics, but among the mass public successful efforts to relate policy to collective values are effective ways to influence public opinion. Republican strategy on tax policy beginning in 1978 clearly recognizes this implication. They increasingly stressed the importance of economic growth as a public objective and the need for tax cuts, reduced inflation, and capital formation incentives to meet this objective. These efforts to have tax changes evaluated by their impact on investment and economic growth do not show up in our analysis. However, it is quite possible that after Reagan's 1980 campaign and his efforts to pass the 1981 tax bill, a similar analysis would show much greater influence of the growth objective and of the conflict between growth and redistribution posed by Reagan's proposals and subsequent debate.

People's stated preferences for collective, or public, objectives are not merely a rationalization for their own economic interests. The factors influencing individual redistribution preferences, such as education, race, age, local per capita income, and unemployment rate, indicate that redistribution preferences are more than a simple manifestation of an individual's current place in the income distribution. Income is related to redistribution preferences, as expected, though its influence was relatively small. Furthermore, many individuals with equivalent incomes have considerably different views on whether the poor should pay lower taxes and whether income should be transferred from the rich to the poor.

Other important determinants of redistribution preferences and of evaluations of particular tax policies are the characteristics of the respondent's local economy and how it is changing. Comparable individuals with identical incomes living in different economic regions have substantially different views towards redistribution and specific taxes. The substantive implications of this finding is that individuals can identify with collective attributes of society, or at least of local communities, and not focus solely on their own situations and incomes.

The methodological implications of these results warrant future attention. Most work estimating individual preferences and studying their formation relies on survey data, as one must to study individual behavior. However, most of these analyses exclude aggregate economic and social considerations, save for the occasional inclusion of region or residence variables (see Wright 1977, for an important exception to this pattern). Our results clearly point to the need to pay more attention to the social and economic environment in which individuals live, as determinants of political preferences.

The importance of the aggregate economic variables in Tables 2 and 5 indicates considerable contextual variation in positions on key elements of the 1978 Tax Revenue Act. These variations have implications for the legislative process. Our findings suggest that some tax issues create considerable conflict between areas and only small differences among individuals living in the same area, for instance, Carter's proposed tax cut and the effort to increase the capital-gains exemption. Other issues elicit the opposite pattern of conflict, such as taxing corporation profits and the legitimacy of the mortgage-interest and gas-tax deductions.

It is only speculation at this point, but it seems reasonable to predict that issues and policies that generate substantial regional preference differences will produce greater amounts of conflict within Congress than policies in which the conflicts are primarily between individuals. Given that congressional representation is based on geography, issues that split each chamber into regional factions would appear to be more divisive than issues that force members to choose among interests in their own constituencies. In terms of tax legislation, this model would predict that Congress would have more difficulty in passing (or rejecting) Carter's tax cut, the Republican effort to increase capital-gains exemptions, and indexing than in deciding on the mortgage-interest and gas-tax deductions, or the issue of how to tax corporate profits. The only way to develop measures of these conflicts, however, and to test the predictions one draws from them, is through the type of individual-preference analysis developed here.

## Appendix

In this appendix we derive the expression for individual evaluations of specific tax proposals shown in Equation 8. We begin with a standard individual utility function denoted as $U^i$. The arguments in this utility function are the collective objectives associated with tax policy and the person's after-tax income, $U^i = U(G, R, r, E, p, I_i)$, where $G$, $R$, $r$, $E$, and $p$ are the public objectives discussed in the text and $I_i$ is the person's disposable after-tax income. The effects on these public objectives of some alteration in current tax policy, denoted by $a$, are given by $\delta G/\delta a$, $\delta R/\delta a$, $\delta r/\delta a$, $\delta E/\delta a$, and $\delta p/\delta a$. We will denote these partials by $\Delta G_a$, $\Delta R_a$, $\Delta r_a$, $\Delta E_a$, and $\Delta p_a$ respectively. The expected change in disposable income is

$$\begin{aligned}\delta I_i/\delta a = \Delta I_{ia} &= (1 - t_i)\delta Y_i/\delta a \\ &\quad + t_i \delta D_i/\delta a - (Y_i - D_i)\delta t_i/\delta a \\ &= (1 - t_i)\Delta Y_{ia} + t_i \Delta D_{ia} \\ &\quad - (Y_i - D_i)\Delta t_{ia}\end{aligned}$$

The marginal utility from a change in each public objective is $\delta U^i/\delta G = U^i_G$, $\delta U^i/\delta R = U^i_R$, $\delta U^i/\delta r = U^i_r$, $\delta U^i/\delta E = U^i_E$, and $\delta U^i/\delta p = U^i_p$ and the marginal utility for disposable income is $\delta U^i/\delta I_i = U^i_I$. The expected change in utility from the tax alteration is $\delta U^i/\delta a = U^i_a$, or $\Delta U^i_a$. The expression for this total differential is

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta U^i_a &= (U^i_R \Delta R_a + U^i_G \Delta G_a + U^i_r \Delta r_a \\ &\quad + U^i_E \Delta E_a + U^i_p \Delta p_a) \\ &\quad + U^i_I[(1 - t_i)\Delta Y_{ia} + t_i \Delta D_{ia} \\ &\quad - (Y_i - D_i)\Delta t_{ia}]\end{aligned}$$

If $\Delta U^i_a > 0$, the individual is presumed to favor $a$; alternatively, if $\Delta U^i_a < 0$, we expect $a$ to be opposed. This expression, minus the $a$ subscripts, is Equation 1 in the text, from which we derived Equation 8 and the empirical estimations.

## Notes

This research was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation to the University of Michigan.

1. The terms relating changes in public objectives to alternative taxes, e.g., $\Delta G$ and $\Delta R$, summarize very complex social processes, about which there is uncertainty and debate. This debate is an important element in the political process but not one we address in this paper. When we estimate the operationalized version of Equation 1, not measuring individual differences in how tax changes are perceived to affect collective goals introduces an implicit downward bias into our estimates of the effects of collective preferences on specific policy preferences. For example, if everyone who agrees that taxes should be used to redistribute income divides evenly on whether tax subsidies to distressed business firms redistribute income, we would find no relationship between redistribution attitudes and the likelihood of favoring tax breaks for such enterprises.

2. These data are in Roper Study No. 648, "The American Public and the Income Tax System," conducted in spring 1978 for H and R Block. The data and information about the study were obtained from the Roper Center, University of Connecticut, Storrs. These data have been augmented by merging variables describing the economic and social structure of respondents' counties with the survey responses.

3. As with any data not designed for the specific research at hand, there are some difficulties in matching theoretical concepts with the variables included in the data set. The most obvious case is the use of the question about business tax credits as a proxy for wanting to use taxes to encourage investment and economic growth in the private sector. It would be quite easy to design a better question for discovering individual preferences for this objective, but we believe the present question is adequate for our purposes. We expect individuals who want to use tax policy to promote investment and growth will suggest using business tax credits to reduce unemployment and welfare, while those who want to use taxes for other purposes are more likely to prefer public-service or direct-grant programs.

4. We convert this scale to one ranging from 0 (satisfied) to 1 (extremely angry) to match the scales of the other variables.

5. The statistical fit measures how well the estimated model describes the observed data. The better the fit, the harder it is to reject the null hypothesis that the specified model is the correct one and conversely for a poor fit. The chi-squared statistic is used to evaluate the fit and to estimate how likely it would be to get a worse fit by chance if in fact the estimated model were the correct one. The better the fit, the lower the value of the chi-squared; and for a

given number of degrees of freedom, the greater the likelihood of getting a worse fit simply by chance, and the more likely one is to accept the estimated model as the true model.

6. These results parallel those of Davis and Jackson (1974), who found that, in 1969, support for a negative income tax was strongest in the northern industrial areas and weakest in the South and rural areas, which was completely opposite to the plan's regional redistribution effects.

7. This procedure is an instrumental variables method using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. It corrects for any stochastic covariance between responses to the different questions and for attenuation attributable to measurement error in the responses. Probit analysis was used on some of the equations and produced no significantly different results. OLS was used to reduce costs and to produce more easily interpreted results.

8. The interaction between housing-price changes and homeownership implies that virtually all homeowners favor the capital-gains tax, given even the smallest housing-price increase within the sample. To see this effect, the two relevant coefficients imply that Support for Capital Gains = $(-.15 + .54\pi_h)$*Own, where $\pi_h$ is the change in local housing prices between 1972 and 1978. The minimum value of this change in the sample was .31, giving a coefficient on Own of .02. By contrast, the average and maximum housing-price changes were .52 and .68, giving coefficients on homeownership of .13 and .22 respectively.

9. These coefficients may overstate partisan differences because we do not have the necessary information to take into account the reciprocal effects of tax-policy preferences on partisanship.

10. Thurow (1971) makes the point that society's income distribution is a classic public, or collective, good.

## References

Davis, Otto A., and John E. Jackson. 1974. Senate Defeat of the Family Assistance Plan. *Public Policy* 22:245–74.

Franklin, Charles H., and John E. Jackson. 1986. Structural Estimation with Limited Variables. In *Political Science: The Science of Politics*, ed. Herbert F. Weisberg. New York: Agathon.

Jackson, John E. 1979. Statistical Estimation of Possible Response Bias in Close-Ended Issue Questions. *Political Methodology* 6:393–423.

Jackson, John E. 1983. The Systematic Beliefs of the Mass Public: Estimating Policy Preferences with Survey Data. *Journal of Politics* 45:840–865.

Musgrave, Richard A. 1959. *The Theory of Public Finance*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Musgrave, Richard A., and Peggy B. Musgrave. 1976. *Public Finance in Theory and Practice*. 2d ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Proceedings of a Conference on Tax and Expenditure Limitations. 1979. *National Tax Journal* 32(2), June.

Sears, David O., and Jack Citrin. 1983. *The Tax Revolt*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Sears, David O., R. R. Lau, T. R. Tyler, and H. M. Allen, Jr. 1980. Self-Interest versus Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitudes and Presidential Voting. *American Political Science Review* 74: 670–84.

Thurow, Lester. 1971. The Income Distribution as a Pure Public Good. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 85:327–36.

Wright, Gerald C., Jr. 1977. Contextual Models of Electoral Behavior: The Southern Wallace Vote. *American Political Science Review* 71:497–508.

Michael R. Hawthorne is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Grinnell College, Grinnell, IA 50112.

John E. Jackson is Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48104.

# THE DYNAMICS OF STRUCTURAL REALIGNMENT

STUART ELAINE MACDONALD
GEORGE RABINOWITZ
*University of North Carolina*
*Chapel Hill*

*Governments render decisions on how resources and values are allocated in a society. In the United States, Congress is the institution in which most of the key allocating decisions are made. To the extent the U.S. political system is integrated, the coalitions that form around the issues debated in Congress should be reflected in the coalitions that support presidential candidates and those that support the major political parties. We formulate a spatial theory of political change in which new ideological cleavages appear in congressional behavior and presidential elections and gradually reorganize the mass party base. The theory leads us explicitly to consider the question of dealignment and to specify conditions under which the parties will lose support from voters.*

How and why does the party system in the United States realign? While there have been many attempts to define *realignment* precisely, the essence of any definition is the idea that in a realignment the underlying support for the two major parties changes. Because some change in party support is occurring most of the time, it is almost a matter of taste to say a political system is undergoing realignment at any given moment. However, at certain times the change is obvious and dramatic enough that virtually everyone acknowledges that a realignment has occurred; at other times the arguments are more subtle and the evaluation less consensual.

The three most ambitious contemporary theories of realignment have been offered by Sundquist (1973), Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale (1980), and Burnham (1970). Sundquist proposes a spatial theory of realignment in which a new issue quite literally realigns the main conflict dimension in the society and causes new electoral coalitions to form. Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale emphasize the importance for realignment of a party's continuing policy control. Burnham proposes a *dealignment* theory that focuses on decline in support for the parties in general rather than the changing balance of mass support. We shall formulate a spatial theory of political change in which new ideological cleavages appear in congressional behavior and presidential elections and gradually reorganize the mass party base. Then we shall return to the implications of our theory for the dealignment question.

## The Spatial Theory of Realignment

The key to the spatial theory of realignment is that at any given time there is a central dimension of conflict in the society and realignments are generated when this conflict dimension is altered in a way that creates new political coalitions. Figures 1-2 show the basic Sundquist model. Consider the situation depicted in Figure 1.

**Figure 1. Basic Spatial-Realignment Model, Panel A**



**Figure 2. Basic Spatial-Realignment Model, Panel B**



Here two candidates, D and R, are competing for the presidency. D represents the issue positions of the Democratic candidate, while R represents the issue positions of the Republican candidate; the dots represent individual voters. The horizontal axis is labeled *economic policy* and the vertical axis is labeled *social policy.* Notice that in Figure 1 the two candidates have identical positions on the vertical dimension, implying that they take the same position on social issues. They differ considerably on the horizontal economic dimension. Hence, the choice between the candidates is based exclusively on economic-policy position. The heavy *cutting line* drawn through the space divides the voters into those closer to the Republican candidate on the right side of the line and those closer to the Democratic candidate on the left side of the line. The line determined by the candidate points represents what we shall call the *active axis* of the election; it represents the central dimension of conflict for the election. In this case the active axis is horizontal because the candidates differ only with regard to economic issues.

In Figure 2, we illustrate a change in the dimensions of conflict across elections. In this panel the candidates differ in their positions on both the social and the economic dimensions. This leads to several important changes. First, and most critical from a realignment perspective, the *cutting line* dividing the coalitions supporting the two parties has changed. Several individuals who were supporting the Democratic candidate in Figure 1 are now supporting the Republican candidate, and vice-versa. Notice, too, that the *active axis* is reoriented: rather than being horizontal, it now has a slope between the two issue dimensions. In general, the slope of the active axis reflects the relative importance of the underlying dimensions in the election. When only the horizontal dimension is important, the axis is horizontal; when both dimensions are equally important, the axis is oriented exactly between the underlying dimensions. A realignment that follows this general pattern we shall call a *structural realignment* in that it is induced by a basic change in

Figure 3. Performance-based Shifts in Cutting Line, Panel A



Figure 4. Performance-based Shifts in Cutting Line, Panel B



the structure of conflict—for example, the introduction of social issues to the political agenda.

Structural realignment can be distinguished from realignment rooted in the quality of performance of the incumbent administration. There is accumulated evidence in studies of presidential outcomes that who wins and loses elections rests on how well the incumbent administration has performed. Great success or failure in handling the economy, big scandals, and foreign wars can cause massive shifts in party strength without changing the structure of conflict. The thrust of Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale's (1980) critique of the Sundquist model is that performance is critical to electoral success.

The impact of performance can be readily illustrated spatially. Figures 3-4 show two elections with identical active axes, that is, with identical conflict dimensions. To keep both figures simple, the conflict is only along the economic left-right dimension. However, the outcome of the election is very different in the two instances. In the first the Democratic candidate is the clear winner; in the second the Republican candidate wins. The different electoral outcomes in the two panels are determined by the location of the cutting line. We shall call a realignment motivated by movement in the cutting line a *performance realignment.*[1]

While both structure and performance can change the distribution of support for the political parties, they are fundamentally different. Structural change flows from the policy debate and concerns the nature of support coalitions; performance change flows from the management of government and concerns electoral success. Thus we see a contrast between the structural question (Who is on which side?) and the performance question (Who is gaining or losing strength across the entire electorate?). Both are politically consequential; yet they are nicely separable. In the spatial context, structure is concerned with axis orientation, while performance is concerned with the placement of cutting lines.

We focus on structural realignment. Our interest in structural change arises from the importance of structured competition for a political system. If there were no more to democratic control of the polity than throwing the rascals out, there would be no real representation and accountability in the political system, for there would be no direction for policy formulation and action. In democratic theory, representation requires mass control of the broad direction of public policy. Accountability requires that when policies have undesirable consequences voters can change *policies*, as well as leaders, through elections.

Previous work has demonstrated that substantial structure exists for presidential elections (Rabinowitz, Gurian, and Macdonald 1984; Rosenstone 1983; Schneider 1978). Our intent is to reveal the process by which structural change occurs. To do this we shall translate the theoretical structural models that have guided the work of many scholars (e.g., Aldrich 1983; MacRae and Meldrum 1960; Rabinowitz 1973; Sundquist 1973) into an explicit empirical model of change. We shall then observe how closely this process conforms to the real world. The most serious test of the structural model to date by Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale (1980) has raised considerable doubt as to its empirical viability. Hence, the outcome of this venture is far from certain.

## The Process of Structural Change

Structural change requires change in the political agenda. Many factors stimulate agenda change—changes in the external environment, introduction of new actors and interests, and changes in the economic system are some of the most obvious sources of agenda change. Hence, political systems are almost always faced with the potential for structural change. When structural change occurs, we hypothesize that change will be visible in the behavior of elites well before it becomes embedded in the mass party system. We base this hypothesis on the assumption that the introduction of new issues is normally an elite activity and that once a new issue or new set of issues is raised, it is other elites who are initially sensitive to it. Mass publics are slow to understand, and react to, most issues, with the possible exception of some social issues. Further, even in the event that the mass public is sensitive to the new issue, the issue itself must become embedded in the party system with the two parties taking opposing positions before it becomes possible for the issue to change partisan support.

Our general concern with elites rather than the mass public is justified by the empirical literature from *The American Voter* (Campbell, et al. 1960) on, which has consistently demonstrated the low information level and weak policy interest of most voters. In addition, studies of agenda setting emphasize the role of elites as initiators of public policy (Cobb and Elder 1972; Kingdon 1984). However, in stressing the elite role we are not contending that the mass is irrelevant in determining the political agenda. Rather we maintain that mass involvement is usually in reaction to, and largely stimulated by, the activities of relevant elites. This "elite-first" perspective is consistent with all the major realignment theories. Nonetheless, the principle of elite leadership is important to establish as a base point before elaborating our model of structural change.

### A Four-Stage Model

How then do we propose the process evolves from elite activity to mass partisan realignment? A four-stage process seems appropriate to us:

1. A new issue is introduced by relevant elites.
2. The issue causes change in congressional ideological coalitions or in the

dialogue between presidential candidates.

3. If the issue has changed ideological coalitions in Congress, that change becomes visible in presidential dialogue.
4. The new ideological cleavage becomes embedded in the mass-party system.

In considering this four-step model, we should stress that this is not a description of how a "typical" issue operates, but rather how a *realigning* issue (or set of issues) operates, in the political system.[2]

The first stage is generic to virtually any political issue; thus, it is not of particular consequence. The second stage is more critical. It implies that the issue is sufficiently powerful to redefine ideological coalitions. Central to the theory we are proposing is the idea that at any given time elites are divided into two basic ideological camps which serve to define the meaning of ideology at that point in time. The meaning of ideological labels is thus allowed to evolve, but the general ideological structure of behavior persists. This view is very similar to Schattschneider's (1960) description of political competition in the United States. Converse's (1964) discussion of the role of ideology for elites and the recent congressional analyses of Poole and Daniels (1985) and Poole and Rosenthal (1985b) are also consistent with the assumption that the behavior of elites is structured along a clear ideological dimension.

The third stage, presidential linkage, is necessary for the issue to have mass impact. The only two institutional settings in the United States that are national in scope and partisan in character are the presidency and the Congress. Therefore, only by appearing in congressional debate or presidential dialogue does an issue have the national forum required to influence the party system. Yet while Congress will often be critical in formulating and debating an issue, congressional debate alone is not sufficiently visible to stimulate a mass realignment. We hypothesize that only issues focused by presidential campaigns possess the saliency needed to translate both the partisanship of the conflict and often the actual substance of the issue to the mass public.

Lastly, in the fourth stage, as a consequence of the salience of presidential elections and the centrality of the presidency in the political system, the change becomes manifest in party support at the subpresidential level. Often this process will be slow because local party representatives may present ideological stands that are quite different from presidential candidates, thus blurring the issue message or making it appear idiosyncratic to a particular candidate. But eventually, with sufficient repetition, the ideological cues influence mass party identification. Thus, if our theory is correct, party realignment is the final stage in a process of change that should be visible earlier in other institutional arenas.

The main thrust of this theory is the idea that change in the ideological cleavage among elites becomes manifest first in presidential dialogue and subsequently in the structure of support for the two major parties. Our next task is to translate these dynamics to the spatial theory of realignment. Spatial models usually consider a single active axis as presented earlier. However, according to the theory we propose, at any given time one can imagine three active axes: (1) a congressional axis representing the current ideological cleavage in the Congress, (2) a presidential axis associated with voting in presidential elections (this is the conventional active axis), and (3) a subpresidential axis associated with voting in elections below the presidential level. The subpresidential axis is our best approximation to current partisan support.

A political system in complete equilibrium would have these three axes in exact correspondence. A political system in which there is disparity between the three

**Figure 5. Structural Change from One Equilibrium to Another, Panel A**



**Figure 6. Structural Change from One Equilibrium to Another, Panel B**



**Figure 7. Structural Change from One Equilibrium to Another, Panel C**



**Figure 8. Structural Change from One Equilibrium to Another, Panel D**



axes is in political disequilibrium and should have potential for change. Given the central role of agenda change to structural realignment, the leading edge of the realignment should be either the congressional or the presidential axis. Because mass party change depends upon the visibility of presidential elections, movement of the party axis should follow that of the presidential axis in the space. Figures 5-8 illustrate this theory.

The equilibrium condition is illustrated in Figure 5. In that figure all three axes are oriented in roughly the same direction. In Figure 6 the congressional axis has been altered by the introduction of a new element to the political agenda. Figure 7 shows the situation in a subsequent election in which the presidential dialogue reflects the same agenda change, and Figure 8 shows the system in a new equilibrium state in which the party axis has taken the same general orientation as the two preceding axes. We show the congressional axis as the leading edge of the realignment. The theory also allows the initial movement to flow from change in the presidential dialogue. The party axis, however, is never predicted to lead and is always predicted to follow the movement of the presidential axis.

The implications of the theory are striking. First, we are proposing that there is a great deal of overall coherence to the behavior of the U.S. political system—that the behavior of the Congress, voting in presidential elections, and mass party preferences are all organized in a common spatial-ideological framework. Second, we are proposing that these three political institutions are integrated so that change in any one is intimately related to change in the other two. Third, we are proposing that the two more directly ideological elements—congressional roll-call behavior and presidential elections—drive the transformation of the party system.

## Empirical Analysis of the Structural-Change Model

In order to test this theory, we need to use an appropriate analytic unit. Because the analysis is historical in scope, it requires units with stability over time. In the United States, states are the natural units for such analysis. Unlike counties, states are stable over time and are politically meaningful. States choose senators and presidential electors, and all members of the House of Representatives are elected within states. Furthermore, there is considerable variation in political attitudes across state aggregates which tends to reflect political divisions within the society.

Our theory suggests that the behavior of Congress, mass voting in presidential elections, and individual partisanship are linked in a coherent spatial framework. We shall attempt to assess the overall coherence of these three elements by locating axes representing congressional behavior, presidential voting, and partisanship in a common space. We will investigate the period 1920-1984. The selection of this particular period is largely a matter of convenience, but it does have some historical integrity, starting with the end of the First World War and including the Great Depression, the Second World War, and the postwar era.

### Data and Measures

The three variables we need to operationalize are *congressional behavior, mass voting in presidential elections,* and *partisanship,* in each case aggregated to the state level. The *congressional behavior* score for each state is determined by the roll-call behavior of the state congressional delegation. The first step in calculating the measure is to assess the position of each member of the House and Senate on the principal dimension of conflict in the appropriate chamber during each congressional year or session. These positions are calculated using the Poole and Rosenthal's (1985a) scaling procedure. This method recovers a single value for each congressman, locating that congressman on the main conflict dimension in each year or session.[3] The state mean is formed by averaging the scores for all congressmen in the state. These state means are then averaged within a presidential election cycle to obtain a single score for each state for each election cycle between 1920 and 1984. The congressional score for 1940, for instance, is thus the average of the mean positions of the congressional delegations in the 1937-38 and 1939-40 Congresses. The score reflects the ideological position of the state delegation on the issues debated over the four-year period.

*Presidential voting* is measured as the percentage Democratic of the vote in each presidential election. The spatial theory underlying the model requires that competition take place between two candidates. Hence, in years in which there is a significant third-party vote, that vote is distributed between the two major parties.[4]

The *partisanship* variable uses the David (1972) composite-B measure of party strength in the state. The composite is based on voting in gubernatorial, House, and Senate races, and is simply the average of the three components. In the analysis we use only off- (non-

Table 1. Summary of Principal Component Analysis

| | Congressional Roll Call | | | Presidential Voting | | | Subpresidential Voting | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year | Dimension 1 | Dimension 2 | 100 × Communality | Dimension 1 | Dimension 2 | 100 × Communality | Dimension 1 | Dimension 2 | 100 × Communality |
| 1920 | .88 | −.24 | 83.2 | .89 | −.27 | 86.8 | .94 | −.18 | 91.6 |
| 1924 | .87 | −.27 | 84.0 | .89 | −.32 | 90.0 | .90 | −.32 | 86.2 |
| 1928 | .79 | −.30 | 71.8 | .80 | −.04 | 64.0 | .92 | −.21 | 89.6 |
| 1932 | .76 | −.31 | 66.8 | .88 | −.31 | 87.6 | .92 | −.16 | 87.2 |
| 1936 | .63 | −.34 | 51.7 | .90 | −.26 | 88.3 | .90 | −.16 | 83.3 |
| 1940 | .76 | −.11 | 59.4 | .95 | −.13 | 91.5 | .94 | −.22 | 93.1 |
| 1944 | .74 | .04 | 54.6 | .95 | −.06 | 89.9 | .93 | −.19 | 90.4 |
| 1948 | .67 | .23 | 50.4 | .71 | .14 | 53.1 | .96 | −.17 | 94.4 |
| 1952 | .49 | .50 | 50.1 | .85 | .26 | 79.1 | .97 | −.10 | 94.6 |
| 1956 | .72 | .43 | 70.5 | .74 | .10 | 56.4 | .95 | −.08 | 91.6 |
| 1960 | .16 | .63 | 42.3 | .56 | .63 | 71.1 | .93 | −.07 | 87.9 |
| 1964 | .06 | .74 | 55.6 | −.57 | .65 | 75.3 | .90 | .00 | 81.6 |
| 1968 | −.39 | .81 | 80.0 | −.16 | .88 | 80.8 | .85 | .06 | 72.1 |
| 1972 | −.44 | .79 | 82.5 | −.53 | .69 | 77.1 | .74 | .15 | 55.3 |
| 1976 | −.39 | .80 | 78.8 | .63 | .50 | 63.6 | .76 | .25 | 63.6 |
| 1980 | −.22 | .80 | 68.4 | .43 | .66 | 61.9 | .76 | .30 | 65.9 |
| 1984 | −.11 | .82 | 67.7 | .04 | .81 | 66.5 | .65 | .30 | 50.7 |

presidential-election-) year indexes to avoid any potential contamination with presidential-election results. Thus, we have one measure of party strength for each four-year presidential election cycle calculated on the basis of subpresidential voting in the even year preceding the presidential election.[5] For example, the party score for 1940 is based on voting in 1938.

## Factor Analysis

Our coherence argument suggests that congressional roll-call behavior, presidential voting, and partisanship should be representable in a common spatial structure. In order to test this proposition, we shall perform a factor analysis of these variables over the time frame of the study. The use of factor analysis for this purpose is theoretically appropriate based on the *individual-level* spatial model (Rabinowitz, Gurian, and Macdonald 1984).

## Results

There is considerable coherence to U.S. politics over this time frame. The results of the principal component analysis show a two-dimensional pattern with the first component accounting for over 56% of the variance and the second accounting for over 17%. The two factors together account for over 74% of the variance in the data. A third factor would account for only an additional 5.5% of the variance, while a fourth would account for 3.6%. The factor coefficients and the communalities (percentage of variance explained) for the variables are summarized in Table 1.[6]

The process of structural realignment is only of interest if considerable structure exists in U.S. politics. The high communalities support that contention. The fact that the policy-making behavior of elites and the voting behavior of the mass fit so well into the same spatial structure is striking confirmation of the integration of these political institutions and is consistent with the ideological structure we hypothesized.

## Visual Display

The factor analysis provides information that allows us to display the axes

**Figure 9. Axis Orientations: Congressional Roll Call**



**Figure 10. Axis Orientations: Presidential Voting**



**Figure 11. Axis Orientations: Subpresidential Voting**



**Figure 12. Axis Orientations: Combined**



spatially over time. Such a display has a heuristic advantage which we shall exploit before turning to a dynamic model of change. The visual display of axis movement shows how the axes have changed orientation from 1920 to 1984 and the relative equilibrium and disequilibrium in the system.

In Figures 9-12, we show the position of each set of axes over time. In Figure 9, we show the position of the congressional roll-call axes, in Figure 10 the presidential-election axes, and in Figure 11 the party axes. These three sets of axes are all from the same factor space; there are simply too many axes with similar orientations to plot them all together. Figure 12 shows the positions of the three sets of axes in the common space for the years 1920, 1936, 1952, 1968, and 1984. These years were selected to include every fourth election cycle starting with 1920. The four figures together give a general sense of how these axes have changed over time. Each set of axes has moved from the lower right towards the upper left. Within that general similarity each has a distinct movement pattern.

The congressional axis, displayed in Figure 9, makes short clockwise moves from 1920 to 1936 and then a consistent set of counterclockwise moves from 1936 to 1976. The congressional axis then swings back modestly in 1980 and again in 1984. The movement of the axis is always quite gradual.

The path of the presidential axis, shown in Figure 10, is similar to the congressional axis except that the presidential axis makes more erratic swings. In particular, the presidential axis takes two very large jumps, the first of these in a counterclockwise direction from 1960 to 1964 and the second in a clockwise direction from 1972 to 1976.

The party axis, shown in Figure 11, has moved quite a bit less and far more slowly than either the congressional or presidential axis. The movement is always in a counterclockwise direction and is always quite modest. Indeed, the changes are so small between years that it is not possible to display all the axes, so a single axis is drawn to represent the party axes from 1920 to 1948.

The general pattern of movement of the three axes is theoretically pleasing. Even given the high communalities of the factor solution, there was no guarantee that the axes would move in a systematic pattern over time, yet that is what we observe. The smooth and consistent change in the roll-call axis is exactly what we would predict for an institution showing ideological evolution. The somewhat peripatetic movement of the presidential axis is in keeping with the more idiosyncratic candidate dependence of presidential elections. Nevertheless, the congressional and presidential axes move in rough concert and fit nicely with an ideology-driven model of change. The slow but directionally consistent reorientation of the party axis supports the theory that party change follows change in the ideological coalitions.

The equilibrium status of the system has changed considerably over the time frame. As is evident in Figure 12, the system was in equilibrium in the early period. In both 1920 and 1936 the three axes have similar orientations. This is consistent with Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale's (1980) and Brady's (1985) assertion that the New Deal realignment was largely performance based.[7] By 1952 that is no longer the case. The three axes are dispersed, with the congressional axis having moved the farthest in the counterclockwise direction. The 1968 axes are the most dispersed of the set, with both the presidential and congressional axes oriented far differently from the party axis, which has changed little from its earlier position. Thus we see by the mid-1960s a system in severe disequilibrium which, according to our theory, should be ready to realign. By 1984 the positions of the axes are somewhat more in equilibrium than in 1968, but substantial disequilibrium remains, suggesting the potential for further change in the future.

## Interpretation

Clearly the general movement of the axes is from the old issues and divisions of the 1920s and 1930s to those of the more modern period. However, a definitive interpretation of the spatial structure in which the axes on the lower right are identified with one critical issue cluster and those on the upper left with another is not possible. Because the change is so consistent over time, any interpretation associated with the time change could conceivably be "correct." With that caveat in place, some attempt at interpretation is appropriate.

The general pattern of movement coincides with the emergence of the civil-rights issue in U.S. national politics. Sinclair (1978) shows that civil-rights issues emerged with the 75th Congress, and it is in this 1936-40 period that we start to see the counterclockwise movement of the roll-call axis. The changing location of axes in the space, however, is not exclusively a function of civil rights. Voting on economic issues as well as social issues determines placement on each congressional scale, and in most congresses economic votes outnumbered votes on social issues (Poole and Rosenthal 1985b). Interpreting this as a change from economic to civil rights (or social issues more generally) is, therefore, too simplistic. A better explanation is that as the civil-rights issue emerged, there was a gradual change in the ideological coalitions in the society. The role of civil rights was to redefine the ideological coalitions. Once these were redefined, elite division on the new issues, such as the economic-redistribution issues of the Great Society, tended to be consistent with the prevailing ideological cleavage in the society.

## Dynamic Analysis of the Structural Model

The factor analysis is useful for demonstrating the general coherence of the U.S. political system and for providing a visual overview of political change. A dynamic analysis of the structural model is necessary, however, to test the theory of structural change we have elaborated. The model we shall analyze is displayed in Figure 13. Our hypotheses are illustrated in the figure by showing the expected magnitude of the various coefficients. The model is a natural analytic extension of the realignment model we discussed earlier, yet it is sufficiently distinct to require some further elaboration.

The three variables in the model are identical to those used in the factor analysis: congressional roll-call behavior, presidential voting, and subpresidential voting. The diagram is drawn with time increasing from left to right. So, for example, the prediction for presidential voting is based on prior presidential voting, the behavior of Congress in the four years preceding the election, and subpresidential voting in the off-year prior to the presidential election.

**Figure 13. Hypothesized Relationships Based on the Structural-Change Model**



The element driving the structural model of partisan change is change in the ideological debate. We hypothesized that an issue provoking such change could be manifest nationally either in the congressional debate or the debate between presidential candidates. As the issue becomes fully imbedded in the ideological structure, if first manifest in congressional debate, it would subsequently find its way into the presidential debate, and vice-versa. However, we hypothesized that partisan change would occur only when the ideological change was manifest in presidential dialogue, since only then would it be sufficiently visible to impinge on the partisan attitudes of the mass public.

The analytic model reflects this four-stage process. Presidential elections lie at the fulcrum of the model, being influenced by, and influencing, the other variables over time. The congressional behavior and subpresidential voting variables play different roles: ideology motivates change in the political system; partisanship influences voting decisions. Over the long term, we expect ideological structure as reflected in the congressional-roll-call variable to influence partisanship through the visibility of presidential elec-

Table 2. Pooled Time-Series Analysis of Structural-Change Model

| Dependent Variable | Independent Variable | Estimate | Standard Error | Adjusted $R^2$ | Auto Correlation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Congressional roll call | | — | — | .74 | .06 |
| | Lagged congressional | .72 | .024 | — | — |
| | Prior presidential | .25 | .026 | — | — |
| | Prior subpresidential | −.11 | .022 | — | — |
| Presidential voting | | — | — | .58 | −.06 |
| | Lagged presidential | .42 | .035 | — | — |
| | Prior congressional | .30 | .030 | — | — |
| | Prior subpresidential | .16 | .028 | — | — |
| Subpresidential voting | | — | — | .81 | −.25 |
| | Lagged subpresidential | .82 | .019 | — | — |
| | Prior presidential | .14 | .022 | — | — |
| | Prior congressional | −.01* | .021 | — | — |

*Not statistically significant at the .01 level.

tions. Analytically, this implies an indirect effect from congressional roll calls to subpresidential voting. In contrast, partisanship should not influence congressional coalition structure even indirectly. Therefore we predict a weak, negative direct effect of partisanship on roll calls to countervail the potential indirect effect via presidential voting.

## Method

We shall perform a pooled time-series analysis. This means we will combine all the observations on a variable over the entire time frame of the study. The advantage of pooling is that it makes it possible to analyze the time series for all states simultaneously. Hence, each variable will have 48 x 17 = 816 cases, one for each state in each time period. (Alaska and Hawaii are omitted from the entire analysis because of excessive missing data.) An example of a case would be Minnesota in 1940. The values of the variables are standardized by election cycle. Standardization is appropriate because the structural model predicts *relative* strength or weakness in a particular election. We have used ordinary-least-squares (OLS) regression for the estimation of the models in the main body of the text. Supplementary results examining the findings under a variety of methodological controls and supporting the conclusions drawn in the text are presented in the Appendix.

## Results

The results reported in Table 2 are nicely consistent with the hypothesized structural-realignment model. Congressional roll-call behavior is a function of both prior roll-call behavior and presidential voting behavior. Both coefficients are substantial, with the lagged effect strong indeed. A weak, but statistically significant, negative effect of partisanship on congressional voting does exist, as predicted.

All three elements contribute to explaining presidential voting behavior. The estimated impact of congressional behavior is twice that of the subpresidential party variable. That the roll-call behavior of Congress proves a significantly better predictor of mass presidential voting than the mass public's own subpresidential voting is impressive. This result implies that congressional delegations are representative of their states and U.S. presidential elections quite sensitive to ideological differences between candidates.

The effect of party on presidential voting is weaker than we had anticipated. This could be caused by the presence of the lagged presidential variable in the equation predicting presidential elections. In order to determine if this is the case, we can reestimate the equation eliminating this variable. The results are similar. The subpresidential party coefficient increases to .324, but that for congressional behavior increases as well to .513. Thus, while the revised analysis enhances the absolute value of the party effect, it still leaves party with substantially less impact than ideology. This suggests that party is not as generically important to presidential voting as we had hypothesized. However, the importance of party could well be dependent on conditions influencing the political system at the time of the election; we shall consider that possibility shortly.

Subpresidential voting is the most stable of the variables in the model. This is in keeping with the known stability of partisanship. As we hypothesized, there is a direct effect of presidential voting, and only an indirect effect of congressional behavior, on partisanship. Ideology stimulates changes in mass partisanship through presidential elections and the cues they provide.

Overall, these results are quite consistent with the process we outlined. Change is motivated by the policy dynamic of congressional activity and presidential elections. The evolution of the mass party system is slow and depends upon the new ideological coalitions among elites becoming visible to the electorate through the dynamic of presidential campaigns.

## Equilibrium, Disequilibrium, and Dealignment

The concept of equilibrium is important to our understanding of the process of change and its political consequences. Earlier, we defined a political system to be in equilibrium when the three axes representing congressional behavior, voting in presidential elections, and subpresidential voting are oriented in the same direction. Such a structural equilibrium prevailed in U.S. politics from 1920 through 1944. During that time congressional roll-call behavior, mass presidential voting, and subpresidential voting had generally similar orientations. From 1948 on, the axes moved to increasing disequilibrium until 1964, when the three axes were widely separated. Since 1964, the level of disequilibrium has tended to decrease. In 1984 the system was closer to equilibrium than it had been in some time, but was still far from the 1920 to 1944 level of equilibrium.

The concept of equilibrium has particular relevance for the issue of dealignment, the tendency of the public to drift away from the political parties. In his elegant analysis of political change in the twentieth century, Burnham (1970) describes the breakup of the strong party system of the late nineteenth century during the Progressive Era. Progressive reforms, such as the decrease in power of party leaders in the legislature and the advent of the primary as a method of nomination, have generally been reinforced by changes since that time. Wattenberg (1984) stresses the declining relevance of partisanship when candidates can present strong images directly to voters through television. The implication of these explanations of dealignment is that the role of parties will decline consistently over time.

The logic of the structural model implies a different pattern—one in which party will play a more meaningful role under equilibrium than disequilibrium conditions. When the political system is in equilibrium, parties are in a good position to satisfy their representation and accountability functions. The fundamental role of partisanship in the electoral system is to serve as an efficient guide in selecting candidates. When the system is in equilibrium, voters can come to know the general positions and performance of parties and rely on these images. Information costs associated with voting on the basis of issues are thereby reduced. Party also provides continuity by linking candidates under common labels. The concept of party identification reflects the idea that people become sufficiently attached to one party or the other so as to think of themselves as Democrats or Republicans.

In periods when there is a divergence between the ideological and partisan coalitions—when the political system is in disequilibrium—we would expect the party system to be under stress. The factors that led to the current party structure are no longer operating among elites. Thus, current identifications in the mass may well run contrary to current ideological preferences. This creates an environment in which established partisanship is a less valuable guide to selecting candidates. Rather than images of behavior that a voter can count on, the party images built up over time are inapplicable to current real-world politics. Hence, a system in disequilibrium is a system in which the individual should rely more on ideological cues and less on partisanship.

The structural theory suggests that the party system will gradually respond to ideological pressure and realign. Once the system moves toward a new equilibrium, partisanship should be able to reassert itself. We propose, therefore, that the equilibrium status of the system influences the vitality of the political parties. If this hypothesis is correct, we should find that the tendency of individuals to use party in making voting decisions and to identify with parties is dependent upon equilibrium level. In particular, we expect that as the level of equilibrium in the system increases, (1) the more useful partisanship is as a voting cue and (2) the more tempting it is to identify with parties. The first hypothesis follows from the fact that party is only a meaningful social-choice mechanism when it conveys information about the issue agenda that will be pursued by party representatives. The closer the system to equilibrium, the more readily citizens can rely on party cues to provide them a handy *and* meaningful guide when making voting decisions. The second hypothesis follows directly from the first: the more meaningful the party label, the more reasonable it becomes to identify with a political party.

In order to test these hypotheses, an operational measure of equilibrium is necessary. We propose to use the average of the correlations between congressional roll-call voting, voting in presidential elections, and voting in subpresidential elections in any given period as the measure of equilibrium.[8] A direct relationship exists between this measure and the graphic concept of common orientation of axes. Correlations measure the cosine of the angle between the variables when they are displayed spatially. The cosine will equal 1.0 when the two variables are oriented in exactly the same direction and will equal zero when they are oriented at right angles. A negative correlation means the variables are separated by more than a 90-degree angle. Thus, the average correlation is a measure of the average angular separation between the three variables.

## Use of Party as a Cue

We wish to test the extent to which party is used as a voting cue under different conditions of equilibrium. In order to do this, we need to incorporate the equilibrium concept into our model of

Table 3. Analysis of Interactive Equilibrium Model

| Dependent Variable | Independent Variable | Estimate | Standard Error | Adjusted $R^2$ | Auto Correlation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Presidential voting | | — | — | .58 | -.07 |
| | Lagged presidential | .37 | .038 | — | — |
| | Prior congressional | .36 | .062 | — | — |
| | Congressional × equilibrium | -.16* | .105 | — | — |
| | Prior subpresidential | .00* | .054 | — | — |
| | Subpresidential × equilibrium | .38 | .110 | — | — |

*Not statistically significant at the .01 level.

presidential voting. We hypothesize that the effect of party should increase as the system moves toward equilibrium, while at the same time the effect of ideology should decrease. These effects should occur because party is an easier cue to use than ideology because it involves little information cost, but it only serves its purpose fully if it conveys meaningful ideological information.

Because the effect of party should increase as a function of equilibrium, we need to include an equilibrium × party term in the model. We predict that this interactive term will have a positive coefficient, signifying that party has increasing impact with rising equilibrium. Similarly, we shall include an equilibrium × ideology term in the model to allow for the possibility that the use of ideology declines when there is less need to pay the information costs associated with ideological voting. We shall analyze an extension of the presidential-voting model presented earlier to which we have added two terms: (1) equilibrium level × subpresidential voting and (2) equilibrium level × congressional roll-call behavior.

The results from the interactive model are displayed in Table 3 and support the hypothesis. Both interactive terms have the expected direction of impact, and the coefficient for party is both statistically significant and substantial. The coefficients are most easily interpreted if we consider the two extreme conditions of complete equilibrium on the one hand and complete disequilibrium on the other. Under the condition of complete disequilibrium, the effects of both party (subpresidential voting) and ideology (roll-call behavior) are simply the noninteractive coefficients because the interactive terms are equal to zero. In this instance ideology has a coefficient of .36 while party has a coefficient of zero, which implies no effect for party whatsoever. In contrast, under the condition of perfect equilibrium where the equilibrium value is 1.0, the effective coefficient for both party and ideology is the sum of the noninteractive coefficient plus the interactive coefficient. Under the condition of complete equilibrium, the effective ideology coefficient diminishes to .20 (.36 + .16), while that for party jumps to .38 (.00 + .38). The evidence strongly supports the view that when the political system is in equilibrium, party is a substantially more valuable cue to individuals in making their voting decision.

## Party Identification

The second equilibrium hypothesis we propose is that people identify more readily with political parties when the system is in equilibrium rather than disequilibrium. This hypothesis depends on the view that people will find identification meaningful when parties provide clear linkages to issues. In order to test the hypothesis, we formulate a model that

**Table 4. Effect of Equilibrium Level on Percentage Identifying as Independent (1954–1986)**

| Variables and Statistics | Estimate | Standardized Estimate | Standard Error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Basic model | | | |
| Percentage independent | | | |
| Constant | 10.04 | — | 3.43 |
| Prior % independent | .76 | .80 | .10 |
| Equilibrium level | -8.83 | -.29 | 3.19 |
| Auto correlation | - .32 | — | — |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | .83 | — | — |
| Number of cases | 16 | — | — |
| Extended model | | | |
| Percentage independent | | | |
| Constant | 10.15* | — | 3.96 |
| Prior % independent | .69 | .72 | .17 |
| Equilibrium level | -9.42 | -.31 | 3.04 |
| Off-year dummy | 2.03* | .17 | 1.15 |
| Time | .14* | .11 | .22 |
| Auto correlation | - .15 | — | — |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | .86 | — | — |
| Number of cases | 16 | — | — |

*Not statistically significant at the .01 level.

predicts changes in the proportion of political independents—those who identify with neither party—as a function of equilibrium level. Our hypothesis is that as the system moves more into a condition of disequilibrium, people will increasingly be drawn to independent status, while as the system moves toward equilibrium, the percentage of independents should decline.

The model we shall analyze is the following: Percentage independent (time $t$) = $b_0$ + $b_1$ percentage independent (time $t - 1$) + $b_2$ equilibrium level. To analyze this model, we require data on the percentage of the electorate who call themselves independents. Good measures of partisanship are available from 1952 to 1984 using the University of Michigan national-election studies. Hence, our time frame is more restricted for this analysis. The analysis predicts the percentage independent of the total electorate in each on and off election year from 1954 through 1984. We also show in Table 4 the estimation of a model that includes both a dummy variable to distinguish on and off year elections and a time variable that ranges from 1 in 1954 to 16 in 1984. The time variable is included to ensure that the estimated coefficients are not an artifact caused by a general tendency for individuals to identify less with parties over this period.

The results support the importance of equilibrium level in explaining trends in identification over this period. The coefficient for equilibrium level is −8.8, indicating that under conditions of complete disequilibrium there will be approximately 9.0% more independents than under conditions of complete equilibrium.[9] Thus we find that individual decisions to identify with political parties are sensitive to the congruence between partisan and ideological preferences.

Our work suggests that dealignment is in part explicable in simple spatial terms. Much of the classic Burnham (1970) analysis rests on institutional impacts, such as the decline in the power of the Speaker and the loss of party control of nominations. Our analysis suggests that some dealignment is to be expected when the contemporary issue debate is less rooted in the party system, that is, when disequilibrium occurs. The spatial-ideological explanation is based on noninstitutional considerations but does not rule out the possibility that relationships exist between institutional and spatial factors. Indeed, some of the institutional revitalization of parties noted by Cotter et al. (1984) and Schlesinger (1985) has occurred as party and ideology have moved back towards equilibrium, suggesting there is some real interplay between institutional and spatial characteristics of the political system.

The relationship between political change, equilibrium level, and partisanship is useful for explicating a paradox in recent political behavior. As the parties have become increasingly easy to identify with issues, partisanship has declined. Thus, it appears that strong issue positions undercut partisanship. Yet theory implies that partisanship should be most excited in times of high issue debate.[10] The analysis we have done resolves the paradox by showing that the effect is exactly as theory suggests *except* that substantial time lags are involved. In the initial period, clear issue stands disequilibrate the system; only later as people are organized around the new ideological cleavage does partisanship become revitalized in the mass. In times of very high issue intensity, such as the Civil War period, the time lags are likely to be substantially reduced, but the general process is likely to be similar.

## Conclusion

Governments render decisions as to how resources and values are allocated in a society. In the United States, Congress is the institution in which most of the key allocating decisions are made. To the extent the U.S. political system is integrated, the coalitions that form around the issues debated in the Congress should be reflected in the coalitions that support presidential candidates and those that support the major political parties. Previous work has demonstrated that such structure exists for presidential elections. The work we have done suggests that the structure extends to the behavior of Congress and the behavior of the mass public in its subpresidential voting as well. All three elements of the political system can be nicely represented in a single two-dimensional space from 1920 to 1984. The results show a system with considerable coherence, where the policy decisions made by the congressional elite are closely tied to the electoral system in which that elite operates. Indeed, we have described a system in which change in any component is intimately related to change in the other components.

The most impressive relationship among the three elements in the system is that between congressional behavior and presidential voting. The dynamic of this relationship relies directly on the idea that there is a prevailing ideological climate in which political conflict is structured. Our view is that congressional roll-call behavior is the clearest institutional manifestation of that ideological climate. As such, it is striking to see its strong historical role in foreshadowing presidential-electoral and partisan coalitions.

Presidential elections are visible nationwide contests that can, at least on occasion, present the substance of ideological debate to the mass electorate and, given the centrality of the presidential office, at times recast that debate. We see evidence for both these roles in our results.

The role of partisanship follows the theory we laid out at the onset. Partisan coalitions change in response to changing ideological coalitions. Partisanship is a derivative effect of the ideological debate in the sense that it initiates no change but only responds to it. As a vehicle for stimulating choice between presidential candidates, partisanship has less weight than we originally anticipated. However, we have seen that the impact of partisanship is enhanced when the political system is in equilibrium.

In studying change, the idea of systemic equilibrium is critical. When ideology separates from partisanship, the political system moves into disequilibrium and a period of realignment is initiated. In our view, dealignment is at least in part a consequence of system disequilibrium. The equilibrium theory predicts both increases and decreases in the importance of partisanship and the vitality of the parties over time. When the political system is in equilibrium, people make greater use of party cues and identify more readily with political parties; under conditions of disequilibrium, partisanship loses meaning and importance.

The structural integrity of U.S. politics appears in stark contrast to the volatility of specific elections and votes. Each election has a unique context of candidates and times; each roll-call vote conjures forth particular interests and motivations. Yet this complex mix of individuals and events is set in an enduring ideological structure that evolves in a very systematic way. We have presented a paradigm for understanding this process of structural change.

## Appendix

The analysis of pooled time-series data presents unusual methodological difficulties (Stimson 1985). We have consistently used OLS to estimate the various models. While we have reported standard errors and significance levels, these should be viewed with caution since they are based on the assumptions of no autocorrelation and independence of cases, assumptions not satisfied in our analysis. Furthermore, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable as a predictor in the equations introduces some danger that estimates may be biased as well as inefficient. The methodological problem is so complex that no "perfect" solution exists. Nevertheless, a reasonable attack on the problem is possible. Our main concern is whether the critical results we have obtained hold up under additional scrutiny. To this end we have performed three additional analyses.

First, we have reestimated the four models using two-stage least squares to see if there is any substantial change. The two-stage procedure involves estimating each lagged dependent variable as a function of the exogenous variables and the exogenous variables lagged (which are the instruments). The estimated variable then replaces the lagged dependent variable in the analysis. The purpose of the two-stage analysis is to see if the potential bias caused by the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable has distorted the estimates. Most commonly, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable will cause the impact of the variable to be exaggerated at the expense of the other independent variables. The results of the two-stage analysis are reported in the second column of Table 5; the first column reproduces the OLS results reported in the text to facilitate comparisons.

The OLS and two-stage coefficients are quite similar in the presidential-voting and subpresidential-voting models, though the two-stage results are not statistically significant in the presidential-voting models. Because the lack of significance is caused by high collinearity in the two-stage model rather than dimunition of estimated effects, it is not a matter of concern.[11] Multicollinearity occurs frequently in two-stage estimation and is one reason to prefer OLS estimates when the two-stage results are similar. The congressional roll-call model is the only model that shows deterioration in the lagged coefficient, but even in this instance there is no change in the substantive interpretation. Thus, the analytic findings are preserved well in the two-stage analysis.

Our second attack on the problem of pooled time-series data is to introduce a dummy variable and an explicit time-dependent function for each state. By in-

**Table 5. Summary of Regression Results Using State Dummies and Aggressively Controlling for Time Dependence**

| Variables and Statistics | Text Result (1) | Two-Stage Estimate (2) | State Dummies (3) | Model 3 + Linear Time (4) | Model 4 + Nonlinear Time (5) | Model 5 + Auto Regression Coefficient (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Congressional roll call | | | | | | |
| Lagged congressional | .72 | .59 | .63 | .44 | .28 | — |
| Prior presidential | .25 | .33 | .30 | .27 | .28 | .29 |
| Prior subpresidential | -.11 | -.11 | -.03* | -.05* | .02* | .07* |
| Autoregression coefficient | — | — | — | — | — | .21 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | .74 | .62 | .74 | .76 | .79 | — |
| Auto correlation | .06 | .19 | .06 | .10 | .05 | — |
| Presidential voting | | | | | | |
| Lagged presidential | .42 | .41* | .30 | .09 | .05* | — |
| Prior congressional | .30 | .31* | .39 | .30 | .31 | .32 |
| Prior subpresidential | .16 | .16* | .00* | -.08* | -.07* | -.07* |
| Autoregression coefficient | — | — | — | — | — | .04* |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | .58 | .52 | .60 | .64 | .64 | — |
| Auto correlation | -.06 | -.05 | -.04 | .01 | .00 | — |
| Subpresidential voting | | | | | | |
| Lagged subpresidential | .82 | .83 | .41 | .20 | .01* | — |
| Prior presidential | .14 | .13 | .09 | .07 | .07 | .07 |
| Prior congressional | -.01* | -.01* | .05* | .02* | .04* | .04* |
| Autoregression coefficient | — | — | — | — | — | -.00* |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | .81 | .67 | .83 | .85 | .87 | — |
| Auto correlation | -.25 | -.26 | -.04 | -.00 | -.01 | — |
| Equilibrium model of presidential voting | | | | | | |
| Lagged presidential | .37 | .52* | .22 | .03* | -.03* | — |
| Prior congressional | .36 | .24* | .47 | .42 | .45 | 44 |
| Prior congressional × equilibrium | -.16* | -.03* | -.24* | -.27* | -.32 | -.33 |
| Prior subpresidential | .00* | .03* | -.20 | -.28 | -.30 | -.34 |
| Prior subpresidential × equilibrium | .38 | .18* | .53 | .52 | .61 | .70 |
| Autoregression coefficient | — | — | — | — | — | -.06* |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | .58 | .54 | .61 | .65 | .65 | — |
| Auto correlation | -.07 | -.17 | -.06 | -.03 | -.04 | — |

*Not statistically significant at the .01 level.

troducing the dummy variables we will control for case repetition effects. When each state is represented by a distinct dummy variable, we expect a marked reduction in the regression coefficients that depend on state differences consistent over time. Party effects should be most sensitive to this. By introducing a set of time-dependent functions into the models, we will control for general trending effects. If our results follow a well defined trend—even one generated by the process we have outlined, these effects will be suppressed in the analysis. The control for trend should be particularly consequential for the lagged dependent variables since they should follow the same over-time pattern as the dependent variables themselves. We performed three additional regressions: (1) adding a dummy variable for each state; (2) adding the state dummy and a state dummy × time variable; and (3) adding the state dummy, the state dummy × time, and a state dummy × time-squared variable to control for nonlinear as well as linear time effects. The results of these analyses are presented in columns 3-5 of Table 5. We do not show the myriad of state coefficients we estimated; they are available from the authors upon request.

The results provide strong support for our principal findings. As expected, the lagged effect of each of the variables is radically diminished with the state and time controls. Nevertheless, there is remarkable consistency for the main effects discussed in the text. The critical coefficients from the analysis of the structural-change model are (1) the effect of presidential voting on congressional roll-call coalitions, (2) the effect of congressional roll-call coalitions on presidential voting, and (3) the effect of presidential voting on subpresidential or party voting. The critical results from the equilibrium analysis are the effects of subpresidential voting and congressional roll-call behavior under the condition of equilibrium in comparison to the effects under disequilibrium. These relationships hold up quite nicely.

The third attack on the problem is to perform an autoregressive analysis on the fully controlled model (Model 5).[12] We do this to ensure that the results obtained are meaningful when the autoregressive behavior of the residuals is taken into account in the estimation. The analysis requires the removal of the lagged dependent variable; this is possible in the fully controlled model because the lagged effect should either be incorporated in the time trend or be autoregressive in character. Thus, the models we analyze using this method include the standard predictor variables (except for the lagged dependent variable), the state dummy, the state dummy × time, and the state dummy × time-squared variables, as well as a one-lag autoregressive estimate. The results are reported in the last column of Table 5. They are quite similar to those in the previous column, again supporting the general consistency of the findings.

## Notes

We are indebted to Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal for generously sharing their roll-call-scaling results with us; without their cooperation, this research would not have been possible. We also wish to thank Leon Fink, Susan Levine, Duncan MacRae, and the Comparative Politics Discussion Group at the University of North Carolina for helpful comments. A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the 1985 meetings of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans.

1. In a strict sense, cutting-line shifts can also be induced by a candidate taking a relatively extreme position. In general, performance-based shifts seem nonspatial in character; however, recent extensions of the spatial model have attempted to incorporate them. A good introduction to the spatial theory of voting is Enelow and Hinich (1984).

2. Carmines and Stimson (1986) present a psychologically oriented model nicely consistent with the model we propose.

3. The calculation of scores for each of the congressmen from 1919 through 1984 was performed by

Poole and Rosenthal and shared with us. The calculation was done annually when a sufficient number of roll calls occurred in a year; otherwise the scaling was done by session. Poole and Rosenthal (1985b) present a detailed report of the analysis in which these coefficients were calculated.

4. Elsewhere (Rabinowitz, Gurian, and Macdonald 1984) a detailed description of the division of third-party votes from 1944 to 1980 is presented. Among those elections only 1948 and 1968 had significant third-party voting. In the pre-1944 period, the only election with a substantial third-party vote was 1924, where the progressive candidate, Robert LaFollette, won 16.6% of the total vote. The LaFollette vote was divided on the basis of a regression using the 1916 Democratic vote as the dependent variable and the 1924 Democratic and LaFollette votes as the independent variables. On this basis the LaFollette vote was divided approximately 4 to 1 for the Democratic party. The data source for the presidential vote was ICPSR Study No. 0019, *State Level Election Returns (1824-1972);* these data were originally collected by Walter Dean Burnham, Jerome M. Clubb, and William H. Flanigan. The source for each of the post-1972 presidential votes was various issues of the *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report.*

5. A description of the data sources for the David coefficient from 1942 to 1978 appears in Rabinowitz, Gurian, and Macdonald 1984. The coefficients from 1918 through 1938 were obtained from David 1972; the 1982 coefficients were calculated based on reports in the *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* and the *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1984.*

6. Each of the eigenvalues for the first four factors exceeds one; given that 51 variables are being analyzed, this result is to be anticipated. The ratios in variance explained across factors (from the first and second through the fourth and fifth) are 3.19, 3.21, 1.57, and 1.37. This pattern is quite consistent with a two-dimensional interpretation.

7. This does not rule out the possibility that some structural change occurred during the New Deal period. Both MacRae and Meldrum (1960) and Erbring, Nie, and Hamburg (1986) find evidence for structural change in fine-grained analyses of Illinois politics. Our own analysis shows somewhat lower levels of equilibrium in 1932 and 1936 than in the early 1920s or the 1940s, but these differences are modest.

8. In the analysis of "party as a cue" reported below we use the average correlation between the congressional, subpresidential, and *prior* presidential voting variables as the equilibrium measure. This ensures that the equilibrium measure is not a function of current presidential voting. In the analysis of "party identification" we analyze the level of independent identification in both off and on years. Presidential voting is not a variable in the prediction equations. The off-year correlations are calculated using the immediately prior presidential election, while the on-year correlations use the current on-year presidential election.

9. As a check on the OLS results, we performed a Yule-Walker autoregressive analysis in which the dependent variable is *change* in percentage independent. The predictor variables are equilibrium level, dummy off year, and time. The coefficient for equilibrium level in this model is −8.08, significant at the .01 level.

10. The theoretical tension surrounding the question of issue clarity and partisan identification is illustrated in the contrast between Pomper (1972) and Nie and Anderson (1974).

11. The collinearity is caused by the fact that the lagged congressional-roll-call and subpresidential-voting variables (which serve as the instruments) are not very different from their unlagged counterparts. This makes the standard errors very high.

12. We performed a Yule-Walker analysis using the SAS autoregression procedure.

## References

Aldrich, John H. 1983. A Spatial Model with Party Activists: Implications for Electoral Dynamics. *Public Choice* 41:63-100.

Brady, David W. 1985. A Reevaluation of Realignments in American Politics: Evidence from the House of Representatives. *American Political Science Review* 79:28-49.

Burnham, Walter Dean. 1970. *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Electoral Politics.* New York: Norton.

Carmines, Edward G., and James A. Stimson. 1986. On the Structure and Sequence of Issue Evolution. *American Political Science Review* 80:901-20.

Campbell, Angus, Phillip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter.* New York: Wiley.

Clubb, Jerome N., William H. Flanigan, and Nancy H. Zingale. 1980. *Partisan Realignment: Voters, Parties, and Government in American History.* Beverly Hills: Sage.

Cobb, Roger W., and Charles D. Elder. 1972. *Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda Building.* Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Converse, Philip E. 1964. The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics. In *Ideology and Discontent,* ed. David E. Apter. New York: Free Press of Glencoe.

Cotter, Cornelius P., James L. Gibson, John F. Bibby, and Robert J. Huchshorn. 1984. *Party Organization in American Politics.* New York: Praeger.

David, Paul T. 1972. *Party Strength in the United States, 1872-1970.* Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.

Enelow, James, and Melvin Hinich. 1984. *The Spatial Theory of Voting: An Introduction.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Erbring, Lutz, Norman Nie, and Edward Hamburg. 1986. The Dynamics of Political Realignment: Mobilization, Recruitment, and Conversion. Paper presented at the 1986 meetings of the American Political Science Association, Washington.

Kingdon, John W. 1984. *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies.* Boston: Little, Brown.

MacRae, Duncan, Jr., and James A. Meldrum. 1960. Critical Elections in Illinois: 1888-1958. *American Political Science Review* 73:538-60.

Nie, Norman H., and Kristi Anderson. 1974. Mass Belief Systems Revisited: Political Change and Attitude Structure. *Journal of Politics* 36:541-91.

Pomper, Gerald. 1972. From Confusion to Clarity: Issues and the American Voter. *American Political Science Review* 66:415-28.

Poole, Keith T., and R. Steven Daniels. 1985. Ideology, Party, and Voting in the U.S. Congress 1959-1980. *American Political Science Review* 79:373-99.

Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. 1985a. A Spatial Model of Legislative Roll Call Analysis. *American Journal of Political Science* 29:357-84.

Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. 1985b. The Unidimensional Congress: 1919-1984. Paper presented at the 1985 meetings of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans.

Rabinowitz, George. 1973. *Spatial Models of Electoral Behavior: An Empirical Analysis.* Chapel Hill, NC: Institute for Research in Social Science.

Rabinowitz, George, Paul-Henri Gurian, and Stuart Elaine Macdonald. 1984. The Structure of Presidential Elections and the Process of Realignment. *American Journal of Political Science* 28:611-35.

Rosenstone, Steven. 1983. *Forecasting Presidential Elections.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Schattschneider, Elmer E. 1960. *Semisovereign People.* New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.

Schlesinger, Joseph A. 1985. The New American Political Party. *American Political Science Review* 79:1152-69.

Schneider, William. 1978. Democrats and Republicans, Liberals and Conservatives. In *Emerging Coalitions in American Politics,* ed. Seymour Martin Lipset. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies.

Sinclair, Barbara D. 1978. From Party Voting to Regional Fragmentation: The House of Representatives from 1933-1956. *American Politics Quarterly* 6:125-46.

Stimson, James A. 1985. Repression in Space and Time: A Statistical Essay. *American Journal of Political Science* 29:914-47.

Sundquist, James L. 1973. *Dynamics of the Party System.* Washington: Brookings Institute.

Wattenberg, Martin P. 1984. *The Decline of American Political Parties: 1952-1980.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Stuart Elaine Macdonald is Assistant Professor and George Rabinowitz is Professor of Political Science, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27514.

# STATE POLITICAL CULTURE AND PUBLIC OPINION

ROBERT S. ERIKSON
*University of Houston*
JOHN P. McIVER
*University of Colorado*
GERALD C. WRIGHT, JR.
*Indiana University*

*Do the states of the United States matter (or are they of no political consequence)? Using a data set with over 50 thousand respondents, we demonstrate the influence of state political culture on partisanship and ideology. For individuals, we find that the state of residence is an important predictor of partisan and ideological identification, independent of their demographic characteristics. At the aggregate level, state culture dominates state demography as a source of state-to-state differences in opinion. In general, geographic location may be a more important source of opinion than previously thought. One indication of the importance of state culture is that state effects on partisanship and ideology account for about half of the variance in state voting in recent presidential elections.*

Political scientists often assume that political attitudes are shaped by local political culture, the commonly shared and reinforced political values within the local community. But unfortunately, we know little about how geographical location influences political attitudes. *Region,* defined in broad categories like *Northeast, South, Midwest,* and *West,* seems to have a modest influence on how U.S. citizens think politically. Typically, political scientists use *region* as a surrogate for a common culture, often attributed to the unique historical, economic, or demographic composition of large areas of the nation. *Region* in this sense is used as an explanatory contextual variable in the analysis of individual-level attitudes and behaviors. Yet do regions, as broad geographic categories, adequately account for all geographical variation in political culture within the United States? Stated differently, have important variations within regions led to unique subregional political cultures? If so, the usual regional definitions mask important differences in political culture within regions.

One intriguing possibility is that the unique political cultures of individual states exert an important influence on political attitudes. We are not alone in entertaining this possibility. A sizeable literature documents apparent differences in state political cultures (Fenton 1957, 1966; Key 1949; Lockard 1959; Patterson 1968). By necessity, though, this literature is largely impressionistic. And the comparative component is implied more than it is demonstrated. The pioneering cultural mapping begun by Daniel Elazar (Elazar 1966; Sharkansky 1970) is forthrightly comparative, but it too is largely impressionistic in its assignment of con-

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
VOL. 81 NO. 3 SEPTEMBER 1987

temporary cultural influences. Comparative analysis of the influence of political culture in the United States has awaited adequate measurement.

We examine the effects of state political culture on the political attitudes of U.S. citizens. This task is made possible by access to an unusually large national-opinion survey. We pool multiple CBS/*New York Times* national-opinion surveys over the period 1976-82. From these surveys, two attitudinal items are available for analysis: party identification and ideological identification. These variables are measured as trichotomies: Democratic, Independent, and Republican; and liberal, moderate, and conservative. This data set is described more fully in Wright, Erikson, and McIver 1985.

Here we analyze only the subset of the CBS/*New York Times* surveys for which a full set of respondent demographic characteristics were ascertained. We examine the differing effects of 48 states, excluding Alaska and Hawaii (no interviews) and Nevada (see Wright, Erikson, and McIver 1985, 480) but with the District of Columbia as an added "state." We have 55,145 respondents for our analysis of the effect of state on party identification and 52,820 respondents for our analysis of the effect of state on ideological identification.

The research that follows is a combination of individual-level and aggregate-level analysis. For the individual-level analysis, we examine geographical units as dummy variables among a larger set of independent variables predicting individual-level responses. For the aggregate-level analysis, we examine the extent to which the observed attitudinal differences across state samples conform to state boundaries, as represented by the state dummy variables from the individual-level analysis, rather than from state-to-state differences in demographic composition.

Admittedly, *political culture* can take on a broader connotation than what we are able to examine in this paper. For instance, Elazar (1966, 84) defines *political culture* as "the particular pattern or orientation to political action in which each political system is imbedded." State political cultures may be classified in part by attitudes of the public and politicians, the kinds of people involved in state government, and the actions of state governments. Here we examine only one aspect of state political culture: state public opinion as summarized in party identification and ideological identification. Moreover, we define *state political culture* as only that portion of state public opinion that cannot be accounted for by the group characteristics of the state electorate. Our assumption is that estimates of the contextual effects of the state of residence on partisanship and ideology reflect the effects of different state political cultures on these important attitudinal variables.

## The Influence of State of Residence on Political Attitudes

Our first task is the estimation of state-level "cultural" effects from survey data. For each of the two dependent variables (party identification and ideological identification), we run four regression equations. First, we include 25 dummy variables representing the available categories on the demographic variables for the CBS/*New York Times* surveys as the independent variables. (The dummy variables represent categories on respondent's age, education, family income, religion, race, gender, and urbanism.) Second, we add three dummies representing the four major regions: Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. Third, we switch to dummies representing a more detailed regional breakdown of eight separate regions: New England, Mid-Atlantic, Great Lakes, Plains, Deep South, Border South, Mountain, and Pacific. Fourth, we replace the region dummies with separate dummy variables for each of 48 states. At each stage our primary interest is to see how the more complex breakdown of geography improves the explanation of the political attitudes in question.

Once we reach the point where each state becomes a dummy variable, we have 72 independent variables, which, with multiple thousands of cases, can be handled easily. In fact the large data set allows the luxury of including missing data *(don't know, no answer)* for each demographic variable as its own dummy variable.

In Table 1, we show the results of the two regression equations predicting party identification and ideological identification from demographic variables alone. The regression coefficients conform to expectations. (Almost all are highly significant, as we would expect, given the large sample sizes.) Having a high income, being a Protestant, being white, being male, and living in the suburbs or rural areas all appear to result in Republicanism and conservatism. Age is also related to conservatism, but its effect on partisanship is not clear. Education is the one variable that clearly pushes partisanship and ideology in opposite directions. High education appears to promote both Republican partisanship and liberal ideological identification.

Our major interest here is in the consequences of adding dummy variables representing geographic location to the set of independent variables. Table 2 displays the statistical evidence. As can be seen, each further refinement of geographic location does add to the prediction of partisanship and ideology: Four regions add significantly to what demographics alone explain; eight regions add significantly beyond what four regions explain; and states add beyond what eight regions explain. Knowing a person's state, therefore, does add to our ability to forecast a person's partisanship or ideology beyond what we know from the person's demographic characteristics alone or even beyond what we know from the person's demographics and region together.

Of course, the increments in the adjusted $R^2$ for each new refinement in the measurement of geography are minuscule. Seemingly it took 10s of thousands of cases to make states collectively a statistically significant set of predictors for political attitudes. This statistical "proof" that the state of residence helps explain political attitudes by itself does not demonstrate the substantive significance of the coefficients for the state dummy variables. Are these estimates of state-to-state differences in political culture large enough and statistically reliable enough to merit detailed attention?

In Table 3, we show the regression coefficients and standard errors for the state dummy variables as predictors of partisanship and ideology, with demographics controlled. Coefficients and standard errors are shown for each of the 48 analyzed states. In place of omitting one state to serve as the base category (the usual procedure in dummy-variable analysis), the intercept is omitted (the two procedures give equivalent equations). *Suppressing* the intercept serves two functions. It gives coefficients representing state effects that are relative to the mean respondent (more precisely, the mean respondent in the base category on each set of demographics) rather than relative to the effect of one arbitrarily chosen base state. Second, it results in standard errors that represent the error in the estimate of the state effect by itself rather than the error in the relative difference between the state effect and the effect of the arbitrarily chosen base state.[1] We will see this to be an important advantage.

The best way to evaluate the magnitudes of the estimated state effects of Table 3 is to compare them with the magnitudes of the effect of the demographic

**Table 1. Regression of Party Identification and Ideological Identification on Selected Demographic Variables**

| | Party Identification | | Ideological Identification | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Demographic Variables | Regression Coefficient | Standard Error | Regression Coefficient | Standard Error |
| Education | | | | |
| Not high-school graduate | | | | |
| High-school graduate | .082** | .010 | -.038** | .010 |
| Some college | .176** | .010 | -.062** | .010 |
| College graduate | .229** | .011 | -.091** | .011 |
| Don't know, refused | .016 | .050 | .007 | .056 |
| Income | | | | |
| Low | | | | |
| Low middle | .033** | .011 | .015 | .010 |
| High middle | .048** | .011 | .016 | .010 |
| High | .145** | .011 | .048** | .011 |
| Don't know, refused | .109** | .018 | .108** | .018 |
| Age | | | | |
| 18–29 | | | | |
| 30–44 | -.042** | .009 | .115** | .008 |
| 45–64 | -.037** | .009 | .200** | .009 |
| 65 and older | .094** | .012 | .260** | .011 |
| Don't know, refused | .121 | .063 | .186* | .067 |
| Race | | | | |
| White | | | | |
| Black | -.540** | .013 | -.161** | .013 |
| Other minority | -.173** | .021 | -.160* | .020 |
| Don't know, refused | .166* | .054 | -.091 | .054 |
| Religion | | | | |
| Protestant | | | | |
| Catholic | -.230** | .008 | -.099** | .007 |
| Jewish | -.504** | .019 | -.444** | .019 |
| Other religion | -.019 | .021 | -.061** | .021 |
| Not religious | -.104** | .023 | -.171** | .023 |
| Don't know, refused | -.138* | .040 | -.050 | .041 |
| Gender | | | | |
| Male | | | | |
| Female | -.029** | .007 | -.038** | .006 |
| Size of place | | | | |
| Rural | | | | |
| Large city | -.045** | .010 | -.060** | .010 |
| Suburbs | .037** | .008 | -.041** | .008 |
| Small city | -.016 | .010 | -.026* | .009 |
| Don't know, refused | -.159 | .011 | .122 | .110 |

*Significant at .001.
**Significant at .0001.

**Table 2. Significance of Regions and States as Predictors of Party Identification and Ideological Identification**

| Variables | Adjusted $R^2$ | Change in Adjusted $R^2$ | F for Change | Degrees of Freedom | Significant at .01? |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Predicting party identification | | | | | |
| Demographic only | .0770 | — | — | — | — |
| Demographics plus four regions | .0866 | .0096 | 194.18 | 3, 55,116 | yes |
| Demographics plus eight regions | .0898 | .0032 | 48.33 | 4, 55,112 | yes |
| Demographics plus 48 states | .0953 | .0055 | 8.35 | 40, 55,072 | yes |
| Number of cases = 55,145 | | | | | |
| Predicting ideological identification | | | | | |
| Demographics only | .0396 | — | — | — | — |
| Demographics plus four regions | .0421 | .0025 | 46.23 | 3, 52,791 | yes |
| Demographics plus eight regions | .0425 | .0004 | 5.11 | 4, 52,787 | yes |
| Demographics plus 48 states | .0444 | .0019 | 2.67 | 40, 52,747 | yes |
| Number of cases = 52,820 | | | | | |

categories, shown in Table 1. This comparison shows that the effect of living in one state instead of another is often of about the same magnitude as the difference between one demographic category and another. Consider, for example, the apparent effects of living in the relatively liberal and Democratic state of Minnesota rather than the relatively conservative and Republican state of Indiana. Comparing these states' relevant regression coefficients suggests that living in Minnesota instead of Indiana produces a difference of .141 on the three-point party-identification scale and a difference of .031 on the three-point ideological-identification scale. These differences are comparable to the effect of being in the highest rather than the lowest income category (see Table 1): a difference of .149 on party identification and .048 on ideological identification. In other words, the effect of living in the Indiana political culture rather than the Minnesota political culture is about the same as the effect of having a very high income instead of a very low income.

Our examples of Minnesota effects and Indiana effects are not the most extreme cases. The most Democratic state effect is estimated to be Georgia's (−.252); the most Republican state effect is estimated to be Nebraska's (.238). The coefficients of Table 1 suggest that the difference in party identification produced by the difference between the political cultures of Georgia and Nebraska is almost of the same magnitude as the difference resulting from being Jewish instead of Protestant or of being black instead of white! And remember that the state coefficients are derived from an analysis in which all major demographic variables are controlled. These differences in state effects on partisanship are not a function of the measured state demographics.

Considering ideology, Table 3 identifies West Virginia as the most liberal state

## Table 3. Effects of State Culture on Party Identification and Ideological Identification

| | Party Identification | | Ideological Identification | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| State | Regression Coefficient | Standard Error | Regression Coefficient | Standard Error |
| Alabama | -.233 | .028 | .065 | .028 |
| Arizona | .047 | .034 | .079 | .033 |
| Arkansas | -.232 | .033 | -.029 | .033 |
| California | .019 | .018 | -.053 | .017 |
| Colorado | .057 | .035 | -.037 | .034 |
| Connecticut | .096 | .030 | -.058 | .030 |
| Delaware | .057 | .069 | -.017 | .068 |
| District of Columbia | -.003 | .053 | -.085 | .053 |
| Florida | -.018 | .021 | .027 | .021 |
| Georgia | -.252 | .024 | -.002 | .024 |
| Idaho | .202 | .045 | .139 | .044 |
| Illinois | .088 | .020 | -.013 | .020 |
| Indiana | .071 | .024 | .003 | .023 |
| Iowa | .098 | .030 | -.039 | .030 |
| Kansas | .094 | .029 | -.056 | .028 |
| Kentucky | -.167 | .028 | -.028 | .028 |
| Louisiana | -.242 | .029 | .079 | .028 |
| Maine | .147 | .043 | -.015 | .042 |
| Maryland | -.130 | .026 | -.032 | .026 |
| Massachusetts | -.019 | .024 | -.109 | .024 |
| Michigan | .092 | .021 | -.041 | .020 |
| Minnesota | -.070 | .027 | -.028 | .027 |
| Mississippi | -.171 | .039 | .054 | .039 |
| Missouri | -.021 | .024 | -.020 | .024 |
| Montana | -.009 | .052 | -.028 | .051 |
| Nebraska | .238 | .037 | -.004 | .037 |
| New Hampshire | .231 | .047 | .013 | .046 |
| New Jersey | .097 | .023 | -.087 | .022 |
| New Mexico | -.035 | .046 | -.011 | .045 |
| New York | .161 | .019 | -.040 | .018 |
| North Carolina | -.107 | .027 | .035 | .027 |
| North Dakota | .160 | .057 | .194 | .055 |
| Ohio | .065 | .020 | -.050 | .019 |
| Oklahoma | -.161 | .032 | .119 | .032 |
| Oregon | -.043 | .030 | -.047 | .029 |
| Pennsylvania | .107 | .019 | -.020 | .019 |
| Rhode Island | .025 | .054 | -.075 | .051 |
| South Carolina | -.012 | .030 | .120 | .029 |
| South Dakota | .001 | .043 | .038 | .043 |
| Tennessee | -.046 | .026 | .013 | .026 |
| Texas | -.127 | .019 | .091 | .018 |
| Utah | .153 | .042 | .169 | .041 |
| Vermont | .134 | .056 | -.115 | .056 |
| Virginia | .015 | .024 | .053 | .024 |
| Washington | -.036 | .026 | -.048 | .026 |
| West Virginia | -.126 | .034 | -.122 | .034 |
| Wisconsin | .053 | .027 | -.023 | .026 |
| Wyoming | -.020 | .064 | -.040 | .064 |

relative to its demographic composition. The most conservative state political culture is that of North Dakota. The magnitude of the difference between these two states exceeds the maximum difference across categories on all demographic variables with the exception of religion. The evident ideological impact of living in West Virginia rather than in North Dakota exceeds by a considerable amount the effect of being Catholic versus being Protestant. But our West Virginia-versus-North Dakota effect does not quite compare in size to the ideological impact of being Jewish versus being Protestant.

Clearly, as estimated by the coefficients for state dummy variables with controls for demographics, the effects of state political culture seem to be reasonably large. But how reliable are these estimates? Each reader may wish to make his or her own assessment, comparing the state estimates with his or her expectations. To us, a few coefficients seem out of line, but most seem plausible. We can do better, however, than to compare estimates with our private intuitions. We can estimate the statistical reliabilities of the state effects.

To ascertain the reliability of the state estimates, we use the standard errors of the state effects, shown in Table 3. Each standard error is equivalent to the sampling error of the sample-based state estimate, but with the effects of demographic variables held constant.[2] The square of each standard error is the error variance in the estimate of the state's attitudinal effect. We use the estimates of error variance in the calculation of overall statistical reliability for the state dummy variables.

Here, we shift for the first time from the individual level to the aggregate level of analysis. For both partisanship and ideology, we wish to estimate the reliability of the 48 estimates of the effect of state culture represented by the state dummy variables. By the standard statistical definition, the reliability of each variable is the ratio of true variance to observed variance. True variance cannot be estimated directly. But because the observed or total variance is the sum of the true variance plus the error variance, we can estimate the true variance by subtracting the error variance from the observed variance.

At the practical level, our steps are as follows: first, we square the standard errors for the state variables and obtain their mean, which serves as the estimated error variance for the state coefficients; second, we compute the observed variance as the variance of the state coefficients; third, we subtract the error variance from the observed variance to estimate the true variance across states in cultural differences; and fourth, we divide the estimated true variance by the observed total variance to estimate the reliability.

For party identification, the estimated reliability of the dummy-variable coefficients is .91. Thus, our estimates of state effects on partisanship with demographic effects removed can be accepted with considerable confidence. For ideology, the estimated reliability of the state effects is a somewhat lower value of .73. Thus, about one-fourth of the variance in these ideology coefficients can be attributed to sampling error.[3]

Let us review our findings so far. First, states make a statistically significant contribution to the prediction of partisanship and ideology beyond what demographics plus a detailed breakdown of region can do. Second, the estimates of specific state effects range sufficiently to compare in magnitude with the measurable effects of standard respondent demographic variables such as race, religion, income, education, and age. Finally, these coefficients for estimated state effects are quite reliable. This means that the state estimates accurately measure state-to-state differences in individual responses to survey items about partisan and ideological identification, adjusted for the effects of the included demographic variables.

## Culture versus Demography as Sources of State Opinion

So far we have examined the effects of state residence upon individual attitudes and how these effects compare with the effects of standard demographic variables upon individual attitudes. In this section, the state rather than the individual respondent is the unit of analysis. Here we try to ascertain the extent to which state-level differences in partisanship and ideology are a function of unique state cultures rather than the different group characteristics of the states' residents.

For this analysis, we decompose the observed mean party identification and the observed mean ideological identification of each state into its cultural component and its demographic component. The cultural components are our estimates of the effect of state political culture on individual attitudes: the dummy-variable coefficients of the state's impact on partisanship and ideological identification independent of demography (see Table 3). The demographic components are the average of the state's respondents' predicted responses based on demography, controlling for state effects. More precisely, the demographic components are the average of the responses predicted by the regression coefficients, but with the effects of the state dummy variables subtracted out. Tautologically, the cultural and demographic components of partisanship (and of ideological identification) add up to exactly the states' mean responses.

In Figures 1 and 2, we show the scatterplots of the states' cultural and demographic components, for partisanship and ideology respectively. The horizontal axes represent the estimated effects of state culture: the farther right the state's position on the horizontal axis, the more Republican or the more conservative the state effect. The vertical axes represent the demographic components of state attitudes: the higher the state's position on the vertical axis, the more Republican or the more conservative is the state in terms of the demographics of its population. States to the right and above the diagonal lines in the two figures are relatively Republican (Figure 1) or relatively conservative (Figure 2). States to the left and below the diagonal line are relatively Democratic (Figure 1) or relatively liberal (Figure 2).

For both partisanship and ideology, the cultural component has more variance than the demographic component. For partisanship, the ratio of variances is .015 to .003. For ideology, the ratio of variances is .005 to .001. Thus the variance attributable to the cultural components of partisanship and ideological identification is five times the variance due to demography.[4]

Adjustment for measurement error modifies these estimates only slightly. We can adjust the two cultural variances, purging our estimates of the error variances from the reliability exercise. Generously, let us assume that the demographic component is measured perfectly, thus allowing a slight inflation of the variance estimate for demography. The resultant ratios still favor culture. For partisanship, the ratio is now .014 to .003, or almost 5 to 1. For ideology, the ratio is .003 to .001, or 3 to 1.

The interpretation of these findings is straightforward and intriguing. Because the cultural components have the higher ratio, most of the variance in state partisanship and state ideology is due to state-to-state differences that cannot be accounted for by the demographic variables measured here. Only a relatively small proportion of the variance in state partisanship and ideology is due to state-to-

**Figure 1. Components of State Party Identification**



state variation in the demographic characteristics—race, religion, income, education, and so on—that we might think account for state-to-state differences in state attitudes. Put another way, state differences in partisanship and ideology are far more than the sum of their demographic parts.

This result must make us question the validity of the procedure of "simulating" state public opinion from the attitudes of the state's known demographic groups. Simulation of state opinion from state demographics has often been employed as a substitute for unavailable state-survey estimates (Pool, Abelson, and Popkin 1965; Weber 1971; Weber et al. 1972). But the simulation of opinion can be misleading if state attitudes are more than the reflection of state demographics. Here we provide ample evidence that the partisanship and ideology of state electorates are not determined exclusively from state demographic compositions but rather are largely the product of the unique political context within each state.

Figure 2. Components of State Ideological Identification



## Accounting for State Differences in Political Culture

We have demonstrated that most of the variance in state attitudes in partisanship and ideology can be attributed to the different political cultures of the individual states. But what accounts for this cultural variation? Can we identify patterns that account for state-to-state differences in state effects on partisan and ideological identification?

Several hypotheses can be advanced to account for differing state influences on partisanship and ideology. Most obviously, we can look for a geographic pattern of common state effects within regions or among geographically similar states. Second, we might expect Elazar's well-known measure of state political culture as *moralist*, *individualist*, or *traditionalist* to be related to our cultural components of partisanship and ideology. Third, we might find a social-context effect, with state demographic characteristics influencing state effects. Finally, we can look for a relationship between the two cultural components themselves: are the causes of Democratic cultures the same as the causes of liberal cultures?

### Region

Earlier, we saw that state effects contribute significantly to the prediction of individual partisanship and ideology beyond what even eight regions can do. But this does not preclude the possibility of regional patterning of the state effects. Referring back to Table 3, one can see some regional patterns. For instance, southern and border states show party effects that are considerably more Democratic than the norm. Southern and interior western states show ideology effects that are more conservative than the average.

The eight-way regional breakdown can account for 59% of the variance in the state coefficients for party identification and 34% of the variance in the state coefficents for ideological identification. Most of this regional predictability is due to the Democratic and conservative South. Excluding Deep South and Border South, only 7% of the variance in the partisan coefficients and only 10% of the variance in the ideological coefficients can be accounted for by region. Therefore, setting aside the cultural distinctiveness of the South, the effect of state cultures on partisanship and ideology does not follow a consistent geographic pattern. Classifying a state as Mid-Atlantic, Mountain, and so on, does not tell us much about the effect of residence in the state upon partisan or ideological identification.

### Elazar's Political Culture

Elazar's well-known measure of political culture categorizes regions within states as *moralist*, *individualist* and *traditionalist*. Sharkansky (1970) operationalized Elazar's measure as a state-level index from purely moralistic states to purely traditional states. Sharkansky's measure of traditionalism correlates quite negatively with our measure of cultural Republicanism (−.69) and somewhat positively with our measure of cultural conservatism (.23). Closer examination shows the common source of variation in each case to be South versus Non-South regionalism. Southern states are rated highly traditionalistic by Elazar and have very Democratic but conservative state effects. With southern and border states omitted, Sharkansky's measure correlates only −.00 and −.03 with partisan and ideological state effects, respectively. Clearly, then, our measures of state cultural effects on partisanship and ideology measure something quite different from Elazar's and Sharkansky's codification of state political culture.

### "Social-Context" Effects

Studies of the contextual effects of small geographic units like neighborhoods have given special attention to the hypothesis that peoples' attitudes are influenced by the aggregated attitudes of those around them. Rationales include the possibilities that people respond to social norms or are influenced by social interactions. Local attitudes are typically operationalized as the attitudes of the locally predominant social groups. The effect of social context might be examined, for example, by seeing whether neighborhood effects on the vote correlate with the vote predicted from residents' individual characteristics (Huckfeldt 1979, 1984). At the state level, the social-context hypothesis offers an obvious prediction. If state effects reinforce state attitudes that result from individual-citizen characteristics, then the demographic component of state opinion (due to individual characteristics) should be related to the cultural component (due to residence in the state apart from individual effects).

Interestingly, the data offer no support for a social-context effect at the state level. For party, the demographic and cultural components of state opinion are correlated at .02, and −.21 when southern and border states are removed. For ideology, the two components are correlated at .22, but only .02 when southern and border states are removed. Thus, the partisan and ideological leanings that a state obtains from its demographic composition do not seem to affect the directions of the cultural components of state partisanship and ideology. Perhaps surprisingly, although the state of residence appears to have a major impact on political attitudes, these state effects are not influenced by the attitudinal predispositions of the states' demographic groups.

### Commonality to Partisan and Ideological Effects?

Although we cannot identify the specific causes of state effects on partisanship or ideology, perhaps the unidentified causes of the two sets of cultural effects are related. If so, the state effects on partisanship and state effects on ideology would correlate with each other. But even this expectation is not borne out by the data. The two are correlated at a surprising −.04. But here is an instance where excluding southern and border states boosts the correlation—due to the conservative but Democratic effects of southern states. With southern and border states excluded, the correlation between state effects for partisanship and ideology is .37, suggesting some commonality.

But at best, whether a state's political culture influences opinion in the liberal or the conservative direction is only modestly related to whether the state culture favors the Republican or Democratic party. At the same time, the correlation between the demographic components of partisanship and ideological identification is a rather high .67 for all states and .55 without southern and border states. This reflects the fact that the same variables that predict Democratic party identification generally are the same that predict liberal ideological identification as well.

This quest for causes of the measured state effects ends on a puzzling note. As we saw, indigenous "state" effects, which we attribute to state-to-state differences in political culture, account for far more of the interstate variance of partisanship and ideology than does interstate variation in the demographic compositions of state populations. A state's partisan or ideological bent seems more a function of its political history and development than of the characteristics of its population. But these important differences in political culture are not easily accounted for. Apart from the uniqueness of the South, with its Democratic but conservative culture, states seem to develop relatively conservative or relatively liberal cultures, or relatively Republican or relatively Democratic cultures, without any pattern that we can yet discern.

## Context or Statistical Artifact?

This paper is an exercise in "contextual" analysis. As usually defined, *contextual analysis* means that individual-level variables are explained in terms of both individual-level and aggregate-level ("contextual") variables. One problem with contextual analysis is that the estimated effects of the aggregate-level independent variable might actually represent in part the effects of unmeasured individual-level variables (Stipak and Hensler 1982). Thus, if one does not adequately control for relevant individual-level independent variables, one risks exaggerating the effects of the contextual variables.

Here, this worry applies to the possible consequences of the incompleteness of the demographic controls. We have dummy variables for categories of *education, income, race, religion, age, gender,* and *urbanism.* Are omitted individual-level variables contributing to the apparent cultural effects? Probably they are, but in most instances only at the margins. An extreme illustration is the absence, in the measurement of religion, of a separate dummy variable for *Mormon.* The *Utah* dummy variable has regression coefficients indicating a conservative and a Republican influence of culture in this state. But part of this cultural effect for Utah probably would disappear if we could control for Mormon affiliation. Mormons are both homogeneous in their political attitudes and geographically concentrated, particularly in Utah. Consequently, Mormon religious affiliation may have a significant impact on the attitudes of Utah residents. Most (omitted) demographic variables, however, are less salient, less homogeneous and less concentrated and, consequently, would have a lesser impact.

We have seen earlier that observed standard demographic variables account for only a small portion of the observed state-to-state differences in opinion. If these demographics contribute so little to state differences in aggregate opinion, incorporating additional group characteristics would seemingly make little difference. Taking an empirical approach to this problem, we can see what happens to the estimates of state cultural effects if we add (or subtract) dummy variables that identify other population subgroups.

In our survey data, union membership is measured for about two-thirds of the respondents. We chose not to use this variable in our primary analysis, partly because of the loss of cases. A second reason was that union membership (or its absence) is not necessarily causally prior to opinion. For instance, Democrats and liberals may be more likely to join unions. Or, Democratic or liberal state electorates could promote prounion legislation that expands union membership. Either way, union members would be more Democratic and liberal, apart from membership affecting partisanship or ideology. But such concerns need not bother us here, since for current purposes we need only for union membership to be a predictor of partisanship and ideology and for frequencies of union membership to vary across state lines.[5]

Union membership makes a useful test variable to determine the robustness of the analysis against omitted variables. Union membership is a good marker of both partisanship and ideology. When added to the regression equations, union membership shows regression coefficients at about the same magnitudes as the standard demographic variables. (Compare union membership's −.177 coefficient for party and −.084 coefficient for ideology with the coefficients of Table 1.) Because union membership is unevenly spread across states, with heavier clustering where the Democratic party and political liberalism thrive, possibly some of our cultural effects for party and ideology can be attributed to union membership instead.

Happily for our enterprise of estimating the effects of state culture, our cultural estimates survive this threat. For both party and ideology, the 48 state-dummy-variable coefficients computed without a union membership control correlate almost perfectly (.99+) with a new set of state coefficients computed with union membership as an additional control. Moreover, the variances of the state coefficients decline only by about 1%.

This result suggests that our state effects are not seriously contaminated or underestimated by the omission of additional demographic variables that contribute to partisan and ideological attitudes.

Table 4. Predicting State Presidential Voting from the Demographic and Cultural Components of State Partisanship and Ideology

| | 1976 Republican Vote | | 1980 Republican Vote | | 1984 Republican Vote | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Components of Partisanship and Ideology | All States | North Only | All States | North Only | All States | North Only |
| Mean state opinion | | | | | | |
| Partisanship | .75** | .56** | .50** | .27* | .32** | .41 |
| Ideology | .22* | .29 | .63** | .65** | .70** | .48* |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | .60 | .57 | .64 | .66 | .58 | .60 |
| Demographic components | | | | | | |
| Partisanship | .32 | .32 | .42* | .40 | .20 | .41 |
| Ideology | -.11 | .18 | .00 | .11 | .25 | .30 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | .03 | .14 | .13 | .16 | .12 | .14 |
| Cultural components | | | | | | |
| Partisanship | .69** | .36* | .40** | .11 | .24* | .30 |
| Ideology | .25* | .39* | .62** | .71** | .63** | .50* |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | .51 | .34 | .51 | .55 | .42 | .42 |
| Number of cases | 47 | 31 | 47 | 31 | 47 | 31 |

*Beta coefficient significant at .05.
**Beta coefficient significant at .001.

## State Political Culture and the Presidential Vote

State-level presidential voting is probably the most visible manifestation of state public opinion. Therefore, one test of the importance of our estimates of state effects on partisanship and ideology is to observe their relationship to presidential voting. Does state presidential voting vary as a function of state partisanship and ideology? If so, does presidential voting respond to only the demographic component of state partisanship and ideology, or do the state effects attributable to state political culture also make an important contribution?

In Table 4, we examine state-level Republican voting in the three most recent presidential elections. The first set of equations predicts the vote from mean state opinion on partisanship and ideology. The second set of equations predicts the vote from the components of state partisanship and ideology determined by citizen demographics. Finally, the third set of equations predicts the vote from the cultural components of state partisanship and ideology—our estimated state effects on individual attitudes. Because the District of Columbia is such an electoral outlier, it is excluded from the analysis of Table 4. Results are shown both for the full set of 47 states and for 31 states, with southern and border states excluded.

The first set of equations demonstrates that state presidential-election returns are quite sensitive to the party identification and ideological identification of the state's electorate. For each election, whether or not we include southern and border states, mean partisanship and ideology together explain well over half the variance in presidential voting. The demographic components of partisanship and ideology alone, however, explain only from 3% to 16% of the variance. Knowing whether a state has a Democratic or Republican—or

Figure 3. The Impact of Political Culture on Presidential Voting: State Support for Reagan—1980



liberal or conservative—demographic profile adds only slightly to one's ability to predict its presidential voting. The cultural components of partisanship and ideology—estimated from our dummy-variable coefficients—permit by far the greater prediction of presidential voting. Cultural components account for 51% of the variance in the vote in 1976 and 1980 and 42% in 1984. Comparable figures without southern and border states are 34%, 55%, and 42% respectively. Interestingly, in the two Reagan elections, state effects on ideology appear to be far more important than state effects on partisanship. This is consistent with other evidence (Rabinowitz, Gurian, and McDonald, 1984) of the increasing role of ideology in the political geography of U.S. presidential elections.

In Figure 3, we illustrate the predictive ability of the cultural components for 1980. This figure shows the bivariate correlation between the 1980 Reagan vote and the 1980 Reagan vote predicted from the cultural components of partisanship and ideology. In the 1980 election, over half the variance in state presidential voting can be accounted for by state effects on individual partisan and ideological attitudes, with the effects of individual demography removed.

The results shown in Table 4 and illustrated in Figure 3 are the culmination of this research as well as a justification for further exploration into the meaning and impact of state political culture. State cultures modestly influence individual partisanship and ideology. Apart from southern regionalism, however, variations in these state effects cannot be accounted for easily. One's state of residence contributes somewhat to one's political attitudes, but it is not clear why this is so. We have discovered that most of the variation in state partisanship and ideology is due to these unique state effects rather than state differences in demography. Finally, we see that these unique state effects can account for half the variance in state presidential voting. These results reveal both the importance and the mystery of state political cultures.

## Conclusions

We have presented the first detailed examination of the effects of different state political cultures on political attitudes in the United States. For each state, we report reliable estimates of the influence of the state political culture on the partisanship and ideology of its individual citizens.

At the individual level of analysis, the state of residence produces at least as much variation in partisanship and ideology as does the typical demographic variable. With state as the unit of analysis, we find that most of the variance in state-level partisanship and ideology is due to state-level differences in political culture rather than the demographic characteristics of residents of different states. These state effects are important politically, as indicated by the fact that they explain about half of the variance in state presidential voting.

The findings we have presented raise several issues for further investigation. For instance, at what point in a person's life does the state political culture exert its influence? Are the state effects we have measured the result of childhood socialization (assuming most people grow up near where they live as adults) or the effects of subtle influence of the local environment upon the attitudes of adults? Finally, the geographic variation in the effects of state political culture requires further inquiry. Do the effects of geography stop at state lines? Indeed the geographic sources of the variation in political opinions measured in this paper may extend beyond discretely different cultures separated by state boundaries. "State" effects captured by state boundaries may represent in part the sum of the effects of regional variation within states, or even of variation that transcends state lines. In any case, it is clear that the political attitudes of U.S. citizens vary in important ways on the basis of where in the United States they live.

## Notes

This is a revised version of a paper delivered at the 1985 Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. We appreciate the helpful comments of Kathleen Knight, Robert Huckfeldt, Jon Lorence, and Lee Sigelman on an earlier draft. We also thank the National Science Foundation for their support of this research in the form of grants SES 83-10443 and SES 83-10870. Neither NSF nor our colleagues are responsible for the analysis and discussion presented here.

1. One caution about replacing the intercept with the base category is that the reported $R^2$ and F-level for the equation will in general be incorrect.

2. Recall that these standard errors are determined from the form of the equation in which the base state replaces the intercept. This is important.

These standard errors are equivalent to sampling errors for state means, but with demographics held constant. If a base state were omitted (as with the normal routine of dummy-variable analysis), the standard errors would be equivalent to the standard error for a difference-of-means test comparing the effect of the particular state with the effect of the base state.

3. The same procedure can be used to estimate the reliabilities of the "raw" state-opinion estimates without the demographic controls. That is, we can estimate state opinion from state dummy variables alone and proceed as above. This yields reliability estimates of .93 for the state means on partisanship and .84 for the state means on ideology. Reliability estimates are slightly higher, therefore, for state estimates of opinion that reflect both cultural and demographic sources than for estimates of the cultural sources alone.

4. Although the cultural and the demographic components add up to define the state means, the variances do not add up in similar fashion. The slight covariance of the two components gets in the way.

5. To see why causal ambiguity is of no concern for this test, consider the extreme case, where union membership does not cause attitudes but where being a liberal or a Democrat cause unionism and/or where liberal or Democratic state cultures promote union membership. Union membership at the individual level would still predict ideology and partisanship, so that states (or state samples) with the most union membership would show up as more *demographically* liberal and Democratic, and by default, less *culturally* liberal and Democratic.

## References

Elazar, Daniel. 1966. *American Federalism: A View from the States.* New York: Thomas Y. Crowell.

Fenton, John H. 1957. *Politics in the Border States.* New Orleans: Hauser.

Fenton, John H. 1966. *Midwest Politics.* New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.

Huckfeldt, R. Robert. 1979. Political Participation and the Neighborhood Social Context. *American Journal of Political Science* 23:579-92.

Huckfeldt, R. Robert. 1984. Political Loyalties and Social Class Ties: The Mechanisms of Contextual Influence. *American Journal of Political Science* 28:399-417.

Key, V. O. 1949. *Southern Politics: In State and Nation.* New York: Knopf.

Lockard, Duane. 1959. *New England State Politics.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Patterson, Samuel C. 1968. The Political Cultures of the American States. *Journal of Politics* 30:187-209.

Pool, Ithiel de Sola, Robert P. Abelson, and Samuel Popkin. 1965. *Candidates, Issues, and Strategies.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Rabinowitz, George, Paul Henry Gurian, Stuart Elaine McDonald. 1984. The structure of Presidential Elections and the Process of Realignment, 1944 to 1980. *American Journal of Political Science* 27:611-35.

Sharkansky, Ira. 1970. *Regionalism in American Politics.* New York: Bobbs-Merrill.

Stipak, Brian, and Carl Hensler. 1982. Statistical Inference in Contextual Analysis. *American Journal of Political Science* 26:151-75.

Weber, Ronald E. 1971. *Public Policy Preferences in the States.* Bloomington, IN: Institute of Public Administration.

Weber, Ronald E., Anne H. Hopkins, Michael L. Mezey, and Frank Munger. 1972. Computer Simulation of State Electorates. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 36:49-65.

Wright, Gerald C., Robert S. Erikson, and John P. McIver. 1985. Measuring State Partisanship and Ideology with Survey Data. *Journal of Politics* 47:469-89.

Robert S. Erikson is Professor of Political Science, University of Houston, Houston, TX 77004.

John P. McIver is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309.

Gerald C. Wright, Jr. is Professor of Political Science, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405.

# TELEVISION NEWS AND CITIZENS' EXPLANATIONS OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS

SHANTO IYENGAR
*State University of New York
Stony Brook*

*Causal beliefs are important ingredients of public opinion. Citizens are able to identify the causes of complex national issues and do so spontaneously. Evidence is presented that individuals' explanations of political issues are significantly influenced by the manner in which television news presentations "frame" these issues. These results are politically consequential, for individuals' explanations of national issues independently affect their assessments of presidential performance.*

From Plato to Schumpeter, political theorists have been preoccupied with the ordinary citizen's ability to understand the course of public affairs (for a recent analysis, see Ferejohn 1987). Empirical research on this question suggests that public opinion is far from enlightened. Citizens are only fleetingly acquainted with current events and very few utilize ideological precepts to organize their political beliefs (for a review of research, see Kinder and Sears 1985). The low level of political knowledge and the absence of ideological reasoning has lent credence to charges that popular control of government is illusory (with respect to U.S. public opinion, for example, see Schumpeter 1950; Toqueville 1954).

The acquisition of information and the application of ideological principles, however, are not the only means for making sense of the political world. I will argue that causal beliefs are important ingredients of political knowledge; that citizens are quite capable of explaining complex national issues and that they do so spontaneously; that individuals' causal accounts of national issues are significantly influenced by the manner in which television news presentations "frame" these issues; and finally, that individuals' explanations of national issues powerfully affect their attitudes toward government.

## Explanations as Knowledge

Explanation is an essential ingredient of human knowledge. To explain events or outcomes is to understand them: to transform the "blooming, buzzing confusion" of today's world into orderly and meaningful patterns. Psychological research has demonstrated that causal relationships feature prominently in individuals' perceptions of social phenomena (Nisbett and Ross 1980; Weiner 1985). In fact, causal thinking is so ingrained in the human psyche that we even invent causation where none exists, as in purely random or chance events (see Langer 1975; Wortman 1976).

Explanatory knowledge is important to political thinking for two reasons. First, answers to causal questions abound in popular culture, making the task of explanation relatively inexpensive. One need not devour the pages of the *Wall Street Journal* or study macroeconomics to "know" why there is chronic unem-

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
VOL. 81 NO. 3 SEPTEMBER 1987

ployment. Second and more important, explanatory knowledge is connotative knowledge. To "know" that unemployment occurs because of motivational deficiencies on the part of the unemployed is relevant to our attitudes toward the unemployed and our policy preferences regarding unemployment. In other words, explanatory knowledge is usable knowledge. Simple factual knowledge, on the other hand (e.g., the current rate of unemployment), does not so readily imply political attitudes and preferences. It is not surprising, then, that opinions, attitudes, feelings, and behaviors in a multitude of domains are organized around beliefs about causation (for illustrative research, see Schneider, Hastorf, and Ellsworth 1979, chap. 2). In fact, causal attributions exert such a powerful hold on behavior that "misattribution" techniques have proven effective in treating behavior disorders (see Fiske and Taylor 1984, 36-39), in inducing "prosocial" behaviors (see Schneider, Hastorf, and Ellsworth 1979, 93-95), and even in strengthening the general sense of psychological well being (see Langer and Rodin 1976).

### Framing Effects in Political Explanation

When individuals engage in causal reasoning, their thinking processes are rarely systematic or exhaustive (see, for example, Kelley 1973). Virtually all forms of human judgment are infinitely labile, with outcomes hinging on a variety of circumstantial and contextual cues (for illustrative evidence, see Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982). The term *framing effects* refers to changes in judgment engendered by subtle alterations in the definition of judgment or choice problems. Tversky and Kahneman (among others), in a number of ingenious studies, have shown that choices between risky prospects can be profoundly altered merely by altering the description of the alternatives. Framing the prospects in terms of possible losses, for example, induces risk-seeking behavior while describing the identical prospects in terms of potential gains makes people risk averse (Kahneman and Tversky 1982, 1984; for illustrations of framing effects in consumer behavior, see Thaler 1980). In short, the invoking of different reference points triggers completely different strategies of choice or judgment.

Political explanation would seem a particularly promising real-world domain for the occurrence of framing effects. Political stimuli are generally remote from everyday life, and ordinary citizens are unlikely to have developed strong commitments to particular explanations; accordingly, one would expect citizens to be highly susceptible to political framing effects.

Because citizens must depend primarily upon the media for information about the political world, there can be no better vehicle for examining political framing effects than media news presentations in general and television news presentations in particular.[1] The evidence reported here indicates that, according to the manner in which television news frames national issues, individuals' explanations of these issues are altered. Moreover, by altering explanations of national issues, the media alter attitudes toward the incumbent president.

## Method

Residents of the Three Village area of Brookhaven Township, Suffolk County, New York, participated in a series of studies described to them as investigations of "selective perception" of television newscasts. Individuals responded to newspaper advertisements offering $10 as payment. This procedure yielded samples that were approximately representative of the local area (see Table 1).

## Procedure

When participants arrived at the Media Research Laboratory, they completed an informed consent form and a short pretest questionnaire probing personal and political background variables. They then watched a 20-minute videotape containing seven news stories described as a representative selection of network news stories broadcast during the past six months. On average, each viewing session had two participants. The fourth story on the tape represented the experimental manipulation and, depending on the condition to which participants were assigned (randomly), they saw different coverage of poverty, unemployment, or terrorism. With the exception of the treatment story, the videotapes were identical.

Following viewing of the videotape, participants completed a lengthy posttest

**Table 1. Demographic and Political Profile of Residents of Brookhaven Township, Suffolk County, New York (in percentages, except *age*)**

| Demographic and Political Factors | Experimental Participants | 1980 NES Sample | 1980 Suffolk County[a] |
|---|---|---|---|
| Female | 57 | 57 | 51 |
| Nonwhite | 5 | 13 | 8 |
| Median age | 37 | 41 | 30 |
| High school education | 38 | 63 | 64 |
| Some college | 26 | 20 | 18 |
| College graduates | 36 | 17 | 18 |
| Employed | 65 | 56 | 58 |
| Unemployed | 6 | 8 | 6 |
| Retired | 4 | 13 | 36 |
| Housewives | 11 | 18 | |
| Students | 11 | 3 | |
| Blue-collar | 19 | 37 | 27 |
| White-collar | 49 | 31 | 48 |
| Professional | 30 | 22 | 26 |
| Protestant | 32 | 63 | — |
| Catholic | 38 | 23 | — |
| Jewish | 27 | 3 | — |
| Voting in last presidential election | 74 | 62 | — |
| Republican | 27 | 22 | 37 |
| Democratic | 40 | 41 | 23 |
| Independent | 23 | 24 | 23 |

Note. For purposes of assessing the representativeness of this group, the comparable figures based on respondents in an American National Election Study (NES 1980) are shown alongside, as are the figures for Suffolk County as a whole. As the figures indicate, the major divergence between the experimental participants and the county/national baselines concerns education. Experimental participants were significantly more educated. The distinctiveness of the experimental samples can be attributed to the fact that Brookhaven Township, where the research was conducted, includes a very high proportion of professional and white-collar workers. Compared to the national sample, the experimental group includes significantly higher numbers of professionals and white-collar workers, but this is characteristic of Suffolk County. The same holds for religion; Suffolk County includes large Jewish and Catholic populations. On all other characteristics including party identification, the three groups are similar.

[a] Suffolk County data provided by Long Island Regional Planning Board; religion and voting figures not available.

(individually, in separate rooms) that included the key questions probing their explanations for the target problem as well as other questions on their issue opinions, their perceptions of President Reagan's issue positions, their assessments of the president's overall performance, his competence and integrity, and his performance in specific domains. On completing the posttest, participants were paid and debriefed.[2]

### Measures

I relied entirely on unstructured questions to get at participants' causal accounts. These questions, though unwieldy and coding intensive, are relatively nonreactive. Given the paucity of research into citizens' explanations of political issues, it would have been presumptuous for the researcher to define the appropriate causal categories. The approach was to let each individual choose his or her own categories, with no prompts whatsoever.

The posttest began by asking participants "When you hear or read about ______, what kinds of things do you think about? Please list as many thoughts as you have." Responses to this "thought-listing" question ranged widely. Nevertheless, it was possible to separate explanatory statements from other categories with a high degree of reliability.[3] Statements were coded as explanatory if they made reference to antecedent causes of the target issue either specifically ("If people would try harder to find work, we would all be better off") or vaguely ("Society screws the poor; the rich get richer, the poor poorer"). Later in the questionnaire, participants were asked to identify what they considered to be "the major causes of ________." The thought-listing method was designed to provide evidence on the spontaneity of causal reasoning; the "most-important-causes" question identifies the specific content of causal beliefs.

## Study 1: Poverty

We established five experimental conditions. In the first condition *(national poverty)*, participants watched a news story that documented the increase in poverty nationwide and the significant reductions in the scope of federal social-welfare programs under the Reagan administration. In the second condition *(high unemployment)*, participants watched a story that juxtaposed the national unemployment rate with the size of the federal budget deficit. The three remaining conditions all framed poverty in terms of particular instances or victims of economic hardship. The first *(the high cost of heat)* portrayed two families unable to pay their heating bills. The second, *(the homeless)* focused on homeless individuals—two black teenagers living on the streets of New York City, and a white couple forced to live in their car in San Diego.[4] Finally, the third case-study condition *(unemployed worker)* described the financial difficulties facing the family of an unemployed auto worker in Ohio. These case-study stories were edited so as to be entirely descriptive; the news stories simply presented the predicament of each victim.

### Results

The results of the "thought-listing" procedure revealed quite clearly that causal attributions of poverty figure prominently in participants' store of information. Participants listed a total of 322 thoughts, of which 124 (39%) represented explanatory statements. The causes people cited most often fell into five categories—inadequate motivation, poor education and inadequate skills, welfare dependence, the economy in general, and governmental actions/inactions.

**Table 2. Most Important Causes: Poverty**

| | Condition | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Explanations | National Trends | High Unemployment | Heating Costs | Homeless | Unemployed Worker |
| Motivation | .10 ( 3) | .06 ( 2) | .13 ( 4) | .23[a] (14) | .13 ( 4) |
| Skills | .14 ( 4) | .11 ( 4) | .22 ( 7) | .39[b] (22) | .19 ( 6) |
| Culture | .00 ( 0) | .03 ( 1) | .03 ( 1) | .07 ( 4) | .09 ( 3) |
| Economy | .31 ( 9) | .39[c] (14) | .37 (12) | .18 (11) | .28 ( 9) |
| Government | .45[d] (13) | .42[d] (15) | .25 ( 8) | .15 ( 9) | .31 (10) |
| Number of cases | 14 | 14 | 14 | 29 | 15 |

Note. Number of responses shown in parentheses.

[a] Significantly different from *high unemployment* condition, $p < .05$ by two-tailed t-test.

[b] Significantly different from all other conditions, $p < .05$ by two-tailed t-test.

[c] Significantly different from *homeless* condition, $p < .05$ by two-tailed t-test.

[d] Significantly different from *homeless* condition, $p < .05$ by two-tailed t-test.

Even allowing for the possibility that respondents may have thought of these antecedent factors only in a loose causal sense, it is still impressive that explanatory thoughts take precedence over evaluations or feelings. Respondents were much more likely to offer reasons for poverty than affective reactions.

Turning to the "most-important-causes" question, the categories of causes parallel perfectly those that emerged from the thought-listing question (see Table 2). Participants were far from mystified by the question—a total of 189 causes were cited, for an average of 2.2 per person. Virtually every respondent mentioned at least one cause (98%), and their responses were remarkably homogeneous in that five categories accounted for almost all the responses (183 out of 189).

*Motivational* explanations, which made up 14% of all responses, point to victims as causing their own plight ("laziness," "People prefer handouts to work," etc.). *Cultural* explanations (4%) invoke family background and upbringing as reasons ("Most people are born into poverty," "broken families"). *Inadequate skills* (24%) refer primarily to the lack of education and job skills. The remaining two categories shift the causal focus away from dispositional or individual characteristics to societal factors. *Economic* explanations (29%) include reference to national economic conditions ("There's unemployment everywhere," "the recession"), to particular sectors of the economy ("There's no construction these days"), the global economy ("competition from overseas"), management/union actions ("Union wages are forcing companies to relocate"), and changes in the nature of work ("high tech"). Finally, *government and society* (24%) is the most politicized of the categories. Included here were references to President Reagan's policies or actions, social-welfare programs, budgetary allocations (particularly cuts in social programs and increases in defense spending), and broad societal trends such as racial discrimination, inequality, the lack of opportunities for people to advance, and so on. (For essentially similar results with quite different indicators and national samples, see Feagin 1975; Goodban 1981; Kluegel and Smith 1986.)

The effects of the experimental manipulations on participants' explanations are summarized in Table 2. Given the small proportion of responses referring to cultural factors, these were subsumed within the motivational category. Causal beliefs were significantly molded by the manner in which the news framed poverty. After watching accounts of specific homeless people, participants were especially drawn to poor motivation or inadequate skills as causal factors. After watching the news story that documented trends in the national poverty rate and federal spending on social programs, participants were especially drawn to economic and governmental/societal factors. If we combine the two systemic response categories *(economy* and *government)*, the proportion of systemic attributions ranges from .33 in the *homeless* condition to .81 in the *high unemployment* condition. Conversely, the proportion of dispositional attributions *(motivation, skills,* and *culture)* ranges from a low of .17 in the *high unemployment* condition to a high of .69 in the *homeless* condition.

Framing poverty in terms of individual victims did not always draw individuals to dispositional accounts of poverty. The homeless, the unemployed, and those unable to afford heat all represent people facing economic difficulties, yet they elicit very different explanations of poverty. The type of victim makes a difference. While the homeless trigger personal or dispositional attributions, people unable to pay their utility bills elicit a preponderance of economic and societal attributions, with the unemployed worker falling in between, eliciting a relatively even mix of societal and dispositional attributions.

Descriptions of homeless people may trigger dispositional explanations of poverty more frequently because "the homeless" fit U.S. citizens' mental representations of "poor people" to a greater degree than unemployed workers or families living in unheated homes. Alternatively, it may be that the predicament of the homeless, being more extreme than that faced by the unemployed worker or families without heat, evokes more individualistic explanations. There is evidence in the psychological literature on attribution that more extreme outcomes prompt dispositional or individualistic attributions (e.g., Walster 1966). Because the homeless have lost everything, people reason that there must be something deficient in their character; if not, homelessness could happen to anyone, a rather threatening proposition (see Lerner 1980).

All told, these results drive home the point that explanations of poverty depend considerably upon the particular informational context in which poverty is encountered. When poverty is framed as a societal outcome, people point to societal or governmental explanations; when poverty is framed in terms of particular victims of poverty, particularly the homeless, people point instead to dispositional explanations.

To assess whether these framing effects withstand controls for built-in or chronic differences in causal beliefs, the analysis incorporated individuals' socioeconomic status, partisanship and approval of presidential performance, issue opinions, and degree of political involvement. I computed two indexes corresponding to the number of systemic *(governmental* and *economy)* and dispositional *(motivation, skills,* and *culture)* causes mentioned and subjected them to a multiple-regression analysis. These results are shown in Table 3.

The effects of the framing manipulations emerged relatively unscathed after taking into account longstanding individual differences in causal beliefs.[5] These differences themselves were fairly intuitive. Nonwhites and females were more prone to see systemic causes for poverty, while college graduates and protestants were loath to cite systemic factors. Professionals, older people, and college graduates saw more dispositional causes while Catholics cited fewer dispositional causes.

These results are essentially similar to those reported in analyses of national-survey data (Kluegel and Smith 1986; Gallup Opinion Report, 1985; Lewis and Schneider 1985) and can be interpreted in motivational terms as reflecting the general impetus toward "defensive attribution." While "haves" favor dispositional explanations, "have-nots" lean toward systemic accounts.

Republicans were significantly less systemic in their reasoning than Democrats or independents. Similarly, participants for whom President Reagan's stock is high were less likely to offer systemic causes. This effect was independent of the feedback from systemic explanations to approval of the president's performance (see Table 4). While individuals who believed that poverty had worsened across the nation were drawn more to systemic causes, individuals who believed that their own economic circumstances had worsened were less prone to

**Table 3. Antecedents of Causal Attributions: Poverty**

| Variables | Systemic Index[a] | Variables | Dispositional Index[d] |
|---|---|---|---|
| Protestants | -.63<br>(.31) | Professionals | .32<br>(.23) |
| College graduates | -.21<br>(.20) | College graduates | .30<br>(.20) |
| Respondents who feel poverty is worsening | .22<br>(.20) | Age > 40 | .28<br>(.24) |
| Nonwhites | .71<br>(44) | Attentiveness to public affairs[e] | -.13<br>(.06) |
| Republicans | -.41<br>(.29) | Conservative-issue opinions[f] | .13<br>(.11) |
| Males | -.40<br>(.19) | Respondents with worsening economic situation | -.20<br>(.19) |
| Exposure to systemic media frames[b] | .31<br>(.19) | Exposure to systemic media frames | -.25<br>(.22) |
| Unemployed/laid off | -.47<br>(.40) | Exposure to *homeless* media frame | .45<br>(.23) |
| Frequency of TV news watching | .22<br>(.16) | Catholics | -.36<br>(.21) |
| Approval of Reagan's overall performance[c] | .17<br>(.13) | | |
| Standard error of regression | .79 | Adjusted $R^2$ | .30 |
| Number of cases | 85 | Number of cases | 85 |

[a] Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients (2SLS) with standard errors in parentheses.

[b] *National trends/high unemployment* conditions combined.

[c] Endogenous variable; the first-stage equation was as follows: 1.77 − .30 (Democrats) + .64 (integrity ratings) + .47 (competence ratings) + .10 (conservative-issue opinions). The adjusted $R^2$ was .63.

[d] Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients (OLS).

[e] Three-item index based on attentiveness to news about public affairs and frequency of "following what's going on in government."

[f] Four-item index based on opinions concerning school prayer, civil rights, and spending for defense and social programs.

Table 4. Poverty Attributions and Evaluations of President Reagan

| Predictor | Coefficient |
|---|---|
| Republican party identification | .33<br>(.20) |
| Specific problem performance[a] | .18<br>(.10) |
| Trait ratings: competence[b] | .39<br>(.09) |
| Trait ratings: integrity[c] | .44<br>(.11) |
| Index of systemic attributions[d] | .31<br>(.12) |
| Standard error of regression | .66 |
| Number of cases | 85 |

Note. 2SLS estimates. Standard errors shown in parentheses.

[a] Summed index of poverty, unemployment, and arms-control performance ratings.

[b] Summer index of *experienced* and *provides strong leadership* trait ratings.

[c] Summed index of *compassionate*, *fair*, and *honest* trait ratings.

[d] Endogenous variable. The first-stage equation was as follows: 1.46 − .40 (no. of dispositional causes) + .47 (exposure to systemic media frames) − .68 (Protestants) + .43 (belief that poverty is worsening nationwide) + .39 (frequency of TV news watching) − .41 (males) − .19 (college graduates). The adjusted $R^2$ was .36.

see the poor as contributing to their lot.

In sum, though causal knowledge is embedded in individuals' socioeconomic circumstances and partisan attitudes, media frames affect this knowledge independently of these antecedents. When the media direct individuals' attention to national outcomes, explanations for poverty become predominantly systemic; when the media point to particular instances of poor people, explanations for poverty become predominantly dispositional.

The final analysis assesses whether explanations for poverty spill over to evaluations of the president. Specifically, the question was whether individuals who understand poverty as a societal or governmental outcome are less apt to praise President Reagan's performance. In this analysis the reverse possibility must also be considered, since supporters of President Reagan systematically discount systemic causes when asked to account for poverty (as noted in Table 3). Evaluations of the incumbent president and explanations for some negative outcome (such as poverty) are likely to feed on each other in reciprocal fashion. Fortunately, it is a relatively simple task to estimate these reciprocal effects, for several of the mainstay determinants of presidential popularity turned out to be essentially independent of individuals' explanations for poverty.[6] Similarly, determinants of causal beliefs (most notably, the effects of the framing manipulations) were unrelated to ratings of Reagan's performance. In short, two-stage least-squares analysis was appropriate since there were effective instruments for both popularity and causal beliefs. The effects of poverty attributions on evaluations of Reagan's overall performance are presented in Table 4.

Systemic explanations of poverty exerted powerful effects on participants' ratings of Reagan's overall performance even after controlling for the effects of

Table 5. Most Important Causes: Unemployment

| Explanations | Condition<br>High Unemployment | <br>Steel Industry | <br>Unemployed Worker |
|---|---|---|---|
| Motivation | .13 ( 4) | .05 ( 1) | .12 ( 3) |
| Skills | .07 ( 3) | .05 ( 1) | .12 ( 3) |
| Economy | .66 (21) | .73 (16) | .62 (16) |
| Government | .14 ( 4) | .18 ( 4) | .16 ( 4) |
| Number of cases | 14 | 12 | 14 |

Note. Number of responses shown in parentheses.

partisanship, ratings of his performance in the specific issue areas of arms control, the budget deficit, and unemployment, assessments of his competence and integrity, and the reverse effects of his overall performance. Individuals who cited more systemic causes were significantly more negative toward President Reagan. This effect was much stronger than the corresponding feedback ($b = .17$, s. e. $= .13$, as reported in Table 3). The number of dispositional causes mentioned proved unrelated to Reagan's popularity rating.

The results in Table 4 provide compelling evidence that individuals use their causal beliefs about national issues as cues for evaluating the president. Individuals drawn to systemic accounts of poverty are also more critical of President Reagan. To the degree systemic explanations for poverty are subject to media framing effects, these effects can indirectly influence the president's standing with the public.

## Study 2: Unemployment

Three conditions were established, each providing a different perspective on unemployment. Two of the conditions were taken from the first study—*high unemployment* and *unemployed worker.* The former represents a systemic frame with the focus on the national unemployment rate, while the latter is a case study of a particular victim of unemployment. In between these two extremes was a third level of coverage describing the serious economic difficulties facing the U.S. steel industry. The expectation was that this presentation would trigger *the economy* as the dominant reference point. (Note that all three conditions featured the identical "lead-in" by the newscaster, who noted the persistence of high unemployment.) In all other respects, the procedures and method were identical to those of Study 1.

### Results

As was the case with poverty, causal attributions were offered spontaneously. The 40 subjects listed a total of 110 thoughts on unemployment, of which 40 took the form of causal attributions. Turning to the content of participants' explanations, Table 5 presents the breakdown of responses to the "most-important-causes" question. The identical set of categories obtained in Study 1 accounted for all the causes cited. Among these, *the economy* was predominant, so much so that two of every three causes cited fell into this category. This was the case even in the *unemployed worker* condition, where the proportion of economic causes was .62. This same story elicited a much lower proportion of economic causes when the target issue was poverty (.28). As Table 5 makes plain, the framing manipulations had no impact on the

**Table 6. Unemployment Attributions and Evaluations of President Reagan**

| Predictor | Coefficient |
|---|---|
| Democratic party identification | -.47<br>(.26) |
| Specific problem performance[a] | .66<br>(.17) |
| Trait ratings: integrity[b] | .41<br>(.19) |
| Respondents who believe unemployment is worsening nationwide | -.56<br>(.32) |
| Index of dispositional attributions | .43<br>(.21) |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | .62 |
| Number of cases | 40 |

Note. OLS estimates. Standard errors shown in parentheses.

[a]Summed index of poverty, unemployment, and arms-control ratings (1 = *very poor,* 5 = *very good*).

[b]Summed index of *honest, fair,* and *compassionate* ratings.

relative prominence of economic (or any other) causes. In fact, explanations of unemployment stand in marked contrast to explanations of poverty. While the former is understood uniformly as a systemic problem regardless of the news frame, the latter is seen as having a mix of both systemic and dispositional causes, the precise composition of the mix being significantly influenced by media presentations.

Even though participants' causal beliefs were unaffected by the framing manipulation, these beliefs did carry over to evaluations of President Reagan. I combined the *economy* and *governmental/societal* categories to form an index of systemic causes. Similarly the two dispositional categories were summed. The independent effects of these indexes on Reagan's popularity is shown in Table 6.

The more dispositional the attribution, the more positive the rating of President Reagan's overall performance. This effect was uncontaminated by any feedback from the Reagan performance ratings because ratings of Reagan's overall performance had no effect on the number of either dispositional or systemic causes for unemployment. Respondents who cited more systemic attributions did tend to be less supportive of the president, but this relationship did not quite attain conventional levels of statistical significance.

## Study 3: Terrorism

The target issue in this study was terrorism. The stimulus event was the June 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847 and the subsequent hostage drama in Beirut. Following the release of the hostages, all three networks aired detailed recapitulations of the crisis. One such story (ABC's) was edited into three very different versions. The first condition *(U.S. role)* viewed the hijacking incident as a protest against the United States. The U.S. role in the region as the principal ally of Israel was noted as was the hijackers' demands that Israel release the Shiites being held prisoners. President Reagan was shown declaring that the U.S. would never concede to terrorists. The second condition *(local politics)* shifted the focus to the internal politics of Lebanon. The report traced the history of Amal, the Shiite organization holding the hostages, and described its political ideology and its efforts to gain a power base in Beirut. The third condition *(hostages released)* showed the hostages saying goodby to each other prior to their release. Red Cross officials were interviewed regarding the state of the hostages' health and their treatment during captivity. The hostages were then shown arriving in Damascus. Finally, unlike the earlier studies, a control condition was added in which subjects saw no story on the target issue, that is, subjects watched the identical videotape without the story on the hijacking.

## Results

As usual, participants were asked to list the things they thought about when they heard or read about terrorism. The 92 participants mentioned a total of 201 thoughts. Cause and effect were prominent in the thoughts listed. Many participants explicitly raised causal *inquiries* (e.g., "Why do people do things like this?"). Causal attributions were also frequent, the most common being dispositional—terrorists as fanatics, deranged extremists, and so on. Terrorism was also traced to situational causes including local political disputes, U.S. policy toward the Middle East, and the support provided terrorist groups by radical leaders such as Colonel Qaddaffi. Causal inquiries and attributions together accounted for 31% of all thoughts. All told, the distribution of responses to the thought-listing question maintained the pattern established in the first two studies, namely, that causal attributions (and questions) are offered spontaneously when individuals think about political issues.

What did participants consider to be the prime causes of terrorism, and to what degree were their causal attributions susceptible to framing effects? Three classes of attributions dominated responses to the "most-important-causes" question. *Dispositional* attributions trace terrorism to personal traits, particularly extremism, fanaticism, and a craving for recognition. *Situational* attributions cover characteristics of the immediate situation and range from general political instability, to governmental oppression, to poverty and injustice. *Policy* attributions encompass actions of the U.S. government, including support for Israel and opposition to the Arab or Palestinian cause, Israeli dominance, and concerted efforts (primarily by "communists") to weaken the U.S. These three broad categories accounted for 175 of the 198 causes mentioned.

The framing manipulation was designed to elicit a significantly higher proportion of policy attributions in the first *(U.S. role)* condition, a higher proportion of situational attributions in the second *(local politics)* condition, and, by default, a higher proportion of dispositional attributions in the *hostages released* and control conditions. The reasoning underlying this last prediction takes into account the well-known tendency of individuals to attribute actions to personal characteristics, a tendency that has been dubbed the "fundamental attribution error" (Ross 1977). In short, under conditions of no coverage and no particular media frame *(hostages released)*, dispositional attributions will predominate. When the media frame terrorist acts as part of a local power struggle, situational attributions will be encouraged, and finally, when the media frame terrorist acts as protests against the U.S., policy attributions will prevail.

Table 7 provides only partial support for these expectations. Dispositional attributions tended to be greatest in the *U.S. role* condition, followed closely by the condition in which there was no media frame *(hostages released)*. More in keeping with expectations, situational attribu-

**Table 7. Most Important Causes: Terrorism**

| | Condition | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Attributions | U.S. Role | Local Situation | Hostages Released | No Coverage |
| Dispositional | .45 (20) | .29$^a$ (11) | .44 (15) | .31 (18) |
| Situational | .24 (11) | .53$^b$ (20) | .35 (12) | .47 (27) |
| Policy | .31$^c$ (14) | .18 ( 7) | .21 ( 7) | .22 (13) |
| Number of cases | 19 | 19 | 18 | 36 |

Note. Number of responses shown in parentheses.

[a]Significantly different from *U.S. role* condition, $p < .15$ by two-tailed t-test.

[b]Significantly different from *U.S. role* and *hostages released* conditions, $p < .10$ by two-tailed t-test.

[c]Significantly different from all other conditions, $p < .16$ by two-tailed t-test.

tions were most frequent in the *local politics* condition (which differed significantly from the *U.S. role* and *hostages released* conditions). Contrary to expectations, individuals given no news of terrorism tended to attribute terrorism to situational rather than dispositional factors. Finally, framing the hijacking as an act of protest against the U.S. did raise the proportion of policy attributions.

A plausible (though obviously post hoc) explanation for the dispositional flavor of participants' attributions of terrorism in the *U.S. role* condition concerns affect. Because this story presented the terrorist act as an expression of opposition to the U.S., it may have prompted a greater outpouring of negative affect. When terrorists are presented as anti-United States, viewers are more likely to be aroused and thereby attribute the actions of terrorists to their personal deficiencies. The posttest questionnaire included a set of questions asking viewers whether the story on the hijacking had "made them feel" a variety of emotions including "disgust," "anger," and "fear." I summed the responses *(yes/no)* to form an index of negative affect. Participants in the *U.S. role* condition were significantly more aroused by the hijacking story. The mean affect score in this condition was 2.11, as opposed to 1.70 for the remaining conditions, a statistically significant difference ($t = 2.01$, $p < .05$ by one-tailed test). Moreover, the greater the level of negative affect, the more dispositional the causal attribution (the simple correlation *(r)* between the index of negative affect and the number of dispositional causes mentioned was .17, $p < .10$). In short, the presentation in the first condition unintentionally manipulated participants' hostility toward terrorists, thereby encouraging them to cite negative personal traits as causes of terrorism.

The independent effects of the framing manipulations on participants' attributions are shown in Table 8. In addition to the *U.S. role* frame, the antecedents of policy attributions included political activity (the more active being more inclined to cite policy causes), religion (Catholics being more policy oriented), and evaluations of President Reagan's performance in dealing with terrorism (the more disapproving the evaluation, the greater the number of policy attributions). Note that this last effect is independent of any feedback from policy attributions to evaluations of the president's performance in handling the problem. (The feedback itself is presented in Table 9).

In addition to participants who watched the *local politics* frame, Jews, Protestants, and Democrats were more apt to cite situational causes of terrorism. Dispositional attributions were affected by the experimental manipulations alone—individuals in the *U.S. role* and *hostages released* conditions were more dispositional in their explanations for terrorism.

Finally, I turn to the impact of attributions of terrorism on evaluations of President Reagan's performance in handling terrorism (see Table 9). In a later section of the posttest, participants were asked to indicate (on a five-point scale) the degree to which they approved or disapproved of the president's performance in dealing with terrorism (this study did not include the question on the president's overall performance).

Both policy and dispositional attributions affected ratings of the president's performance, but in opposite directions. The greater the number of policy attributions, the more critical the terrorism performance rating. This effect was substantial, despite having been purged of the reciprocal influence of participants' evaluations of the president's performance. It was also independent of partisanship, issue opinions, race, gender, and a measure of political interest. The number of dispositional attributions also affected participants' ratings of the presi-

**Table 8. Antecedents of Terrorism Attributions**

| Predictor | Policy[a] | Situational[b] | Dispositional[b] |
|---|---|---|---|
| *U.S. role* condition | .32<br>(.15) | — | .55<br>(.16) |
| *Local politics* condition | — | .22<br>(.15) | — |
| *Hostages released* condition | — | — | .21<br>(.16) |
| Political activity[c] | .10<br>(.08) | — | — |
| Protestants | — | .29<br>(.17) | — |
| Catholics | .30<br>(.13) | — | — |
| Jews | — | −.55<br>(.31) | — |
| Democratic party identification | — | .11<br>(.11) | — |
| Approval of President Reagan's handling of terrorism[d] | −.16<br>(.09) | — | — |
| Standard error of regression | .53 | — | — |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | | .41 | .42 |
| Number of cases | 84 | 92 | 92 |

[a] 2SLS estimates. Standard errors shown in parentheses.

[b] OLS estimates.

[c] Composite index based on voting, attending a rally, and contributing money.

[d] Endogenous variable; the first-stage equation was as follows: 2.04 − .33 (interest) − .31 (males) + .43 (Republicans) + .67 (whites) + .31 (conservative-issue opinions). The adjusted $R^2$ was .34.

**Table 9. Terrorism Attributions and Evaluations of President Reagan's Handling of Terrorism**

| Predictor | Coefficient |
|---|---|
| Republican-party identification | .33<br>(.27) |
| Political interest[a] | -.22<br>(.10) |
| Conservative-issue opinions[b] | .31<br>(.11) |
| Males | -.26<br>(.20) |
| Whites | .71<br>(.46) |
| Index of policy attributions[c] | -.63<br>(.23) |
| Index of dispositional attributions | .18<br>(.13) |
| Standard error of regression | .87 |
| Number of cases | 84 |

Note. 2SLS estimates. Standard errors shown in parentheses.

[a] Based on four questions—the degree to which respondents follow public affairs, frequency of discussing politics, attentiveness to newspaper, and attentiveness to TV coverage of public affairs.

[b] As defined in Table 2.

[c] Endogenous variable; the first-stage equation was as follows: .37 − .29 (no. of situational attributions) + .24 (*U.S. role* condition) + .17 (index of political activity) + .32 (Catholics). The adjusted $R^2$ was .20.

dent's performance: the more dispositional one's understanding of terrorism, the more positive the rating. This effect, however, was noticeably weaker than that exerted by policy attributions.

To sum up, attributions for terrorism are influenced by the perspectives television news presentations impose on terrorist acts. When these acts are placed in the context of a local political situation, situational attributions predominate; when terrorism is framed as a protest against the U.S., policy and dispositional attributions come to the forefront of individuals' explanations. Finally, as was true for poverty and unemployment, explanations for terrorism are relevant to evaluations of the president, in this case to ratings of the president's performance in regard to terrorism.

## Conclusion

People can and do explain the issues and events they encounter in the world of public affairs. These explanations are politically consequential, for they can be and are integrated with evaluations of the incumbent president. The more individuals attribute problems to structural or systemic causes, the more critical they are of President Reagan's performance.

Individuals are quite sensitive to contextual cues when they reason about national affairs. Their explanations of issues like terrorism or poverty are critically dependent upon the particular reference points furnished in media presentations. Whether terrorists are seen as protesting U.S. actions or as attempting to strengthen their political influence has the effect of invoking very different attributions of terrorism. Similarly, whether news about poverty takes the form of particular victims or of nationwide outcomes makes a difference to viewers' attributions of poverty.

The exception to this pattern is unemployment, where attributions are heavily systemic regardless of the media frame used. It may be that the term *unemployment* is itself a sort of semantic frame or wording effect that directs individuals to think of the concept as a collective rather than individual outcome. Asking people to explain "why John Smith was laid off" or "why so many Americans are out of work" may elicit a different set of attributions. Alternatively, the sustained prominence of economic problems in the nation's political rhetoric and policy agenda during the past decade may have served to alert individuals to *the economy* as a catchall cause for unemployment.

It is important to qualify these results by noting the short time interval between the experimental manipulation and the elicitation of participants' causal beliefs. The framing effects may wear off rapidly. As yet I have no evidence bearing on the question of persistence. However, the identical experimental design yielded significant delayed effects (up to a week following exposure to the treatment) on participants' responses to an open-ended question concerning "the most important problems facing the nation" (see Iyengar and Kinder 1987, chap. 3).

All told, these results suggest that it is important to document the degree to which particular media frames are more or less dominant in news coverage of current issues. To take the case of poverty, the tendency of the U.S. public to see the causes of poverty as lying within the poor themselves may be due not only to dominant cultural values like individualism and self-reliance (as argued by Feldman 1983; Kluegel and Smith 1986), but also to news coverage of poverty in which images of poor people predominate. This is in fact the case with television news coverage of poverty, where close-up depictions of personal experience far outnumber depictions of poverty that are societal or nationwide in emphasis. I have examined every story in the *CBS Evening News* from January 1981 through December 1985 that made reference to "welfare," "social programs," "poor people," "hunger," and other such referents of poverty. Ninety-eight stories contained material relevant to poverty, of which 56 (57%) presented a particular victim. The figure is actually higher if 1981 is excluded, since that was the year of the pitched battles between the Reagan administration and the Democratic Congress on appropriations for social programs, thus resulting in an abnormally high number of government-oriented poverty stories. For the 1982-85 period, the percentage of case-study stories is 68. U.S. citizens who watched *CBS Evening News* during this period would, understandably, have been drawn to dispositional accounts of poverty, whatever social and economic values they subscribed to. At this point, I can only offer the pervasiveness of case-study coverage as a plausible cause of public beliefs. I do have evidence, however, that the degree to which particular issues are seen as *national* problems is significantly lowered when issue coverage takes the form of the "particular-victim" scenario. Specifically, Kinder and I found that when network news coverage of both pollution and unemployment focused on individuals or families adversely affected by either issue, viewers were less likely to come away believing that either pollution or unemployment were important national problems (Iyengar and Kinder 1987, chap. 4).

The political implications of the "particular-victim" media frame are unmistakable. Citizens' causal attributions will fix upon dispositional rather than structural factors. This is naturally beneficial to the incumbent president—people are less likely to treat the administration and its actions as causal agents. President Reagan's concern in 1982, at the height of the recession, that the networks were providing too much coverage of people who had lost their jobs. ("Is it news that some fellow out in South Succotash has just been laid off and that he should be interviewed nationwide?") seems misplaced. In light of the results reported here, the White House should encourage such coverage, for it has the effect of shielding the president from any culpability, deserved or otherwise.

In closing, I hope that this paper serves to promote research into the explanatory or causal side of public opinion. As I have shown, ordinary people are quite capable of explaining national problems. In doing so, however, they are susceptible to media-framing effects. In altering individuals' causal knowledge, news presentations also influence individuals' evaluations of the president. Given what is known about the "imperialism" of causal attributions, this last finding may be but the tip of an iceberg. Researchers interested in economic voting have begun to probe into voters' explanations for their personal economic situation, finding that these attributions serve to politicize personal circumstances. That is, to the degree voters see systemic causes for their own financial difficulties, they are more likely to vote against those in office (see Feldman 1982; Peffley and Williams 1985). How people explain national problems can similarly influence their policy opinions and therefore their candidate preferences, as well as their attitudes toward the political process itself. In sum, research into citizens' political explanations represents an important new thrust for public-opinion research.

## Notes

Financial support was provided by the National Science Foundation (SES 84-20164). I am indebted to Kenrick Leung, Sholeh Khorooshi, Silvo Lenart, and David Moskowitz for research assistance, and to Robert Wyer, Jr. and Ellen Robb for comments on an earlier draft. Study 1 was conducted in June 1985, Study 2 in August 1985, and Study 3 during September and October 1985.

1. The focus on television news is justified, for it is the most preferred source of public-affairs information for the great majority of the U.S. public (see Bower 1985).

2. In any experimental procedure it is imperative that the researcher guard against the effects of demand characteristics—cues in the experimental situation that suggest to participants what is expected of them. Several such precautions were undertaken including a plausible cover story that disguised the true purpose of the study. In addition, the treatment stories were compiled using studio-quality editing equipment so that participants could not know that the stories had been altered. Finally, the aura of the research laboratory was minimized by inviting participants to bring a spouse, friend, or colleague with them. Most did so and the average session size of two means that a participant typically watched the videotape with someone he or she knew. The concern over experimental demand also dictated the choice of a posttest-only design. Had I asked participants for their explanations of the target issue both before and after exposure to the videotape, this would have provided them with a powerful cue as to the researcher's intent, thereby affecting their posttest responses.

3. Responses fell into four general categories: explanations, prescriptions/remedies, descriptions, and expressions of affect. Using this four-fold classification, two independent coders agreed more than 90% of the time.

4. These were initially separate conditions, as we wished to investigate the effects, if any, of the victim's race. In this particular study, the two conditions elicited responses not significantly different. For purposes of this analysis, therefore, they were merged.

5. In this analysis and those that follow, the remaining attributional categories are included in the equation as control variables. This is because the number of causes falling into a particular category inevitably reduces the number falling into other categories.

6. These included an index of conservative-issue opinions, ratings of the president's competence (the degree to which the terms *experienced* and *provides strong leadership* fit Reagan), and ratings of his integrity (the degree to which *honest, fair,* and *compassionate* fit Reagan).

## References

Bower, Robert. 1985. *The Changing Television Audience in America.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Feagin, Joseph. 1975. *Subordinating the Poor: Welfare and American Beliefs.* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Feldman, Stanley. 1982. Economic Self Interest and Political Behavior. *American Journal of Political Science* 26:446-66.

Feldman, Stanley. 1983. Economic Individualism and American Public Opinion. *American Politics Quarterly* 11:3-29.

Ferejohn, John. 1987. Information and the Democratic Process, in *Information and Democratic Politics,* eds. John Ferejohn and James Kuklinski. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Fiske, Susan, and Shelley Taylor. 1984. *Social Cognition.* Reading: Addison-Wesley.

Gallup Report. 1985. Monthly Opinion Report No. 234.

Goodban, Nancy. 1981. Attributions about Poverty. Ph.D. diss., Harvard University.

Iyengar, Shanto, and Donald Kinder. 1987. *News That Matters: Television and American Opinion.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kahneman, Daniel. 1984. Choices, Values, and Frames. *American Psychologist* 39:341-50.

Kahneman, Daniel, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky. 1982. *Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.* London: Cambridge University Press.

Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1982. The Psychology of Preferences. *Scientific American* 246:136-42.

Kelley, Harold. 1973. The Processes of Causal Attribution. *American Psychologist* 28:107-28.

Kinder, Donald, and David Sears. 1985. Public Opinion and Political Behavior. In *Handbook of Social Psychology,* vol. 2, eds. Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson. New York: Random House.

Kluegel, James, and Eliot Smith. 1986. *Beliefs about Inequality.* New York: Aldine.

Langer, Ellen. 1975. The Illusion of Control. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 32:311-28.

Langer, Ellen, and Judith Rodin. 1976. The Effects of Choice and Enhanced Personal Responsibility for the Aged: A Field Experiment in an Institutional Setting. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 34:191-98.

Lerner, Melvin. 1980. *The Belief in a Just World.* New York: Plenum.

Lewis, Irving, and William Schneider. 1985. Hard Times: The Public on Poverty. *Public Opinion* 9:2-7.

Nisbett, Richard, and Lee Ross. 1980. *Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment.* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Peffley, Mark, and John Williams. 1985. Attributing Presidential Responsibility for National Economic Problems. *American Politics Quarterly* 13:393-425.

Ross, Lee. 1977. The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings, in *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology,* vol. 10, ed. Leonard Berkowitz. New York: Academic Press.

Schneider, David, Albert Hastorf, and Phoebe Ellsworth. 1979. *Person Perception.* Reading: Addison-Wesley.

Schumpeter, Joseph. 1950. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy.* New York: Harper and Brothers.

Thaler, Richard. 1980. Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice. *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* 1:39-60.

Tocqueville, Alexis de. [1863] 1954. *Democracy in America,* Vol. 1. Reprint. New York: Vintage Books.

Walster, Elaine. 1966. Assignment of Responsibility for an Accident. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 3:73-79.

Weiner, Bernard. 1985. "Spontaneous" Causal Search. *Psychological Bulletin* 97:74-94.

Wortman, Camille. 1976. Causal Attributions and Personal Control, in *New Directions in Attribution Research,* vol. 1, eds. John Harvey, William Ickes, and Robert Kidd. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Shanto Iyengar is Associate Professor of Political Science, State University of New York, Stony Brook, NY 11794.

# THREAT ESCALATION AND CRISIS STABILITY: A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS

STEVEN J. BRAMS
*New York University*

D. MARC KILGOUR
*Wilfrid Laurier University*

*We develop a model of crisis stability based on a deterrence game. Players are assumed to be able to choose any level of initial cooperation or noncooperation; the more cooperative player (if there is one) may then choose to retaliate. In a crisis, players are assumed to have escalated their conflict and desire to stabilize it before it explodes. Players can, by threatening their opponent, stabilize the new status quo. In addition, points of threat escalation are identified at which neither player can prevent the opponent from escalating further without threatening the opponent more severely than before the crisis erupted, thereby heating up an already tense situation. Crisis stabilization is aided by being close to the full-cooperation position, though, paradoxically, both players may benefit from having created a crisis that only escalating threats may resolve. We discuss ways of avoiding threat escalation and the increased risk of war that it entails, especially in conflicts between the superpowers.*

Prominent in the lexicon of nuclear strategists is the notion of *crisis stability*. Roughly speaking, this is a state of affairs in which neither side in a two-party conflict has a first-strike advantage that would give it the incentive to preempt the other, especially in a crisis in which tensions are high and distrust is rampant.[1]

In this paper we shall interpret this concept broadly to include *any* stabilizing forces—not just the lack of a first-strike advantage—in a crisis. For example, if each side can threaten devastating retaliation after a first strike because a substantial portion of its weapons are survivable, this second-strike ability may well deter a first strike and therefore be crisis stabilizing, even though each side can still do better striking first than striking second.

*Crisis stability* is therefore the structural feature of conflicts that, even after they have escalated to crisis proportions, permits decision makers to prevent the crisis from exploding. The principal means to avoid an explosion is to ensure that neither side has an incentive to preempt the other in the crisis.[2]

Nuclear deterrence between the superpowers, as long as it is assured by a second-strike capability, would appear to provide the necessary insurance. What worries the political leaders of each superpower considerably more than a "bolt from the blue" by the other superpower is the possible escalation of a conventional conflict, such as might occur in the Middle East or Western Europe, into a crisis that involves serious threats to their allies or even their own security. Insofar as the ability to stabilize such a conflict lies outside their control, crisis stabilization—at

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
VOL. 81 NO. 3 SEPTEMBER 1987

least on their part—is jeopardized.

Presumably, decision makers in an escalatory situation would prefer to be able to damp down a conflict, or at least contain it, so that a crisis cannot erupt into full-fledged war in which everybody may suffer egregiously. This is an especially frightening problem in a confrontation between nuclear powers. But even in conventional conflicts, such as that between Iran and Iraq today, the human casualties and material damage on both sides may be horrendous.

The ability to stabilize a crisis or contain a conflict, however, may be a mixed blessing. For once it is recognized by the antagonists that disaster may be escapable, they may be more willing to take risks that they would avoid if escape from disaster were impossible (Brams and Kilgour 1987c).

Put another way, crisis stability may encourage provocative behavior, whereas an inability to stabilize crises may induce more cautious choices. In the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, for example, the leaders of the superpowers assiduously eschewed making explicit nuclear threats as the crisis heightened (Morgan 1986, 178), perhaps in part because each side's second-strike capability at the time was not as great as it is today (notwithstanding the greater vulnerability today of each side's land-based ballistic missiles). In the absence of stabilizing forces, the situation was already extremely delicate, so neither side wanted to do anything to provoke the other into preempting with nuclear weapons.

On balance, however, crisis stability is surely desirable; while it affords each side greater leeway to be provocative, which itself may be upsetting, it makes escalation of a crisis decidedly less likely. Because stability is an eminently game-theoretic concept, it is appropriate to model crisis stability using a game. Accordingly, we shall begin our analysis by setting up a threat game (TG), based on chicken, to model deterrence. The so-called deterrence equilibrium in this game, as we shall show, may be difficult to sustain if a crisis pushes the players into bellicose postures.

How they can prevent their positions from deteriorating further in a crisis will be one theme of our analysis.[3] Specifically, after describing the rules of TG and its equilibrium outcomes, we shall indicate what crisis stabilization entails. We shall then derive threat functions, or lines, showing how the players in a crisis can deter further escalation and then spell out when this task is most trying.

Unfortunately, under certain conditions there are crisis points that cannot be stabilized without an escalation in threats by the players: the threats of reprisal that originally sustained cooperation no longer suffice to stabilize the crisis and thereby to deter preemption past this crisis point. In effect, the players will already have gone too far to make a return to mutual cooperation, or even stabilization, worth their while without threat escalation.

We shall show that a game that requires threat escalation to stabilize near the cooperative outcome is one in which neither player can benefit from conflict in a crisis. In such a game, each player does relatively well at the cooperative outcome, lessening the temptation to defect. However, if the players should drift away from this outcome in a crisis, more dire threats are needed to prevent further deterioration of the crisis.

By contrast, if both players are not particularly advantaged at the cooperative outcome and can do better by escalating their conflict (to some degree), the threats required to restore the status quo do not escalate, tempting each player to foment a (mild) crisis. If the crisis should become severe enough to hurt both players, however, then threat escalation is required to restore the status quo.

We will assess the plausibility of this

game as a model of nuclear deterrence and as a basis for determining when deterrence can be maintained in a crisis. We shall then return to a discussion of the substantive interpretation of this game in light of our findings about crisis stability, particularly in superpower conflict, and conditions for maintaining it. The Cuban missile crisis will be used to illustrate some of the results derived from our game-theoretic model.

## The Threat Game

TG is based on the game of chicken that, it has been argued, constitutes an appropriate basic model of deterrence between the superpowers (Brams 1985, chap. 1). This claim has been disputed by Zagare (1985, 1987), who contends that prisoners' dilemma is a better model (but see Brams and Kilgour 1986b and 1988 for an arms-race application of this model).

This dispute, however, is somewhat beside the point because TG adds two significant features to chicken that make it a truly different game (Brams and Kilgour 1987a): (1) the players can make quantitative choices of levels of cooperation ($C$) or noncooperation ($\overline{C}$), not just qualitative choices of $C$ or $\overline{C}$; (2) once these initial choices, which can be interpreted as levels of nonpreemption or preemption, are made, only the less preemptive player (i.e., the player who chose the lower level of preemption initially, if there was one) can retaliate by choosing a different—and presumably higher—level of noncooperation subsequently. The game terminates whenever the initial levels are the same or, if they are not, after the less preemptive player has retaliated.

To be sure, the rule that allows only the more aggrieved player, who chose a lower level of preemption initially, to retaliate is arbitrary. Our reasoning is that conflict escalates precisely because each player, in turn, is willing and able to raise the ante. If escalation were unilateral, and one player simply became more and more aggressive without provoking retaliation from the other, then the process would not be two-sided escalation but one-sided aggression.

We are interested in modeling situations in which both players move up the escalation ladder. However, we telescope this process into one in which, after the possible preemption of each player, a single retaliatory countermove is allowed that can "right the balance" for the initially more cooperative player. (Other rounds of escalation could be added, but we think the present simple sequence captures well the process that might trigger further escalation.) To take account of the possibility that this process might have a history that does not start the players off from blissful cooperation, we shall later posit the occurrence of a crisis that transports the players to some less-than-cooperative point and then ask what threats are required to arrest further escalation.

Formally, TG is defined by the following rules:

1. The players do not choose initially between $C$ and $\overline{C}$ but instead choose preemption levels $s$ (*row*) and $t$ (*column*) that may range on a continuum between 1 (no preemption) and 0 (maximum preemption). These choices are simultaneous and determine a point on the unit square, defined by vertical coordinate $y$ and horizontal coordinate $x$ (see Figure 1), which we call the *initial position*. It is convenient to assume that before play commences, the *preplay position* of the players is (1, 1), the mutual-cooperation position, but this starting point is not crucial to our analysis.
2. The 2 × 2 game of chicken is embedded in the unit square so that the four corners of the square correspond to the four "pure" states $(r_i, c_j)$ of chicken,

with $r_i$ giving the payoff of row and $c_j$ the payoff of column (the subscripts $i$ and $j$ give the rankings of payoffs, with 4 being best and 1 being worst):

a) Both players cooperate ($CC$)—next best outcome for both players: $(r_3, c_3)$ at upper-left corner in Figure 1.

b) One player cooperates and other does not ($C\overline{C}$) and $\overline{C}C$)—best outcome for the player who does not cooperate and next-worst for the player who does: $(r_2, c_4)$ and $(r_4, c_2)$ at upper-right and lower-left corners, respectively.

c) Both players do not cooperate ($\overline{C}\,\overline{C}$)—worst outcome for both players: $(r_1, c_1)$ at lower-right corner.

3. In Figure 1, the square is drawn so that the (1, 1) position, corresponding to the $CC$ outcome of chicken, is at the upper left and the (0, 0) position, corre-

**Figure 1. The Threat Game**



*Key:*

$(r_i, c_j)$ = (payoff to row, payoff to column)
$r_4$, $c_4$ = best; $r_3$, $c_3$ = next best; $r_2$, $c_2$ = next worst; $r_1$, $c_1$ = worst
$s$, $t$ = initial strategy choices of row and column, respectively
$q(t)$ = subsequent strategy choice of row (more cooperative player initially)

sponding to the $\overline{C}\,\overline{C}$ outcome of chicken, is at the lower right. (This positioning of outcomes corresponds to the usual one for 2 × 2 games, but it reverses the ordering of values on the horizontal axis: values of $x$ increase rather than decrease from right to left.) Points of the square not at the four corners represent "mixtures" of two or more outcomes of chicken; the payoffs that these mixtures yield are defined in Rule 5 below, and illustrated subsequently.

4. If $s = t$, the game terminates at point $(t, s)$ in the unit square. If $s > t$, the more cooperative player, row, retaliates against column by changing the level of cooperation, according to the retaliation function $q(t)$, to make the *final position* of the game $(t, q(t))$. Row's retaliation function thus depends on column's initial choice $t$; however, it is the value of $s$, as compared with $t$, that determines whether row or column (if either) can retaliate. If $s < t$, column is the player who is more cooperative initially and thereby can retaliate; column's level of cooperation changes from $t$ to $p(s)$, where $p(s)$ is column's retaliation function, and the final position is $(p(s), s)$. The players' retaliation functions are chosen at the same time as their initial choices, $s$ and $t$. Much of the rest of the paper will be devoted to showing what initial choices and retaliation functions are optimal, in a certain sense, for the players in TG.
5. Payoffs to row ($R$) and column ($C$) are defined by both the chicken payoffs at the four corners of the unit square and the actual final position $(x, y)$ on the square:[4]

$$P_R(x, y) = xyr_3 + x(1 - y)r_4 + (1 - x)yr_2 + (1 - x)(1 - y)r_1$$

$$P_C(x, y) = xyc_3 + (1 - x)yc_4 + x(1 - y)c_2 + (1 - x)(1 - y)c_1$$

At the four corners of the unit square, $P_R$ and $P_C$ exactly coincide with the corresponding payoffs of chicken. At any other point on the square, $P_R$ and $P_C$ are averages of the four payoffs at the corners, weighted according to the position of the point relative to the corners.

It is worth noting that the payoff functions are bilinear (linear in each coordinate): in calculating payoffs at $(x, y)$, the payoffs at each corner are weighted by the product of the distances, parallel to the axes, from $(x, y)$ to the opposite corner.[5] The definitions imply that the payoffs are continuous functions of the final position $(x, y)$ on the unit square.

As an illustration of this weighting system, consider the coordinates of the final position shown in Figure 1, $x = 1/2$ and $y = 1/3$. The weights of the four corner values of chicken in $P_R(x, y)$ and $P_c(x, y)$ are

$(1, 1)$: $xy = 1/6$ $\quad$ $(0, 1)$: $(1 - x)y = 1/6$

$(1, 0)$: $x(1 - y) = 1/3$ $\quad$ $(0, 0)$: $(1 - x)(1 - y) = 1/3$

which sum to 1.

The two lower payoffs in Figure 1, $(r_4, c_2)$ and $(r_1, c_1)$, which correspond to corners equidistant from (1/2, 1/3), are equally weighted by factors of 1/3 in $P_R$ and $P_C$. Similarly, the two upper payoffs, $(r_3, c_3)$ and $(r_2, c_4)$, which also correspond to corners equidistant from (1/2, 1/3), are equally weighted by factors of 1/6. Not unreasonably, the upper factors have half as much "pull" as the lower factors, for they correspond to twice the distance from (1/2, 1/3) on the vertical axis.

Different weighting factors would deform the continuous surface generated by our payoff functions. But because these deformations would remain anchored at the four corners of the unit square, they would not alter the basic nature of the Nash (1951) equilibrium results that we shall describe shortly.

An advantage offered by the present

formulation, in addition to mathematical tractability, is that the four weights in $P_R$ and $P_C$ can be interpreted as probabilities because they are nonnegative and sum to 1. Consequently, $P_R$ and $P_C$ may be thought of as expected values, the corner values being the four "pure" states of the game that can arise. As probabilities of being at the four corners, the four factor weights, when multiplied by a player's payoffs at each corner, give this expected payoff at any point of the unit square. It is worth noting that these factor weights are functions of the mixed (i.e., probabilistic) strategies of the players, who can be viewed as choosing strategy mixtures $x/(1 - x)$ and $y(1 - y)$.

In a nonprobabilistic interpretation, which we prefer because it leaves unambiguous who initially is the more cooperative player, the unit square of Figure 1 might be considered a board game. The players choose $(x, y)$ coordinates, according to Rules 1–4, that define a point on this board. As given by Rule 5, the payoffs to the players are the heights of the continuous surfaces, above the $(x, y)$ plane, generated by $P_R$ and $P_C$. A Nash equilibrium then has the property that the player who was more cooperative initially cannot increase his or her payoff by changing the coordinate when the opponent's coordinate is held constant.

TG has several qualitatively different Nash equilibria, but only one equilibrium, which we call the deterrence equilibrium (DE) (Brams and Kilgour 1987a), involves no preemption: $(x, y) = (1, 1)$, with payoffs $(r_3, c_3)$ to row and column. Assume, henceforth, that the payoffs are normalized so that $r_4 = c_4 = 1$, $r_1 = c_1 = 0$, and the intermediate payoffs satisfy the following inequalities: $0 < r_2 < r_3 < 1$ and $0 < c_2 < c_3 < 1$. Then the initial strategies and retaliation functions that render this outcome stable are

$$s = 1,\ q(t) \leqslant q_1(t);$$
$$t = 1,\ p(s) \leqslant p_1(s)$$

where

$$q_1(t) = \frac{c_3 - tc_2}{1 - t(1 - c_3 + c_2)}, 0 \leqslant t < 1 \textit{ and}$$

$$p_1(s) = \frac{r_3 - sr_2}{(1 - s(1 - r_3 + r_2)}, 0 \leqslant s < 1.$$

At DE both players never preempt ($s = t = 1$), but row threatens retaliation at level $q(t) \leqslant q_1(t)$ if preempted at level $t < 1$; and column threatens retaliation at level $p(s) \leqslant p_1(s)$ if preempted at level $s < 1$. The "1" subscripts on the right sides of each retaliation-function inequality indicate that the preempted player initially chooses $s = y = 1$ (row) or $t = x = 1$ (column). Note that the retaliation levels, $q(t)$ and $p(s)$, row and column threaten are functions of the levels of preemption, $t$ and $s$, of their opponents; we shall have more to say about this functional dependence later.

Like other Nash equilibria, DE possesses the property of "mutually fulfilled expectations": the choice of $q(t) \leqslant q_1(t)$ by row and $p(t) \leqslant p_1(t)$ by column associated with DE ensures that any level of preemption by each player's opponent will be at least as costly (after retaliation) as no preemption. Hence, the players do at least as well, and generally better (if the inequalities are strict), by choosing no preemption initially ($s = t = 1$).

In an earlier model of deterrence (Brams and Kilgour 1985a, 1985b), we did not permit retaliation to be a function of the level of preemption of the more preemptive player. Instead, in a deterrence game (without variable retaliation), we showed that "optimal deterrence" could be achieved by threats of retaliation independent of the actual level of preemption.[6] The introduction of *variable* retaliation may be viewed as a refinement of the earlier model in that it ties retaliatory threats to the level of preemption rather than assuming that only one threat—sufficient to deter maximal preemption—applies to all situations. In a real-life context, this refinement is echoed in the abandonment by the United States of "massive retaliation" in favor of "flexible response" or "graduated deterrence" around 1960 because the former doctrine was considered too blunt (and incredible) a retaliatory policy for anything but an all-out Soviet nuclear attack.

Because one player can, by choice of his or her DE strategy, make the compromise outcome at least as attractive for the opponent as preemption, and vice versa, there is a strong reason for both players to settle on DE. Because DE depends fundamentally on threats, however, it is not surprising that it is neither perfect nor subgame-perfect in the sense of Selten 1975.[7] This is because if deterrence for any reason should fail, it may be irrational to retaliate because retaliation could lead to a worse outcome for the threatener, if obliged to carry out the threat, as well as for the player who preempted and thereby provoked retaliation.

The problem of imperfectness is "solved," at least in theory, if the players can irrevocably precommit themselves to carrying out their threats. In the case of nuclear deterrence between the superpowers, both sides have institutionalized detailed procedures for responding to a nuclear attack that are designed to ensure—so far as possible—that retaliation will occur, even if communication, command, control, and intelligence ($C^3I$) capabilities are damaged by the attack (Bracken 1983).[8]

We shall assume that the rules of TG permit precommitments by the players that are regarded as credible—the threatened player believes that the threatener will in fact retaliate at the level that player says he or she will. We shall now take a closer look at the nature of the retaliatory threats necessary to sustain not only DE but also—should a crisis cause the players' positions on the unit square to deteriorate (reasons why this might happen will be given later)—a position below and to the right of DE in Figure 1. It is important to bear in mind that while the theoretical solutions we offer suggest how threats might be tailored to provocations in order to render them more credible, we know of no practical procedures for operationally matching actual threats to the real-life preemption they are intended to deter.

## Deterrence in a Crisis

We assumed earlier that the preplay position of the players in TG is (1, 1). A *crisis* is an event or series of events that changes this position to $(x_0, y_0)$, where either $x_0 < 1$ or $y_0 < 1$ or both—that is, at least one player has acted so that $(x_0, y_0) \neq (1, 1)$. We assume for now that the new preplay position is near but not at (1, 1), in a sense to be made precise later.

In essence, the crisis has created a situation in which the players find themselves, more or less simultaneously, to be more hostile toward each other than previously, perhaps because one player partially preempted and the other responded with some noncooperative countermove. Indeed, a crisis suggests at least a partial failure of deterrence, which may occur for any of a variety of reasons, including domestic political considerations, misperceptions by the players, lack of communication, and the like. The question we address here is how deterrence can be restored—what kinds of threats are needed to prevent further deterioration of the crisis.

If the players wish to return to DE at (1, 1) eventually, an option for each is to try to do so immediately. By virtue of the fact that DE is a Nash equilibrium, if either player credibly announces his or her DE strategy, the opponent can do no better than to return to that player's own DE strategy. Thus, if column were to announce $t = 1$, $p(s) \leqslant p_1(s)$, row would

**Figure 2. Reduced Game Board at ($x_0$, $y_0$)**



maximize its payoff by returning to $s = 1$. The desire to protect against possible future preemption by column would then motivate row to threaten retaliation as well, that is, $q(t) \leqslant q_1(t)$.

One problem with effecting stabilization immediately at DE is that it would necessarily involve threats against the status quo ($x_0$, $y_0$). By assumption, the game is not at (1, 1) after the crisis has occurred, so some intimidation would be required to return to this point. In the middle of a crisis, however, a threat of retaliating against the status quo might indeed be dangerous because it could be interpreted as moving up the escalation ladder. Moreover, to create an incentive for an opponent to return to (1, 1), the threatener would have to change to a cooperative position; this may not be easy to do in a crisis.

It may be preferable for the players to try first to stabilize the status quo ($x_0$, $y_0$), postponing further ameliorative measures for restoring the nonpreemption position at (1, 1) until the crisis atmosphere has cleared. This might be done by indicating a temporary acceptance of the current position and using presumably milder threats to deter *further* preemption.

Such a tactic, in forestalling a deepening of the crisis by arresting it at the point where it currently is, affords the players the opportunity to buy more time. Yet it poses a new question: Is it always possible, given a preplay position near but not at full cooperation, for one or both players to stabilize ($x_0$, $y_0$) using threats less provocative than those supporting full deterrence at (1, 1)?

If the players perceive their problem as one in which the new status quo ($x_0$, $y_0$) brought on by the crisis is the best (i.e., most cooperative) position they can hope for in the short term, then we may consider the revised threat game to be a game played on a reduced "game board," comprising those points that lie below and to the right of ($x_0$, $y_0$) rather than (1, 1) (see Figure 2). In the Appendix, this short-term deterrence problem is modeled by a reduced threat game, or simply reduced game, wherein the preplay position is assumed to be ($x_0$, $y_0$).

It is shown that, provided ($x_0$, $y_0$) is not too far from (1, 1)—specifically, $x_0 > x^* = r_2/(1 - r_3 + r_2)$ and $y_0 > y^* = c_2/(1 - c_3 + c_2)$—this game has a deterrence equilibrium, analogous to DE, defined by

$$s = y_0,\ q(t) \leqslant q_{x_0,y_0}(t)$$
$$t = x_0,\ p(x) \leqslant p_{x_0,y_0}(s)$$

where

$$p_{x_0,y_0}(s) = \frac{P_R(x_0, y_0) - sr_2}{1 - s(1 - r_3 + r_2)},\ 0 \leqslant s < y_0$$

and

$$q_{x_0,y_0}(t) = \frac{P_C(x_0, y_0) - tc_2}{1 - t(1 - c_3 + c_2)},\ 0 \leqslant t < x_0$$

It is this reduced deterrence equilibrium (RDE) at ($x_0$, $y_0$), now to be discussed, that will serve as the cornerstone of our model of crisis stabilization.

## Crisis Stabilization

We now examine more closely the properties, feasibility, and strategic implications of RDE. A few initial observations help to set the stage. First, notice that $p_{1,1}(s) = p_1(s)$ and, similarly, $q_{1,1}(t) = q_1(t)$. This means that, as $(x_0, y_0)$ approaches $(1, 1)$, RDE at $(x_0, y_0)$ approaches DE, the deterrence equilibrium of the threat game.

Other mathematical properties of RDE in the reduced game are important. Like $p_1(s)$ and $q_1(t)$ in the original game, $p_{x_0,y_0}(s)$ and $q_{x_0,y_0}(t)$ are continuous, strictly increasing, and convex: as the levels of initial cooperation, $s$ and $t$, increase, the minimal threats of retaliation, $1 - p_{x_0,y_0}(s)$ and $1 - q_{x_0,y_0}(t)$, necessary to deter will decrease at a decreasing rate. In other words, players must be relatively *more* threatening at low levels of initial provocation than at high levels, sometimes threatening even greater retaliation than the provocation at these levels. The nature of such threats is analyzed in detail in Brams and Kilgour 1987a and compared to the findings of Axelrod 1984.

Perhaps the simplest way to understand all these deterrence equilibria is by means of *threat lines*. Each player threatens the other with just enough retaliation (at the threshold) to make the threatened player prefer no preemption to unilateral preemption at any level. The threat line shows how this minimum level of retaliation depends on the level of preemption.

For example, at DE in the threat game, column threatens to punish any level of preemption by row (i.e., any $s < 1$) by cooperating at level no more than $p_1(s)$. Column's threat line (really a curve) at this equilibrium, called the *basic threat line*, is given by $x = p_1(y)$ for $0 \leqslant y < 1$ and is shown in Figure 3. Similarly, column's threat line supporting the RDE at $(x_0, y_0)$ in the reduced game is given by $x = p_{x_0,y_0}(y)$ for $0 \leqslant y < y_0$. The upper bound, $y_0$, on $y$ means that at RDE, column does not threaten to retaliate against the status quo $y_0$, just as column does not retaliate against $y = 1$ at DE in the original game.

In Figure 3 we illustrate several threat lines of column (in addition to the basic threat line) for several typical RDEs. Row has a corresponding threat line at each RDE; in general, the threat line of row supporting an RDE at $(x_0, y_0)$ is given by $y = q_{x_0,y_0}(x)$ for $0 \leqslant x < x_0$. Note that the threat lines supporting RDE at $(x_0, y_0)$ always begin at $(x_0, y_0)$. It is shown in the Appendix that a player's threat lines supporting RDEs at different status quo points $(x_0, y_0)$ never cross—they are either coincident or disjoint, as illustrated by the "parallel" threat lines of Figure 3.

In order that it be rational for the less preemptive player to retaliate against the more preemptive player (Brams and Kilgour 1987a), $(x_0, y_0)$ must be sufficiently close to $(1, 1)$—that is, satisfy $x_0 > x^*$ and $y_0 > y^*$, where the lower bounds $x^*$ and $y^*$ are as defined in the Deterrence in a

Figure 3. Several Threat Lines of Column



**Figure 4. Configuration of Basic Threat Lines in Which Crisis Stabilization Without Threat Escalation Is Always Possible near (1, 1)**



Crisis section. At higher levels of preemption, by comparison, retaliation by the less preemptive player sufficient to deter the opponent is irrational in the sense that it hurts the retaliator as well as the opponent. In effect, we consider only whether a crisis can be stabilized at $(x_0, y_0)$ in the reduced game when *rational* retaliatory threats by both players are possible.

We can now answer the question posed previously. When can one or both players attempt immediate crisis stabilization of a status quo point $(x_0, y_0)$ without threat escalation? We shall consider two cases. In the first case, the basic threat lines of both row and column take the form shown in Figure 4.

Observe that all points in the unit square near (1, 1) are either below column's basic threat line or to the right of row's (or both). Therefore, at least one player—and sometimes both, namely, in the region of overlap between (1, 1) and $(x', y')$—can stabilize a crisis at $(x_0, y_0)$ with the same threats meant to deter preemption at (1, 1).

The case illustrated in Figure 4 occurs whenever, in the neighborhood of (1, 1), $x = p_1(y)$ lies to the right of $y = q_1(x)$. It is shown in the Appendix that this takes place if and only if

$$\frac{1 - c_3}{c_3 - c_2} > \frac{r_3 - r_2}{1 - r_3} \qquad (1)$$

Notice that for fixed $c_2$ and $c_3$, Inequality 1 holds if $r_3$ is relatively close to $r_2$, and similarly for fixed $r_2$ and $r_3$. In general, Inequality 1 holds when $r_3$ and $c_3$ are relatively small—that is, when the players do not value the status quo very highly. For example, if $r_3 = .5$, $c_3 = .6$, and $r_2 = c_2 = .3$, then Inequality 1 is satisfied.

If Inequality 1 does not hold, Figure 5 applies and there are initial points close to (1, 1)—specifically, near the main diagonal where the threat lines diverge—from which neither player can attempt crisis stabilization without escalating its threats. On the other hand, if $(x_0, y_0)$ is sufficiently close to one of the edges of the unit square, this status quo point will be either below column's basic threat line (near the vertical axis), or to the right of row's (near the horizontal axis), and one player can stabilize $(x_0, y_0)$.

A *point of threat escalation* is one that is neither below column's basic threat line nor to the right of row's, which in Figure 5 means below and to the right of (1, 1). In Figure 4 there are also points of threat escalation below and to the right of (1, 1), but they are not in the neighborhood of (1, 1). Instead, they are points below and to the right of the *interior* point of intersection $(x', y')$ of the two basic threat lines.

Actually, all points in the regions where the curves "flare outward" (from $(x', y')$ in Figure 4 and from (1, 1) in Figure 5) are points of threat escalation. It is noteworthy that, whether Figure 4 or Figure 5 applies, crisis stabilization is always facilitated if $(x_0, y_0)$ falls near one of the edges of the unit square. This is because the preemptor has more to lose and is thus more vulnerable to threats. Hence, a crisis in which both players are more or less equally noncooperative is generally harder to stabilize—except when Inequality 1 holds and the players are close to (1, 1) and therefore "protected" (see Figure 4).

In general, crisis stabilization is enhanced when the advantages of mutual cooperation in the threat game are substantial for the players and, in the reduced game, the status quo at $(x_0, y_0)$ is not too far from (1, 1). In addition, crisis stabilization is abetted if $(x_0, y_0)$ significantly favors one player; this makes the opponent's threat of retaliation potentially more harmful and hence likely to be taken more seriously.

There is one curious aspect to crisis instability in the neighborhood of $(x, y) = (1, 1)$ that suggests why players may have difficulty when the basic threat lines flare out as in Figure 4. As shown in the Appendix, the expected payoffs, $P_R(x_0, y_0)$ and $P_C(x_0, y_0)$, may actually exceed their values of $r_3$ and $c_3$, respectively, when $(x_0, y_0) \neq (1, 1)$. That is, *both* players may be able to improve their payoffs at points on the game board below and to the right of (1, 1), where the players are less than fully cooperative.

The dark lines shown in Figure 4, along the top and left edges of the square except near (1, 1), indicate the Pareto-superior outcomes of the threat game. (From a *Pareto-superior* point, neither player can do better unless the other player does worse.) In particular, the Pareto-superior outcomes (on the oblique line) between the two basic threat lines are better for both players than $(r_3, c_3)$. In fact, all the points in the lens-shaped region between the two basic threat lines are Pareto improvements over $(r_3, c_3)$, so the players would appear to have good reason to foment crises that drive them into this region and toward the oblique Pareto-superior line, beyond which both players do worse rather than better.

When Inequality 1 is reversed, the oblique, Pareto-superior line of Figure 4 vanishes, resulting in Figure 5 and points of threat escalation near (1, 1). These points correspond to outcomes Pareto-inferior to $(r_3, c_3)$; moreover, one must threaten worse reprisals than at (1, 1) to make it rational to stay at them.

The level of threats required in the reduced game to stabilize crises at threat-escalation points always exceeds the basic threats in the threat game that stabilize (1, 1) and make it a deterrence equilibrium. Thus, threats at crisis points $(x_0, y_0) \neq (1, 1)$ but close to (1, 1) in Figure 5 must be *more* severe than those at (1, 1) to prevent further deterioration of the crisis.

We believe that our theoretical findings accord with reality in certain strategic situations. For instance, as the Soviets were about to install nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba in October 1962, President Kennedy deemed his previous verbal warnings no longer adequate to alter their behavior. Claiming his earlier exhortations had fallen on deaf ears, he escalated the conflict, imposing a blockade and contemplating even stronger actions, such as a possible air strike against the missile sites.

It seems, in such crises, that both sides may initially perceive an advantage in

**Figure 5. Configuration of Basic Threat Lines in Which Crisis Stabilization Without Threat Escalation Is Not Possible near (1, 1)**



raising the stakes, as suggested by Figure 4, but not to the point of an explosion. Although the tension in such crises may be unsettling, to say the least, both sides may well foresee benefits if the lid can be kept on (i.e., if they do not move past the oblique line in Figure 4). Indeed, following the missile crisis and sobered by it, the United States and the Soviet Union quickly reached an agreement on a hot line, which they hoped would defuse future crises, and also signed the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

These conciliatory actions surely produced a Pareto improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations (assuming the superpowers had moved past the Pareto-superior line and did better when they stepped back from the abyss) even if this improvement did not occur in the heat of the crisis. As in the application of many theoretical models, our model's "fit" may not be immediate but can be interpreted to occur over time.

Paradoxically, perhaps, a crisis that does, in the end, abate may have stabilizing long-term effects, even though, like the Cuban missile crisis, it may be a terrifying experience through which to live (Kavka 1986, 236–37). In terms of our model, both sides may see a short-term advantage in escalating a conflict, the increased risk of war being offset by the potential benefits of gaining a significant edge over the other side. However, as each side takes actions that bring both closer to the precipice, the dangers become more palpable and each seeks a way to step back.

Thus, while there may be an incentive to depart from the cooperative outcome in the threat game initially, this desire may set in motion a countervailing force: as each side becomes more threatening and conflict becomes imminent, fears arise that induce both sides to try to wind down the crisis. Then, not desiring to be so close to the precipice, each side finds it rational to retreat to (1, 1)—from which, unfortunately, they will probably be drawn again by the possibility of higher payoffs.

## Conclusions

It is important to emphasize that crisis stabilization is always possible in the threat game if either player credibly threatens retaliation at a level given by the deterrence equilibrium of this game. The new question posed in this paper concerns simultaneous departures: If both players should, because of a crisis, find themselves at point $(x_0, y_0) \neq (1, 1)$ of the unit square, can they stabilize this point using milder threats, making it a new status quo from which neither player will have an incentive to depart unilaterally?

The calculations of the threat game can be carried over to this reduced game, with $(x_0, y_0)$ now assumed to be the preplay position. If the goal of the players is first to stabilize $(x_0, y_0)$ and not necessarily to induce a return to (1, 1) immediately, then this goal cannot always be realized without escalating threats at $(x_0, y_0)$, which may well aggravate a crisis already fraught with the danger of a conflagration.

This goal of temporary stabilization seems a sensible one for the players to aspire to if preventing a further deterioration of their positions in a crisis is a sine qua non of eventually easing out of the crisis and moving back to the status quo ante at (1, 1). Numerous crises in international politics have been abated by just such incremental steps.

For example, the eventual settlement of the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 depended initially on the removal by the Soviets of the missiles they were about to install in Cuba. The United States provided the incentive when it escalated its verbal warnings to a blockade. Once the Soviets promised to remove the missiles, the United States agreed to lift the blockade, after which the crisis subsided.

Our game-theoretic analysis shows

that crisis stabilization may not always be possible, even in the case of small departures from (1, 1), without threat escalation. In general, such escalation is necessary whenever both players do definitely worse in straying from (1, 1).

But this may not always be the case. In fact, by precipitating a crisis, both players may be able to improve their payoffs, perhaps for domestic political reasons. Eventually, however, as the crisis worsens, threats may be escalated to prevent a further deterioration of relations, which may in turn push the two sides back to more conciliatory stances out of fear that their conflict could get out of hand. Yet, the milder threats required to stabilize the cooperative outcome at $(x, y) = (1, 1)$ may tempt the players once again to defy these threats and take risks for the higher payoffs, eventually leading to points of threat escalation where they both suffer.

The inducement to escalate threats in a crisis is heightened if the cooperative outcome is valued highly by the players, giving them less reason to depart initially to try to improve their lot. But even then, a surprising condition can facilitate crisis stabilization: the crisis places the players in asymmetrical positions whereby one player is substantially more antagonistic, or preemptive, than the other at $(x_0, y_0)$. The more cooperative player is then in a position to reduce his or her threats, indicating (temporary) acceptance of $(x_0, y_0)$ and thereby stabilizing it.

In the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviets initially reaped a significant advantage by their preemption, but the United States could threaten them with strong military reprisal, both of a conventional kind against Cuba and of a nuclear kind against the Soviet Union itself (Trachtenberg 1985). More perilous would be a potential crisis with rapid escalation on both sides and in which neither side could pose an overwhelmingly greater threat against the other, perhaps because the confrontation occurred in neither's "sphere of influence."

It is perhaps fortunate that most preemptive moves made by the superpowers have been against foes that were perceived to be within their spheres of influence. The greatest danger, according to our model, is when there is sudden and serious escalation on both sides, which seems most likely to occur when the confrontation is outside either's immediate sphere of influence, such as in the Middle East, or even outer space.

Stabilizing such a crisis without threat escalation, much less returning to the status quo ante, may be impossible for rational players. We hope that a recognition that there are threat-escalation points and that there may be no escape from them without aggravating the crisis further, will help to avert such crises.

## Appendix

We begin by defining various "deterrence games," specifying the strategy choices available to the players, the rules for determining final outcomes, and the payoff functions. The game board of each game is its set of possible final outcomes. For example, the threat game (TG) has the unit square ($[0, 1]^2$) as its game board, and its strategy choices, final outcome, and payoffs are as given in Table A-1—($1_S$), ($1_F$), and ($1_P$), respectively. Note that $r_2$, $r_3$, $c_2$, and $c_3$ are constants satisfying $0 < r_2 < r_3 < 1$ and $0 < c_2 < c_3 < 1$.

Fix $x_0$ and $y_0$ satisfying $0 < x_0 < 1$ and $0 < y_0 < 1$. When the game board is reduced from the unit square to $[0, x_0] \times [0, y_0]$, the problem faced by the players can be modeled by a reduced game. We define the reduced TG at $(x_0, y_0)$ to be Game 2 of Table A-1. Game 2 is played just as the original game; the only difference is in the "shrinking" of $(x, y)$ by

## Table 1. Four Deterrence Games

| | Game 1<br>Threat Game (TG) | Game 2<br>Reduced TG at $(x_0, y_0)$<br>Board Reduction | Game 3<br>Reduced TG at $(x_0, y_0)$<br>Strategy Transformation | Game 4<br>Reduced TG at $(x_0, y_0)$<br>Payoff Transformation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strategies (S) | | | | |
| Row | $s \in [0, 1]$ and,<br>if $s > 0$,<br>$q{:}[0, s) \to [0, 1]$ | same as 1S | $s' \in [0, y_0]$ and,<br>if $s' > 0$,<br>$q'{:}[0, x_0 s'/y_0) \to [0, y_0]$ | same as 1S |
| Column | $t \in [0, 1]$ and,<br>if $t > 0$<br>$p{:}[0, t) \to [0, 1]$ | | $t' \in [0, x_0]$ and,<br>if $t' > 0$,<br>$p'{:}[0, y_0 t'/x_0) \to [0, x_0]$ | |
| Final Outcome (F) | $(x, y) = \begin{cases} (p(s), s) & \text{if } s < t \\ (t', s') & \text{if } s = t \\ (t, q(t)) & \text{if } s > t \end{cases}$ | $(x', y') = (x_0 x, y_0 y)$,<br>where $(x, y)$ same as 1F | $(x', y') = \begin{cases} (p'(s'), s') & \text{if } s^* < t^* \\ (t', s') & \text{if } s^* = t^* \\ (t', q'(t')) & \text{if } s^* = t^* \end{cases}$<br>where $s^* = s'/y_0$ and $t^* = t'/x_0$ | same as 1F |
| Payoffs (P) | | | | |
| Row | $P_R(x, y) = xy(r_3)$<br>$+ x(1 - y)(1)$<br>$+ (1 - x)y(r_2)$<br>$+ (1 - x)(1 - y)(0)$<br>$= x + yr_2$<br>$- xy(1 - r_3 + r_2)$ | $P_R(x', y')$ | same as 2P | $Q_R(x, y) = P_R(x', y')/x_0$ |
| Column | $P_C(x,y) = y + xc_2$<br>$- xy(1 - c_3 + c_2)$ | $P_C(x', y')$, where $P_R$ and $P_C$ same as 1P and $(x', y')$ same as 2F | same as 2P | $Q_C(x,y)$<br>$= P_C(x', y')/y_0$,<br>where $P_R$ and $P_C$ same as 1P and $(x', y')$ same as 2F |

factors of $x_0$ and $y_0$ in $(2_F)$ to obtain a final outcome that always lies on the reduced game board.

It is possible to think of Game 2, the reduced TG at $(x_0, y_0)$, as being played entirely within the new game board. This is so because Game 3 is equivalent to Game 2, using the transformations $s' = sy_0$, $t' = tx_0$, $q'(t') = y_0q(t'/x_0)$, and $p'(s') = x_0p(s'/y_0)$. Although Game 3 might be seen as the more natural way to reduce TG to the game board $[0, x_0] \times [0, y_0]$, we shall continue to work with Game 2 for convenience. Similarly, Game 4 is strategically equivalent to Game 2, for the strategy sets and resulting position $(x, y)$ are identical in both, and the payoffs in Game 4 are constant multiples of the payoffs in Game 2. Thus Games 2, 3, and 4 are strategically identical.

We next determine the precise conditions under which Games 1 and 2 are equivalent. First compare the payoff functions of Games 1 and 4 for row only—the situation for column is analogous. From 4P and 2F it is easy to verify that

$$\begin{aligned} Q_R(1, 1) &= [x_0 + y_0r_2 - x_0y_0(1 - r_3 + r_2)]/x_0 \\ Q_R(0, 1) &= y_0r_2/x_0 \\ Q_R(1, 0) &= 1 \\ Q_R(0, 0) &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

Define $r_2' = Q_R(0, 1)$ and $r_3' = Q_R(1, 1)$. Then

$$\begin{aligned} Q_R(x, y) &= xy(r_3') + x(1 - y)(1) + (1 - x)y(r_2') \\ &\quad + (1 - x)(1 - y)(0) \end{aligned} \tag{A-1}$$

because the right side of this equation equals

$$\begin{aligned} &\{xy[x_0 + y_0r_2 - x_0y_0(1 - r_3 + r_2)] + x(1 - y)x_0 \\ &\quad + (1 - x)y[y_0r_2]\}/x_0 = [xx_0 + yy_0r_2 \\ &\quad + xx_0yy_0(1 - r_3 + r_2)]/x_0 \\ &\quad = P_R(xx_0, yy_0)/x_0 = Q_R(x, y) \end{aligned}$$

because of 2F and 4P.

Comparison of Equation A-1 with 1P shows that row faces the same strategic problem in Game 4 as in Game 1, provided that $0 < r_2' < r_3' < 1$. Because

$$\begin{aligned} r_3' - r_2' &= [x_0 + y_0r_2 - x_0y_0(1 - r_3 + r_2)]/x_0 \\ &\quad - y_0r_2/x_0 = 1 - y_0(1 - r_3 + r_2) > 0 \end{aligned}$$

the games are strategically equivalent for row if and only if $r_3' < 1$, which is equivalent to

$$x_0 + y_0r_2 - x_0y_0(1 - r_3 + r_2) < x_0$$

Because $y_0 > 0$, this inequality holds if and only if $x_0 > r_2/(1 - r_3 + r_2) = x^*$. Combining with the analogous conditions for column's payoffs, we conclude that Game 1 and Game 2 are strategically equivalent if and only if $x_0 > x^*$ and $y_0 > y^*$.

Now assume that $x_0 > x^*$ and $y_0 > y^*$. Our previous analysis of Game 1 (TG) applies equally to the reduced TGs at $(x_0, y_0)$ because of the strategic equivalence we have demonstrated. For Game 4, the deterrence equilibrium is

$$\text{(DE)} \quad s = 1,\ q(t) \leqslant q_1(t) \textit{ and } t = 1,\ p(x) \geqslant p_1(s)$$

where

$$p_1(s) = \frac{r_3' - sr_2'}{1 - s(1 - r_3' + r_2')},\ 0 \leqslant s < 1,$$

and $q_1(t)$ is similar. Of course the DE is identical in Game 2, for 4S and 2S are the same. The transformation given above shows, after some simplification, that in Game 3 DE becomes

$$\begin{aligned} &s' = y_0,\ q'(t') \leqslant q_{x_0,y_0}(t') \textit{ and} \\ &t' = x_0,\ p'(s') \leqslant p_{x_0,y_0}(s') \end{aligned}$$

where

$$p_{x_0,y_0}(s') = \frac{P_R(x_0, y_0) - s'r_2}{1 - s'(1 - r_3 + r_2)},\ 0 \leqslant s' < y_0$$

and

$$q_{x_0,y_0}(t') = \frac{P_C(x_0, y_0) - t'c_2}{1 - t'(1 - c_3 + c_2)},\ 0 \leqslant t' < x_0$$

Here, $P_R(x_0, y_0)$ and $P_C(x_0, y_0)$ are as given by 1p.

Finally, we show that, near (1, 1), column's basic threat line $(p_1(y), y)$ lies to the right of row's basic threat line $(x, q_1(x))$ if and only if

$$\frac{1 - c_3}{c_3 - c_2} > \frac{r_3 - r_2}{1 - r_3} \qquad \text{(A-2)}$$

(see Figures 4 and 5). Recall that

$$p_1(y) = \frac{r_3 - yr_2}{1 - y(1 - r_3 + r_2)}, \quad 0 \leqslant y < 1$$

*and*

$$q_1(x) = \frac{c_3 - xc_2}{1 - x(1 - c_3 + c_2)}, \quad 0 \leqslant x < 1$$

Since $\lim_{y \to 1} p_1(y) = \lim_{x \to 1} q_1(x) = 1$, both treat lines pass through (1, 1).

We now show that at (1, 1), the slope of $(x, q_1(x))$ is less than that of $(p_1(y), y))$ if and only if Inequality A-2 holds. Because

$$\frac{dq_1}{dx} = \frac{(c_3 - c_2)(1 - c_3)}{[1 - x(1 - c_3 + c_2)]^2}$$

we have that the limiting slope of $(x, q_1(x))$ at $x = 1$ is

$$\left.\frac{dq_1}{dx}\right|_{x=1} = \frac{(c_3 - c_2)(1 - c_3)}{(c_3 - c_2)^2} = \frac{1 - c_3}{c_3 - c_2}$$

Similarly,

$$\left.\frac{dp_1}{dy}\right|_{y=1} = \frac{1 - r_3}{r_3 - r_2}$$

so that the limiting slope of $(p_1(y), y)$ at $y = 1$ is

$$\left(\left.\frac{dp_1}{dy}\right|_{y=1}\right)^{-1} = \frac{r_3 - r_2}{1 - r_3}$$

Comparison of these two slopes now yields inequality A-2.

It is not difficult to verify that any point $(x, y)$ on column's threat line at $(x_0, y_0)$ satisfies $P_R(x, y) = P_R(x_0, y_0)$. (This shows that threat lines never intersect; they are either coincident or disjoint.) Now a threat line for column can be drawn through each point of the unit square. It is easy to show that for any point $(x_0, y_0)$, the threat line separates those outcomes that satisfy $P_R(x, y) > P_R(x_0, y_0)$ from those for which $P_R(x, y) < P_R(x_0, y_0)$. The outcomes preferred by row are always on the side of the threat line containing (1, 0). These facts also apply to column's payoff and row's threat lines.

These observations provide a way to identify Pareto-superior outcomes. If the two threat lines from a point "flare away" (as in Figure 5), the point is Pareto-superior to all those points below and to the right. Otherwise it is not (Figure 4). Proceeding as in the derivation of Inequality A-2 yields the sets of Pareto-superior outcomes shown in Figures 4 and 5.

## Notes

Steven J. Brams gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Ford Foundation under Grant No. 845-0354 and the National Science Foundation under Grant No. SES84-08505; D. Marc Kilgour gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada under Grant No. A8974; and the authors appreciate the comments of Raymond Dacey, Zeev Maoz, and Barry O'Neill.

1. We use *preemption* to mean initial attack, the implication being that each side may attack first out of fear of being attacked. This fear, as we shall show, may be well grounded in the threat game, especially when both sides may reap benefits simultaneously from escalation to points away from the cooperative outcome.

2. A more extended discussion of crisis instability can be found in O'Neill 1987, which reviews different efforts to formalize crisis instability and defines axiomatically a game-theoretic index of this concept; see also Intriligator and Brito 1977. For a fascinating alternative game-theoretic model of escalation based on a dollar auction in which the two highest bidders pay, see O'Neill 1986 and Shubik 1971.

3. In a noncrisis context, the "robustness" of deterrent threats has been analyzed in Brams 1985 (pp. 36–43).

4. The route by which the final position is attained from the preplay and initial positions may

be relevant but will not be modeled here. Rather, our focus will be on the deterrent threats that can arrest further crisis escalation, however it got started.

5. The four weights so obtained are nonnegative and sum to 1, but they do not constitute barycentric coordinates. This is because they do not provide a unique representation for every point of the square; uniqueness is preserved only if three points (rather than the four corner points in our model) are used to define coordinates in the two-space of the unit square.

6. In related work, Dacey (1987) analyzes within a decision-theoretic framework the use of probabilistic bribes, threats, and tit-for-tat combinations in a number of variable-sum games. Probabilistic variations on tit-for-tat are developed in Brams, Davis, and Straffin 1979 and Brams and Davis 1987 and can also be found in Brams 1985 (chaps. 3, 4) and Brams and Kilgour 1986a, 1987b.

7. See also Shubik 1982 (pp. 265–270) for a recent discussion of perfect equilibria and related concepts.

8. Gauthier (1984) claims that such precommitments are not necessary to deter aggression but that threats that are not credible are empty, and empty threats invite attack. His calculus of deterrence, we believe, is sensible only when the retaliator's threats will assuredly be implemented because of precommitments.

## References

Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The Evaluation of Cooperation.* New York: Basics.

Bracken, Paul. 1983. *The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Brams, Steven J. 1985. *Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Brams, Steven J., and Morton D. Davis. 1987. The Verification Problem in Arms Control: A Game-theoretic Analysis. In *Interaction and Communication in Global Politics,* eds. Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, Richard L. Merritt, and Dina Zinnes. London: Sage.

Brams, Steven J., Morton D. Davis, and Philip D. Straffin, Jr. 1979. The Geometry of the Arms Race. *International Studies Quarterly* 23:567–88.

Brams, Steven J., and D. Marc Kilgour. 1985a. Optimal Deterrence. *Social Philosophy and Policy* 3:118–35.

Brams, Steven J., and D. Marc Kilgour. 1985b. The Path to Stable Deterrence. In *Dynamic Models of International Conflict,* eds. Urs Luterbacher and Michael D. Ward. Boulder: Lynne Reinner.

Brams, Steven J., and D. Marc Kilgour. 1986a. Notes on Arms-Control Verification: A Game-theoretic Analysis. In *Modelling and Analysis in Arms Control,* eds. Rudolf Avenhaus, Reiner K. Huber, and John D. Kettelle. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.

Brams, Steven J., and D. Marc Kilgour. 1986b. Rational Deescalation. *Physica* (Amsterdam) 22D:337–50.

Brams, Steven J., and D. Marc Kilgour. 1987a. Optimal Threats. *Operations Research* 35. Forthcoming.

Brams, Steven J., and D. Marc Kilgour. 1987b. Verification and Stability: A Game-theoretic Analysis. In *Arms and Artificial Intelligence,* ed. Allan M. Din. Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Forthcoming.

Brams, Steven J., and D. Marc Kilgour. 1987c. Winding Down if Preemption or Escalatiaon Occurs: A Game-theoretic Analysis. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31. Forthcoming.

Brams, Steven J., and D. Marc Kilgour. 1988. *Game Theory and National Security.* Forthcoming.

Dacey, Raymond. 1987. Ambiguous Information and the Manipulation of Plays of the Arms Race Game and the Mutual Deterrence Game. In *Interaction and Communication in Global Politics,* eds. Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, Richard L. Merritt, and Dina Zinnes. London: Sage.

Gauthier, David. 1984. Deterrence, Maximization, and Rationality. *Ethics* 94:474–95.

Intriligator, Michael D., and Dagobert L. Brito. 1976. Formal Models of Arms Races. *Journal of Peace Science* 2:77–88.

Kavka, Gregory S. 1986. Morality and Nuclear Politics: Lessons of the Missile Crisis. In *Nuclear Weapons and the Future of Humanity: The Fundamental Questions,* eds. Avner Cohen and Steven Lee. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld.

Morgan, Patrick M. 1986. New Directions in Deterrence Theory. In *Nuclear Weapons and the Future of Humanity: The Fundamental Questions,* eds. Avner Cohen and Steven Lee. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld.

Nash, John. 1951. Non-Cooperative Games. *Annals of Mathematics* 54:286–95.

O'Neill, Barry. 1986. International Escalation and the Dollar Auction. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 30:33–50.

O'Neill, Barry. 1987. A Measure for Crisis Instability, with Applications to Arms Control Agreements and Space-Based Missile Defenses. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31. Forthcoming.

Selten, Reinhard. 1975. Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games. *International Journal of Game Theory* 4:25–55.

Shubik, Martin. 1982. *Game Theory in the Social Sciences: Concepts and Solutions.* Cambridge: MIT Press.

Shubik, Martin. 1971. The Dollar Auction Game: A

Paradox in Noncooperative Behavior and Escalation. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 15:109–11.
Trachtenberg, Marc. 1985. The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis. *International Security* 10:137–63.
Zagare, Frank C. 1985. Toward a Reformulation of the Theory of Mutual Deterrence. *International Studies Quarterly* 29:155–69.
Zagare, Frank C. 1987. *The Dynamics of Deterrence.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Steven J. Brams is Professor of Politics, New York University, New York, NY 10003.

D. Mark Kilgour is Professor of Mathematics, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario N2L C35.

# BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS IN RADICAL MILITARY REGIMES

GREGORY J. KASZA
*Indiana University*

*Most theories of bureaucratic politics depict state bureaucracies as a conservative force in the political system. Their resistance to radical politics and innovative programs is attributed to certain typical traits of bureaucratic structures and career patterns. I summarize the arguments for bureaucratic conservatism, and then describe how civilian bureaucracies serving military regimes in Japan (1937-45), Peru (1968-75), and Egypt (1952-70) invalidated those arguments by promoting radical policy programs through the three devices of supraministerial bodies, low-ranking ministries, and new specialized agencies. I conclude that middle theories of bureaucratic politics may prove more fruitful than grand theoretical attempts to encompass all bureaucracies in a single set of propositions, and that structural and occupational explanations of bureaucratic behavior need to be modified by a greater appreciation for the role of individual bureaucratic leaders.*

While it is commonplace to note the great power of modern state bureaucracies, most scholars agree that bureaucrats use their sizable influence for conservative or moderately reformist ends in relation to the existing social order. Administrative radicalism is said to be blocked by certain inherent features of bureaucratic organizations that foster conservative behavior. Although a few students of public administration have challenged this position, their rebuttal has not suggested that a professional, merit-state bureaucracy might foment revolutionary changes in politics and society.

Unrelated to the issue of inherent bureaucratic tendencies, several case studies of political change have brought the term "revolution from above" into currency (Einaudi 1976; Trimberger 1978). Most often, such revolutions are ascribed to military-bureaucratic regimes that have undertaken radical policy programs at the instigation of administrative elites themselves. This contrasts with the more familiar portrayal of revolutions, in which radical policies follow an upheaval of mass violence launching a new elite into power. The role played by military officers in revolutions from above has received serious scholarly attention. For example, it has been analyzed in some cases through the concept of the military's "new professionalism," which describes how a preoccupation with internal security may lead the armed forces to espouse fundamental social change (Stepan 1978, 128-34). Although it is widely recognized that civilian bureaucrats make a critical contribution to governance in military regimes (Feit 1973, 8-13; Nordlinger 1977, 121-22), their role in fomenting revolution from above has received much less study, and its implications for the aforementioned thesis of inherent bureaucratic conservatism have never been fully elaborated.

This article relates the research on radical military regimes to the standard portrait of bureaucratic conservatism, describing systematically how civilian bureaucratic institutions have overcome the most often cited obstacles to innovation and become prominent forces for change. It begins with a review of the main arguments for bureaucratic conservatism. It then subjects these arguments to empirical testing in three cases of so-called revolution from above: Japan (1937-45), Peru (1968-75), and Egypt (1952-70). The conclusion is that bureaucratic structures and career patterns need not prevent radical institutional behavior and that some forms of administrative organization have provided strong incentives for innovation.

Several clarifications are in order. First, the focus of attention is not on circumstances in which political figures have been appointed to administrative posts and acted as a deus ex machina to herd their subordinates in a new direction. These instances are numerous enough (early-Meiji Japan would be one example), but they disprove nothing about the allegedly inherent conservatism of professional, career civil servants. Defenders of the conservative image of bureaucracy need only respond that political appointees, too, will join the conservative ranks as soon as they begin to feel at home in a bureaucratic establishment (Djilas 1957; Michels 1962). How political revolutionaries give birth to bureaucracy is part of this study, but it is equally concerned with how professional bureaucracies give birth to revolution. Second, the argument is not simply that a few disgruntled ideologues may penetrate the examination system and become administrative officials; this is a hollow truism, given the size of today's state bureaucracies. Rather, the subject is institutional behavior, that is, the process by which professional administrators with revolutionary objectives have transformed their bureaus into radical political actors. Third, while the hypothesis that bureaucratic politics may vary with the regime context emerges as a logical supposition from this research, there is also ample reason to believe that the findings may be applicable to other regime configurations; the latter possibility, however, has not been systematically explored. Note that although military regimes supply most of the evidence, this factor does not emasculate the brief against theories of bureaucratic conservatism because these theories virtually never specify the regime context as a conditional variable in their calculations. Finally, there is no contention that state bureaucracies in any context are as likely to foment change as they are to guard the status quo. It is probable that all social institutions, bureaucratic or otherwise, tend to be conservative most of the time. Such may be the general bent of human nature. However, most theories of bureaucratic politics assert that bureaucracy is a special case of institutional conservatism. It is argued that certain distinctive traits of bureaucratic organizations lock them into a conservative mold in a way that is not true of other social institutions. It is this argument that the article challenges by demonstrating that its claims have been disconfirmed in a significant number of cases.

## The Case for Bureaucratic Conservatism

The concept of revolutionary bureaucracy defies many common axioms of empirical theory purporting to prove that bureaucracy induces conservative policy making. The factors thought to discourage innovation begin with recruitment criteria. Recruitment into the higher civil service is said to exclude political nonconformists (Leemans 1976b, 12). Entrance examinations tend to emphasize technical knowledge or a high general level of education rather than political activism, and where political criteria are considered, they are used to weed out those with undesirable affiliations or to confirm that the candidate's ideological commitments resemble those of his or her examiners. Thus, few applicants favoring a sharp departure from existing policy will be admitted. One variation on this theme is that creative people are not attracted to apply for bureaucratic jobs due to recruitment criteria and other conservative aspects of bureaucratic organization (Crozier 1964, 53; LaPiere 1965, 410–12). Another is that recruitment criteria limit successful applicants to the middle and upper classes, which presumably have a stake in defending the status quo (Leemans 1976b, 12; but see Halpern 1963, chap. 4).

A second point is that recruitment criteria and the functional division of labor between bureaucratic offices foster a rational-technical approach to policy problems and a complementary desire to minimize partisan political input into policy making. In the famous phrase of Karl Mannheim, bureaucrats seek "to turn all problems of politics into problems of administration" (1936, 118). The bureaucrat believes that there is one rational "best" solution for each problem and that his or her technical and managerial skills as well as systematic administrative procedures are necessary to identify that solution. Partisan political interference forcing a break with routine in the name of ideology is resisted as an irrational force subversive of effective decision making.

A third factor allegedly promoting conservatism is that the specialization of bureaucratic labors imposes an incremental approach to problem solving and obstructs holistic assessments of system-level crises and reforms (Sharkansky 1971, 269–75). Each office has a limited field of jurisdiction and expertise, giving it but a partial view of the overall policy picture. Bureaucrats are therefore unlikely to advocate major policy shifts that would transcend the competence and jurisdiction of any particular agency. In the words of Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman, the bureaucrat's perspective on policy is often "a mile deep and an inch wide" (1981, 114).

A fourth element cultivating a conservative outlook is said to be the importance of seniority in winning promotion (Strauss 1960, 65–67). No bureaucrat will reach a post of substantial authority until and unless that bureaucrat is thoroughly socialized into established institutional norms. Iconoclastic behavior born of youthful exuberance will have minimal impact. As Robert Merton wrote, "The bureaucrat's official life is planned for him in terms of a graded career, through the organizational devices of promotion by seniority, pensions, incremental salaries, etc., all of which are designed to provide incentives for disciplined action and conformity to the official regulations. The official is tacitly expected to and largely does adapt his thoughts, feelings, and actions to the prospect of this career. But *these very devices* which increase the probability of conformance also lead to an over-concern with strict adherence to regulations which induces timidity, conservatism, and technicism" (1952, 367). Due to the seniority principle, the would-be innovator confronts Anthony Downs's law of increasing conserverism: "In every bureau, there is an inherent pressure upon the vast majority of officials to become conservers in the long run" (1967, 99).

A fifth contention is that bureaucrats are conservative because their official functions are hemmed in by legal strictures and supervision (Leemans 1976a, 89–90). In their review of the literature comparing public- and private-sector organizations, Rainey, Backoff, and Levine found a widespread consensus that "government organizations tend to have their purposes, methods, and spheres of operation defined and constrained by law and legally authorized institutions to a much greater degree [than private organizations]. One effect of these constraints is that public managers have less choice as to entry and withdrawal from various undertakings" (1976, 238). The mechanisms of enforcement are not only internal but also involve accountability to external agencies, such as legislatures, interest groups, the courts, and the press (LaPiere 1965, 405; Roessner 1977, 348).

A sixth trait said to impede innovation is the prevalence of group over individual decision making in bureaucracies. Irving Janis (1982, 174–75) has attributed major bureaucratic blunders to a "groupthink" syndrome that includes the propensity to exclude minority opinions and adverse information that might threaten the preconceptions underlying group consensus. Downs (1967, 180) also notes that a bureaucratic search for new methods to bridge a performance gap is likely to be biased from the outset by the need to achieve consensus behind any new course of action. The room for innovation varies inversely with the number of people who must give their approval. The judgment of William Whyte was even harsher: "People very rarely *think* in groups; they talk together, they exchange information, they adjudicate, they make compromises. But they do not think, they do not create" (1956, 57).

A final impediment to radical policy shifts is the special relationship that frequently develops between bureaucratic agencies and powerful civil interest groups subject to their authority (LaPalombara 1974, 333; Leemans 1976a, 69–71; Lowi 1979, 58–61; Peters 1978, 148–51). These *clientela* connections often find administrators serving as lobbyists for their client groups within the state. Unabrasive and predictable administration requires cooperation from key civil associations, and the bureaucracy's maintenance of close ties with them becomes a vested interest that transforms officials into protectors of the existing social order.

To summarize, the causes of bureaucratic conservatism are said to be (1) recruitment criteria, (2) a rational-technical approach to policy problems, (3) a specialization of functions that leads to incremental policy making, (4) promotion by seniority, (5) legal restraints and accountability, (6) the prevalence of group decision making, and (7) special relationships with powerful interest groups.[1] These arguments are prominent not only in the "new-public-administration" literature of the late 1960s and 1970s but in most standard works on bureaucratic politics. They point to a conclusion that has been restated so many times it has earned the status of a cliché. Michel Crozier, who defined a bureaucratic organization as *"an organization that cannot correct its behavior by learning from its errors"* (1964, 187), found the case for rigidity so persuasive that "one may wonder more about the (very infrequent) innovating decisions than about the reiteration of routinized behavior" (p. 52). Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman declare, "Prudence, practicality, moderation and avoidance of risk are the preferred traits of a civil servant; only a politician could have termed extremism a virtue and moderation a vice" (1981, 12). And Fritz Morstein-Marx wrote, "The merit bureaucracy operates like a brake; it favors a coherent evolution and discourages excessive swings of the pendulum" (1957, 162). It follows that when bold new policy initiatives are in order, bureaucrats will fade into the background, and politicians will come to the fore. As stated by Mattei Dogan, "During crises, exceptional situations, or dramatic circumstances, the power of top civil servants almost disappears, and politicians—parliamentarians, ministers, or charismatic leaders—assume full powers" (1975, 19–20).

The mainstream position on bureaucratic conservatism has not gone unchallenged, but the claims of the dissenters are quite modest in the context of this research. A first counterargument is to attack the excessive occupational determinism of the mainstream position. Modern state bureaucracies comprise a vast complex of institutions. They are not monolithic, and their members are not all cut from the same cloth. "Bureaucrats," Charles Goodsell writes, "don't 'bur' " (1985, 79, 83) but rather engage in very diverse occupations (cf. Waldo 1971, 276). Anthony Downs's (1967, 88-89) description of different bureaucratic types (climbers, conservers, advocates, zealots, statesmen) further underscores the diversity among bureaucratic personnel. A second rejoinder is that the mainstream position is not unambiguously supported by case studies of actual bureaucratic behavior. Both empirical studies of the policy-making process and survey research designed to unearth the attitudes of bureaucrats have sometimes contradicted the conservative image (Blau 1955, chap. 12; Roessner 1977, 354-57; Goodsell 1985, 50-54; Kohn 1971, 465-66). Many canons of the majority view do seem to spring from the abstract logic of organization theory rather than careful empirical testing, and even the logic of bureaucratic career patterns may not be as obvious as it first appears. For example, while some may see the seniority system as logically breeding conformity, others may point to the bureaucrat's job security as (equally logically) facilitating innovation by decreasing the cost of failure (Blau 1955, 188, 199, 208; Kohn 1971, 470; Thompson 1969, 40). Whether either of these propositions is generally valid awaits the systematic gathering of evidence. Finally, many critics have argued that state bureaucracies are no more nor less conservative than businesses in the private sector. Goodsell (1985, 49-50) notes that state agencies face many demands for high performance despite the absence of the market and that private businesses also manifest many traits typical of official bureaucracies (cf. Kohn 1971, 466).

On careful inspection, the critics of the conservative image of bureaucracy do not so much overturn the mainstream position as provide a healthy corrective for some of its more extreme expressions. To expose exaggerated statements of occupational determinism is not yet to demonstrate that bureaucracies may spawn radical changes, and the critics' empirical evidence for bureaucratic innovation rarely transcends technological improvements. For example, Dwight Waldo's (1971, 274) account of bureaucratic innovations refers to new methods of measurement and data storage, and J. David Roessner (1977, 352) gauges bureaucratic innovation by the speed with which bureaucratic agencies adopt new operational procedures and products invented elsewhere. Even Anthony Downs (1967, 110, 204), whose account of how zealots may promote new policies is pertinent to the pages that follow, offers as evidence of bureaucratic innovation only new weapons technology such as guided missiles and Polaris submarines (see Lewis 1980, chaps. 2, 3). Similarities in the performance of the public and private sectors do not really contradict the conservative portrait of bureaucracy but only demonstrate that there may be little to choose between public and private bureaucracies on this score. None of these criticisms explains how or why bureaucratic institutions might move in radical *political* directions or attempts to explain the phenomenon of administrative radicalism in terms of bureaucratic theory.

The remainder of this article examines how innovative bureaucrats in Japan, Peru, and Egypt managed to transcend the various factors allegedly producing conservative administration. Each case study will document briefly the character of the regime's policies and then describe several specific instances in which civilian bureaucrats took the initiative in introducing radical programs. The treatment highlights the use of several organizational devices, common to the three cases, that enabled creative administrators to play a decisive role in policy making.

## The Ways and Means of Administrative Revolution

Three principal organizational tools have been used to break down the barriers to bureaucratic innovation in radical military-bureaucratic regimes. The most important has been the supraministerial agency, which may take the shape of an ad hoc committee or a large, formal institution. Supraministerial agencies have been uniquely effective in enabling administrators to sidestep nearly all the major hindrances to creative policy making. They are also the most easily organized of the various institutional means to innovation because their establishment may require little tampering with existing structures or change in the law. In fact, they have become a ubiquitous feature of state bureaucracies under all forms of political regime, represented in the industrial democracies by such examples as the Dutch Central Plan Bureau, the Belgian Bureau of Economic Planning, and the United States Office of Management and Budget. Supraministerial agencies played a vital political role in the mobilizational military systems of Japan, Peru, and Egypt by assembling radical bureaucrats from all arms of the administration and turning these otherwise isolated elements into an organized, coherent political bloc within the state.

A second instrument of change has been the low-ranking ministry that emerges from obscurity to promote bold, new policies. In any hierarchical system, it is mainly those near the top who have a vested interest in sustaining the hierarchy; those at the bottom may have more to gain by overturning it, and this is demonstrated in the case studies by the experience of several minor ministries.

The third vehicle for innovation has been the new agency established with a formal mandate to develop novel policies in a specific area. Administrative reorganization has become a continual process in most states, and for this reason the policy-making tendencies of bureaucracy cannot be adequately discussed without taking into account the input of new agencies. Bureaus of this type tend to be less politically significant than supraministerial bodies, whose responsibilities are more diffuse, but they nonetheless sponsored many fresh policy departures in all three countries under study.

### Japan

The organizational landscape of Japanese society was largely redrawn during the 1937–45 period. As a result of state action, all labor unions were dissolved in favor of the Industrial Patriotic Society (Gordon 1985, Notar 1985). Political parties gave way before the bureaucratically managed Imperial Rule Assistance Association, whose subdivisions mobilized almost the entire population by age, occupation, and place of residence (Yokusan Undō Shi Kankokai 1954). Women's groups were absorbed by the Great Japan Women's Association (Fujii 1985), and drastic consolidations were effected in every business sector; the number of banks, for example, was cut from 426 in 1938 to 69 in 1945 (Hadley 1970, 118), and textile mills from 271 to 44 (Johnson 1982, 165). Moreover, these changes were not mere expedients in response to war but were considered part of a permanent transition from the dying era of freedom to the nascent epoch of the national-defense state. Considering the size of the country and its level of development, Japan possessed the most powerful military-bureaucratic regime in history, and the radicalization of the bureaucracy was the key to its unprecedented expansion of control over society.

One salient example of a supraministerial agency that initiated structural changes was the Cabinet Information Bureau (CIB), which took charge of state policy toward the mass media. Under its tutelage, Japan's media industries were thoroughly reorganized. The 10 producers of dramatic movies were forcibly reduced to 3; all news-film companies were merged into a single firm under state direction; and some 300 film distributors were fused into a new state-regulated monopoly (Tanaka 1957, 241–84; Uchikawa 1973, 356–65). The CIB took charge of organizing every film program shown in every theatre in Japan. The press underwent similar changes. In 1942, only 64 general daily newspapers remained where there had been nearly 700 six years before, and some 25 thousand magazines were also systematically driven out of business (Uchikawa 1973, 492–97; Ōhara Shakai Mondai Kenkyūjo 1965, 186). By December 1940, the CIB had also asserted complete and direct control over the contents of all radio broadcasts, and thereafter it strove to see that every program, from the news to musical entertainment, would "conform to the purposes of the state" (Uchikawa 1973, 478). How did this institution apparently ensconced in the establishment come to break so cleanly from the conservative mold?

The very interministerial character of the CIB cut through one impediment to innovation, namely, the incrementalism associated with the work of highly specialized offices. As of December 1940, the CIB counted 118 bureaucrats of high rank among 510 full-time employees. Fifty-two of the ranking bureaucrats were permanent CIB officials (most transferred from other agencies), while 24 were on temporary assignment from the Foreign Ministry, 14 from the Home Ministry, 10 each from the army and navy ministries, and eight from the Communications Ministry (*Senzen no Jōhō Kikō Yōran* 1964, 88,187). One reason supraministerial bodies like the CIB are created is to free policy makers from ministerial blinders and to forge programs that cut across normal jurisdictional boundaries.

As for a rational-technical orientation, CIB officials certainly believed in a rational approach to organization and planning (they were not technocrats), and in fact their educational backgrounds differed little from those of other high civil servants. The top officials (e.g., Kiwao Okumura, Yoshio Miyamoto, Ryūzō Kawamo) had graduated from the law faculty of Tokyo Imperial University and passed the difficult higher-civil-service exams, following the usual elite route to an administrative career. They had entered the bureaucracy in the mid-1920s as employees of various established ministries. However, their commitment to rational administration was complemented (indeed, bolstered) by a radical political ideology that borrowed elements from both Marxist and fascist thought. They believed that an important stage of history revolving around democracy and party politics, capitalism and free markets, and individualism and the profit motive was coming to an end. As they saw it, the irrationalities of a competitive society exemplified by class conflict and the Great Depression could only be rectified by a quantum leap in rational, bureaucratic state control (Miyamoto 1942, 12–13, 18–24; Okumura 1938, 34–43, 113–14). Their rational approach to problem solving therefore posed no checks upon radical policy departures.

Ideological convictions along these lines were an important criterion for entry into the bureau almost from its inception. The CIB had started as an informal bureaucratic discussion group in the early 1930s and evolved into a formal committee in 1935 to supervise the state's news agency, whose creation at that time had been one of the group's recommendations

—a significant innovation in itself. The committee was initially of little consequence, but it soon became a haven for bureaucrats of radical inclinations, who were called "renovationist bureaucrats" (*kakushin kanryō*). By the late 1930s, a record of commitment to radical state-control policies was common to the background of many officials joining the bureau. For example, Kiwao Okumura had framed the seminal legislation to control the electric-power industry in 1935 as a Communications Ministry official, enunciating the widely publicized principle of "private ownership/state management," and Ryūzō Kawamo (1936) had praised both the Nazi and Soviet broadcasting systems before enlisting in the CIB. Regardless of conservative recruitment criteria for initial entry into a bureaucratic career, the admissions standards used by the bureau to screen prospective candidates from other agencies involved a novel set of political convictions.

The seniority principle was less operative in the CIB's personnel decisions than it was in the established ministries. In this fairly new organization, there was no upper crust of old hands to block the advancement of younger bureaucrats, and those officials seconded temporarily from other ministries remained on the seniority ladders of their home agencies. Most importantly, the CIB was formally attached to the cabinet, allowing the prime minister to fill the top posts at his discretion; the chief executive did not exercise comparable rights in the more autonomous ministries. Both the civilian Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe and his successor General Hideki Tōjō used this prerogative to staff the bureau with mid-career "renovationists." When Kiwao Okumura took effective charge of the CIB as its vice governor in October 1941, he was but 41 years of age.

The projects advocated by the CIB were delayed or modified on several occasions by the presence of legal barriers. Plans to consolidate publishers, for example, could not be completed until the full cabinet sanctioned this policy in late 1941. However, the bureau's record of making laws was more impressive than its record of obeying them. As the international crisis deepened in the late 1930s, an overloaded policy agenda and the need for speedy decisions saw more and more legislative matters removed from the purview of the parliament and relegated to the realm of administrative decrees. The State Total Mobilization Law of 1938 was a comprehensive enabling act that empowered the executive to regulate the organization, finances, and operations of almost every civil association in Japan. In practice, all but the most critical decisions pursuant to this law were made in bureaucratic offices. The mobilization law was originally drafted and proposed by the Cabinet Planning Board, another supraministerial body whose genealogy and personnel resembled those of the CIB. The planning board was the superagency charged with economic policy. The mobilization law and the Film Law of 1939, another statute replete with enabling clauses, allowed the CIB to execute much of its media-policy revolution through unilateral ordinances that were perfectly legal. Legal restraints were even less of a factor in Peru and Egypt, whose military regimes were launched by means of coups d'état involving a sharper break with the preceding legal systems and the abandonment of meaningful parliamentary institutions altogether.

The CIB also freed bureaucrats of impediments to innovation born of special relationships with interest groups. The CIB did not have long-standing ties with powerful media companies, and this is one reason that the bureau frequently pursued more radical policy goals than the Home Ministry, which exercised traditional jurisdiction over the film industry and the press. For instance, the Home Ministry opposed (on some counts, successfully) the CIB's early plans for consolidating the film industry in order to protect Shōchiku and Tōhō, the two largest producers of dramatic movies.

The Ministry of Commerce and Industry offers an example of the second device used to further innovation, as a relatively weak ministry that quickly changed direction under the military regime. Founded in 1926, the ministry lacked prestige in a country where institutional age is highly prized, and its authority was at first quite limited. Wartime mobilizatiaon offered special opportunities to expand its functions, however, and by 1940 "renovationist bureaucrats" like Nobusuke Kishi dominated the ministry and identified themselves with the more radical schemes to extend state control over society. Their policies caused hundreds of thousands of bankruptcies among small-to-medium-size companies and forced the largest firms into "control associations" (*tōseikai*) through which officials attempted to regulate production priorities, access to raw materials, and many other key managerial decisions (Johnson 1982, 143, 162–65). Although the Ministry of Commerce and Industry had extensive connections with the industrial combines, the prospect of new authority served as an important counterweight, inducing officials to pursue many policies opposed by their clients in civil society. While the supraministerial Cabinet Planning Board designed the broad contours of economic mobilization, the ministry was charged with their implementation. The CIB stood in a similar relationship to the Home Ministry and Communications Ministry, which executed many of that bureau's policy plans. In both cases, considerable movement of personnel between the supraministerial planning agencies and the ministries of implementation helped to mitigate (though not eliminate) friction between them.

Regarding the third tool for change, the Welfare Ministry, founded in 1939, demonstrates how a new agency can serve to produce innovations in a particular policy field. The coming era of the national-defense state was deemed to require a coordinated effort by all economic actors. With few exceptions, previous legislation had not set standards for working conditions, and this resulted in costly labor disputes and poor morale and health among workers. The Welfare Ministry quickly filled the policy vacuum with regulations governing such matters as the payment of allowances for overtime, night work, and family size, and the provision of company facilities for dining, health care, and other services (Gordon 1985, 261–97). These measures were complemented by strict controls over wages and labor mobility, the whole package representing a sharp departure from earlier policy.

The profound impact of Japan's military regime stretches beyond the ravages of the Pacific war into many aspects of postwar Japanese society. The CIB's consolidations fixed a national structure of daily newspapers that largely persists to this day. Wartime economic mobilization set critical precedents for Japan's famous industrial policy of the postwar era, and labor mobilization laid important groundwork for the system of enterprise unions (Nakamura 1981, 18; Ōhara Shakai Mondai Kenkyūjo 1965, 60–61). Despite the regime's premature end in defeat, the legacy of the "renovationist bureaucrats" lingers in these and many other aspects of the social system. Scholars rarely analyze measures of administrative reorganization as major events, but they may be every bit as consequential in a bureaucratically dominated regime as a major shift in the party system of a democracy.

## Peru

The Peruvian government of General Juan Velasco Alvarado has been perhaps the most studied case of revolution from above. Velasco oversaw a rapid expansion of the state sector involving the nationalization of numerous industries, including the telephone and electric utilities, fish-meal production, mining and petroleum extraction and refining, the railroads, airlines, television stations, newspapers, various import and export activities, banking, and insurance (Lowenthal 1975, 7). Employment in the public sector mushroomed from 270 thousand in 1967 to 455 thousand in 1975, and public expenditures rose from 24% to 46% of the gross national product (Cleaves and Scurrah 1980, 72). Even more impressive was the creation or restructuring of popular organizations in many social sectors, especially those aimed at industrial and agricultural workers and urban squatters. Although military officers were prominent in top administrative posts, the armed forces came into power divided as to the question of revolutionary goals (Pilar Tello 1983, 72–83). In the beginning, conservative officers held many key ministerships so that appointments might accord with the military hierarchy and maintain balance between the services. In this circumstance, supraministerial bodies directly under the president played a key role in developing radical policies.

Military officers, career bureaucrats, and civilian outsiders hired into the government all participated in formulating the revolutionary program. While the relative input of each group varied by issue area, one well-documented case that highlights the role of longer-term state administrators was the regime's agrarian reform. The redistribution of land was among the most radical policies during Velasco's tenure, ranking with the Mexican and Cuban land reforms as one of the most comprehensive in Latin American history. Approximately 7.2 million hectares (about 31% of all agricultural land) were turned over to collective enterprises involving some 414 thousand families, and both the large foreign agro-export companies and the Peruvian landed oligarchy were eradicated in the process (Cleaves and Scurrah 1980, 220–21). The results would have been far less dramatic without the intervention of civilian bureaucrats.

The excellent research of Peter Cleaves and Martin Scurrah (1980, 96–110) describes the evolution of agrarian policy in some detail. In November 1968 the minister of agriculture, General José Benavides, organized a small commission within the ministry comprising bureaucrats and a few individuals from the private sector to draft a new agrarian reform law. The minister was not among the more radical officers in the government, and a majority of the commission favored a reform of moderate proportions. Before the ministry's proposal could be presented to the cabinet, however, two radical administrators on the commission took steps to sabotage it. One was Benjamín Samanez, formerly chief of a regional agrarian office under the civilian government of Fernando Belaunde Terry. The other was Guillermo Figallo, who had worked for Belaunde's National Agrarian Council. These men communicated their discontent privately to members of the president's advisory council, Comité de Asesoramiento de la Presidencia (COAP), an agency staffed mainly with radical colonels handpicked by Velasco. COAP permitted the president to accomplish within the army what supraministerial bodies were to achieve within the bureaucracy: the establishment of a radical nucleus. COAP members sympathetic to the dissenters then consulted Eduardo Morán, a bureaucrat employed by the Institute of National Planning, who prepared a statement censuring the proposed reform. When the cabinet met to consider the ministry's recommendations, one COAP officer read Morán's position paper aloud, while another suggested that the matter was too vital to be decided within a single ministry.

The upshot was the creation of a broader supraministerial commission directly under COAP to reconsider the issue. Including Samanez, Figallo, and Morán among its members, this body was stacked in favor of the radicals. Predictably, the second commission's proposal was a more extreme measure. The civilian bureaucrats not only drafted the new law but also composed supplementary notes for the sponsoring ministers, advising them how to respond to questions that might be raised in the cabinet. The puppeteers themselves were ineligible to attend meetings of the all-military Council of Ministers. The new reform generated its own superagency of supervision, the Directorate for the Promotion and Diffusion of the Agrarian Reform. Its first director was Benjamín Samanez. Another member of the COAP commission, Guillermo Figallo, proposed that a new agrarian judiciary be founded to uproot the influence of large landowners over existing rural courts and protect the interests of the peasantry. He subsequently became the first president of a new Agrarian Court System (Cleaves and Scurrah 1980, 154–55). It is noteworthy that COAP's radical commission and the new judicial system, like Japan's CIB, were organized at the behest of civilian bureaucrats themselves and did not simply materialize as impositions from above.

The agrarian reform was just one example of how a combination of supraministerial bodies and new specialized bureaucracies enabled administrators to take the initiative in radicalizing the regime. The government's unconventional policies toward Peru's urban squatters (estimated at more than 760 thousand in Lima alone) illustrated the same phenomenon (Stepan 1978, 160). A small commission formed directly under the president authored a report leading to the formation of a new-towns development office, Oficina Nacional de Desarrollo de los Pueblos Jóvenes (ONDEPJOV) (Stepan 1978, 162). This was a supraministerial agency to orchestrate the activities of all government organs operating in the urban slums, and like Japan's cabinet planning bodies it was directly responsible to the prime minister (Dietz 1980, 144). At the same time, a new Ministry of Housing was launched to serve as ONDEPJOV's principal tool of implementation. The result was an unprecedented effort to organize the squatters and extend them land titles and basic public services. In this case, the original presidential commission was dominated by nongovernmental personnel (Collier 1976, 98–99), which renders this instance less damaging to the theory of bureaucratic conservatism than COAP's commission for agrarian reform. The ensuing steps of administrative reorganization, however, were very similar.

In 1972, a grand attempt was made to integrate the various planning agencies operating in high priority sectors of popular mobilization into a single superagency of superagencies, Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social (SINAMOS). Like the agrarian reform and many other radical programs, the blueprint for SINAMOS was developed by a COAP task force with significant bureaucratic participatiaon (Lowenthal 1975, 38). At the highest level, SINAMOS was led by some of the most radical military and civilian administrators serving the regime (e.g., General Leonidas Rodriguez Figueroa and Carlos Delgado Olivera), and it answered directly to President Velasco (Pilar Tello 1983, 92). The agencies promoting the agrarian reform and the betterment of the squatters were among eight key institutions incorporated into SINAMOS, and its establishment led to even more radical policies on several fronts. However, the effort to create a radical supraministerial body on this scale was not an unqualified success. Most of the agencies incorporated into SINAMOS were longstanding subdivisions of established ministries, not creatures of the military regime, and their personnel often brought with them the conservative habits of their former institutions (Delgado Olivera 1973, 256-61). According to Carlos Delgado Olivera, "The problem here was the following: how to structure, on the basis of personnel from typically conservative organisms, an institution of revolutionary objectives" (1973, 260). The mere relocation of conservative organs in SINAMOS did not suffice to resolve this problem, and strenuous efforts were made to restructure the offices in question and retrain their employees. Nonetheless, SINAMOS often suffered from internal dissension. Unlike the other supraministerial bodies discussed above, SINAMOS was also very large, employing some five thousand officials. Its size alone diluted the degree of political selectivity in appointing its personnel. Size was also a handicap in that SINAMOS was not just a planning body but possessed the resources to involve itself in policy implementation, and it thereby threatened the regular bureaucracy more than a simple supervisory agency like ONDEPJOV, which left execution entirely to the ministries. The smaller the size of a radical supraministerial agency, the greater may be its internal cohesion, and the less opposition it will provoke by encroaching upon the budgets and bailiwicks of the established ministries.

The phenomenon of a weak government agency adopting a radical stance and consequently expanding its influence was represented in Peru by the Institute for National Planning (INP). The institute had been installed by an earlier military government in 1962, but it had been neglected during the presidency of Fernando Belaunde (1963-68). The new military regime offered the agency a fresh chance to grow, and it rapidly increased its size, budget, and authority by promoting innovative policies. Adopting novel interpretations, rooted in dependency theory, of Peru's underdevelopment, the planning institute acquired new authority to prioritize development projects and to control the sectoral budgets and investments of many government institutions (Dietz 1980, 11; Cleaves and Scurrah 1980, 71-73). Although the officials of the INP were known to have a strong technocratic background, this did not immunize them against the appeal of radical programs. Indeed, the regime's openness to change offered them the best opportunity they had ever had to plan and organize their country's development. Abraham Lowenthal wrote of the influence of technocrats in the regime: "the best-trained and most self-confident *técnicos* have tended to recommend that the reforms be carried further. The Planning Institute's impact, especially, has been to define the regime's approach in more comprehensive terms, to push for eliminating policy inconsistencies by generalizing the more radical of conflicting approaches. The regime has found itself both pushed and pulled to *profundizar la revolución*" (1975, 40).

It would be an error to portray the motives of the INP's reformers as somehow purely technocratic in the sense of being unrelated to politics. Certainly not all bureaucratic innovations are politically motivated; but policy decisions that cause a major shift of resources and power in the social system are at least partly political by their very nature. Such decisions impose a solution on a grand scale to the fundamental political problem of who gets *what, when,* and *how,* and they cannot be made without some determination regarding the basic values of justice and equality. The technocratic and the political cannot be neatly separated at this level of policy making. Nor should one imagine that innovative bureaucrats necessarily pretend to themselves that their actions are purely technocratic in character. The same universities that provide future bureaucrats with their training in engineering or law are also frequently hotbeds of political radicalism. Some of Peru's *técnicos* had been student leaders as young men (Lowenthal 1975, 34), and a common denominator among Japan's renovationist bureaucrats was their exposure to Marxist ideas on university campuses in the 1920s (Hashikawa 1965, 264–65). Happily for the officials of the INP, their radical proclivities dovetailed nicely with their career interests under the military regime, earning them more consequential posts than those granted to their more conservative peers. Some were even shifted to other agencies to bring them into step with the regime's revolutionary line; for example, Eduardo Morán was moved to the Ministry of Agriculture after his efforts to promote the agrarian reform, and Carlos Delgado was transferred to the same ministry and then into SIMANOS.

Defenders of the conservative portrait of bureaucracy might dig in their heels at this juncture and counter that there is no proof a *majority* of bureaucrats in these cases took on radical colors. However, because bureaucracies are undemocratic and do not operate by majority vote, this is quite beside the point. To say that most bureaucrats are conservative most of the time is not really saying very much, since this is true of people in virtually all occupations. Bureaucracy, "that gigantic power started up by midgets" as Balzac called it, should not be of interest to political science primarily for the majority opinions of the midgets. The gigantic power in question is the power of institutions. If theories of bureaucratic conservatism have something serious to say, it is not simply that most bureaucrats are normally conservative, but that bureaucratic institutions must behave conservatively due to their inherent characteristics. What is demonstrated in the records of Japan, Peru, and Egypt is that radical minorities of administrators can redirect the institutional power of the bureaucracy, and they have done so by means of organizational devices so commonplace that hardly a government in the world has failed to make use of them.

### Egypt

The governments of Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser introduced a broad range of radical policies in Egypt, especially in the early-to-mid-1960s following the declaration of Arab socialism. Sweeping measures of nationalization imposed state ownership and management of all banking, insurance, foreign trade, shipping, heavy industries, airlines, public utilities, and newspapers, as well as control over department stores, hotels, flour mills, tanneries, construction companies, and other significant manufacturing enterprises (Waterbury 1983, 73–76). Combined with limits on privately held stock in most industrial concerns (Dekmejian 1971, 125), these steps effectively eliminated the class of private capitalists hitherto dominant in the Egyptian economy. Several land reforms accomplished the same task vis-à-vis the country's dominant rural class of large landowners. By 1965, the government had made available through expropriations and land reclamation over 1.2 million acres (approximately 20% of all cultivable land) for distribution to landless peasants, benefitting over three hundred thousand families (Stephens 1971, 365). Iliya Harik has characterized this reform as "the most striking turnover in landholding in the history of private property in Egypt" (1974, 36). Furthermore, the conditions of the peasantry as a whole were improved by policies regulating the status of tenants, agricultural rents, and irrigation, and by the organization of cooperatives providing a wide array of new services (Harik 1974, 37–38). As in Japan and Peru, Egypt's political parties gave way before the regime's own administered mass organizations (successively, the Liberation Rally, the National Union, and the Arab Socialist Union), and important interest groups such as labor unions and student associations were reorganized into bodies enjoying little spontaneity or autonomy thanks to firm bureaucratic control (Ayubi 1980, 451–56; Binder 1966; Harik 1973).

Egypt's socialist transformation was accompanied by a remarkable increase in the size and complexity of the state. Whereas the Peruvian military had raised the number of ministries from 11 to 17, their number doubled in Egypt (from 15 to 30) during Nasser's rule. Even these figures underestimate the proliferation of new organizational units in the public sector, which grew from several dozen in 1952 to about 600 (excluding village councils) in 1969 (Ayubi 1980, 239). The numbers alone conceal from view a constant process of redistributing functions and reorganizing existing agencies. The state administration expanded from approximately 350 thousand officials in 1952 to 1.2 million in 1970, not counting the personnel of some 370 public companies, the armed forces, and other public-sector organizations outside of the civil service proper (Ayubi 1980, 243). The Egyptian bureaucracy suffers the immense disadvantage of a legal requirement that it must hire all university graduates seeking employment, a guarantee that the administration will absorb countless unfit candidates and inflate perpetually, regardless of its objective needs. The tales of incompetence and corruption that inevitably flow from this circumstance are legion (Ayubi 1980, 280–87; Baker 1978, 70–72; Waterbury 1983, 347–49). Nasser sought to transform the Egyptian bureaucracy in two fundamental ways: the first was to downgrade traditional bureaucrats schooled in the liberal arts and the law and substitute for them a technocratic administration led by engineers; the second was to turn the new technocracy to bold tasks of economic and political development. The means by which he aimed to achieve these ends closely resembled those employed by his counterparts in Japan and Peru.

The history of planning agencies in Nasser's Egypt exemplifies the use of supraministerial bodies to foster new programs. The first of these was the Permanent Council for the Development of National Production (PCDNP) organized in October 1952, which assembled technocrats from several ministries and the private sector (Ayubi 1980, 227). Most of the regime's early policy initiatives germinated within the council, including the first agrarian reform, the High Dam and Kima fertilizer plant at Aswan, and the Helwan Iron and Steel Complex (Waterbury 1983, 60–61). In the realm of development policy, the PCDNP occupied a position in relation to the Revolutionary Command Council similar to that of COAP to Peru's Council of Ministers, representing forces for change at a time when the supreme executive body was divided among officers of various political tendencies. Unlike COAP, however, the PCDNP was dominated by civilians. While symbolizing Nasser's intent to elevate technocratic personnel in the bureaucracy, the PCDNP also redirected thinking about the state's overall role in society by pioneering economic planning in Egypt and by expanding the public sector through the acquisition of state shares in its developmental projects; it thus involved itself in decisions that were not simply technical but political in kind.

Various supraministerial planning organs served Nasser throughout his 18-year rule, appearing and disappearing unpredictably in a continual process of administrative reorganization that became a trademark of the regime. For starters, the PCDNP was complemented by a High Agency for Planning and Coordination in 1952 to supervise the development of public services. The latter was succeeded the following year by the Permanent Council for General Services. Then in 1955 a National Planning Committee was established that in 1957 absorbed both the general services council and the PCDNP. In the same year, however, the National Planning Committee was split into a supervisory High Council for National Planning and an organ to elaborate the details of its designs that retained the name *National Planning Committee.* There followed an independent Institute for National Planning in 1960, and finally a full-fledged Ministry of Planning in 1961, which was reorganized under the baton of the prime minister in 1964 (Abdel-Malek 1968, 109–10; Ayubi 1980, 226–31). And so it went. Clearly, one way to disengage bureaucratic agencies from conservative habits is to prevent the formation of habits altogether.

Needless to say, not all of these measures of restructuring were of equal moment, but occasionally they marked major turning points in government policy. Such was the establishment of the Ministry of Industry in 1956. 'Aziz Sidqi, the career bureaucrat who became the first head of the new ministry, was still in his thirties at the time of his appointment, illustrating once again how administrative reorganization can blunt the seniority principle. Holding a Ph.D. in regional planning from Harvard University, Sidqi had a solidly technocratic background, but this in no way dampened his enthusiasm for innovation (Baker 1978, 178). Sidqi supervised the drafting of Egypt's first five-year development plan, and to oversee its implementation, his ministry was given the power to license the establishment, expansion, or relocation of all industrial enterprises (Waterbury 1983, 70–71). As a young agency, the Ministry of Industry was not inhibited by close ties to private companies, and its policies often reflected an antagonistic attitude toward the private sector.

In the early 1960s, Sidqi was reportedly Nasser's closest collaborator in formulating the socialist decrees that brought most of Egyptian industry under state control, and he made certain that the Ministry of Industry benefited handsomely from the nationalizations (Waterbury 1983, 69–71, 77–80). Some 438 of the public companies to emerge in 1961 from various acts of expropriation were divided among 39 enterprise associations according to economic sector. These associations (*al-mu'assasa al-'amma,* variously translated as "general organizations" or "public organizations") were a new form of state institution standing midway between the regular ministries above and the public enterprises below. Each association exercised legal powers over its member companies, and it in turn was beholden to the legal authority of the ministry charged with its supervision. The Ministry of Industry initially controlled eight of the associations, covering such sectors as foodstuffs, petroleum, electric power, metallurgy, and chemicals and enveloping a total of 168 different companies (Ayubi 1980, 221–25, 236; Waterbury 1983, 80). These administered enterprise associations had their counterparts in Japan's control associations, which differed only by leaving most of the member companies under private ownership.

The Egyptian nationalizations, like the innovative policies pursued by bureaucrats in Japan and Peru, demonstrate how three different interests can harmonize together to produce radical bureaucratic action: (1) a political interest—in this case, a commitment to socialism involving at least the conviction that private capital and the free market did not work for the public good; (2) a rational-technical interest—the desire to plan the nation's developmental course rationally; and (3) an organizational interest—the aim of expanding the size, budget, and authority of one's bureau. Rational-technical inclinations and organizational concerns, so often thought to breed conservatism, proved to be completely supportive of a new political tendency in the three cases.

Nasser created numerous other agencies that labored to promote an innovative technocratic orientation or novel political commitments. One was the Ministry of National Guidance (renamed several times), which took over the supervision of Egypt's nationalized newspapers (Harik 1974, 131; Rugh 1979, 37–38). Another was the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, organized to take forthright action in a policy field thought to be hampered by the foot-dragging of established agencies. Like so many radical bureaus serving the three military regimes, this one was placed directly under the president and operated independently of any external bureaucratic authority (Harik 1974, 249–50). The Suez Canal and the High Dam at Aswan were also administered by new agencies that enjoyed a special autonomy. In these cases, the innovation desired was efficient management rather than any change of a political nature (the former perhaps more difficult to achieve in the Egyptian context than the latter), and the new bodies were staffed with officials educated in engineering and other technocratic fields. The results were two of the most competently managed organs of the Egyptian government (Ayubi 1980, 273–80). As a rule, however, the agencies engaged in policy innovation in the three countries functioned neither more nor less efficiently than their bureaucracies as a whole.

The creation of new agencies did not usually involve the hiring of new bureaucrats. Although some top administrators were appointed from outside the government in Peru, new agencies in all three countries were generally staffed with bureaucrats already employed by other state institutions; in terms of personnel, the same deck of cards was being reshuffled to produce a new hand. Rather than serving as an entry point for outsiders, new agencies more often performed as channels through which ambitious career administrators could gain entry into the political elite. In Egypt, both the first minister of industry, 'Aziz Sidqi, and the first head of the High Dam authority, the engineer Sidqi Sulaiman, subsequently rose to the prime ministership, and more than half of the 186 cabinet ministers to serve between 1952 and 1973 had labored in the civil bureaucracy (Putnam 1976, 50). There were many examples in Japan and Peru as well of administrators gaining posts of national prominence due to their roles in innovative agencies.

For a military elite with radical objectives, an alliance with civilian bureaucrats is not a marriage of convenience; it is a marriage of necessity. The officer corps itself is simply unequipped to plan and implement major new programs. In 1961, Egyptian bureaucrats with a military education numbered only three of the 210 top administrators in the Ministry of the High Dam, one of 110 in the Ministry of Planning, four of 262 in the Ministry of Culture and National Guidance, and none of the 88 in the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. In 1967, only 370 (2%) of the government's 17,828 top administrators had military backgrounds (Ayubi 1980, 348, 350). In Peru, where military officers were more numerous in bureaucratic posts than in Egypt or Japan, only about four hundred of the five thousand members of the officer corps held policy-making posts in the civilian administration. Of the 450 thousand employees in the public sector as a whole, less than one-tenth of 1% were soldiers (Cleaves and Scurrah 1980, 84). In all three countries, the military played the critical role of establishing a regime supportive of change, and military officers supplied the impetus for many radical programs, but the civilian bureaucracy was not simply a passive tool following orders. Civilian bureaucrats themselves sponsored some of the boldest innovations, and thanks to various forms of administrative reorganization, they fully earned the status of equal partners in the task of revolution from above.

## Conclusion

The argument for inherent bureaucratic conservatism is that characteristic administrative structures and career patterns effectively block sharp policy innovations. This argument is contradicted by the record of civilian bureaucratic institutions in Japan, Peru, and Egypt, where bureaus manned by professional career administrators actively instigated radical innovations in public policy. Moreover, these innovations resulted from incentives and measures of reorganization that are found in most modern state bureaucracies and that systematically thwarted the elements commonly alleged to foster conservatism.

Regarding recruitment practices, although conservative standards often prevail for initial entry into the bureaucracy, the creation of supraministerial agencies and new specialized ministries (often on the advice of bureaucrats themselves) allowed for a more selective grouping of officials anxious to promote innovation. The notion that group decision making breeds conformity to existing policies obviously does not apply where entry into the group in question depends upon a prior commitment to change; in that circumstance, group pressures to conform work in favor of innovation. The seniority principle was easily violated by new agencies and those directly under executive authority, which offered rapid advancement to officials in midcareer without regard for an established hierarchy. As for deep-rooted ties to client groups in civil society that might have slowed bureaucratic innovation, such ties had not yet developed in most of the new agencies and younger ministries that championed policy change. Rational-technical concerns did not prove incompatible with the adoption of radical political ideologies by many key administrators; indeed, it is ironic that rational-technical training should be thought to exclude a broader preoccupation with political values when so many contemporary ideologies call for a planned, organized, and technologically sophisticated transformation of society. The incremental approach to problem solving, said to blind specialized bureaucrats to the consideration of systemic reforms, was no hindrance to supraministerial agencies given broad policy-making responsibilities and drawing their officials from many different fields of specialization. Finally, legal restraints upon bureaucratic action did not pose severe obstacles to change in situations where executive and administrative decrees were either the principal (Japan) or the only (Peru, Egypt) sources of law itself. Respect for internal regulations may even improve the prospects for innovative agencies by allowing radical administrators at the top to control the actions of more conservative subordinates (Blau 1955, 189-91; Crozier 1964, 202-3).

These findings cannot be passed off as anecdotal because the institutional devices that generated new programs in Japan, Peru, and Egypt—supraministerial planning organs, low-ranking agencies, and new specialized ministries—are regular features of state bureaucracies throughout the world. In fact, they have been used to further innovation by all types of political regimes. Examples in a democratic context would include the way that President Richard Nixon's National Security Council changed the basis of U.S. foreign policy (Kissinger 1979, 23-24, 38-48), and the role of the Commissariat du plan in developing France's postwar industrial policy (Shonfield 1969, 128-30). Franklin Roosevelt's record as a progenitor of new bureaus, launching 195 federal agencies during the New Deal (Strauss 1960, 57), almost rivals that of Nasser. The same devices have also served mobilizational single-party regimes. Examples are the State Planning Committee (*Gosplan*) in the Soviet Union and the Ministry of Propaganda and Reich Chambers of Culture in Nazi Germany, which served as models for Japan's Cabinet Information Bureau. A broader review of bureaucratic systems, rather than showing these cases to be eccentric, would reveal yet other mechanisms capable of unlocking the shackles of conservatism. Ministerial cabinets, for example, also recruit without deference to seniority and can assemble a select crew of administrators devoted to a particular course of change. A supraministerial bureaucratic stratum, such as France's Grands Corps, may have the same potential to promote change as the supraministerial agencies studied above (Crozier 1964, 197–98, 254–55). The cases examined in this article furnish extreme examples of innovation, to be sure, but while the degree of innovation was extraordinary, the means by which innovation was accomplished are simply too familiar to interpret these cases as rarities that somehow confirm the general validity of the conservative argument.

The article points to two general conclusions. The first is that the attempt to formulate a grand theory of bureaucratic politics per se is premature, given our limited knowledge of the subject and its complexity; research might proceed more profitably toward middle-range explanations of how a limited number of bureaucracies of a certain description have functioned. The second conclusion is that theorizing about bureaucracy at any level may be an enterprise fraught with intrinsic limitations.

The experience of administrative radicalism in Japan, Peru, and Egypt points to several promising grounds for middle theories of bureaucratic politics. One approach would be to examine bureaucratic behavior in different political regimes. Although there has been interesting research on this topic (Caiden 1971, chap. 11; Esman 1966; Fainsod 1963; Heady 1966, chap. 6), the literature on bureaucratic conservatism does not address the significance of regime differences, an obvious deficiency in light of these findings. There is reason to hypothesize that the role of bureaucracies may differ depending upon whether the dominant political elite is the military, a democratic party, or some form of authoritarian party (not to imply that the regime context could be examined without more careful specification). Different ruling elites bring different resources to the task of policy making, and this may leave them more or less dependent upon the bureaucracy and more or less inclined to use it in certain ways.

A second basis for middle theory would be to focus on bureaucracies in particular regions or political cultures (see Crozier 1964, 210–12). Cultural differences do not pose insurmountable obstacles to comparison, but an Achilles' heel of the conservative stereotype has been its relative emphasis on evidence from the Western industrial democracies. Greater attention by theorists to studies of administration in other regions might bring to light more divergent patterns based upon the role of bureaucracy in traditional society, the colonial bureaucratic legacy, or common popular attitudes toward bureaucracy. Any of these factors might affect the likelihood of innovative policy making. In Japan, for example, the traditional legitimacy and prestige associated with bureaucratic governance has emboldened administrators to advocate new programs in many periods of this century. Arguably, innovative bureaucrats are more often blocked by conservative politicians in Japan than the other way around. Bureaucrats might be less inclined to take such initiatives in Latin America, however, where administrative action is not accorded the same legitimacy and respect.

A third basis for middle theory would be to examine bureaucratic behavior in times of crisis. Crozier (1964, 196–98, 225–26) and Leemans (1976b, 16–17) both note the important connection between crises and bureaucratic innovation, but most evidence for administrative conservatism from Europe and the United States (including that of Crozier) is taken from a postwar era of unusual stability, when all Western elites, bureaucratic or otherwise, have largely shunned radical change. Data from this setting cannot sustain universal propositions regarding conservative policy making. Comparative studies of how bureaucracies have responded to severe depressions, domestic violence, or foreign wars might point to different conclusions. These, after all, are the events that tend to provoke innovative responses from all segments of society, and bureaucrats should be no exception. If Blau's (1955) study of a New Deal agency is any indication, Western bureaucrats of the crisis-ridden 1930s were much more imaginative than their descendants are portrayed today.

A final ground for middle theory would be to link theoretical statements to particular forms of bureaucratic organization. The traits that distinguish bureaucracy from other types of social organization are not sufficient to press institutional action into a single mold or to impose the same behavioral pattern on all administrators. In practice, bureaucratic organization is not a generic entity but allows of many variations, and they do not all provide the same incentives and disincentives with respect to innovative policy making. Theoreticians sometimes assume that bureaucratic structures are sufficiently alike to be described by a single list of tendencies, but studies focused on supraministerial agencies or younger ministries might produce results different from those aimed at other forms of bureaucratic organization.

The second conclusion is that all explanations of how organizational structures affect institutional or individual behavior face certain limitations, regardless of the theoretical level of abstraction. No institutional setting offers a definitive explanation for the human behavior that occurs within it, and this is certainly true regarding bureaucracy. Bureaucratic policy making is strongly influenced by external factors such as historical circumstances, cultural values, and the impact of other social institutions. Organizational structures themselves contain a complex potpourri of stimuli that can sway individual behavior and collective action in contradictory ways. As important as it is to understand the impact of these structures, structures alone merely offer opportunities for social action. At every step, the decisions made by human beings as to how they will use those opportunities are critical to the policy-making process, and these decisions are made in large part free of structural determination. Supraministerial agencies may offer different opportunities and incentives to administrators than established ministries, but they are no more a guarantee of innovative policy making than an ordinary ministry is of conservatism. Events in Japan, Peru, and Egypt underscore the crucial role played by the individuals who create and manage these structures. Without an appreciation for the subjective input of men like Kiwao Okumura, Benjamín Samanez, and 'Aziz Sidqi, the action of bureaucratic institutions in these countries is rendered incomprehensible.

In a word, theories of bureaucratic politics must complement structural and occupational variables with a keen appreciation for the role of bureaucratic leadership (Lewis 1980). Too often the significance of individuals is lost in structural studies that reduce the human subject to a function of his or her occupation or institutional environment, many making no mention of bureaucrats with proper names. When taken to extremes, occupational and structural explanations dehumanize social actors, and they thereby impoverish our understanding of social action, rather than enhance it. As long as the people running state bureaucracies remain all too human, even the best efforts to gauge the effect of organizational structures on public policy will fail to explain many important episodes in the history of bureaucratic politics.

## Notes

This research was generously funded by the Northeast Asia Council of the Association for Asian Studies and by the Office for Research and Graduate Development at Indiana University, Bloomington. I wish to thank Alfred Diamant and Iliya Harik for their comments and suggestions.

1. Another prominent contention is that bureaucratic conservatism is reinforced by the absence of market competition, which many economists consider a vital stimulus to innovation (Roessner 1977, 344-45; Rainey, Backoff, and Levine 1976, 235). This argument is omitted here because the radical changes discussed in the country studies below are not the sort of innovations likely to be stimulated by market competition in any case; therefore they are not relevant to consideration of this variable.

## References

Abdel-Malek, Anouar. 1968. *Egypt: Military Society.* Trans. Charles Lam Markmann. New York: Random House.

Aberbach, Joel D., Robert D. Putnam, and Bert A. Rockman. 1981. *Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Ayubi, Nazih N. M. 1980. *Bureaucracy and Politics in Contemporary Egypt.* London: Ithaca.

Baker, Raymond William. 1978. *Egypt's Uncertain Revolution under Nasser and Sadat.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Binder, Leonard. 1966. Political Recruitment and Participation in Egypt. In *Political Parties and Political Development,* ed. Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Blau, Peter M. 1955. *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy: A Study of Interpersonal Relations in Two Government Agencies.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Caiden, Gerald E. 1971. *The Dynamics of Public Administration: Guidelines to Current Transformations in Theory and Practice.* New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.

Cleaves, Peter S., and Martin J. Scurrah. 1980. *Agriculture, Bureaucracy, and Military Government in Peru.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Collier, David. 1976. *Squatters and Oligarchs: Authoritarian Rule and Policy Change in Peru.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Crozier, Michel. 1964. *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Dekmejian, R. Hrair. 1971. *Egypt under Nasir: A Study in Political Dynamics.* Albany: State University of New York Press.

Delgado Olivera, Carlos. 1973. *Testimonio de lucha* [Testimony of struggle]. Lima: Ediciones PEISA.

Dietz, Henry A. 1980. *Poverty and Problem-Solving under Military Rule: The Urban Poor in Lima, Peru.* Austin: University of Texas Press.

Djilas, Milovan. 1957. *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System.* New York: Praeger.

Dogan, Mattei. 1975. Introduction to *The Mandarins of Western Europe,* ed. author. New York: Sage.

Downs, Anthony. 1967. *Inside Bureaucracy.* Boston: Little, Brown.

Einaudi, Luigi. 1976. Revolution from Within? Military Rule in Peru Since 1968. In *Peruvian Nationalism: A Corporatist Revolution,* ed. David Chaplin. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.

Esman, Milton J. 1966. The Politics of Development Administration. In *Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration, and Change,* ed. John D. Montgomery and William J. Siffin. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Fainsod, Merle. 1963. Bureaucracy and Modernization: The Russian and Soviet Case. In *Bureaucracy and Political Development,* ed. Joseph LaPalombara. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Feit, Edward. 1973. *The Armed Bureaucrats: Military-Administrative Regimes and Political Development.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Fujii, Tadatoshi. 1985. *Kokubō Fujinkai* [The national defense women's association]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.

Goodsell, Charles T. 1985. *The Case for Bureaucracy: A Public Administration Polemic.* 2d ed. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.

Gordon, Andrew. 1985. *The Evolution of Labor Relations in Japan: Heavy Industry, 1853-1955.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Hadley, Eleanor M. 1970. *Antitrust in Japan.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Halpern, Manfred. 1963. *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa.*

Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Harik, Iliya. 1973. The Single Party as a Subordinate Movement: The Case of Egypt. *World Politics* 26:80–105.

Harik, Iliya. 1974. *The Political Mobilization of Peasants: A Study of an Egyptian Community.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Hashikawa, Bunzō. 1965. Kakushin kanryō. In *Kenryoko no shisō* [The idea of power], ed. Jirō Kamishima. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō.

Heady, Ferrel. 1966. *Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective.* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Janis, Irving L. 1982. *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes.* 2d ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Johnson, Chalmers. 1982. *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Kawamo, Ryūzō. 1936. Hōsō jigyō no kantoku hōshin ni tsuite [Concerning plans for the management of the broadcasting business]. *Denmu kenkyū shiryō* 7:41–47.

Kissinger, Henry. 1979. *White House Years.* Boston: Little, Brown.

Kohn, Melvin L. 1971. Bureaucratic Man: A Portrait and an Interpretation. *American Sociological Review* 36:461–74.

LaPalombara, Joseph. 1974. *Politics within Nations.* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

LePiere, Richard T. 1965. *Social Change.* New York: McGraw-Hill.

Leemans, Arne F. 1976a. A Conceptual Framework for the Study of Reform of Central Government. In *The Management of Change in Government,* ed. author. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Leemans, Arne F. 1976b. Overview. In *The Management of Change in Government,* ed. author. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Lewis, Eugene. 1980. *Public Entrepreneurship: Toward a Theory of Bureaucratic Political Power.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Lowenthal, Abraham F. 1975. Peru's Ambiguous Revolution. In *The Peruvian Experiment: Continuity and Change under Military Rule,* ed. author. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lowi, Theodore J. 1979. *The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States.* 2d ed. New York: W. W. Norton.

Mannheim, Karl. 1936. *Ideology and Utopia.* New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World.

Merton, Robert K. 1952. Bureaucratic Structure and Personality. In *Reader in Bureaucracy,* ed. author, Ailsa P. Gray, Barbara Hockey, and Hanan C. Selvin. New York: Free Press.

Michels, Robert. 1962. *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy.* New York: Free Press.

Miyamoto, Yoshio. 1942. *Hōsō to kokubō kokka* [Broadcasting and the national defense state]. Tokyo: Nihon Hōsō Shuppan Kyōkai.

Morstein-Marx, Fritz. 1957. *The Administrative State: An Introduction to Bureaucracy.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Nakamura, Takafusa. 1981. *The Postwar Japanese Economy: Its Development and Structure.* Trans. Jacqueline Kaminski. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.

Nordlinger, Eric A. 1977. *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments.* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Notar, Ernest J. 1985. Japan's Wartime Labor Policy: A Search for a Method. *Journal of Asian Studies* 44:311–28.

Ōhara Shakai Mondai Kenkyūjo. 1965. *Taiheiyō sensōka no rōdō undō* [The labor movement during the Pacific war]. Tokyo: Rōdō Junpōsha.

Okumura, Kiwao. 1938. *Nihon seiji no kakushin* [The renovation of Japanese politics]. Tokyo: Ikuseisha.

Peters, B. Guy. 1978. *The Politics of Bureaucracy: A Comparative Perspective.* New York: Longman.

Pilar Tello, María del. 1983. *Golpe o Revolución? Hablan los Militares del 68* [Coup or revolution] The military officers of 1968 speak]. Vol. 2. Lima: Ediciones SAGSA.

Putnam, Robert D. 1976. *The Comparative Study of Political Elites.* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Rainey, Hal G., Robert W. Backoff, and Charles H. Levine. 1976. Comparing Public and Private Organizations. *Public Administration Review* 36:233–44.

Roessner, J. David. 1977. Incentives to Innovate in Public and Private Organizations. *Administration and Society* 9:341–65.

Rugh, William A. 1979. *The Arab Press: News Media and Political Process in the Arab World.* Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

*Senzen no jōhō kikō yōran* [Survey of the prewar structure of information]. 1964.

Sharkansky, Ira. 1971. Constraints on Innovation in Policy Making: Economic Development and Political Routines. In *Toward a New Public Administration: The Minnowbrook Perspective,* ed. Frank Marini. Scranton, PA: Chandler.

Shonfield, Andrew. 1969. *Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power.* London: Oxford University Press.

Stepan, Alfred. 1978. *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Stephens, Robert. 1971. *Nasser: A Political Biography.* New York: Simon and Schuster.

Strauss, Eric. 1960. *The Ruling Servants: Bureaucracy in Russia, France—and Britain?* New York: Praeger.

Tanaka, Jun'ichirō. 1957. *Nihon eiga hattatsu shi* [The history of Japanese films]. Vol. 2. Tokyo:

Chūō Kōron-sha.
Thompson, Victor A. 1969. *Bureaucracy and Innovation.* University, AL: University of Alabama Press.
Trimberger, Ellen Kay. 1978. *Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru.* New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.
Uchikawa, Yoshimi, ed. 1973. *Masu media tōsei* [Mass media controls]. Vol. 2. Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō.
Waldo, Dwight. 1971. Some Thoughts on Alternatives, Dilemmas, and Paradoxes in a Time of Turbulence. In *Public Administration in a Time of Turbulence,* ed. author. Scranton, PA Chandler.
Waterbury, John. 1983. *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Whyte, William H., Jr. 1956. *The Organization Man.* Garden City: Doubleday.
Yokusan Undō Shi Kankokai. 1954. *Yokusan kokumin undō shi* [History of the national assistance movement]. Tokyo: Kaimeidō.

---

Gregory J. Kasza is Assistant Professor of East Asian Languages and Cultures and Adjunct Assistant Professor of Political Science, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405.

# STACKING THE DECK: BUREAUCRATIC MISSIONS AND POLICY DESIGN

JONATHAN BENDOR
*Stanford University*
SERGE TAYLOR
*Carnegie-Mellon University*
ROLAND VAN GAALEN
*Stanford University*

*Empirical studies suggest that mission-oriented bureaucrats bias their design of program alternatives to increase the odds that a superior will choose the kind of program the officials want. However, political executives may anticipate this manipulation and try to reassert control. These struggles are examined in three models. In Model 1 a senior bureaucrat is interested only in missions; the bureaucrat's political superior controls him or her by rejecting inferior proposals and entertaining new options from other policy specialists. Model 2 is a principal-agent analysis. Here the official is interested only in budgets; the official's superior reduces search bias by creating an ex ante incentive scheme. In Model 3 the bureaucrat cares about both budgets and programs; the superior uses both his or her final review authority and ex ante incentives to reduce agenda manipulation. The models' contrasting implications for the political control of bureaucracy are examined.*

The air force is dominated by bomber pilots. The corps of engineers is dominated by civil engineers. The navy is dominated by carrier admirals. These agencies tend to develop a sense of mission, an orientation toward a particular means as well as particular ends (Halperin 1974). Indeed, devotion to the means can overwhelm an agency's attachment to the ends: "To say there is not a deeply ingrained prejudice in favor of aircraft among flyers . . . would be a stupid statement for me to make. Of course there is" (General Thomas White, air force chief of staff, quoted in Futrell 1980, 253). This phenomenon, often called goal displacement (Merton 1957), has numerous causes: homogeneous professional training of an agency's leadership (Kanter 1979; Kaufman 1960; McGregor 1974), genuine conviction that the national interest is well served by carrying out the mission, and career motivation (promotions are easier to obtain if we continue to do what we know how to do). Political superiors may, however, construe an agency's job in broader terms. The corps of engineers is supposed to protect citizens against flood disasters; building dams is only one method for doing that. From the perspective of the secretary of defense, the navy is supposed to strengthen national defense. Deploying aircraft carriers is only a means to that end, and if technological changes in, for example, surface-to-surface missiles render carriers obsolete, then the secretary may want to change the navy's force structure.

The ability of politicians to alter the repertoire of agencies is, however, constrained by their lack of technical expertise. The relative merits of strategic bombers versus ICBMs are better known to specialists in the department of defense than to politicians. Indeed, policy alternatives are often generated by experts in the first place (Polsby 1984). Politicians dominate agenda formation in the sense of determining the *problems* that have priority but specialists dominate the generation of *solutions* (Kingdon 1984; Light 1983). Frequently—by no means always—the specialists are bureaucrats.[1]

This informational asymmetry gives bureaus an opportunity; their mission orientation provides a motive. When asked to generate policy proposals for review by their political superiors, bureaucrats are tempted to bias the search for alternatives so that their superiors wind up selecting the kind of program the agency wants to pursue: "Thus alleged 'options' are often advocacy in more sophisticated guise, one real choice and two or three straw men" (Destler 1974, 135).[2] Such manipulation is the stuff of Washington folklore. In general, biased advocacy is the norm: "The sensitivity of military groups to new program needs depends largely upon service doctrine and service interests. The Air Force was active in pushing strategic deterrence and the Army in innovating European defense since each program was closely related to existing service doctrine. All the services were hesitant in pushing continental defense and limited war, however, which were alien to existing service doctrine" (Huntington 1961, 288; see also Bergerson 1980, 64–65; Coulam 1977, 93–96). Such descriptions point up the influence of career bureaucrats, an emphasis often found in public administration and organization theory (Allison 1971, chap. 3; Pfefer 1981, 119–21; Simon, Smithburg, and Thompson 1950, 533–34).

An equally well established research tradition has emphasized how politicians try to reassert their control over the bureaucracy. (On the White House's efforts to direct the bureaucracy, see, among others, Aberbach and Rockman 1976, Arnold 1976, Hess 1976, Lynn 1981, March and Olsen 1983, Moe 1985, Nathan 1975, Salamon 1981, and Seidman 1970.) One type of control rests on the ability of political executives to review and possibly reject all of a subordinate's options. This is, after all, a superior's formal prerogative. Recognizing this, a bureaucrat may be deterred from proposing an idea that furthers the agency's objectives rather than the superior's. Of course, the threat of a veto must be credible. If a subordinate believes that the superior would be better off accepting the subordinate's preferred alternative than suffering the delay following a rejection of all proposals, the subordinate will consider the threat of rejection a hollow one and rig the agenda anyway.

A political executive can strengthen his or her hand by having more than one subordinate generate options, concurrently or sequentially. Stimulating competition among subordinates was central to Franklin Roosevelt's administrative strategy (Schlesinger 1958, 534–35), and with good reason: threatening to turn down a subordinate is more credible if there are other options waiting in the wings. (For experimental evidence see Sutton, Shaked, and Binmore 1986.) Though simultaneous competition may be rare—an executive must incur the cost of diverting the attention of subordinates from other problems—the sequential strategy may be fairly common.

A second type of control is to reward the bureaucrat for devising options that are useful to the superior. If the politician can evaluate the political worth of an alternative, then even if he or she cannot observe how an agency generates the proposals the politician may be able to induce the agency to keep his or her interests in mind. Investigating such incentive schemes has been an active area of research in the economics of organization (Arrow 1985). The analysis, known as principal-agent theory, has a simple logic. A superior (the principal) knows that the subordinate (agent) enjoys an informational advantage. For example, the agent may possess technical expertise or the principal may be unable to monitor the agent's actions perfectly. The principal believes the agent may exploit these advantages for the agent's own purposes. Anticipating this, the principal precommits him- or herself to a reward scheme *before* the agent acts. The payoffs to the agent are contingent on outcomes the principal can observe. A key task in this research program is to examine the conditions under which a superior can induce a subordinate to choose precisely as the superior would have, had the latter chosen directly.

The ideas underlying principal-agent models have diffused into political science (Moe 1984), perhaps encouraging some scholars to believe that the older concern with bureaucratic influence has been unwarranted. Though politicians may be "mere dilettantes" on technical issues, they are professionals on strategic affairs, and, as we have learned from Neustadt (1960) and others, inducing a subordinate to do as one would wish is a matter of strategy. Hence descriptions of bureaucrats rigging the choice sets of politicians and political appointees may be seriously incomplete, for they focus only on the last steps of the decision process, neglecting how search may be conditioned by incentives created by superiors.

These issues are central to our understanding of policy making. If bureaucrats bias the search for options, we should investigate their policy goals and how they try to attain them. Alternatively, if politicians anticipate these problems and control them, students of the policy process may be able to ignore the bureaucracy, at least insofar as policy generation is concerned. As indicated, scholars disagree which view is more correct. It seems likely that—under the right conditions—each has merit; the problem is to specify just what those conditions are. To help us figure this out, we develop several models of political control, investigating the effects of both a review process and of incentives. In the first section, we study how a mission-oriented bureaucrat designs alternatives when he knows that in the final review his superior will reject unsatisfactory proposals and consider competing proposals. In the second section, we develop a principal-agent model to analyze how a superior could, in addition to reviewing proposals, use the carrot of bigger budgets to induce the bureaucrat to carry out the search the superior would prefer. (To avoid confusion, we assume the superior is female, the subordinate, male, in all three models.) We initially simplify the analysis by assuming in the first section that the bureaucrat has only programmatic preferences and in the second section that he cares only about budgets. In the third section we consider a more general model in which the bureaucrat is interested in both missions and budgets; as in the second section, the superior uses both types of control strategies. The models' main features are summarized in Table 1.

To keep the focus on substantive issues, we present the model informally in the text. The Appendix presents the mathematical version.

## The Basic Framework

The three sections share a common structure. A political superior in the executive branch, such as the president, a department secretary, or other high appointee, instructs a subordinate, such as a bureau chief, to prepare several proposals addressing a problem that concerns the superior. The superior knows that there are two qualitatively different kinds

Table 1. The Models' Main Features

| Parameters | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bureaucrat's goals | mission only | budget only | missions and budgets |
| Superior's method of control | final review | final review and budgetary incentives | final review and budgetary incentives |

of programs she wants to evaluate: type $x$ (e.g., missiles) and type $y$ (e.g., planes). Indifferent to the programs' technological and administrative characteristics, she cares only about the political benefits they would produce. Not knowing which one would better serve her goals, she instructs the bureau to draft two proposals, one of each type. The bureau has a fixed amount of effort to devote to this task. Effort may be a complex function of person-hours allocated to each design, weighted by the ability of the staff. Let $e_x$ denote the effort the bureau allocates to designing the type-$x$ program and $e_y$ the effort it spends designing the type-$y$ program. This allocation of search effort cannot be observed by the boss.

We assume a simple search technology. Let $X(e_x)$ represent the political benefits that accrue to the boss for a given search allocation, $e_x$; similarly for $Y(e_y)$.[3] To fit the uncertain quality of planning, we assume that $X$ and $Y$ are random variables. Exactly what the *realized* benefits are, for any given search allocation, depends on a host of idiosyncratic factors that cannot be predicted with certainty. Consequently, the bureaucrat knows the a priori distribution of benefits but will only discover the worth of a specific proposal after he has finished planning.

**Figure 1. More Design Time Produces Stochastically Better Proposals**



We assume that thinking improves the quality of solutions: $X(e_x') \geqslant X(e_x)$ when $e_x' > e_x$, and similarly for $Y$. Graphically, this means that more design time shifts the distribution of possible proposals to the right (Figure 1). To follow standard terminology, $X(e_x')$ is *stochastically larger* than $X(e_x)$. To avoid pedantic repetition, we shall usually just say that one distribution is better than another.[4]

Once the bureau chief has prepared two proposals, he presents them to the superior. We assume that she knows the political benefits she will reap by implementing either proposal. If only one option is satisfactory, she chooses that one; if both are acceptable she picks the better of the two, denoted max($X$, $Y$). In either case the decision process ends. If she finds neither acceptable, she turns them both down and invites other specialists—other agencies, her own staffers, outside think tanks, and individual policy entrepreneurs—to propose new alternatives.[5]

Let $Z$ denote the amount of political benefits that would be generated by outside alternatives. Because these outside proposals are not the special province of the agency, we assume that their distribution is known by both the superior and the subordinate. In this second and final stage, the boss chooses the best of the three proposals, denoted max($X$, $Y$, $Z$).

Thus in the basic model each decision maker must make a choice. Consider the superior's problem first. She must decide whether to accept the better of the bureau's two proposals in the first period or to wait, expecting that other policy specialists will generate something better. Her acceptance level $a$ is a conditional rule of the form, "if max($X$, $Y$) is above $a$, accept it; otherwise, defer the selection until the second period."[6] The level of the optimal acceptance or stopping rule $a^*$ depends on the executive's utility function. We assume her utility is proportional to a proposal's political payoffs. In addition, she prefers sooner to later, discounting the value of future proposals by a parameter $\delta_s$ between zero and one.

To see how she would compute $a^*$, consider a particular value of max($X$, $Y$) called $m$. If $m$ is high, other proposals are unlikely to beat it. And if the executive is impatient (a low $\delta_s$), the cost of waiting is great. In such circumstances, she would take $m$ in the first round. If $m$ is poor, the odds are good the outside competition will offer something better. And if she is patient, she does not incur significant delay costs. In such circumstances she would reject $m$ and make her final decision later. In general she will reject $m$ if and only if it is less than the discounted value of what she could get in the second round, $\delta_s E[\max(m, Z)]$ (see Figure 2). Thus, she sets $a^*$ so that she is indifferent between taking $m = a^*$ now and taking the expected value of max($m$, $Z$) later.

Consequently, the superior's optimal acceptance rule depends only on her knowledge of $Z$ and on her utility function, but not at all on her beliefs about the distributions of $X$ and $Y$ or even on her knowledge of the realized value of the proposals. In game-theoretic terms, the superior has a best response to the bureau's choice that is not contingent on that choice: it is a dominant strategy for her to pick $a^*$ in the above manner.[7] Thus, there is a fundamental difference between this control strategy of review and the control strategy of incentives introduced later. In the former, the superior will make her best move at every point in the process, rejecting a first period option only if she expects to improve upon it by waiting. In contrast, the incentive strategy presumes, in common with most principal-agent models, that the superior can *precommit* to a schedule of rewards before the subordinate makes his move. The second strategy requires precommitment: if the subordinate believed that his superior was not obligated to keep her promise once she inspected the agency's proposals, the incentives would lose their force.

**Figure 2. The Expected Value of the "Good Tail" of $Z$**



The subordinate's problem is to pick a search strategy, $e_y^*$, that maximizes his expected utility, given his goals and the prevailing incentives. In the pure mission-oriented model we shall assume that he values the type-$y$ program (planes) over type $x$ (missiles), though either is preferred to letting an outsider win, so $u_y > u_x > u_z$.[8] For simplicity and with no loss of generality, we set $u_z$ equal to zero. To ensure the two decision makers have conflicting interests we assume that $X$ is better for the superior: if the bureaucrat devotes equal effort to each, then $p(X > b) \geqslant p(Y > b)$ for every benefit level $b$.

The bureaucrat prefers having a proposal accepted in the first period to having the same proposal accepted later. Thus $u_{y2} = \delta_b u_{y1}$, where the numerical subscripts denote the period and where

$\delta_b$, the bureaucrat's discount factor, is between zero and one. Similarly $u_{x2} = \delta_b u_{x1}$.

The tensions facing a mission-oriented bureaucrat are now evident. The agency would like to manipulate the superior's agenda so that she will accept a type-$y$ proposal in the first round. However, the bureaucrat knows that $x$ is a better kind of program for the boss, so to increase the odds of beating out the competition he may be forced to spend time designing $x$s.

In the pure budgetary model the bureaucrat's expected utility depends only on the appropriation he will receive for the accepted program. His search strategy is therefore driven by the budget policy, which the superior designs in advance. The budget policies are described below. In the complex model, the bureaucrat still prefers planes to missiles to losing to an outsider and is also interested in funding. His optimal search strategy therefore must trade off these two goals.

Most principal-agent models focus on either of two kinds of informational asymmetry: the unobserved actions of subordinates (moral hazard) or their unobserved personal characteristics (adverse selection). Our work emphasizes moral hazard. Thus, in all three models, we allow the superior to know the bureaucrat's preferences; similarly, he knows her acceptance level.

## Model 1: The Mission-oriented Bureaucrat

In this section we investigate how a purely mission-oriented bureaucrat exploits his expertise in order to win approval of his pet program. First we examine absolute levels of stacking the deck, for example, when search will be extremely rigged. Next we use comparative statics to examine changes in search.

Clearly the bureau chief can control the process if his superior's acceptance level is low. There are two main reasons why the superior would be so undemanding. In each case the consequence is a rigged agenda.

PROPERTY 1.1. *If the outside competition is sufficiently poor, or the executive sufficiently impatient, the bureau stacks the deck completely by spending all its time designing the y alternative.*

Both conditions make intuitive sense. For the boss, the benefit of further search is the possibility of discovering a superior proposal; the cost, the cost of delay.[9] If the benefit is too low, or the cost too great, she will stop the process in the first period by accepting the bureau's better alternative. And if the bureau chief is sure he can satisfy his superior in the first round, he prefers to do so with a proposal consistent with his mission orientation.[10]

Now we move to the opposite extreme: a mission-oriented bureau that does exactly what its superior wants—more precisely, what the superior *would* want were she completely informed about the quality of the two types of programs. Let us call the search that a completely informed superior would carry out *unbiased* search. (In principal-agent models, the generic term for the choice of a fully informed superior is the "first-best" solution.)

PROPERTY 1.2. *A combination of strong outside competition and a patient superior can induce a mission-oriented bureaucrat to carry out unbiased search.*

In this situation the outside proposals are so promising that the agency has a chance of getting a proposal accepted only if it spends all its time on the superior type of program, $x$. Spending time on $y$ is futile. In such circumstances the executive's first-best search would be to ignore $y$ completely, which is just what the agency is driven to do.[11]

What counts here are the *relative* levels of the outside options, the acceptance threshold, and $Y$. If the bureaucrat knows that no matter how much time he spends working out the bugs of his mission program it still would be politically dreadful for his superior, then his only chance of getting a proposal accepted is to concentrate on $x$, even if the outside alternatives are mediocre.

Thus, a mission-oriented bureau tightly constrained by outside forces may do just what a fully informed boss would want. In these circumstances the control strategy of review works as well as could be desired. But Property 1.2 described sufficient conditions for unbiased search, not necessary ones. Can internal controls substitute for external ones? If the bureaucrat is neutral, that is, indifferent as between $x$ and $y$, and has the same time preference as his superior, then he is trying to maximize the (time-weighted) probability of receiving her approval. Surely this orientation must make him do what she wants? Not necessarily.

PROPERTY 1.3. *Mission neutrality and identical time preferences do not guarantee unbiased search.*

Neutrality is insufficient: whereas the superior likes high values of $\max(X, Y)$, the bureau chief is indifferent between a proposal that just squeaks by and one that far exceeds the acceptance level.

Property 1.2 implied that search is not always biased toward the bureau's pet program. One might think that at least search will never be skewed toward the other type. This too is wrong.

PROPERTY 1.4. *Despite the bureaucrat's preference for the $y$ program, a purely mission-oriented bureau may spend more time designing the $x$ alternative than a fully informed superior would want.*

Consider this example. The superior is patient and will nearly always defer the final program choice until the second period. This worries the bureau chief who is impatient and craves a first-round decision. In the slim hopes of discovering an outstanding proposal that will induce his superior to look no further, he throws all his organizational resources into investigating the more promising type, $x$. The patient superior, however, considers a second-round decision nearly as good as a first-round selection. Therefore, unbiased search would approximately maximize the average value of the best of the three proposals. If there were diminishing returns to search, it would be suboptimal to devote all effort to $x$. The bureau, however, does precisely that.

Now we investigate how agenda manipulation shifts in response to changes in the model's parameters, first examining changes in the bureaucrat's preferences and subsequently investigating changes in the strength of the outside competition. To simplify the presentation we explain the results with the aid of figures; derivations are in Section 12 of the Appendix.

## Changes in the Bureaucrat's Preferences

Over time, the composition of a bureau's dominant coalition can change (Kanter 1979, 102–8), in turn altering its leader's preferences for different programs. How will a purely mission-oriented chief shift his search pattern as his programmatic preferences change?

Consider an equilibrium before the parametric change. The benefit of paying more attention to $y$ is an increased chance that it will be accepted multiplied by the utility of $y$. The cost of doing this is a reduced chance that $x$ will be accepted multiplied by its utility. These expected marginal gains and losses were equal at the old optimal $e_y^*$. If the bureau comes to value $y$ more, the marginal benefits of devoting more effort to $y$ rise while the marginal costs are unchanged. Hence the bureau increases its focus on $y$. Symmetrically, if the bureau values $x$ more,

Figure 3. Bureaucrat Switches to $x$



STATUS QUO ANTE

NEW SITUATION

the marginal costs of $e_y^*$ increase while the marginal benefits remain unchanged, so the agency attends less to $y$.

This result is intuitive. The bureau chief's liking for $y$ over $x$ represents conflict of interest between the superior and subordinate. As this bias falls, conflict diminishes, and search should be less skewed toward the type of program that is inferior from the boss' point of view.[12]

What happens if losing to the outsider becomes less unpleasant, that is, $u_z$ rises? Because this means that the bureaucrat cares less intensely whether the executive chooses $x$ or $z$, the implicit costs of devoting effort to its mission have fallen. Hence search is skewed more toward his preferred program.

## The Effect of Improved Competition

We know from Properties 1.1 and 1.2 that the quality of outside proposals influences the bureau's strategy. In policy formation in the United States, the trend seems to be toward improved competition. Many observers have noted a growth of think tanks and policy entrepreneurs in Washington. This growth probably affects policy: the Reagan administration is reputed to listen to ideas from institutions like the Heritage Foundation.

How will a purely mission-oriented bureau respond if the quality of these competing proposals becomes stochastically better? Most beliefs about the restraining role of competition (e.g., a monopolist's ability to extract consumer surplus for itself) imply that the subordinate would stack the deck less as its competition improves. Further, in this model, improved competition raises the executive's acceptance level, making her more demanding. Since the bureaucrat is less likely to beat his rivals and will be evaluated more stringently, won't he spend more time on the type of program that he knows is superior for the boss?

Not necessarily, as the following pair of examples shows. In the first example the bureaucrat makes the expected move of paying less attention to $y$; in the second he pays more attention. In both cases we simplify matters by assuming that the bureau has no chance of beating the outside competition in the second round, which allows us to focus only on the first period. (Alternatively one could assume that the bureaucrat discounts the future completely.) Improved competition still matters, however, because it raises the acceptance level in the first period.

The first example is shown in Figure 3. In the old status quo, the boss's acceptance criterion is moderately demanding. As revealed by the superiority of distribution Y, which occurs only when $e_y > e_x$, the bureau spends more time preparing $y$ than $x$. The bureau does devote some time to $x$, possibly due to diminishing marginal returns to search.

The second picture in Figure 3 depicts the new status quo, in which greatly improved competition has induced the executive to jack up her acceptance threshold by a lot. Now the agency has no choice: to have any chance of getting a proposal accepted it must spend all its time on $x$, the superior type. As expected, the bureaucrat becomes more docile in response to improved competition and tougher standards.

However, the next example of Figure 4 shows that just the opposite can happen. The status quo ante is the same as the previous example's. Then competition improves and the acceptance level increases, though less dramatically than before. Once again, to have any chance of designing an acceptable alternative, the agency must specialize. But unlike the previous example, $y$ has a chance of being satisfactory, though of course the bureau is more likely to generate an acceptable proposal if it specializes in $x$. Which path the bureau chief chooses depends on how much he prefers $y$ over $x$ versus the relative chances of getting either one approved. If $u_y \times p(Y \geqslant a^*) > u_x \times p(X \geqslant a^*)$, given full specialization in each case, the bureau will focus more on $y$ in response to improved competition.

This example is not bizarre; it is just a circumstance in which the bureaucrat's decision variable has increasing marginal utility and decreasing total utility. Clearly, if the bureau's rivals improve their proposals, the bureau chief's expected utility falls. The world has become a tougher place for the agency: it is less likely to win in either round. But because the administrator can do nothing about this, he focuses on the *relative* values of alternatives. And despite the fall of $e_y$'s absolute value, its relative value can increase—as it did in the second example.[13]

How does the superior fare in the new environment? There are two answers here. The partial equilibrium answer, based on a fixed search strategy, is that she is unambiguously better off. If the second round is needed, she will get max($X$, $Y$, $Z$), which can only get better if $Z$ improves. Therefore, in the first period, she can afford to forego comparatively mediocre options that she would previously have approved. Hence, if the bureau does not adjust its search, improved competition must make the superior better off.

**Figure 4. Bureaucrat Switches to $y$**



NEW SITUATION

The complete equilibrium answer, however, is that the boss is *not* invariably better off. An example is presented in Figure 5. For simplicity, $Z$ is a constant, $z$. The superior is patient, with an acceptance level just below $z$. For simplicity, we assume that both $X$ and $Y$ have only three values: for a given allocation of effort, the bureau could generate a poor, a mediocre, or a good proposal of each type of program.

In the old equilibrium (Figure 5a) the bureau spends more time thinking about $y$, resulting in a small chance of a spectacularly good plan, $y_3$. After z improves (Figure 5b) the bureaucrat realizes he can no longer afford to devote so much effort to $y$. Figure 5c shows the new equilibrium, after the bureau has adjusted its search by spending more time on $x$, thereby driving $x_3$ past the new $z$. The sharp decline of $y_3$ indicates that there are increasing returns to search from the superior's point of view. Because it is easy to ensure that the fall of $y_3$ more than offsets the increases of $z$ and $x_2$, in this case improved competition ultimately hurts *both* the superior and the subordinate.

Of course it is possible that improved competition in the generation of policy alternatives typically enhances the well being of political superiors. If this is so, we suspect that it is because they take steps to ensure that their subordinates' interests are linked with their own. We examine such control strategies next.

## Model 2: The Budget-oriented Bureaucrat

We now turn to the other end of the continuum to analyze the behavior of a bureau chief interested only in increasing his agency's appropriations. The basic structure remains the same: the bureaucrat generates proposals; the political executive makes the final choice. Now, however, each actor enjoys a larger repertoire of choices. We shall examine in turn three new decision variables of the bureau chief. In addition to allocating effort, he can now (1) make his proposals more or less innovative, (2) reorganize his agency's planning to decrease or increase the correlation between his two proposals, and (3) draw on ideas floating in the "policy primeval soup" (in Kingdon's phrase) to alter correlation between his and outsiders' plans. (When examining Variables 1 and 3, we will suppress the distinction between the agency's two types of proposals, focusing directly on the derived distribution of max($X$, $Y$).) The superior can design and precommit to incentive schemes. We consider three policies. The first is the simplest: if she accepts one of the agency's options, the bureau will receive a budget to administer that program. The funding grows in proportion to the program's political benefits. To maintain tractability we assume that the bureau chief is risk-neutral in the budget.

**Figure 5. Partial Equilibrium versus Full Equilibrium Analysis**


(A) Old equilibrium
$X_1$ $Y_1$ $Z$ $X_2$ $X_3$ $Y_2$ $Y_3$
(B) New situation, old $e_y^*$ (superior is better off)
$X_1$ $Y_1$ $X_2$ $X_3$ $Z$ $Y_2$ $Y_3$
(C) New equilibrium (superior is worse off)
$Y_1$ $X_1$ $X_2$ $Z$ $Y_2$ $Y_3$ $X_3$

$a^*$ is not drawn ($a^* = Z - \epsilon$)

This incentive scheme is simple enough to be empirically plausible: all the superior needs to know is that the bureau chief prefers more funds to less. Moreover, because precommitting to an appropriation is a public matter, it is easier than precommitting to an acceptance level.

What behavior will this incentive scheme induce? Because here the bureau chief is interested only in funding and because he knows that his reward will increase in the quality of his better alternative, if the superior selects it, one might think that he will conduct unbiased search. However, consider the following properties.

PROPERTY 2.1. *The winner-take-all incentive policy does* not *guarantee that a budget-oriented bureaucrat will carry out unbiased search.*

Problems arise because this winner-take-all scheme makes the bureaucrat ignore the value of outside alternatives to his superior. Consequently he places a lower value on innovative searches that may lose to outsiders, even if such strategies—when they succeed—generate excellent proposals. Thus this incentive policy creates the following conflict:

PROPERTY 2.2. *The political executive* always *prefers riskier search to more cautious search, if the associated distributions have the same mean. Under the winner-take-all scheme, however, the bureaucrat does not always prefer riskier search.*

Note that these preferences do not derive from attitudes toward risk: both actors are risk-neutral. It is the logic of the relationship that drives them to have different views toward innovation. The superior knows that if the agency's proposals are poor, she can defer her decision in the hope that an outside alternative will be superior. Thus, she is protected from downside risk. And, of course, she likes the benign uncertainty of outstanding alternatives. Therefore she always wants the agency to try more innovative policy design (Kohn and Shavell 1974). The bureaucrat, however, is not always protected from downside risk. Indeed, risky search may increase the chance of losing to outside competitors (Figure 6). In general, if prospects look very good for the agency, the bureaucrat will prefer more cautious search; if matters are desperate—little chance of winning in either round—he will prefer bolder search. Thus the logic of the situation can induce bureaucratic caution without assuming that administrators are personally averse to risk.

**Implementation Budget Scheme**

An intelligent superior might realize that the winner-take-all scheme is undesirable because it drives a wedge between her interests and her subordinate's. Alternatively it may be infeasible if the only rivals to the agency are staffers or think-tank analysts who lack the organizational resources for implementation. For either reason, we now consider a second incentive strategy: the executive decides in advance that the agency will administer whichever option she deems best, as well as the associated budget.[14] Thus, even if she picks an outside proposal the agency will implement it.

Figure 6. Cautious versus Innovative Search



This scheme does diminish some of the conflicts created by the winner-take-all system: because the bureaucrat is interested only in budgets and will be funded to implement outsiders' proposals, he will not in his own search shy away from innovative ideas just because they run some risk of losing to an outside alternative. Nevertheless, it is not a panacea.

PROPERTY 2.3. *The implementation budget scheme does not ensure that a budget-oriented bureaucrat will carry out unbiased search.*

The remaining problem is conflicting time preferences. It is often asserted that career bureaucrats are more patient than political executives (e.g., Heclo 1977, 143). The latter typically have short stays in Washington and both sides know it. Therefore, in our model, the patient bureaucrat might prefer a second-period choice of a wonderful outside alternative—which the bureau, blessed with a correspondingly large budget, would implement—to a first-period choice of its own programs (recall that the bureaucrat has no mission preferences here).

PROPERTY 2.4. *The superior always prefers a first-period search yielding a stochastically better distribution of alternatives to one yielding an inferior distribution. The bureaucrat has the same preferences—if he is less patient than his superior. If he is more patient, he will under certain conditions prefer search that generates inferior distributions.*

The superior's preference comes as no surprise. Because the bureaucrat's reward depends on the quality of the accepted alternative, one might think that he too would always prefer superior search. So he does, if he is more anxious than his superior to reach an early resolution. But if he is more patient he may sabotage the first period, hoping to receive much more funding later. The implementation budget scheme makes the bureaucrat internalize the value of outside alternatives; indeed, now he may overvalue them (see Appendix, sec. 10).

Thus far the superior's control methods have been predicated on a genuine diversity among policy specialists: the outside proposals have been assumed independent of the agency's, and (given a search allocation) the agency's proposals have been independent of each other. Because in the real world policy ideas diffuse, experts might think in similar ways. The superior may want genuine pluralism maintained; would the bureaucrat also like this? To examine their possibly conflicting preferences for diversity, we consider two kinds of cognitive interdependence: the first concerns the relation between the agency's proposals; the second, the relation between the agency's plans and everyone else's. We take up each in turn. When considering the first type we continue to assume that the outside alternatives are independent of the bureau's.

An agency can organize its planning in several different ways. One office could be charged with the task, or each program could be the responsibility of separate offices. If there are separate units, they could communicate with varying intensity. The more "tightly coupled" the offices, the more correlated (positively interdependent) the alternatives are likely to be. (For a precise definition of *positively interdependent distributions,* see sec. 11 of the Appendix.) Hence, the organization of proposal generation can be a strategic choice: given a fixed allocation of effort, the agency can decide to organize its planning in either a tightly or a loosely coupled way. These choices matter. To focus only on the effects of interdependence, we assume that the *un*conditional distributions of the two plans are unaffected by how tightly coupled they are.

PROPERTY 2.5. *The superior would always prefer the agency to organize its search to reduce positive interdependence between its alternatives. A less patient bureaucrat has the same preferences. However, a more patient subordinate will under certain conditions prefer more correlated search.*

The intuition behind the superior's preference is straightforward. Tightly coupled planning is more likely to produce two good proposals; it is also more likely to generate two bad ones. Because the superior needs only one good option, the disadvantage of two poor alternatives outweighs the advantage of two good ones. Thus she prefers pluralistic policy design. Indeed, a more pluralistic process yields a superior distribution of max($X$, $Y$) (Bendor 1985, 47; Bhattacharya and Mookherjee 1986), so even a risk-averse superior prefers loosely coupled search.

This superiority of low correlation implies that Property 2.4. obtains. Thus the bureaucrat, whose budgetary reward is contingent on the outcome, will also generally prefer loosely coupled search, unless he wants to sabotage the first round in order to wait for an outside option.

The second dimension of interdependence concerns the relation between the agency's search and the outsiders'. Typically, policy arenas form communities of common attention. Ideas for new programs diffuse in these networks (Heclo 1978; Kingdon 1984; Polsby 1984). When an agency designs policy proposals, it can draw in varying degrees on this fund of public knowledge. Thus, qualitatively different search strategies produce plans correlated in varying degrees with proposals from outside the agency. Would the superior prefer high or low correlation over time?

One might think that an extension of Property 2.5 would apply immediately: search that is loosely coupled over time is always better than more tightly coupled search. Not so, however: when time is introduced the problem becomes more complex.

PROPERTY 2.6. (a) *In sequential search the superior does* not *always prefer loosely coupled design strategies and* (b) *if the superior's stopping problem is classical in that her optimal strategy in the first period is to reject poor alternatives and to accept good ones, then she prefers less correlated search. However, even in this setting there can be conflict: the bureaucrat will under certain conditions prefer more interdependent search.*

The superior might prefer high correlation in the sequential setting—Result (a)—when good options are likely to be followed by much better ones. Consider the following simple example. In the first round, max($X$, $Y$) will be either poor ($m_1$) or good ($m_2$). The two outside alternatives, $z_1$ and $z_2$, are strongly correlated with $m_1$ and $m_2$ respectively. Assuming that policy specialists learn from each other, the second-round proposals generally improve upon the earlier ones: $z_1$ is a bit better than $m_1$, and $z_2$ is much superior to $m_2$. Because $z_1$ is but a small improvement over $m_1$, the superior will accept $m_1$ if she discounts the future moderately. However, she will reject $m_2$ in the hopes of doing much better later. Given this pattern of accepting poor first-period proposals and rejecting good ones, if the agency could figure out a way to plan so that its alternatives were even more positively correlated with the later ones, the superior would prefer that the agency do so. (For example, if the alternatives were perfectly correlated, rejecting $m_2$ would be riskless since it would always be followed by the wonderful $z_2$.)

This example requires the counterintuitive acceptance strategy of accepting poor options and rejecting good ones. Yet, though it is counterintuitive, such a strategy can be an optimal stopping rule because, in a search context, alternatives have information value as well as intrinsic value. Poor alternatives are accepted not because they are intrinsically useful but because their appearance augurs ill. Conversely, good alternatives are rejected because they predict an even brighter future.

When the stopping rule is more conventional, loosely coupled search is again desirable—Result (b). Because the superior will initially spurn inferior options, she does not want the second set of proposals closely related to the first set. And because she accepts good alternatives in the first round, the value of high correlation—fine early options precede fine later ones—is irrelevant (see sec. 11 of the Appendix).

The bureaucrat's tastes, however, do not always run to less correlated search even in the classical setting. If, for example, he is sufficiently impatient, he will prefer any first-round proposal to any second-round one. Therefore he would want his superior to have an extremely low acceptance level. But more loosely coupled search can induce the superior to raise her standard, making the bureaucrat worse off.[15]

Because the above problems stem from conflicting time preferences, a sophisticated political superior would take these into account while designing incentives. One cure is simple. If her subordinate is more patient, she should scale down the budgetary payoff in the second period; if less patient, she should increase it. (Equivalently, she could increase the first-period payoff for a patient bureaucrat and decrease it for an impatient one.) Typically, one would expect a political executive to know that her subordinate is more patient; how much so would be uncertain. To simplify matters, we make the less plausible assumption that she knows $\delta_b$ precisely. Then finally we arrive at a scheme that induces unbiased search.

PROPERTY 2.7. *If the superior uses an implementation budget scheme and rescales the second-period budget by $\delta_s/\delta_b$, a budget-oriented bureaucrat will conduct unbiased search.*

Under this scheme, the bureaucrat's valuation of a second-period budget is proportional to $\delta_s/\delta_b$ multiplied by his own discount of $\delta_b$, so it is proportional to the superior's discount of $\delta_s$. Therefore, the bureaucrat's induced utility function is now qualitatively the same as the superior's in both periods, eliminating all the conflicts over search strategies described in Properties 2.2 and 2.4–2.6. We should remember that the superior has induced this without knowing anything about the technical details of the search process, what the returns to policy analysis and design are, and so forth. Thus, bureaucrats' greater technical expertise may be countered by incentive systems that tie the career officials' goals to the fulfillment of politicians' objectives.

But the conditions guaranteeing unbiased search are restrictive. Most importantly, we have assumed in this section that the bureau chief is interested only in appropriations; he cares not a jot about the type of program he implements.

## Model 3: Budgets and Missions

The most important case empirically is one in which bureaucrats are interested in both budgets and missions. We now assume that utility $= k_1$(program) $+ k_2$(budget), where $k_1$ and $k_2$ are positive constants symbolizing relative intensity for programs and budgets respectively. (The earlier models are special cases in which either $k_1$ or $k_2$ is zero.) The problem is otherwise the same.[16]

Can the superior control this more complex subordinate? She can since she knows his programmatic preferences.

PROPERTY 3.1. *The following implementation budget scheme ensures that the bureaucrat will carry out unbiased search:* (a) *if the superior accepts a proposal in the first period, she appropriates a budget that increases linearly in the value of the accepted alternative; if she chooses x, she gives the agency an additional fixed amount of $c_1$, which gives the bureaucrat a utility of $k_1/k_2(u_y - u_x)$;* (b) *if the superior makes her decision in the second period, she again gives the agency a budget composed of a linear term plus a constant; the linear part is rescaled by $\delta_s/\delta_b$. If she chooses x, she adds a constant, $c_2$, which equals $\delta_b\, c_1$. If she accepts z, she adds a constant of $c_3$, which gives the bureaucrat a utility of $\delta_b\, k_1/k_2(u_y - u_z)$.*

These incentives neutralize the bureau chief's mission orientation. Because he is indifferent between, say, implementing $y$ in the first period and implementing $x$ plus getting the extra funding of $c_1$, only the variable part of the budget matters. And because that increases in the realized political benefits to the superior, the decision makers' interests are bound together.[17]

Thus, despite her ignorance of how alternatives are generated, the political superior can get exactly what she wants—if she knows exactly what the bureaucrat wants. Note that the incentive scheme is only moderately complicated; the hard part is obtaining accurate information about the bureaucrat's preferences. (The limitations of assuming perfect information are examined in the concluding section.)

However, although the political executive can induce unbiased search, because she does not know the search functions, it is unlikely that the above incentive scheme is *efficient:* other schemes might make both decision makers better off, once one factors budget costs into the superior's utility function. For example, suppose $c_1$—the cost of inducing the bureaucrat to treat $x$ and $y$ evenhandedly—is large and its expected benefit—the improvement in the average value of $\max(X, Y)$—is small, say $\epsilon$. For simplicity, assume that without the incentive of $c_1$, the bureaucrat will spend all his time on $y$ and that his superior will choose $y$ in the first period with certainty; with the compensation of $c_1$ he will devote all his attention to $x$, guaranteeing that it will be selected. In this circumstance, the incentive scheme of Property 3.1 is Pareto inefficient. The superior would be better off foregoing the $\epsilon$ improvement of unbiased search, saving the large sum of $c_1$; the subordinate is nearly indifferent as to having $y$ approved versus the combination of having $x$ approved and receiving the lump-sum appropriation of $c_1$ plus the tiny budget increase proportional to $\epsilon$. Therefore if she gave him a small fraction of $c_1$ unconditionally, they would both be better off than under the incentive scheme that induces unbiased search.

Of course, in our model, the superior does not know the requisite facts about search, and though the administrator does have this information and therefore could point out when the incentive scheme is inefficient, the former cannot trust the latter not to exploit his greater expertise. Thus inefficient arrangements can arise here from a combination of asymmetric information and the subordinate's inability to commit to the mutually beneficial course of action of revealing his information.

Let us assume, therefore, that the scheme of Property 3.1 is in place. We can now readdress the comparative-static issues of the first model. Consider personnel matters. Just as politicians vary in their commitment to policies versus their drive to win elections, so do career bureaucrats vary in their dedication to programs versus their appreciation of bigger budgets. This variation would matter to political executives if they were concerned about the cost of implementing programs.

PROPERTY 3.2. *Assume that for a fixed level of benefits, the superior preferred smaller to larger budgets. Then, given the above budget policy,* (a) *the superior always prefers a less biased bureaucrat to a more biased one; and* (b) *the superior always prefers a bureaucrat more oriented toward budgets than one less oriented.*

The cost of neutralizing a mission orientation is less, the smaller the difference between $u_y$ and $u_x$; hence, Result (a). Similarly, the more appropriations matter compared to programs (smaller ratios of $k_1/k_2$), the more cheaply neutrality is bought; hence Result (b).[18]

Thus, given this incentive structure, personnel policy has an important monotonicity property: the more the bureau chief approaches the pure, budget-oriented subordinate, the better off his superior is. This may parallel the electoral control of politicians. It is sometimes argued that politicians oriented toward winning would tend to drive out rivals oriented toward policy, particularly in competitive districts (Mayhew 1974, 13-15; Wittman 1983, 148-50). Similarly, one might expect budget-oriented bureaucrats to outlast more programmatically driven colleagues because the selection environment favors the former.

Now consider shifts in the policy arena. Recall that in the pure-mission model, the superior's prospects could decline if the outside proposals improved, a perverse consequence of the agency's response to tougher competition. This cannot happen when the appropriate incentives are in place.

PROPERTY 3.3. *Assuming the described budget policy, the superior's expected utility* always *rises if the outside alternatives become stochastically better.*

Indeed, almost all the parametric changes that had indeterminate effects on the superior's welfare in the pure-mission model now have, given the budget policy of Property 3.1, determinate and intuitive effects.[19] Pursuing its own interests, the mission-oriented agency's response to improved competition could wipe out the gains to the executive. However, once the agency's interests have been bound to those of the politician, it will not alter its search in a way that harms its superior. Accordingly, as a mental shortcut, one can simply consider how parametric changes affect the superior. Thus the right incentives make the bureaucracy irrelevant in an important sense: one need not study it if one is interested in how political leaders—their careers, electoral prospects, and so forth—are affected by exogenous changes in policy arenas.[20] Further, because political benefits accruing to political executives are usually related to benefits accruing to various constituencies, if one is interested in macro issues—relations between voters, interest groups, and politicians and how these shift as policy ideas change—then, again, one can ignore the bureaucracy.[21]

## Conclusions

These models have strikingly different implications concerning the political control of bureaucracy. In Model 1—the pure mission-oriented case—a superior using only the (credible) threat of rejecting a bureaucrat's proposals is sometimes unable to prevent her agenda from being completely rigged, and only under the most fortuitous circumstances will the subordinate carry out unbiased search. In Models 2 and 3, adding the appropriate budgetary incentive schemes induces the bureaucrat to plan just as a completely informed political executive would. Perhaps more importantly, when these incentives are in place, changes in the larger environment (such as the quality of options in the "policy primeval soup") affect the superior in the expected way, whereas in Model 1 such changes can, via the agency's mediating influence, have perverse effects. Thus Model 1 directs our attention to bureaucracy's role in policy formation; Model 3 implies we can ignore it.

Ignoring the inner workings of bureaucracies would economize on the information-processing resources of the discipline. Most descriptions of agencies' roles in policy generation and implementation are richly detailed. Theory is hard pressed to absorb such complexity; it is easier to assume that policy proposals need not be designed and that the beliefs and preferences of career bureaucrats can be set aside.

Of course, starting with simple theories is a sensible intellectual strategy. And Model 3 suggests that when the appropriate incentives are in place, a unitary-actor interpretation of the executive branch may be a reasonable approximation of "its" behavior. But a close examination of this principal-agent model suggests that caution is in order.

First, though the final reward structure ensures unbiased search, the bureaucrat's programmatic preferences still matter, for they affect the cost of the incentive scheme. Therefore, the classic issue of the compatibility of politicians' and bureaucrats' interests remains alive.

Second, the incentive scheme reflects a partial optimization. A complete optimization would require that the superior balance the benefits of improved search against the cost of inducing the improvement. Executives would find this more global calculation much more difficult, for it requires knowing or having beliefs about the probabilistic returns to search, and then trading off expected marginal gains of inducing bureaucrats to move toward unbiased search versus the marginal costs. Control strategies and outcomes would then be shaped by what politicians believed was feasible, by how they weighted the advice of specialists inside and outside government, and in general by the politics of belief formation. Once again, experts' policy preferences may matter.

Third, inducing unbiased search, even without maximizing net benefits, requires knowing the subordinate's goals exactly. This is implausible. Though agencies' mission orientations are part of Washington folklore, a political appointee will not know precisely how much a bureau chief prefers one program to another. Therefore an incentive scheme will never neutralize an agency's search exactly; there will be undercompensations and overcompensations.

To be sure, conclusions built on assumptions of perfect information may be robust, that is, introducing a "small" amount of uncertainty may lead only to "small" changes in results. For example, it has been shown recently that the control of politicians by voters in the classical spatial model is robust in this sense (Calvert 1985b); perhaps this will also hold true for the control of bureaucrats by politicians. Most importantly, one would like to know about two kinds of robustness. First, do small misperceptions of the subordinate's goals produce small errors in the incentive scheme, in turn diminishing the superior's expected benefits by just a bit?[22] Second, if the incentive scheme is "nearly" optimal, do the comparative-static results of Model 3—for instance that the superior prefers bureaucrats more oriented to budgets to those with more programmatic concerns (Property 3.2)—still hold up? Both questions are for future research to settle; clearly affirmative answers would give us more confidence in principal-agent models.

Fourth, the incentive scheme becomes more complex as the principal and agent differ on more dimensions. The scheme for the purely budget-oriented bureaucrat was simpler and required less information than the one designed for the administrator who cared about programs as well. In the real world, politicians and agency officials will differ by still more dimensions (Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981). Of course, politicians could deploy rough-and-ready reward schemes—indeed, we think these more common than refined ones. But as we saw with the first policy, the simple scheme of Property 2.1, rough-and-ready rewards are not likely to ensure the best results. In this domain it seems that simple control strategies are suboptimal, possibly significantly so.[23]

The basic idea of principal-agent models is that superiors, anticipating that subordinates might exploit informational asymmetries for their own purposes, establish controls with this in mind. This is a valuable corrective to an overemphasis on bureaucratic influence. But we are struck by how demanding the prerequisites for full control are. Indeed, we suspect that the modern tools of principal-agent analysis and search theory will demonstrate that rational superiors would not strive for complete control: even if feasible, it would be too expensive. Because of these limits, the older literature on bureaucratic influence still has much to teach us.

## Appendix

This presentation of the model does not parallel the text's sequence. Note too that only mathematical properties not obviously established in the text are derived here.

*1.* The bureaucrat's fixed search budget (normalized to unity) is spent on generating proposals of two types, $x$ and $y$: $e_x + e_y = 1$. The political benefits of these proposals to the superior are independent random variables $X$ and $Y$, whose probability distributions are stochastically increasing in $e_x$ and $e_y$, respectively. We assume that for equal effort levels $e_x$ and $e_y$, $X$ is stochastically larger than $Y$.

Whereas $X$ and $Y$ are available in both periods, the type-$z$ proposal is generated by outside competition in the second period. Its political benefits are given by the random variable $Z$, which may or may not be independent of $X$ and $Y$.

*2.* The superior can influence the bureaucrat's activities by providing him with a budget and manipulating this as an incentive scheme that may depend on which program (type $x$, $y$, or $z$) will be realized, the corresponding level of political benefits ($X$, $Y$, or $Z$), and the period (1 or 2) when the final choice is made by the superior. This budget function is known to the bureaucrat.

One would expect the budget function to be designed to counterbalance the bureaucrat's mission bias and to reflect the superior's utility function (see Properties 2.7 and 3.1). In that case, the bureaucrat would have an incentive to act more in accord with the superior's wishes. Under a *winner-take-all* incentive policy, the bureau receives no budget if an outside proposal of type $z$ is accepted, whereas under an *implementation budget* scheme, the bureau receives an appropriation no matter which proposal is accepted.

*3.* The bureaucrat is assumed to be an expected-utility maximizer. The only variables under his control are $e_x$ and $e_y$, both nonnegative and summing to one. His utility function is of the form $u$(program, budget, period), where (1) program $= x$, $y$, or $z$ (depending on which proposal is accepted by the superior), and

$$u(y, \cdot, \cdot) \geqslant u(x, \cdot, \cdot) \geqslant u(z, \cdot, \cdot)$$

i.e., the bureaucrat prefers $y$ to $x$, and $x$ to $z$, other things equal; (2) $u_2 > 0$, i.e., the bureaucrat prefers higher budgets, other things equal; and (3) period $= 1$ or $2$ (depending on when the final choice is made by the superior), and $u(\cdot, \cdot, 1) > u(\cdot, \cdot, 2)$, i.e., the bureaucrat prefers period 1 to period 2, other things equal.

*4.* In addition to determining the budget scheme, it is the superior's prerogative to decide which program will be realized, and when. The superior is also an expected-utility maximizer, and her utility function is of the form $v$(benefits, period) where (1) $v_1 > 0$, i.e., the superior prefers higher levels of political benefits ($X$, $Y$, or $Z$), other things equal; and (2) period $= 1$ or $2$, and $v(\cdot, 1) > v(\cdot, 2)$, i.e., the superior prefers period 1 to period 2, other things equal. For convenience we have assumed that the budget is not an argument of her utility function.

*5.* We impose the following important restrictions: (1) the superior rejects a first-period proposal only if she expects to improve on it by waiting; thus, she lacks the power to manipulate the bureaucrat by threatening decisions that would be to her own disadvantage to carry out; and (2) the bureaucrat in turn maximizes his expected utility without trying to influence the superior's acceptance rule or incentive scheme by using his control over $e_x$ and $e_y$ as a weapon.

*6.* It is worth noting that the assumptions made so far do *not* guarantee that the superior's optimal strategy is "classical," i.e., to accept the better of $X$ and $Y$ in the first period if $\max(X, Y)$ is sufficiently large and otherwise postpone the decision to the second period and accept the best of $X$, $Y$, and $Z$. This *will* be the case, however, if we assume that (1) $Z$ is independent of $X$ and $Y$; and (2) $v(\text{benefits}, 2) = \delta_s \cdot v(\text{benefits}, 1) \geq 0$ for some implicit discount rate $\delta_s \in [0, 1]$. Under those assumptions, the superior will accept the better realized value of $X$ and $Y$, say $m$, in the first period if and only if

$$\begin{aligned} v(m, 1) &\geq E\{v[\max(m, Z), 2]\} \\ &= \delta_s E\{v[\max(m, Z), 1]\} \end{aligned}$$

which is equivalent to $m \geq a$ for some constant $a$, the *acceptance* level. If $m < a$, then it would be better for the superior to wait until the second period. Assumption (1) will be relaxed in section 11.

*7.* Let $S_x$ denote the event that the type-$x$ proposal is accepted in either the first or the second period, $S_{x1}$ the event that the type-$x$ proposal is accepted in the first period, and similarly for $S_{x2}$, $S_y$, $S_{y1}$, $S_{y2}$, and $S_z = S_{z2}$. Then

$$\begin{aligned} S_{x1} &= \{X \geq Y, X \geq a\} \\ S_{x2} &= \{X \geq Y, X < a, X \geq Z\} \\ S_x &= S_{x1} \cup S_{x2} \\ S_{y1} &= \{Y > X, Y \geq a\} \\ S_{y2} &= \{Y > X, Y < a, Y \geq Z\} \\ S_y &= S_{y1} \cup S_{y2} \\ S_z &= S_{z2} = \{\max(X, Y) < \min(a, Z)\} \end{aligned}$$

To analyze how the probabilities of these events depend on $e_x$ and $e_y$, the following observation is helpful: because $e_x$ cannot take on two different values at the same period, the assumption that $X(e_x = e_x^\dagger)$ is stochastically larger than $X(e_x = e_x')$ whenever $e_x^\dagger > e_x'$ is equivalent to the seemingly stronger assumption that $X(e_x = e_x^\dagger) \geq X(e_x = e_x')$, and similarly for $Y$ with respect to $e_y$.

It follows that if $e_x' + e_y' = e_x^\dagger + e_y^\dagger = 1$, $e_x^\dagger > e_x'$, and $e_y^\dagger < e_y'$, then

$$\begin{aligned} S_x(e_x = e_x', e_y = e_y') &\subseteq S_x(e_x = e_x^\dagger, e_y = e_y^\dagger) \\ S_y(e_x = e_x', e_y = e_y') &\supseteq S_y(e_x = e_x^\dagger, e_y = e_y^\dagger) \\ S_{x1}(e_x = e_x', e_y = e_y') &\subseteq S_{x1}(e_x = e_x^\dagger, e_y = e_y^\dagger) \\ S_{y1}(e_x = e_x', e_y = e_y') &\supseteq S_{y1}(e_x = e_x^\dagger, e_y = e_y^\dagger) \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, if $e_x + e_y = 1$,

$$\frac{dP(S_x)}{de_y} \text{ and } \frac{dP(S_{x1})}{de_y}$$

are both negative, and since

$$\frac{dP(S_x)}{de_y} = \frac{dP(S_{x1})}{de_y} + \frac{dP(S_{x2})}{de_y}$$

$$\text{so } \frac{dP(S_{x2})}{de_y} < \frac{dP(S_{x1})}{de_y}$$

Similarly,

$$\frac{dP(S_y)}{de_y} \text{ and } \frac{dP(S_{y1})}{de_y}$$

are both positive, and

$$\frac{dP(S_{y2})}{de_y} > -\frac{dP(S_{y1})}{de_y}$$

*8.* If the budget function is such that $\max\{\text{budget} : \text{project} = z\} \leq \min\{\text{budget} : \text{project} = x \text{ or } y\}$, or any other condition guaranteeing that the bureaucrat always prefers his own proposals $x$ and $y$ to the outside competition of type $z$, and $\text{budget}(\text{period} = 1) \geq \text{budget}(\text{period} = 2)$, other things equal, or any other condition guaranteeing that the bureaucrat's time preference cannot be reversed by the budget, then (1) *a higher acceptance level a makes the bureaucrat worse off.* This follows from the fact that if $a^\dagger > a'$, then $S_{x1}(a = a^\dagger) \subseteq S_{x1}(a = a')$, $S_x(a = a^\dagger) \subseteq$

$S_x(a = a')$, $S_{y1}(a = a^{\dagger}) \subseteq S_{y1}(a = a')$, $S_y(a = a^{\dagger}) \subseteq S_y(a = a')$, and $S_z(a = a^{\dagger}) \supseteq S_z(a = a')$; and (2) *a stochastically larger Z makes the bureaucrat worse off.* This follows by a very similar argument. Note that if $Z$ becomes stochastically larger, the acceptance level $a$ will increase as well.

*9.* A completely mission-oriented bureaucrat's utility function does not depend on the budget. Therefore, the above conclusions 8.1 and 8.2 apply.

Under a winner-take-all incentive policy, budget = 0 whenever project = $z$, so the first condition of section 8 is automatically met. Therefore, if the other condition is also satisfied, those two conclusions apply to this case as well.

*10.* It is obvious that the superior always prefers a stochastically larger distribution of $\max(X, Y)$. If the bureaucrat is purely budget oriented (i.e., his utility does not depend on the program type), the budget is proportional to the political benefits, and his utility function is such that it implicitly defines an optimal acceptance level $a^{\dagger}$ from his perspective (analogous to the superior's acceptance level $a$; see section 6), then the bureaucrat also prefers a stochastically larger distribution of $\max(X, Y)$, provided that $a^{\dagger} \leqslant a$, i.e., he is less patient than the superior. To see this, note that in this situation both the budget and the period in which the final choice is made can only change to the bureaucrat's advantage. If, however, $a^{\dagger} > a$, it is conceivable (though not necessary) that the superior is more likely to accept proposals in the first period that do not meet the bureaucrat's own standard.

*11.* Given any two random variables $U$ and $V$, a *correlation-decreasing transformation* (*cdt*) changes their joint distribution so that $p(U > s, V > t)$ is decreased for all $s$, $t$, without affecting the marginal distributions of $U$ and $V$ (Epstein and Tanney 1980).

1. Relaxing the assumption that $X$ and $Y$ are independent (given $e_x$ and $e_y$), we will analyze the effect of a *cdt*. Given $e_x$ and $e_y$, a *cdt* on the joint distribution of $X$ and $Y$ leads to a stochastically larger distribution of $M = \max(X, Y)$, which is in the superior's interest. If the bureaucrat is purely budget oriented (i.e., his utility is independent of the *program* type), and less patient than the superior, this helps him as well. If the bureaucrat has some mission bias, the effect of such a *cdt* on his welfare is indeterminate, since the probability that $Y$ exceeds $X$ can either increase or decrease.
2. Relaxing the assumption that $M = \max(X, Y)$ and $Z$ are independent, consider a *cdt* on their joint distribution. As illustrated in the text (Property 2.6.a), this is not always in the superior's interest. Moreover, even if the superior's optimal decision rule is classical (that is, $M$ is accepted in the first period if and only if $M \geqslant a$), then a *cdt* on $M$ and $Z$ is not necessarily good for the superior under a complete-equilibrium analysis. To see this, note that since she cannot precommit to a suboptimal acceptance level (i.e., $a$ must be a best response), she will in general change her cutoff if the joint distribution of $M$ and $Z$ changes. In turn the new $a$ may cause the bureaucrat to alter his search so much to the superior's disadvantage that the net effect on her welfare is negative. However, under the partial-equilibrium analysis of Property 2.6.b, the superior prefers a *cdt* since it has the effect of stochastically increasing $\max(M, Z) = \max(X, Y, Z)$ on the set $\{M < a\}$.

*12.* Suppose the bureaucrat's utility function is of the simple form,

$$u(\mathit{program}, \mathit{budget}, 1) = \begin{cases} 1 + \mathit{budget} & \text{if } \mathit{program} = y \\ c + \mathit{budget} & \text{if } \mathit{program} = x \\ \mathit{budget} & \text{if } \mathit{program} = z \end{cases}$$

$$u(\mathit{program}, \mathit{budget}, 2) = \delta_b\, u(\mathit{program}, \mathit{budget}, 1)$$

where $c$ and $\delta_b$ are both in the interval $[0, 1]$. Assume that the expected utility $E(u)$ is a concave function of $e_y$ with an interior maximum satisfying $dE(U)/de_y = 0$ where $e_x + e_y \equiv 1$. By the results in section 7,

$$\frac{d^2E(u)}{dcde_y} = \frac{dP(S_{x1})}{de_y} + \delta_b \frac{dP(S_{x2})}{de_y}$$

is negative. Therefore, as the relative utility of $c$ of type $x$ is increased, the bureaucrat's optimal $e_y$ decreases, so $e_x$ increases. This determinate result holds only for this special utility function. Even here, however, the remaining comparative statics on $e_x$ and $e_y$ are indeterminate. For example, analyzing the bureaucrat's response to a changed acceptance level $a$ we have

$$\frac{d^2Eu}{da\,de_y} = \left[\frac{d^2P(S_{x1})}{da\,de_y} + \delta_b \frac{d^2P(S_{x2})}{da\,de_y}\right] c + \frac{d^2P(S_{y1})}{da\,de_y} + \delta_b \frac{d^2P(S_{y2})}{da\,de_y}$$

since $u_y = 1$ and $u_z = 0$. Note that many of the *components* of the above equation cannot be signed. For example,

$$\frac{d^2P(S_{x1})}{da\,de_y} = \frac{d}{da}\left(\frac{dP(S_{x1})}{de_y}\right)$$

$$= \frac{d}{da}\left[P(X > Y|X \geqslant a)\frac{dP(X \geqslant a)}{de_y} + \frac{dP(X > Y|X \geqslant a)}{de_y} P(X \geqslant a)\right]$$

$$= P(X > Y|X \geqslant a)\frac{d^2P(X \geqslant a)}{da\,de_y} + \frac{dP(X > Y|X \geqslant a)}{da}\frac{dP(X \geqslant a)}{de_y} + \frac{d^2P(X > Y|X \geqslant a)}{da\,de_y} P(X \geqslant a) + \frac{dP(X > Y|X \geqslant a)}{de_y}\frac{dP(X \geqslant a)}{da}$$

Without further assumptions, the sign of this component cannot be determined, so neither can the overall expression for $d^2Eu/da\,de_y$. Since changes in either $Z$ or $\delta_s$ affect $a$, they are likewise indeterminate. Finally, grinding through similar comparative-static equations for $\delta_b$ and $Y$ reveal that they cannot be signed either.

13. *For any given acceptance rule,* the superior prefers stochastically larger distributions of $X$, $Y$, and $Z$ (obtained by adding nonnegative random variables $\Delta_x$, $\Delta_y$, and $\Delta_z$, respectively). If the superior's utility function is linear or convex (risk-neutral or risk-seeking) in the benefits, she also prefers riskier distributions (obtained by adding random-noise terms $\epsilon_x$, $\epsilon_y$, and $\epsilon_z$, respectively, satisfying $E(\epsilon_i|X, Y, Z) = 0$ for $i = x, y, z$) (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1971). However, paralleling the effect of reduced correlation in section 11.2 above, the effect of riskier $Z$ on the superior's welfare is indeterminate once one allows $a$ and $e_y$ to vary.

## Notes

Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Stanford Conference on Adaptive Institutions (November 1984), the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (August 1985), and the Stanford Seminar on Politics and Organizations (Winter 1986). We would like to thank the seminar and conference participants—especially Thomas Hammond, Keith Krehbiel, Terry Moe, and Barry Weingast—for their helpful comments.

1. Consider, for example, Polsby's finding that "The civilian control of atomic energy . . . started with a scientific laboratory threatened with extinction. As the laboratory searched for ways to remain useful, it began also to seek to innovate and to invent new policies. It is not uncommon to hear of such a sequence of events" (1984, 164).

2. A recent CBO study (Congressional Budget Office 1986) on infrastructure management observed that "federal programs do not constantly encourage broad searches for ways to improve the productivity of infrastructure. Most . . . are managed not to support and promote broad policy goals but instead to provide capital for predetermined types of projects" (p. 15). For more on domestic policy formation see Salamon 1981, 190.

3. These political benefits need not correspond to those of a conventional cost-benefit analysis: the politician's goals need not be normatively appropriate. Indeed, many bureaucrats probably believe that without technical guidance, politicians would often make inappropriate decisions based on narrow electoral criteria. Such officials may think that by manipulating the menu of alternatives they are offering a form of guidance.

4. This condition implies that average political benefits also increase with search.

5. One may wish to consider the jurisdictional structure as an object of long-run strategic interest (Hammond 1986). It is fixed for the short run modeled here. In any case, recall that giving one agency a temporary monopoly is not necessarily suboptimal for the superior, given the opportunity costs of a simultaneous generation of alternatives. Moreover, we will see that the model yields simultaneous *review* of alternatives as a special case.

6. Rejecting poor proposals and accepting good ones, the "classical" stopping rule (Kohn and Shavell 1974), is optimal if $Z$ is independent of $X$ and $Y$ and the future is discounted. We generally assume independence; correlated search is covered in Properties 2.5 and 2.6.

7. Of course, her decision depends on what the realized value of $\max(X, Y)$ is. It is the conditional decision *rule* that can be formulated without observing the bureau's proposals.

8. This preference ordering approximates the air force's attitudes toward intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in the 1950s. Initially unenthusiastic toward missiles and strongly oriented toward bombers, the dominant coalition in the air force became much more interested in IRBMs when it became evident it could lose out to the army's Jupiter missile (Armacost 1969, 55–56).

9. Suppose, for example, the superior was a political appointee, an assistant secretary who wanted to make her mark in a hurry. (For data on the length of tenure of political appointees in the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations, see Heclo 1977, 105. For tenure data on senior career bureaucrats, see McGregor 1974, 24).

10. Because the boss takes into account both benefits and costs, the two conditions are intertwined. For example, the more impatient she is, the better the outside competition can be and still be "sufficiently" poor so that the agenda is completely rigged.

11. Of course if the outside competition is sufficiently strong and the superior sufficiently patient, the bureaucrat's search will be irrelevant to the boss because she will never accept his proposals.

12. These results imply another sufficient condition for complete agenda manipulation: if $u_x$ is "sufficiently" small and the chance of getting $y$ approved is not too small, the agenda will be totally rigged.

13. Similarly, it is easy to show that changes in the quality of the agency's alternatives, in the bureaucrat's discount parameter, or in the superior's acceptance level all have indeterminate effects on search (Appendix, sec. 12).

14. The winner-take-all scheme would not necessarily be undesirable if the supply of outside alternatives depended on the prospect of receiving a budget for the program, as was partly the case for the army's interest in missiles (Kanter 1979, 112). In this model, however, $Z$ is exogenously fixed.

15. Let $m_1 = 1$, $m_2 = 2$, $z_1 = 2$, and $z_2 = 4$; their unconditional probabilities equal 1/2. The bureaucrat's discount is .2; the superior's, .4. If $M$ and $Z$ are perfectly positively correlated the superior will accept either $m_1$ or $m_2$; if they are independent she will reject $m_1$. She prefers the latter situation; the bureaucrat, the former.

16. Though the purely budget-oriented administrator was a special case, almost all of Model 2's results carry over to the more realistic setting of an administrator interested in both missions and funding. (One must assume, of course, that the two types of agents face the same budgetary policy.) The only results that do not generalize are the parts of Properties 2.4 and 2.5 describing the responses of an impatient bureaucrat.

17. This scheme is not the only way to induce unbiased search. Assuming that the costs of implementing the program would still be covered, the superior could, in the first period, subtract a fixed amount of $c_1$ if she chose $y$. When combined with appropriate second-period adjustments, *any* weighted average of penalty for $y$ of $\alpha c_1$ and bonus for $x$ of $(1 - \alpha)c_1$ would have the desired effect of neutralizing the bureaucrat's mission orientation. There are infinitely many such combinations. A choice between bonuses and penalties would probably matter to the superior. If she is operating under an overall budget constraint, a bonus for choosing $x$ would require transfering funds from another bureau to this agency; a penalty for choosing $y$ would reduce the program size of this agency. However, the comparative-static results of Properties 3.2 and 3.3 are unaffected by this choice between carrots

and sticks.

18. In a model of advice giving, Calvert has discovered the intriguing result that superiors may prefer more biased subordinates (1985a). However, because he has modeled asymmetric information quite differently from the approach taken here, his finding and ours are not comparable.

19. The one exception is a change in the bureaucrat's discount factor: inspecting the second-period terms in the budget policy of Property 3.1 reveals that a change in $\delta_b$ can make the superior either better or worse off.

20. Personnel shifts are another matter: as we have seen, these affect a superior's welfare because it costs less to obtain unbiased search from less biased bureaucrats.

21. Note that most of the comparative statics on the bureau's allocation of search effort are still indeterminate: for instance, improved $Z$ could make it focus more on $x$ or $y$. Therefore, those interested in the details of policy formation might still find the agency's behavior interesting. In either case, however, the new search would be unbiased.

22. Two other assumptions of perfect information should also be subjected to sensitivity analysis: that the bureaucrat knows the superior's acceptance level, and that both know the distribution of second-round possibilities. It is worth noting that if the superior has an unbiased but noisy perception of $Z$, her acceptance level is higher than it would be if she knows $Z$ (Kohn and Shavell 1974, 115). The reason parallels her preference for more objectively innovative search: because she can always fall back on the agency's better alternative, her increased perception of very bad possibilities is irrelevant, but her belief in very good possibilities raises her aspirations. (In this case, interestingly, the political superior need not have optimistic biases in order to have unrealistically high policy aspirations.) Yet, although pure uncertainty imparts a bias to behavior, as perceptions become less noisy the acceptance level converges to the full-information $a^*$; thus here small amounts of uncertainty do indeed have only small effects on actions.

23. For an analysis of the control problems created by the multiplicity of political principals and the ensuing multiple-winning coalitions, see Hill 1985 and Hammond, Hill, and Miller 1986. For a more wide-ranging analysis of the problems politicians have in controlling bureaucratic agents, see Moe 1984.

## References

Aberbach, Joel, Robert Putnam, and Bert Rockman 1981. *Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Aberbach, Joel, and Bert Rockman. 1976. Clashing Beliefs within the Executive Branch: The Nixon Administration Bureaucracy. *American Political Science Review* 70:456–68.

Allison, Graham. 1971. *The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis.* Boston: Little, Brown.

Armacost, Michael. 1969. *The Politics of Weapons Innovation.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Arnold, Peri. 1976. Executive Reorganization Theory. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.

Arrow, Kenneth. 1985. The Economics of Agency. In *Principals and Agents,* eds. John Pratt and Richard Zeckhauser. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Bendor, Jonathan. 1985. *Parallel Systems: Redundancy in Government.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Bergerson, Frederick. 1980. *The Army Gets an Air Force: Tactics of Insurgent Bureaucratic Politics.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Bhattacharya, Sudipto, and Dilip Mookherjee. 1986. Portfolio Choice in Research and Development. *Rand Journal* 17:594–605.

Calvert, Randall. 1985a. The Value of Biased Information: A Rational Choice Model of Political Advice. *Journal of Politics* 47:530–55.

Calvert, Randall. 1985b. Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model. *American Journal of Political Science* 29:69–95.

Congressional Budget Office. 1986. *Federal Policies for Infrastructure Management.* Washington: GPO.

Coulam, Robert. 1977. *Illusions of Choice: The F-111 and the Problem of Weapons Acquisition Reform.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Destler, I. M. 1974. *Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Epstein, Larry, and Stephen Tanny. 1980. Increasing Generalized Correlation. *Canadian Journal of Economics* 13:16–34.

Futrell, Robert. 1980. *Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907–1964.* New York: Arno.

Halperin, Morton. 1974. *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy.* Washington: Brookings.

Hammond, Thomas. 1986. Agenda Control, Organizational Structure, and Bureaucratic Politics. *American Journal of Political Science* 30: 379–420.

Hammond, Thomas, Jeffrey Hill, and Gary Miller 1986. Presidential Appointment of Bureau Chiefs and the "Congressional Control of Administration" Hypothesis. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC.

Heclo, Hugh. 1977. *A Government of Strangers.*

Washington: Brookings.

Heclo, Hugh. 1978. Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment. In *The New American Political System*, ed. Anthony King. Washington: American Enterprise Institute.

Hess, Stephen. 1976. *Organizing the Presidency.* Washington: Brookings.

Hill, Jeffrey. 1985. Why So Much Stability? The Role of Agency Determined Stability. *Public Choice* 46:275–87.

Huntington, Samuel. 1961. *The Common Defense.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Kanter, Arnold. 1979. *Defense Politics: A Budgetary Perspective.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kaufman, Herbert. 1960. *The Forest Ranger: A Study in Administrative Behavior.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Kingdon, John. 1984. *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies.* Boston: Little, Brown.

Kohn, Meir, and Steven Shavell. 1974. The Theory of Search. *Journal of Economic Theory* 9: 93–123.

Light, Paul. 1983. *The President's Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Carter.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lynn, Laurence. 1981. *Managing the Public's Business.* New York: Basic Books.

McGregor, Eugene. 1974. Politics and the Career Mobility of Bureaucrats. *American Political Science Review* 68:18–26.

March, James, and Johan Olsen. 1983. What Administrative Reorganization Tells Us about Governing. *American Political Science Review* 77:281–96.

Mayhew, David. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Merton, Robert. 1957. *Social Theory and Social Structure.* Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

Moe, Terry. 1984. The New Economics of Organization. *American Journal of Political Science* 28: 739–77.

Moe, Terry. 1985. The Politicized Presidency. In *The New Direction in American Politics*, eds. John Chubb and Paul Peterson. Washington: Brookings.

Nathan, Richard. 1975. *The Plot that Failed: Nixon and the Administrative Presidency.* New York: Wiley.

Neustadt, Richard. 1960. *Presidential Power.* New York: Wiley.

Pfeffer, Jeffrey. 1981. *Power in Organizations.* Marshfield, MA: Pitman.

Polsby, Nelson. 1984. *Political Innovation in America.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Rothschild, Michael, and Joseph Stiglitz. 1971. Increasing Risk II: Its Economic Consequences. *Journal of Economic Theory* 3:66–84.

Salamon, Lester. 1981. The Presidency and Domestic Policy Formulation. In *The Illusion of Presidential Government*, eds. Hugh Heclo and Lester Salamon. Boulder: Westview.

Schlesinger, Arthur. 1958. *The Coming of the New Deal.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Seidman, Harold. 1970. *Politics, Position, and Power.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Simon, Herbert, Donald Smithburg, and Victor Thompson. 1950. *Public Administration.* New York: Knopf.

Sutton, John, Avner Shaked, and Kenneth Binmore. 1986. An Outside Option Experiment. London School of Economics. Typescript.

Wittman, Donald. 1983. Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis of Alternative Theories. *American Political Science Review* 77:142–57.

Jonathan Bendor is Associate Professor of Public Policy and Public Management, and Roland Van Gaalen is Ph.D. candidate in Statistics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305.

Serge Taylor is Associate Professor of Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213.

# ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND THE COHERENCE OF LEGISLATION

DAVID AUSTEN-SMITH
WILLIAM H. RIKER
*University of Rochester*

*Legislators' beliefs, preferences, and intentions are communicated in committees and legislatures through debates, the proposal of bills and amendments, and the recording of votes. Because such information is typically distributed asymmetrically within any group of decision makers, legislators have incentives to reveal or conceal private information strategically and thus manipulate the collective decision-making process in their favor. In consequence, any committee decision may in the end reflect only the interests of a minority. We address a problem of sharing information through debate in an endogenous, agenda-setting, collective-choice process. The model is game theoretic and we find in the equilibrium to the game that at least some legislators have incentives to conceal private information. Consequently, the final committee decision can be "incoherent" by failing to reflect the preferences of all committee members fully. Additionally, we characterize the subset of legislators with any incentive to conceal data.*

> In sum, reasoned deliberation is important in decision making. Lawmaking consists of more than log rolling, compromises, or power plays. General debate enables members to gain a better understanding of complex issues, and it may influence the collective decisions of the House. The dilemma members often face . . . "is to know what is right, and to make the right decisions" based upon skimpy, incomplete, or unavailable information.
>
> Oleszek, *Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process*

The study of rhetoric is possibly the earliest form of political analysis. Within this tradition scholars have, for pedagogical purposes, categorized rhetorical devices and stances and judged the persuasiveness of appeals. From Aristotle onwards, a frequent proposition in the commentary on rhetoric is that rhetorical stances are and ought to be conditional on the particular audience and situation. Because there are, beforehand, infinitely many audiences and situations, the mere compilation of appropriate stances on a case-by-case basis is not useful for generalization. To approach the proposition about audiences and situations systematically, it is necessary to explore more abstract models of rhetorical interaction, which, one hopes, will ultimately be testable. What follows is a step in this direction.

Legislation is rarely, if ever, an end in itself. Instead, lawmakers are concerned about the consequences of legislation. Typically, however, the connection between legislation and consequence is known only with uncertainty. And while it may be that legislators' goals and preferences as to outcomes are common knowledge, their individual information and beliefs about possible consequences of policies for these goals are at least partially, and often entirely, private. As a result, their induced preferences as to legislation are private and variable because they blend publicly known goals

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
VOL. 81 NO. 3 SEPTEMBER 1987

with their private judgements. Thus, for example, when considering a minimum-wage bill, the individual legislators' ideals about income distribution are likely to be well known, but their information regarding technical data (e.g., the connection between minimum-wage levels and unemployment), their beliefs about its accuracy, and so on, are likely to be unknown.

Debate is one mechanism whereby such private information can be disseminated within a group of decision makers. With this mechanism each member faces a question of rhetorical strategy: To what degree should one reveal one's private information in debate so that the eventual decision of the group can be based on the information thus pooled? It is by no means clear a priori what the member will do.[1] On the one hand, each individual has an interest in sharing information in order to estimate better which policy is most in his or her particular interest. On the other hand, if information is both asymmetrically distributed and, when kept private, potentially advantageous in the decision-making process, there is an incentive to conceal data strategically. If the group is collegial in tone (as, for example, a cabinet) then one might expect sharing. In adversarial groups, however, with parties having widely divergent interests in policy, concealment seems more likely.

In any event, within the context of legislative decision making, understanding the circumstances in which individuals have incentives to conceal germane information is of considerable interest. For when such data are not shared, the legislative decision may turn out in the end to reflect only the interests of some minority.

In the next two sections we offer a simple model of committee decision making in which committee members can transmit private information, either directly, through debate, or indirectly, through offering motions. During an initial debate stage, individuals may reveal all, some, or none of their relevant data. After debate, they simultaneously offer one policy proposal each. These proposals constitute the agenda. Given the agenda, a round-robin majority voting process determines the group choice. Finally, the model is set up to avoid voting cycles. Because we are concerned with the strategic management of information, we have deliberately eliminated other problems of strategy by standardizing and trivializing agenda formation and voting. A complete description of the process of decision making would, of course, require the analysis of strategic choice at every stage of the process, but we limit ourselves here to the initial task of studying the revelation of information.

In principle, individuals' information can vary across stages. Thus, if not all information is pooled at the debate stage, some legislators might, at the voting stage, wish to alter their proposals. But because our model is a single reading process, this option is not available. Evidently, if all information is fully shared in debate, no one can have reason to change his or her proposal and the agenda will be invariant over repeated readings. With a slight deviation from customary usage, we call such an agenda "coherent."[2] Our principle finding is that within this institutional setting, coherence in terms of information sharing is not guaranteed. Beyond that, we show that the committee divides into two disjoint and well-defined groups of legislators. All the legislators in one group, containing the median voter (measured with respect to preferences over the consequences of legislation), choose to reveal all their information. Each legislator in the remaining group has an incentive to conceal some or all of his or her private information. And if we pair any legislator other than the median from the first group with any legislator from the second group, they will be diametrically opposed with respect to the issue under consideration by the committee.

We describe the model and results informally, then discuss further implications and draw conclusions. We develop the model formally and offer proofs for the results in the extensive, entirely self-contained, Appendix.

## Model and Results: Informal Development

### The Model

The canonical problem the model addresses is easily stated. Consider a group of individuals (a committee) required to come to some collective decision, the consequences of which are known only with uncertainty. Suppose the individuals have diverse preferences over consequences and possess private information as to how different decisions will affect the outcome. Under what circumstances can we expect full revelation of private information, so that collective choice can reflect all the data relevant to the decision? The answer depends on, among other things, such factors as the nature of the decision and the degree of uncertainty, on the particular collective decision-making scheme used, on the distribution of preferences over consequences, and so on.

The structure here is straightforward. We consider a committee consisting of $n$ individuals, where $n$ is an odd number greater than or equal to three. Each member of the committee has quadratic preferences over a one-dimensional space of consequences. We suppose the preferences to differ only in ideal points so that, in particular, legislators' attitudes to risk are the same. Quadratic preferences are symmetric and single peaked and exhibit a high degree of risk aversion. Legislator $i$'s ideal point is labelled $z_i$. For convenience of argument, legislators are themselves named so that $z_1 < z_2 < \ldots < z_n$; thus, the lower the index $i$, the further left is $z_i$ on the single dimension. This committee has to select a policy. Like consequences, policies are taken to be one-dimensional objects and are called bills. We impose the simplest relationship connecting bills to outcomes, or consequences: bills equal outcomes up to the realization of some random variable. Thus, letting $b$ denote a particular bill, and $\beta$ the random variable, the consequence of implementing policy $b$ is itself a random variable given by $y = b + \beta$. So one can think of a bill producing outcomes probabilistically, an interpretation that reflects genuine disputes in the real world about the anticipated consequences of legislation.

An example of the sort of issue described here is the mandatory fluoridation of public water supplies. In this case, $b$ denotes the level of fluoride that agencies are required to introduce into the water supplies—determined by legislation—while $\beta$ describes the level introduced by nature. It is the total level of fluoride in water, the consequence $y$, that legislators care about; but they can only determine part of this beforehand and their expectations regarding the distribution of nature's contribution, $\beta$, will affect their preferences as to policies, $b$.

For convenience in abstract argument and model building, we assume some statistical regularities about $\beta$. Thus, the distribution of $\beta$ is normal with an unknown mean, $\beta^*$, but with a known variance of one; the covariance between $b$ and $\beta$ is identically zero; all legislators share the same prior beliefs regarding $\beta^*$, and these are described by the standardized normal distribution. The assumption that $\beta$ is distributed normally is largely a technical convenience. The assumptions about the extent of legislators' knowledge concerning this distribution, however, are substantive. That there is ignorance regarding the mean of the distribution is reasonable; that legislators know surely what the variance is, is not so reasonable. We justify the assumption by observing that with only one source of uncertainty, we generate a model sufficiently rich to focus on the strategic issue of concern here. Furthermore, multiple sources of uncertainty can be expected to give added weight to legislators' incentives for concealing private information. Thus, any results obtained regarding the incentives to conceal are stronger with only a singleton source.

Before the committee meets, each member acquires some information about $\beta^*$ in the form of an independent random sample from the distribution of $\beta$. This sampling is what produces members' private information. We describe legislator $i$'s private information as an expectation of the unknown mean, $\beta^*$, based on the sample $i$ observes: denote this expectation here as $E_i[\beta^*]$. So, before observing his or her random sample, a legislator initially believes that nature, on average, adds no fluoride to water supplies; but, having observed the sample, the legislator comes to expect nature to contribute a level of $E_i[\beta^*]$ on average.[3]

Because legislator $i$'s initial belief regarding the average value of the random variable is zero, $i$'s induced ideal point over bills is given by $z_i$ *prior* to observing the random sample. *After* observing the sample, however, $i$'s induced ideal point is revised consonant with $i$'s change in belief and is now given by $z_i - E_i[\beta^*]$. In terms of our running example, $i$'s most preferred level of legislated fluoridation is given by $i$'s most preferred level of fluoridation in the absence of natural intervention minus the expected level of nature's contribution. Once legislators have received their information, there is clearly no reason to presume that the distribution of induced ideal points over the policy dimension is the same as that over outcomes. Consequently we can have, say, $z_i - E_i[\beta^*]$ less than $z_j - E_j[\beta^*]$ even though $z_j$ is less than $z_i$.

The common prior over $\beta^*$, the sample size, and the list of ideal points over outcomes, $\{z_i\}$, are all common knowledge.[4] Only individual-sample means, and thus expectations $\{E_i[\beta^*]\}$, are private data.

The institutional details of decision making have already been sketched. The process has three stages. During the first stage, legislators engage in debate. After debate, each committee member (simultaneously) makes a proposal, a bill $b_i$, generating an agenda $\mathbf{b} = (b_1, \ldots, b_n)$. Finally, majority voting over all pairs of proposals determines the committee decision. Given our earlier assumptions, there will always be a Condorcet winner at this stage if the set of proposals is not empty: that is, despite variations in the relative orderings of legislators along the policy dimension, single-peaked preferences over bills are preserved. And because there will always be some proposal offered, the committee's final decision is well defined. The agenda-setting stage and the voting stage are fairly standard; the debate stage, though, is novel.

"Debate" is modeled as a strategic signalling game (see, e.g., Banks and Sobel 1987; Crawford and Sobel 1982; Gal-Or 1985, 1986). The idea underlying the model is that speeches in committee reveal information as to where legislators stand on some issue and why they hold their positions. Such information is not going to persuade people to alter their evaluations of consequences; it can, however, affect their perceptions of what bill or policy will best promote particular outcomes. In the present context, committee members' beliefs regarding the mean of $\beta$ determines their most preferred policy. Going into committee, these beliefs are based largely on private data. Sharing information in committee can lead members to revise their expectations and thus affect their induced preferences over legislation. Recognizing this makes information sharing a strategic consideration for individual legislators.

There are a variety of ways to model debate as a signalling game. Here, we adopt one of the simplest. Legislators simultaneously reveal unbiased estimates of their private data to the committee as a whole. The strategic character of information sharing is introduced by allowing the estimate to be noisy. If a legislator's message is noise free, that legislator fully reveals his or her private data. If the message is completely noisy, he or she reveals nothing. Intermediate levels of noise offer partial information. In this last case, because the selection of a noise level is a strategic decision, other participants may make inferences about the legislator's information in addition to that contained in the message per se, that is, saying nothing may sometimes reveal much.

Although it has precedent in other models of signaling (Gal-Or 1985, 1986), restricting strategies to unbiased estimates of individuals' true data is a strong assumption (Crawford and Sobel 1982). Emphasizing favorable information and playing down unfavorable information is commonplace in political argument, even if straightforward lying is not.[5] Ultimately, this assumption needs to be relaxed. But we will use it here in order to concentrate on the simplest problem of rhetorical strategy, namely, the amount of information to impart, without complicating the analysis with considerations of the quality of information transmitted.

The remaining substantive restriction imposed is the strategic simultaneity of messages: this rules out the give-and-take of argument in the normal usage. In the present context, however, dialectical changes of position can have no role, so the assumption seems a legitimate working principle.

The institutional structure described induces a three-stage game with the legislators as players. For each legislator, a strategy consists of a signalling rule for the debate stage of the game, a proposal rule for the agenda-setting stage, and a voting rule for the final stage. Each of these rules specifies what the legislator should do at the relevant stage, *given* his or her information at that stage and the strategies of others. For example, in the debate stage, a legislator's actual choice of noise depends on, among other things, his or her private information; while the legislator's actual choice of proposal, $b_i$, is conditional not only on this data but also on the signals received in debate from other legislators.

As noted, the agenda-setting stage results in an agenda, **b**, which is a list of proposals by members, $\mathbf{b} = (b_1, \ldots, b_n)$. In order to interpret the agenda **b**, consider the situation at the end of the third stage, when the agenda has been voted on. Each legislator, having observed others' proposals and votes, can then look back and formulate, afterwards, the proposal that he or she would now choose to make. Call this ex post proposal $b_i^+$ and let $\mathbf{b}^+$ be the list of these preferred final proposals. Clearly, $\mathbf{b}^+$ need not be the same as **b** because at the end one or more legislators might wish they had offered different proposals. Define an agenda to be *coherent*, however, if and only if $\mathbf{b}^+ = \mathbf{b}$. In other words, an agenda is coherent if and only if, once revealed to the committee and voted on, no legislator would wish to change his or her proposal from that offered (in ignorance of others' proposals) during stage two of the process. This definition of coherence means that all the information potentially available to the committee—as a whole and at the time of the legislative choice—has in fact been incorporated into bills and votes.[6] The rationale for the definition is that when the committee decision reflects all information, the bill enacted is as consistent as possible with the values of the members. When not all the information is pooled, however, the enactment may be at odds with the values of some, even many, members of the group. But notice that coherence does not *require* all private information in fact to be pooled: only that the outcome from a coherent agenda be *as* *if* such pooling had occurred.

Each legislator $i$ chooses a strategy to maximize his or her expected pay-off from the eventual collective decision, that is, the bill passed at the voting stage of the game. Only pure strategies are considered and we look for perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBEs). This solution concept rules out cooperative behavior among legislators (our model is "adversarial" rather than "collegial") and ensures that strategies selected prior to any given stage of the game remain optimal once that stage is reached (Selten 1975). A formal description of the game and definition of the equilibrium is given in sections 1–8 of the Appendix.

Before going on to present the results, it is worth reemphasizing that the model is explicitly set up to isolate the strategic aspects of information transmission. For example, although agenda setting is endogenous, the way in which proposals are placed and the structure of the subsequent voting mechanism effectively give legislators' dominant proposal strategies. Were this not the case, any outcome of the decision-making process other than the pooled-information result (i.e., the median voters' ideal point relative to the pooled information) could not then be attributed surely to the strategic use of information. Moreover, with a single-dimensional issue space, simple-majority voting over all pairs of alternatives in the agenda, and (very) risk-averse preferences, the model is intrinsically biased toward legislators choosing to reveal all their private data in debate. Any results asserting that legislators may yet choose to conceal private information are thereby relatively strong.

### Results

Consider the situation before any legislator has observed his or her private information but in which all legislators have the set of commonly known data, that is, what the sample size will be, what everyone's priors over $\beta$ are, and so forth. Given this situation, define $E[\mu]$ to be the expected location of the median *proposal* at the agenda-setting stage of the decision-making process. Let $i^*$ be the legislator with the median ideal point in *consequences*, $i^* = (n + 1)/2$. Then the main results may be summarized as follows:

PROPOSITION. *There exists an essentially unique PBE such that,* relative to their information at each stage,[7]

1. *all legislators vote sincerely in the voting stage of the game*
2. *all legislators propose their expected induced ideal points in the agenda-setting stage of the game*
3. *legislator $i^*$ always volunteers all his or her private information in debate*
4. *If $E[\mu] = z_i^*$, then all legislators volunteer all their private information in debate*
5. *If $E[\mu] < (>)\ z_i^*$, then any legislator $i > (<)\ i^*$ will volunteer all his or her private data in debate*
6. *If $E[\mu] < (>)\ z_i^*$, then any legislator $i < (>)\ i^*$ has an incentive to conceal part or all of his or her private data in debate. Partial revelation of data is* not *fully revealing, and what the legislators choose to do (reveal none, some, or all of their data) depends on the particular distribution of preferences and parameters of the situation*
7. *Suppose $E[\mu] < z_i^*$; then in the equilibrium, $i < j$ implies $i$ will offer no more information in debate than $j$, all $i, j < i^*$, mutatis mutandis, the analogous result holds when $E[\mu] > z_i^*$*

It follows from Claims 5–7 of the proposition that coherent agendas cannot be guaranteed. Claims 5 and 6 also say that *all* of the legislators with an incentive to conceal their private information lie on exactly *one* side of the median in outcome space, $i^*$. In other words, if any two legislators—say, $j$ and $k$—fail to share all of their private data with the committee at the debate stage, then either (1) $z_j < z_i^*$ *and* $z_k < z_i^*$, or (2) $z_j > z_i^*$ *and* $z_k > z_i^*$ (which of these two possibilities obtain depends on, among other things, the distribution of ideal points $\{z_i\}$). And Claim 7 of the proposition asserts that more extreme legislators, in terms of their positions with respect to consequences, have a relatively greater incentive than others to conceal private information when anyone on their side of the issue has any such incentive.

Claim 1 of the result follows from the single-reading structure of decision making. Sophisticated voting is by definition an action taken at an earlier stage to influence an outcome at a later stage. Because the sequence of debate, agenda setting, and voting occurs only once, there is nothing to be gained by voting insincerely in the final stage. The intuition behind Claim 2 is much the same. Single-peakedness of individuals' preferences over bills is preserved in the model and so, given the equilibrium voting strategies specified in Claim 1, legislators can do no better in the agenda-setting stage than offer their expected induced ideal point for consideration (see section 9 of the Appendix).

Although, at the agenda-setting stage, legislators propose their expected induced ideal points, it may turn out afterwards that once the agenda is revealed, each individual will update his or her beliefs regarding an ideal point. This is because each member knows that in equilibrium, proposals reveal currently perceived ideal points. These are certainly invertible so that all private data is effectively public once the voting stage is reached. However, recognizing this fact does not alter the ex ante optimality of choosing proposals according both to one's private information and to the data actually revealed in debate. Of course, if all information is revealed in debate, then no legislator would wish to alter a proposal afterwards.

**Figure 1. Ideal Points over Consequences, $y = b + b$**



**Figure 2. Induced Ideal Points over Bills, $b$, under Fully Pooled Information**



Now notice that because individual proposal strategies are fully revealing, legislator $i^* = (n + 1)/2$ will surely be the median voter with respect to bills at the voting stage—with fully pooled data, legislators' *relative* positions over bills correspond exactly to those over outcomes (see Figures 1 and 2, in which legislators' common expectation regarding $\beta$ under fully pooled information is denoted $E[\beta^*]$). Consequently, at the voting stage, the proposal most preferred by $i^*$ will win. But it is *not* true that legislator $i^*$ will necessarily make the winning proposal at the agenda-setting stage. It is precisely the possibility of being the proposer of the bill de facto most preferred by $i^*$ that generates incentives to conceal information in debate.

Consider a single individual $i$ at the start of the debate stage, prior to any opportunities for sharing information. For expositional purposes, suppose initially that there are three committee members. The legislator's induced ideal point at this stage is $z_i - E_i[\beta^*]$, as indicated earlier. His or her best estimate of the location of the other two legislators'

**Figure 3. Legislator *i*'s Expectations at the Start of the Debate Stage**



induced ideal points at the same stage is exactly as illustrated in Figure 1(b), but with the expectation $E[\beta^*]$ replaced by the legislator's own private—and almost surely distinct—expectation $E_i[\beta^*]$. However, even though all legislators are known to propose their induced ideal points at the agenda-setting stage, it is *not* the case that *i*'s expectation of the de facto median *proposal*, as evaluated at the start of the debate stage, is $z_2 - E_i[\beta^*]$, his or her current estimate of the location of legislator 2's induced ideal point. The reason is simple: because $E_i[\beta^*]$ is an estimate based on *i*'s private data and because the other legislators have formed similar estimates based on their own private data, there is a positive probability that legislators other than *i* are in fact located elsewhere. Hence, any of the three members of the committee has a positive probability of being the proposer of the de facto winning bill.

To estimate the location of the winning proposal, therefore, individual *i* must first calculate the probability of each of the six possible left-to-right orderings of the three committee members' induced ideal points and then, given each of these orderings, estimate the location of the relevant median's most preferred bill. Combining these data gives *i*'s expectation regarding the median proposal, $E_i[\mu]$. Evidently, this estimate, $E_i[\mu]$, must lie between *i*'s expectation of the extreme legislators' ideal points:

$$z_1 - E_i[\beta^*] < E_i[\mu] < z_n - E_i[\beta^*].$$

So, by virtue of the equilibrium second- and third-stage strategies discussed above, it follows that $E_i[\mu]$ must be *i*'s expectation of the de facto winning proposal. Figure 3 illustrates one possibility (see also Appendix, section 15, where an explicit example is worked through).

The choice of legislator *i* in the preceding discussion was arbitrary. But at the start of the debate stage, legislators are identical except for their ideal points in outcome space, $\{z_i\}$, and the specific estimates, $\{E_i[\beta^*]\}$, derived from their private data. Therefore, because any legislator *i*'s induced ideal point is given by $z_i - E_i[\beta^*]$, at the start of the debate stage all legislators will agree on their *relative* positions along the bill dimension. So if, in Figure 3, we first let $i = 1$, then let $i = 2$ and finally let $i = 3$, the picture we would draw in each case would differ *only* in the absolute location of the induced ideal points, and not in their relative locations. In particular, although individuals' predebate estimates of the median proposal, $\{E_i[\mu]\}$, need not coincide, they will all agree on the expected distance separating this estimate from the induced ideal point of the median legislator in consequences. For the example of three voters, this distance is denoted by Δ in Figure 3. In other words, the value of Δ is independent of anybody's private information, even though the individual estimates, $\{E_i[\mu]\}$, do depend on this information. An individual's estimate, $E_i[\mu]$, determines the location in the bill space for his or her calculation of Δ, though the calculation itself then depends only on matters of common knowledge. And this is true whatever the size of the committee.

Because Δ is independent of individuals' private data, we can set $E_i[\beta^*]$ equal to zero for any legislator *i* and calculate $E_i[\mu]$ on this basis—call it $E[\mu]$—and obtain the identical value of Δ we would if we knew *i*'s actual expectation $E_i[\beta^*]$. Moreover, Δ is then given by the distance separating $z_{i^*}$ and $E[\mu]$; it is this fact we exploit in stating our proposition. If, in debate, all private data is fully revealed, then $E_i[\beta^*] = E[\beta^*]$ for all legislators $i$, and, therefore, $\Delta$ is surely equal to zero at the start of the agenda-setting stage. For our three-person example, this situation is depicted in Figure 2. More generally, the greater the amount of private data revealed in debate, the smaller (in absolute value) will be the size of $\Delta$, and the less uncertainty there will be regarding the location of the median proposal (these facts are established in section 10 of the Appendix).

We are now in a position to elucidate Claims 3 through 6 of the proposition. Suppose, for the sake of this discussion, that there are three legislators and the situation is as described in Figure 3, so that everyone at the start of the debate stage estimates the median proposal to be to the right of legislator 2's induced ideal point. As we argued above, the more any private information becomes revealed to the committee as a whole, the closer the situation becomes to the case with fully pooled information (Figure 1b). That is, the value of $\Delta$ is closer to zero, and the uncertainty concerning the accuracy of any individual's estimate of the location of the median induced ideal point is smaller. Therefore, irrespective of what any other legislator chooses to do, both legislator 1 and legislator 2 can reduce $\Delta$ —so moving the expected winning proposal closer to their induced ideal points —and simultaneously lower the uncertainty regarding this outcome by each volunteering all of his or her private data in debate. By the assumption of risk aversion, both effects unambiguously improve these legislators' expected payoffs from the outcome of the decision-making procedure.

Because this result for legislators 1 and 2 depends only on the fact that $\Delta$ is positive and does not depend on what 3 chooses to do, it is easy to see that the argument extends to similarly placed legislators in larger committees. Hence, Claims 3 through 5 follow (see section 11 of the Appendix).

Return now to the three-person example. Given $\Delta$, legislators 1 and 2 have an unambiguously best strategy to pursue in debate. This is not true for legislator 3. On the one hand, revealing his or her private information in debate reduces the uncertainty surrounding the final outcome, which improves legislator 3's expected payoff. But on the other hand, revealing this data reduces the value of $\Delta$, and so the location of the expected winning proposal moves further away from his or her most preferred alternative. Legislator 3 faces a trade-off and exactly what he or she chooses to do will depend on the details of the issue under consideration. In particular, exactly how much information 3 elects to impart in debate will depend on how much other legislators choose to share. In the three-person example we are discussing, 3 can deduce correctly that 1 and 2 will reveal all their private data. Therefore, 3 takes this into account and simply chooses that level of noise in his or her signal which maximizes the expected payoff from the decision-making process, namely, the level that balances 3's expected loss from reducing $\Delta$ with his or her expected gain from reducing the uncertainty surrounding the final outcome.

In committees larger than three, however, the strategic problem for legislators placed similarly to 3, relative to $\Delta$, is more complex. The underlying trade-off is the same for each such voter and, given what everyone else does, the best strategy for any given legislator in this situation is determined by the maximizing problem described above. But there is a further difficulty because these legislators have distinct ideal points in outcome space. Because of this, for any arbitrary list of others' debate strategies, each individual may well have a different most preferred combination of $\Delta$ and the uncertainty surrounding the final outcome.

Consequently, we have to establish that there exists a set of signals at the debate stage—one signal for each of the legislators under consideration—that is mutually consistent in the sense that each legislator's signal maximizes his or her expected payoff, given the specified signals of everyone else. Technically, such a list is a Bayesian equilibrium to the debate stage of the decision-making game, and section 12 of the Appendix demonstrates that such an equilibrium exists. This establishes the first part of Claim 6.

The remaining part of Claim 6 says that giving some, but not complete, information is not fully revealing; that is, hearing a noisy message and knowing the level of noise constitute insufficient data for any legislator to infer exactly what the sender's private information must be. The reason for this relates to the fact, discussed above, that the distance $\Delta$ is independent of anyone's private information: therefore, since it is the value of $\Delta$ that matters for strategic purposes, any particular level of noise chosen in equilibrium by, say, legislator 3 is consistent with any specific observations of the random variable. Of course, the actual message received by the committee at large is informative. It is simply not fully revealing (unless there is no noise in the message at all).

The final part of the proposition is a straightforward consequence of legislators' ideal points being distributed along a single-dimensional outcome space. The further out an individual is located relative to the median, $i^*$, the greater the incentive to conceal information. Loosely speaking, this is because the expected utility loss associated with greater uncertainty as to the final outcome is relatively small. With a higher variance, there is a higher likelihood that the final outcome will be located closer to that individual's ideal point. But it is worth remarking that without the assumption of identical sample sizes, *m*, this last result does not necessarily hold (although the other claims do).[8]

Which side of legislator $i^*$'s induced ideal point individuals at the start of the debate stage expect the de facto median proposal to lie on depends on the dispersion of the ideal points $\{z_i\}$ relative to the variances of the distribution of $\beta$ and of the initial beliefs on $\beta^*$. In the Appendix (section 15), we illustrate the possibilities in the context of a three-voter example. Essentially, the example suggests that when committee members' ideal points over consequences are not "too" dispersed or asymmetrically distributed, it is the relative extremists who have an incentive to conceal private information. But if the distribution of these ideal points is sufficiently skewed about the median, it is the relative moderates who have such an incentive. A sufficient condition for all legislators to volunteer all of their private information in debate is (quantitative) symmetry in the distribution of ideal points, $\{z_i\}$; that is, for any $z_i$ less than $z_{i^*}$, there is a distinct $z_j$ greater than $z_{i^*}$ such that $(z_{i^*} - z_i) = (z_j - z_{i^*})$. In this instance, the value of $\Delta$ is identically zero. Although slight deviations from symmetry leave $\Delta$ "close" to zero, we cannot say surely whether or not such deviations induce information sharing that is "close" to complete. Our conjecture is that it will be close. With small $\Delta$, the expected change in the location of the winning proposal is small, but with, say, no information sharing on the part of those with any incentive to conceal, the variance associated with this location is high. Because legislators are risk averse, therefore, we expect relatively weak incentives to hide private information in this case.

## Conclusion

The importance of imperfect and incomplete information for explaining much of what we observe in the political world has long been recognized (by, e.g., Mill 1910, Milton 1927; and, in a more abstract way, Downs 1957). However, it is only relatively recently that appropriate analytical techniques have been developed with which to address the issues. The relevant literature is correspondingly thin, although growing rapidly, and most of this work is concentrated in models of elections (see Calvert 1986 for a recent review). There are three principal ways in which information can be transmitted in the legislative process: through voting behavior, through making proposals or amendments, and through debate. We know of only one work explicitly concerned with any of these, namely Ordeshook and Palfrey 1985, which examines some examples of sophisticated voting in which legislators know only their own preferences surely. The authors do not address proposals and debate, the focus of attention here. In particular, we concentrate on the extent to which a legislative, decision-making process is coherent in the sense that it generates incentives for legislators to share any private information germane to the decision. For the procedure studied here, our results suggest that while agendas may indeed be set under effectively pooled information, coherence—in the sense of information sharing—is not generally guaranteed.

Given our contemporary pessimism about the rationality of social life, our main result on coherence may seem obvious. However, not everyone shares this pessimism and, frequently, what is presupposed in accepting the "obvious" is not always so transparent (witness, for instance, the history of the "law of demand" in economics). Furthermore, we did not anticipate our additional result as to *which* legislators, in committees of the type studied here, would have incentives to conceal private information. (It should be noted, however, that this characterization is essentially an artifact of the assumption of a one-dimensional issue.) Admittedly, these results come from a sparse model. However, one way to study reality is to examine models where the assumptions are made for the sake not of verisimilitude but of a conservative test. Our model, as argued earlier, is biased toward full revelation. As such, the results have substantive implications both descriptively and normatively.

For the proposition on coherence, just as the possibility of strategic generation of cycles refutes the argument that Condorcet voting rules produce the socially preferred choice, so the possibility of strategic revelation of information refutes the argument that Condorcet voting rules produce the correct choice—Condorcet's so-called jury theorem (see Black 1958, 163-65). More generally, our result calls into question some extreme claims of liberalism, for instance, that truth triumphs in the marketplace of ideas.

Given this descriptive and normative significance, it is important to ask, How general is our result? We deliberately made our model simple enough to analyze the bare bones of the strategic problem. While we did not find it necessary to limit the number of people (our assumption of an odd number of committee members is simply a convenience to identify the median uniquely), we did limit the number of dimensions, the legislative procedure (e.g., the number of readings), and the range of rhetorical strategy (by disallowing biased information). So it is reasonable to inquire whether our main result—that coherence cannot be guaranteed—carries over into more complicated models and even into the real world.

We conjecture that our result holds up. Suppose one increased the number of dimensions, thereby eliminating or obscuring the multidimensional median. Because the revelation that occurs in our model depends on knowledge of the median, it seems unlikely that the absence or invisibility of a median will motivate coherence.

Suppose one altered the legislative procedure by increasing the number of readings. Such a model, being more specific than ours, might institutionally encourage full revelation. That is, legislators might, after initial readings, formulate their ex post optima, $b^+$, relative to these preliminary readings, to use as b for the final reading; thus perhaps actually achieving an agenda $b^+$ after the final reading such that $b^+ = b$. If so, they satisfy the definition of coherence. The expectation that coherence will be produced in this way depends, we conjecture, on whether the number of readings is finite or not. If there are an infinite number of readings, then with (in effect) an infinity of test votes, other participants may well be able to infer concealed information, thereby generating coherence. Suppose, however, that the number of readings is finite, perhaps limited to two or three as in normal legislative procedure. If there is strategic advantage to concealing information in debate, then this advantage surely persists through debate, proposals, and voting of all penultimate readings. In which case, legislators would be expected to reveal fully only at the proposal and vote of the final reading. Thus the model of multiple readings may well reduce to the case of a single reading.

Whether a model of committees and legislatures is appropriately conceived as having a finite or infinite number of readings depends on how specifically one wishes to model institutions. If institutions are subordinated to the whole political process (including elections, campaign polls, etc.) in a seamless and continuous world, then one ought to assume infinite readings, for politics goes on forever. If, however, the investigatory emphasis is on institutions as such, then the model of finite readings seems appropriate. In which case, the results of our model are likely to be robust.

Suppose, finally, that contrary to our assumptions, legislators reveal biased information. This is surely a more realistic model than ours. It means that, besides giving simply noisy signals, rhetoricians might offer biased information. In our example of fluoridation, the variable would involve not only the amount of naturally occurring fluoride but also the quality of estimates made by persons variously concerned about caries, cancer, or communism. We conjecture that considerations of bias would do nothing to increase coherence (though they raise a host of important issues in their own right).

Consider two cases, one where any debater's bias is common knowledge and one where it is not. If bias is known, it can be appropriately discounted and is indeed irrelevant. If, on the other hand, voters believe that information is biased but do not surely know exactly how, this belief compounds uncertainty and complicates legislators' evaluations of the median and of the strategy of revelation. If voters are Bayesian in estimating bias, debaters are then likely to distort in strategic ways. If, however, voters are Laplacian in their treatment of bias (and thus inconsistent with the assumptions of this model), debaters are then encouraged to lie directly. So, if there is ever an advantage to conceal one's true position, the possibility of bias, it seems, will at least not increase, and will probably decrease, coherence.

## Appendix

We begin by describing, in sections 1–7, the formal structure of the decision-making game being analyzed.

1. *Committee.* Let $N = \{1, 2, \ldots, n\}$ be the set of committee members, $n$ odd and $n \geqslant 3$. Each $i \in N$ is endowed with quadratic preferences over the set of consequences, called outcomes, R: $U_i(y) = -(z_i - y)^2$, $\forall\ y \in R$ where $z_i \in R$ is $i$'s given ideal point. Without loss of general-

ity, index $N$ so that $i < j$ if and only if $z_i < z_j$, for all $i, j \in N$.

2. *Policy Issue.* The committee has to select a policy, called a bill, $b \in R$. Policies equal outcomes up to a realization of a one-dimensional random variable $\beta$. An outcome is then a mapping, $y$: $R^2 \to R$ such that $y(b \mid \beta) = b + \beta$. Assume $\beta \sim N(\beta^*, 1)$ and $\text{cov}(\beta, b) = 0$.

3. *Information.* The mean $\beta^*$ is assumed unknown. All legislators share common priors over this mean, described by the standardized normal distribution, $\Phi$. Prior to going into committee, each $i \in N$ observes an independent random sample of $m$ draws from $N(\beta^*, 1)$: let $i$'s sample mean be $\beta_i$. The structure of preferences, the distribution of ideal points over outcomes $\{z_i\}$, the sample size $m$, and the shared prior distribution of $\beta$ are all common knowledge. Each individual $i$'s sample mean $\beta_i$ is private information, known only to $i$.

4. *Induced Preferences.* From 1, 2, and 3, on going into committee, each $i \in N$ has induced preferences over bills given by

$$\begin{aligned} u_i(b) &= E[-(z_i - b - \beta)^2 \mid \beta_i] \\ &= -(z_i - b)^2 + E[\beta \mid \beta_i] \cdot (2(b - z_i) \\ &\quad - E[\beta \mid \beta_i]) - \text{var}\,\beta \end{aligned}$$

This indirect utility function is symmetric-single-peaked in $b$, with induced ideal point given by $\zeta_i = z_i - E[\beta \mid \beta_i]$. Applying Bayes Rule to individuals' priors over $\beta$ gives $E[\beta \mid \beta_i] = m\beta_i/(m + 1)$, $i \in N$. Clearly there is no reason for the distribution of induced ideal points $\{\zeta_i\}$ to be the same as that of ideal points over consequences.

5. *Decision-Making Procedure.* Committee decision making has three stages: debate, agenda setting, and voting. In debate, legislators simultaneously reveal noisy messages:

$$\hat{\beta}_i = \beta_i + \eta_i;\ \eta_i \sim N(0, s_i),\ s_i \in [0, \infty],\ \forall i \in N.$$

Here, the level of noise $s_i$ is a control variable of legislator $i$. We suppose that on hearing any legislator's message, the level of noise selected by the legislator becomes common knowledge. This is evidently an extreme case. It is, however, extreme at the conservative end of the spectrum, particularly since we have ruled out biased signals. Once messages are revealed, each legislator $i$ (simultaneously, from a strategic perspective) makes a proposal, a value $b_i \in R$. The list of proposals $\{b_i\}$ constitutes the agenda. Finally, the committee decision is determined by simple majority voting over all pairs of alternatives in the agenda. By construction, a determinate decision will always emerge (cf. sec. 4). Without loss of generality, assume the sequence of votes is given by $\Sigma = ((b_i \text{ vs. } b_{i+j})_{j=1,\ldots,n-1})_{i=1,\ldots,n-1}$. In words, $\Sigma$ is the sequence-of-sequences given by placing $b_1$ first against $b_2$, then against $b_3$, and so on until finally placed against $b_n$. Then $b_2$ is placed against $b_3$, then against $b_4$, and so on until finally placed against $b_n$. Then $b_3$ is placed against $b_4$, and so on. Finally, the sequence-of-sequences ends with $b_{n-1}$ being placed against $b_n$.

6. *Strategies.* A strategy for legislator $i$ is a triple consisting of a signalling rule, a proposal rule, and a voting rule. Mixed strategies are not permitted. Then, $i$'s signalling rule is a function, $s_i : z_i \times R \to [0, \infty]$; $i$'s proposal rule is a function, $b_i : z_i \times R \to R$; $i$'s voting rule is a function, $v_i : z_i \times R \times R^n \times \Sigma \to \{0, 1\}^{n(n-1)/2}$, where in the vote between $b_i$ and $b_{i+j}$, a value of 0 denotes a vote in favor of $b_{i+j}$ and a value of 1 denotes a vote in favor of $b_i$. $R^n$ here is the set of possible agendas.

We write $t_i = (s_i(z_i, \beta_i), b_i(z_i, \beta_i), v_i(z_i, \beta_i, \{b_j\}, \Sigma)) \in T$, $\forall i \in N$, where T is the set of all possible strategies.

7. *Objectives.* Let $\Omega_i^o = \{\beta_i, \{z_i\}, m\} \in \Omega^o$ describe $i$'s information at the start of the debate stage, where $\Omega^o$ is the family of all possible such informations; and let $\Omega_i = \Omega_i^o \cup \{(\hat{\beta}_j, s_j) \mid j \in N\} \in \Omega$ describe $i$'s information at the start of the agenda setting stage, where $\Omega$ is the family of all possible such informations. Each legislator $i$ chooses a strategy $t_i$ to maximize $i$'s expected pay-off from the committee's final decision. Let $E[b^* \mid \Omega_i^o, \{t_j\}]$ be $i$'s expectation of the winning proposal in the voting stage, conditional on $i$'s beliefs at the start of the debate stage and all legislators' strategies. Let $\{t_{-i}\} = \{t_j \mid j \neq i\}$. Substituting $b^*$ for $b$ in $i$'s indirect utility schedule specified in 4, $i$'s maximand is given by

$$\begin{aligned} &E[u_i(b^*) \mid \Omega_i^o, t_i, \{t_{-i}\}] \\ &\quad = E[-(z_i - b^*)^2 + E[\beta \mid \Omega_i^o, \{t_{-i}\}] \\ &\quad \cdot (2(z_i - b^*) - E[\beta \mid \Omega_i^o, \{t_{-i}\}]) \\ &\quad \mid \Omega_i^o, \{t_j\}] - \operatorname{var}(\beta \mid \Omega_i^o, \{t_{-i}\}) \\ &= -z_i^2 + E[\beta \mid \Omega_i^o, \{t_{-i}\}] \\ &\quad \cdot (2z_i - E[\beta \mid \Omega_i^o, \{t_{-i}\}]) \\ &\quad + E[b^* \mid \Omega_i^o, \{t_j\}] \\ &\quad \cdot (2(z_i - E[\beta \mid \Omega_i^o, \{t_{-i}\}]) \\ &\quad - E[b^* \mid \Omega_i^o, \{t_j\}]) \\ &\quad - \operatorname{var}(\beta \mid \Omega_i^o, \{t_{-i}\}) \\ &\quad - \operatorname{var}(b^* \mid \Omega_i^o, \{t_j\}) \end{aligned}$$

To economize on notation, let $w_i(t_i, t_{-i} \mid \Omega_i^o) \equiv E[u_i(b^*) \mid \Omega_i^o, t_i, \{t_{-i}\}]$. We can now write the committee decision-making game in normal form as, $\Gamma = (\mathrm{T}^n, \{w_i \mid i \in N\})$.

8. *Equilibrium and Proposition.* Let $\tau = 1,2,3$, index each of the three stages of the committee game—respectively, debate, agenda setting, and voting. Let $\Omega_{i(\tau)}$ be $i$'s information at the start of stage $\tau$: thus, $\Omega_{i(1)} = \Omega_i^o$, $\Omega_{i(2)} = \Omega_i$, and $\Omega_{i(3)} = \Omega_i \cup \{b_j\}$. Let $w_{i(\tau)}(\cdot,\cdot \mid \Omega_{i(\tau)})$ be $i$'s expected payoff at the start of stage $\tau$, conditional on $i$'s information at that stage: by definition, $w_{i(1)}(\cdot,\cdot \mid \Omega_{i(1)}) \equiv w_i(\cdot,\cdot \mid \Omega_i^o)$. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) to the committee game $\Gamma$ is an *n*tuple of strategies $\{t_i^*\}$ such that for each $i \in N$, for all $\beta_i \in \mathrm{R}$, and for each $\tau = 1,2,3$,

$$\begin{aligned} &w_{i(\tau)}(t_i^*, t_{-i}^* \mid \Omega_{i(\tau)}) \\ &\quad \geqslant w_{i(\tau)}(t_i, t_{-i}^* \mid \Omega_{i(\tau)}) \; \forall t_i \in \mathrm{T} \end{aligned}$$

Hence, a PBE is a set of strategies, $\{t_i^*\}$, that constitutes a Bayesian equilibrium at *each* stage of the game.

Let $E[\mu]$ be the common expectation of the median proposal in the agenda-setting stage of the game, conditional on the common-knowledge data but *prior* to any legislator observing his or her private information: this will be defined rigorously below (sec. 10).

PROPOSITION: *There exists an essentially unique PBE to $\Gamma$, and it is such that relative to their information at each stage,*

1. *all legislators vote sincerely in the voting stage*
2. *all legislators propose their expected induced ideal points in the agenda-setting stage*
3. *legislator $(n + 1)/2 \equiv i^*$ always volunteers all his or her private information in debate ($s_i = 0$)*
4. *if $E[\mu] = z_i^*$, then all legislators volunteer all their private data in debate*
5. *if $E[\mu] < (>)\ z_i^*$, then any legislator $i > (<)\ i^*$ will volunteer all his or her private data in debate*
6. *if $E[\mu] < (>)\ z_i^*$, then any legislator $i > (<)\ i^*$ has an incentive to conceal part or all of his or her private data in debate ($s_i \in [0, \infty]$). Partial revelation of data is* not *fully revealing; and what the legislators choose to do depends on the particular distribution of preferences and parameters of $\Gamma$*
7. *suppose $E[\mu] < z_i^*$. Then in the*

*equilibrium,* $s_i \geqslant s_{i+1}$ for $i = 1, \ldots, i^*-1$. *Mutatis mutandis, the analogous result holds when* $E[\mu] > z_i{}^*$

9. *Claims 1 and 2 of the Proposition.* Because we are looking for a PBE, we prove the proposition by solving the final stage of the game first, then working backwards to the debate stage. So consider the voting stage and fix the earlier proposal and debate strategies arbitrarily.

For the voting process described in section 5, it follows from results of McKelvey and Niemi 1978 (for the complete information case) and Ordeshook and Palfrey 1985 (for the incomplete information case) that all individuals have a weakly dominant voting strategy, namely, for any agenda, to vote sincerely with respect to their induced preferences and beliefs (section 4). This is Claim 1 of the proposition. Now consider the proposal stage of the game.

Let $\{b_i\}$ be any agenda and let $\{(\zeta_i \mid \Omega_i, \{b_i\})\}$ be the list of induced ideal points at the start of the voting stage of the game: from section 4, $(\zeta_i \mid \Omega_i, \{b_i\}) = z_i - E[\beta \mid \Omega_i, \{b_i\}]$, all $i$. Then by section 4 and the previous result on voting strategies, the winning proposal from $\{b_i\}$ will be that most preferred by the individual with the median induced ideal point in $\{(\zeta_i \mid \cdot)\}$. In particular, the winning proposal is defined by $b^* \in \{b_i\}$ such that

$$| (\zeta_\mu \mid \cdot) - b_i | \geqslant | (\zeta_\mu \mid \cdot) - b^* |, \forall b_i \in \{b_i\}$$

where $\zeta_\mu$ denotes the relevant-median induced ideal point. Now consider any individual $i$ at the start of the agenda-setting stage. Let $(\zeta_i \mid \Omega_i)$ be $i$'s induced ideal point and let $E[\zeta_\mu \mid \Omega_i]$ be $i$'s expectation of the median induced ideal point at this stage of the game. Then by the characterization of the de facto winning proposal, we have $E[b^* \mid \Omega_i, \{t_j\}] = E[\zeta_\mu \mid \Omega_i]$ and $\mathrm{var}(b^* \mid \Omega_i, \{t_j\}) = \mathrm{var}(\zeta_\mu \mid \Omega_i)$. Fix an arbitrary list of proposals of legislators other than $i$, $\{b_{-i}\}$. Then by the single-peakedness of induced preferences over bills, it follows that legislator $i$ has a dominant proposal strategy, namely, set $b_i = (\zeta_i \mid \Omega_i)$. This proves Claim 2 of the proposition.

10. *Some Preliminary Results.* In this section, we establish some properties of legislators' expected payoffs, evaluated at the start of the debate stage of the game. In particular, we show that any legislator's expected payoff is independent of his or her private information.

Given equilibrium second- and third-stage strategies, let $\{s_j\}$ be an arbitrary list of debate strategies, and consider individual $i$'s maximand at the *start* of the debate stage of the game, $w_i(t_i, t_{-i} \mid \Omega_i^o)$. Let $E[\zeta_\mu \mid \Omega_i^o, \{s_j\})$ be $i$'s expectation of the median induced ideal point on going into committee, with associated variance $\mathrm{var}(\zeta_\mu \mid \Omega_i^o, \{s_j\})$. Note that $E[\zeta_\mu \mid \Omega_i^o, \{s_j\}] \neq E[\zeta_\mu \mid \Omega_i]$ is both possible and likely. By convention, we have $z_i < z_j$ if and only if $i < j$ (sec. 1). Let $\Pi$ be the set of permutations of $N$ and, $\forall\ \pi \in \Pi$, let $\mu(\pi)$ be the median individual under the bijection $\pi$ (so for the identity bijection, $\pi_o$, $\mu(\pi_o) = (n + 1)/2$). Hence we can write,

$$E[\zeta_\mu \mid \Omega_i^o, \{s_j\}] = \Sigma_\Pi p(\pi \mid \Omega_i^o, \{s_j\}) \cdot E[\zeta_{\mu(\pi)} \mid \Omega_i^o, \{s_j\}]$$

where $p(\pi \mid \Omega_i^o, \{s_j\})$ is the probability that the ordering of the set of induced ideal points $\{\zeta_j\}$ going into committee is given by $\pi$, given $i$'s information at this stage. Across individuals, the family of information sets $\{\Omega_i^o\}$ differs only in the realizations of individual sample means, $\{\beta_i\}$. Because all individuals' draws are i.i.d. from the same normal distribution and the common prior on $\beta^*$ is also normal, we have, therefore,

$$p(\pi \mid \Omega_i^o, \{s_j\}) = p(\pi \mid \{s_j\})\ \forall i \in N, \forall \pi \in \Pi$$

From section 4,

$$\zeta_{\mu(\pi)} = z_{\mu(\pi)} - E[\beta \mid b_{\mu(\pi)}, \{s_j\}).$$

Hence, $\forall \pi$:

$$E[\zeta_{\mu(\pi)} \mid \Omega_i^o, \{s_j\}] = z_{\mu(\pi)} - E[\beta \mid \Omega_i^o, \pi, \{s_j\}] = z_{\mu(\pi)} - E[\beta \mid \beta_i] + f(\pi \mid \Omega_i^o, \{s_j\})$$

where $f(\cdot) \epsilon \mathrm{R}$ accounts for the difference between $i$'s observation, $\beta_i$, and that of individual $\mu(\pi)$, $\beta_{\mu(\pi)}$, necessary to yield individual $j = \mu(\pi)$ median in induced ideal points going into committee. (By definition, $f(\pi \mid \Omega_i^o, \cdot) = 0 \ \forall \pi \epsilon \Pi$ such that $\mu(\pi) = (n+1)/2$.) Specifically, the term $\{E[\beta \mid \beta_i] + f(\cdot)\}$ is the mean of the appropriately truncated normal distribution, that is, $N(E[\beta \mid \beta_i], (m+1+\sigma)^{-1})$, where $\sigma = \Sigma_{N/\mu(\pi)}\, m \cdot (m \cdot s_j + 1)^{-1}$, with the truncation depending on $\{\{z_i\}, \pi\}$. Again, by virtue of all legislators' draws being i.i.d. from the same normal distribution, and the common prior on $\beta^*$ being normal, it follows from the definition of $\zeta_{\mu(\pi)}$ that

$$f(\pi \mid \Omega_i^o, \{s_j\}) = f(\pi \mid \{s_j\}) \ \forall i \epsilon N, \ \forall \pi \epsilon \Pi$$

Consequently, since both $p(\cdot)$ and $f(\cdot)$ are independent of private information,

$$\mathrm{var}(\zeta_\mu \mid \Omega_i^o, \{s_j\}) = \mathrm{var}(\zeta_\mu \mid \{s_j\}) \ \forall i \epsilon N$$

Now $i$'s maximand $w_i(\cdot \mid \Omega_i^o)$ depends on $i$'s private information $\beta_i$ if and only if it depends on $E[\beta \mid \beta_i]$. By section 9, $i$'s exectatopm pf the winning proposal at the start of this debate stage is given by $i$'s expectation of the location of the median proposal, $E[\zeta_\mu \mid \Omega_i^o, \cdot]$. So substituting for $E[b^* \mid \cdot]$ and $\mathrm{var}(b^* \mid \cdot)$ in $w_i(\cdot \mid \Omega_i^o)$ and differentiating with respect to $E[\beta \mid \beta_i]$ gives (where we write $E_i \equiv E[\beta \mid \beta_i]$)

$$\partial w_i(\cdot \mid \Omega_i^o)/\partial E_i = 2\{z_i - E_i + (z_i - E_i - E[\zeta_\mu \mid \cdot]) \cdot \partial E[\zeta_\mu \mid \cdot]/\partial E_i - E[\zeta_\mu \mid \cdot]\}$$

But from the earlier reasoning,

$$\partial E[\zeta_\mu \mid \cdot]/\partial E_i = \Sigma_\Pi\, p(\pi \mid \cdot) \cdot \partial E[\zeta_{\mu(\pi)} \mid \Omega_i^o, \cdot]/\partial E_i = -1$$

Hence, $\partial w_i(\cdot \mid \Omega_i^o)/\partial E_i = 0 \ \forall i \epsilon N$. In other words, the value of any individual's maximand *for the committee game* $\Gamma$ is independent of that individual's particular observation, $\beta_i$. So in choosing strategies for the game, all that matters are the relative distances separating individuals' induced ideal points over bills.

From section 9, individual $i$'s best proposal strategy in the agenda-setting stage is to propose his or her induced ideal point, $(\zeta_i \mid \Omega_i)$, at that stage. Since the agenda generated in this way constitutes a unique subgame equilibrium, the agenda fully reveals all the private data once it is announced at the start of the voting stage. Legislator $i^* = (n+1)/2$ will therefore surely be the median voter at the voting stage; and this is known to all individuals on going into committee for the debate stage of the game. Still assuming that equilibrium second- and third-stage strategies are used by all individuals, define the gap

$$\Delta(s_i \mid \Omega_i^o, \{s_{-i}\}) = E[\zeta_{i^*} \mid \Omega_i^o, \{s_j\}] - E[\zeta_\mu \mid \Omega_i^o, \{s_j\}]$$

$$= z_{i^*} - E[\beta \mid \Omega_i^o, \pi_o, \{s_{-i}\}] - E[\zeta_\mu \mid \Omega_i^o, \{s_j\}]$$

Define $E[\mu] \equiv E[\zeta_\mu \mid (\Omega_i^o : \beta_i = 0)]$. Then, by the facts established above and the structure of admissible debate strategies (sec. 5), we have $\forall i \epsilon N$, $\forall \Omega_i^o \epsilon \Omega^o$:

$$[s_i = \infty \ \forall i \epsilon N] \rightarrow [\Delta(s_i \mid \cdot, \{s_{-i}\}) = z_{i^*} - E[\mu] \ \mathit{and}\ \mathrm{var}(\zeta_\mu \mid \cdot, \{s_j\} > 0]$$

$$[s_i = 0 \ \forall i \epsilon N] \rightarrow [\Delta(s_i \mid \cdot, \{s_{-i}\}) = 0 \ \mathit{and}\ \mathrm{var}(\zeta_\mu \mid \cdot, \{s_j\}) = 0)$$

and

$$[s_i \leqslant s_i'] \rightarrow [\mid \Delta(s_i \mid \cdot, \{s_{-i}\}) \mid$$

$$\leqslant | \Delta(s_i' \mid \cdot, \{s_{-i}\}) | \textit{ and}$$
$$\mathrm{var}(\zeta_\mu \mid \cdot, s_i \{s_{-i}\}) \leqslant$$
$$\mathrm{var}(\zeta_\mu \mid \cdot, s_i', \{s_{-i}\})]$$

11. *Claims 3, 4 and 5 of the Proposition.* Given the results established in section 10, we can now prove claims 3, 4, and 5 of the Proposition. We do this directly, by showing that the expected payoff to any of the specified legislators at the start of the debate stage is strictly decreasing in the amount of noise added to the debate message.

Suppose $E[\mu] \leqslant z_{i^*}$ and consider $i \geqslant i^*$. Fix $\{s_{-i}\}$ and consider $i$'s maximand, $w_i(t_i, t_{-i} \mid \Omega_i^o)$. Assuming equilibrium second- and third-stage strategies, the argument of section 9 allows us to substitute for $E[b^* \mid \Omega_i^o, \{t_j\}]$ and obtain

$$\begin{aligned} w_i(t_i, t_{-i} \mid \Omega_i^o) &= w_i(\Omega_i^o, \{t_{-i}\}) \\ &+ E[\zeta_\mu \mid \Omega_i^o, s_i, \{s_{-i}\}] \cdot (2(\zeta_i \mid \Omega_i^o) \\ &- E[\zeta_\mu \mid \Omega_i^o, s_i, \{s_{-i}\}]) \\ &- \mathrm{var}(\zeta_\mu \mid \Omega_i^o, s_i, \{s_{-i}\}) \end{aligned}$$

where $\omega_i(\cdot)$ is the sum of terms in $w_i(\cdot)$ that are independent of $t_i$. Given $\{t_{-i}\}$ and given $i$'s best second- and third-stage strategies, legislator $i$'s optimal debate strategy is given by $s_i \in [0, \infty]$ which maximizes $W_i(\cdot) = [w_i(\cdot) - \omega_i(\cdot)]$. Substituting for $E[\zeta_\mu \mid \cdot, \{s_{-i}\}]$ in $W_i(\cdot)$ and rearranging gives

$$\begin{aligned} W_i(\cdot) &= \{E[\zeta_{i^*} \mid \cdot] - \Delta(s_i \mid \cdot, \{s_{-i}\})\} \\ &\cdot \{2(\zeta_i \mid \cdot) - E[\zeta_{i^*} \mid \cdot] \\ &+ \Delta(s_i \mid \cdot, \{s_{-i}\})\} \\ &- \mathrm{var}(\zeta_\mu \mid \cdot, s_i, \{s_{-i}\}) \end{aligned}$$

Differentiating $W_i(\cdot)$ with respect to $s_i$ gives

$$\begin{aligned} \partial W_i/\partial s_i &= -2\partial \,| \Delta(s_i \mid \cdot) | /\partial s_i \cdot \{(\zeta_i \mid \cdot) \\ &- E[\zeta_{i^*} \mid \cdot] + \Delta(s_i \mid \cdot)\} \\ &- \partial \mathrm{var}(\zeta_\mu \mid \cdot, s_i, \cdot)/\partial s_i \\ &= -2\partial \,| \Delta(s_i \mid \cdot) | /\partial s_i \cdot \alpha_i(s_i, \{s_{-i}\}) \\ &- \partial \mathit{var}(\zeta_\mu \mid \cdot, s_i, \cdot)/\partial s_i \end{aligned}$$

where $\alpha_i(s_i, \{s_{-i}\}) = \{(\zeta_i \mid \cdot) - E[\zeta_\mu \mid \cdot, s_i, \cdot]\}$, the gap between $i$'s induced ideal point and $i$'s expectation of the location of the median proposal. From section 10, both partial derivatives are positive. By supposition, $E[\mu] \leqslant z_{i^*}$: so, again from section 10, $E[\zeta_\mu \mid \cdot, s_i, \cdot] \leqslant E[\zeta_{i^*} \mid \cdot] \, \forall \{s_j\}$. Because $i \geqslant i^*$, therefore, $\alpha_i(\cdot) \geqslant 0$. Hence, $\partial W_i(\cdot)/\partial s_i < 0 \, \forall s_i > 0$. This establishes the first part of Claim 5 in the proposition.

When $E[\mu] \geqslant z_{i^*}$, an entirely symmetric argument establishes that all $i \leqslant i^*$ will choose to volunteer all their private data (i.e., select $s_i = 0$). This proves the rest of Claim 5. Combining the two cases establishes Claims 3 and 4.

12. *Claim 6 of the Proposition.* To prove this claim, we first show that given the debate strategies of others, any of the specified legislators may have the ability and incentive to conceal some or all of his or her private information in debate. Then we exploit a straightforward fixed-point argument to demonstrate that an equilibrium set of debate strategies exists.

So suppose $E[\mu] < z_{i^*}$. For all $\{s_j\}$ and for at least one individual $i < i^*$, the difference $\alpha_i(\{s_j\})$ in $\partial W_i(\cdot)/\partial s_i$ must be negative; and for $s_j$ sufficiently small for all $j$, $\alpha_i(\cdot)$ must be negative for all $i < i^*$ (see sec. 10). From Claim 5, all legislators $j \geqslant i^*$ will volunteer all their private data, that is, $s_j = 0 \, \forall j \geqslant i^*$. Leaving this implicit, let $\{s_{-i}\}$ be an otherwise arbitrary list of debate strategies of all legislators other than $i$, where $i < i^*$. Suppose $\alpha_i(\infty, \{s_{-i}\}) < 0$. Then for individual $i$, decreasing the amount of noise in his or her debate signal raises the expected payoff *through reducing* $\mathit{var}(\zeta_\mu \mid \cdot)$ but lowers the expected payoff through reducing $|\Delta(s_i \mid \cdot)|$. Thus, $i$ faces a trade-off. Suppose there exists an $s_i' \in (0, \infty)$ such that $\partial W_i(\cdot)/\partial s_i = 0$ at $s_i'$ (see sec. 11, where this derivative is calculated). In this case, $i$ has an incentive to reveal some, but not all, of his or her private information. From section 10, the derivative of variance in $\partial W_i(\cdot)/\partial s_i$ (which is clearly monotone in $s_i$) and $\alpha_i(\cdot)$ are independent of $\beta_i$ and thus common knowledge. Moreover, substituting from section 10, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
&\partial\Delta(s_i \mid \cdot)/\partial s_i \\
&\quad = -\partial E[\zeta_\mu \mid \Omega_i^o, s_i, \{s_{-i}\}]/\partial s_i \\
&= -[\Sigma_\Pi\, \partial p(\pi \mid \cdot)/\partial s_i \cdot \{z_{\mu(\pi)} \\
&\quad - E[\beta \mid b_i] + f(\pi \mid \cdot)\} \\
&\quad + \Sigma_\Pi\, p(\pi \mid \cdot) \cdot \partial f(\pi \mid \cdot)/\partial s_i] \\
&= -[\Sigma_\Pi \partial p(\pi \mid \cdot)/\partial s_i \cdot \{z_{\mu(\pi)} + f(\pi \mid \cdot)\} \\
&\quad + \Sigma_\Pi\, p(\pi \mid \cdot) \cdot \partial f(\pi \mid \cdot)/\partial s_i]
\end{aligned}$$

And this is independent of $i$'s private information, $\beta_i$. Thus, choosing an interior value of noise, $0 < s_i < \infty$, is *not* invertible by other committee members, and, therefore, given $\{s_{-i}\}$, $i$'s best choice of $s_i$ can be determined by simply examining the derivative of $W_i$ with respect to $s_i$. In other words, $i$ has the ability to offer some but not all of his or her private information if he or she so wishes. However, $\partial W_i(\cdot)/\partial s_i$ is clearly dependent on $\{s_{-i}\}$, so we need to demonstrate the existence of an equilibrium set of debate strategies.

Let $G_i(\{s_{-i}\})$ be $i$'s best reply correspondence (in debate strategies) to others' choices, and let $g_i(\{s_{-i}\}) = \inf\{s_i \epsilon G_i(\cdot)\}$. Now $\partial W_i(\cdot)/\partial s_i$ is surely differentiable in $\{s_{-i}\}$. Therefore, by the Implicit Function Theorem, $g_i(\cdot)$ is a continuous function of $\{s_{-i}\}$ $\forall \{s_{-i}\}$ such that $g_i(\cdot) \epsilon (0, \infty)$. Suppose there is a sequence $(\{s_{-i}\}^\nu) \rightarrow \{s_{-i}\}^o$ such that $(g_i^\nu) \rightarrow g_i^+ > g_i(\{s_{-i}\}^O) = 0$. Then $\partial W_i(\cdot)/\partial s_i = 0$ at $g_i^\nu\ \forall \nu < o$ and $\partial W_i(\cdot)/\partial s_i < 0$ at $g_i^+$. But this implies that $W_i(\cdot)$ is not smooth in $\{s_j\}$ for sufficiently large $\nu$, a contradiction. Hence, $g_i(\cdot)$ is a continuous function. Assume all legislators' debate strategies are bound above by some arbitrary finite number, say, $K < \infty$ (note that this bound is irrelevant for $j \geqslant i^*$, by Claim 5). Then for any $i$, $g_i(\{s_{-i}\}) \epsilon [0, K]$. Let $\gamma(\{s_j\}) = (\{g_i(\{s_{-i}\})\}_{i \epsilon N})$. Then $\gamma(\cdot)$ is a continuous mapping from $[0, K]^n$ into $[0, K]^n$. By virtue of the $n$-dimensional version of Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem, the mapping $\gamma(\cdot)$ has a fixed point. Given the restriction on individuals' strategy spaces, this point clearly constitutes an equilibrium for the debate stage of the game: call this set of strategies a $K$-equilibrium and write $s_i(K)$ to denote $i$'s $K$-equilibrium strategy. Note that $s_i(K)$ is continuous in $K$. If for some suitably large (and finite) $K$, $s_i(K) < K\ \forall i \epsilon N$, then we are done. Suppose that for all finite $K$ and all $i < i^*$, $s_i(K) = K$. Then as $K \rightarrow \infty$, $\lim s_i(K) = \infty\ \forall\, i < i^*$. Hence, $s_i = \infty\ \forall i < i^*$ and $s_i = 0\ \forall i \geqslant i^*$ is surely an equilibrium for the debate stage. So suppose there is some (not necessarily fixed) individual $j$ for whom $s_j(K) = K$, all finite $K$ and that there is some distinct $i < i^*$ for whom $s_i(K) < K$ in some $K$-equilibrium, say, $K = K^*$. Then as $K \rightarrow \infty$, $\lim s_j(K) = \infty$. From definition of $W_i(\cdot)$, it follows that for arbitrary $i, j < i^*$, if $s_j > s_j'$, then, holding $(\{s_{-i}\}/s_j)$ fixed,

$$\begin{aligned}
&[g_i(s_j', \cdot) < \infty] \rightarrow [g_i(s_j, \cdot) \\
&\quad \leqslant g_i(s_j', \cdot)]
\end{aligned}$$

Therefore, $s_i(K)$ continuous in $K$ and $s_i(K^*) < K^*$ imply $s_i(K) < K$, $\forall K > K^*$. Hence, $s_i(K) \epsilon [0, K^*]\ \forall K > K^*$, and, therefore, the sequence $(s_i(K))_{K \rightarrow \infty}$ contains a convergent subsequence with limit in $[0, K^*]$. Thus, an infinite equilibrium exists. This completes the proof of Claim 6, since the case of $E[\mu] > z_{i^*}$ follows in a symmetric manner.

13. *"Essential uniqueness" of equilibria to* $\Gamma$. Before going on to establish Claim 7, it is convenient here to show that the equilibrium to the game is unique. This amounts to showing that if there are dis-

tinct equilibrium sets of debate strategies, each such set gives rise to the same expected payoff to all legislators.

Sections 9–12 establish the existence of a perfect equilibrium $\{t_i^*\}$ to the committee game $\Gamma$, which satisfies Claims 1-6. Because the second- and third-stage strategies are dominant strategies, the equilibrium is essentially unique if, whenever $\{s_i'\}$, $\{s_i''\}$ are any pair of equilibrium sets of debate strategies, then $|\Delta(\{s_i'\})| = |\Delta(\{s_i''\})|$.

To check this equality, suppose the claim to be false. Let $E[\mu] < z_{i^*}$ and assume $|\Delta(\{s_i'\})| > |\Delta(\{s_i''\})|$. Then, $\mathrm{var}(\cdot \mid \{s_i'\}) > \mathrm{var}(\{s_i''\})$ by section 10. Hence, there exist legislators $j < i^*$ such that $s_j' > s_j'' \geqslant 0$. Suppose for such a legislator that $w_j(\{t_i'\}| \cdot ) > w_j(\{t_i''\}| \cdot )$. From section 10, $|\Delta(s_j^o|\{s_{-j}''\})| > |\Delta(s_{-j}''|\{s_{-j}''\})|$ (and similarly for the variances) for some $s_j^o > s_j''$. So by continuity of $w_j(\cdot|\cdot)$, there is $s_j^o > s_j''$ for which $w_j(t_j^o, \{t_{-j}''\}| \cdot ) > w_j(\{t_i''\}| \cdot )$. This contradicts the assumption that $\{s_i''\}$ is an equilibrium for the debate stage. Similarly, $w_j(\{t_i'\}\} \cdot ) < w_j(\{t_i''\}| \cdot )$ is impossible. Hence, $w_j(\{t_i'\}| \cdot ) = w_j(\{t_i''\}| \cdot )$ is necessary for all $j < i^*$ having $s_j' > 0$. Suppose there are at least two such individuals, $j, k < i^*$. Without loss of generality, let $j < k$. But then $|\alpha_j(\{s_i\})| > |\alpha_k(\{s_i\})| \ \forall \{s_i\}$. Hence, $w_k(\{t_i'\}| \cdot ) = w_k(\{t_i''\}| \cdot )$ implies $w_j(\{t_i'\}| \cdot ) > w_j(\{t_i''\}| \cdot )$, a contradiction. Therefore, there can be only one individual $j < i^*$ with $s_j' > 0$. Symmetric reasoning likewise yields that there can be at most one individual $k < i^*$ with $s_k'' > 0$. If $j \neq k$, then $|\alpha_j(\cdot)| \neq |\alpha_k(\cdot)|$, in which case it is impossible for $j$ and $k$ to be indifferent between the two equilibria, as required: for, say, $j$ to be indifferent would require $s_j' = s_k''$, but this would mean $k$ could not be indifferent. Hence, either $j = k$ or there exists no $k < i^*$ such that $s_k'' > 0$. In the first case, if $j = k$, then $s_i' = s_i'' = 0$ for all $i \neq j$. In which case argmax $w_j(\cdot)$ is unique; but then $|\Delta(\{s_i'\})| = |\Delta(\{s_i''\})|$. In the remaining case, we have $s_i'' = 0 \ \forall i \in N$. But since $s_i' = 0 \ \forall i \in N/\{j\}$, uniqueness of argmax $w_j(\cdot)$ then implies either that $\{s_i''\}$ is not an equilibrium or that $\{s_i'\}$ is not an equilibrium. This contradiction proves the assertion.

14. *Claim 7 of the Proposition.* Suppose $E[\mu] < z_{i^*}$ and let $s_i \in (0, \infty)$ for some $1 < i < i^*$ at equilibrium. Fix the equilibrium strategies $\{s_{-i}\}$ and suppose they are such that $s_{i-1} = s_i$. Then, $\partial W_i(\cdot)/\partial s_i = \partial W_{i-1}(\cdot)/\partial s_{i-1} = 0$. From section 10,

$$\partial|\Delta(s_i \mid \cdot)|/\partial s_i = \partial|\Delta(s_{i-1} \mid \cdot)|/\partial s_{i-1}$$

*and*

$$\partial \mathrm{var}(\cdot \mid s_i)/\partial s_i = \partial \mathrm{var}(\cdot \mid s_{i-1})/\partial s_{i-1}$$

But $z_{i-1} < z_i$ implies $|\alpha_i(\{s_j\})| < |\alpha_{i-1}(\{s_j\})|$. Since $E[\mu] < z_{i^*}$, then, we must have $\partial w_{i-1}(\cdot)/\partial s_{i-1} > 0$, a contradiction. The claim now follows.

15. *The Relative Location of* $E[\mu]$ *and* $z_{i^*}$. The sign of $(z_{i^*} - E[\mu])$ depends on the dispersion of ideal points $\{z_i\}$ relative to the variance of the random variable. Here, by a suitable choice of units, we have normalized this variance to one. Although we have been unable to obtain a closed-form solution connecting the dispersion of ideal points and the variance of $\beta$ to $\mathrm{sgn}(z_{i^*} - E[\cdot])$, the general principles can be illustrated with an example.

Let $n = 3$ and suppose $z_2 = 0$. Also for this example, suppose that the variance of the common prior on $\beta^*$ is not, as assumed earlier, equal to one but is such that the variance of the posterior used to calculate $E[\mu] = E[\zeta_\mu \mid \beta_i = 0, \{s_j = \infty, \forall j\}]$, given $m$ draws, is 1. Thus, we can work entirely with the standardized normal distribution, $\Phi$; and need consider only permutations $\pi \in \Pi$ such that individuals 1 and 3 are median in induced ideal points on going into committee. Let $\pi = \{\pi(1) = i, \pi(2) = j, \pi(3) = k\}$. Let

$p(ijk) = \Pr[\zeta_i < \zeta_j < \zeta_k \mid s_j = \infty, \forall j]$ and let $f(ijk) = f(\pi \mid \cdot, s_j = \infty, \forall j)$, and so on. Then,

$$\Delta^\infty \equiv z_2 - E[\mu] = -\{p(312) \cdot [z_1 + f(312)] + p(213) \cdot [z_1 + f(213)] + p(132) \cdot [z_3 + f(132)] + p(231) \cdot [z_3 + f(231)]\}.$$

Since $z_1 < 0 < z_3$, and $\Phi$ is the standardized normal, we have

$$f(312) = \phi(z_1)/(1 - \Phi(z_1));$$
$$f(132) = \phi(z_3)/(1 - \Phi(z_3);$$
$$f(213) = -\phi(z_1)/\Phi(z_1);$$
$$f(231) = -\phi(z_3)/\Phi(z_3)$$

Here, $\phi$ is the density function associated with the cumulant, $\Phi$; and, for instance, $f(312)$ is obtained by truncating $\Phi$ to the left at $z_1$ and calculating the mean of this truncated normal. Let $\beta(jk) \equiv (E[\beta \mid \beta_j] - E[\beta \mid \beta_k])$, $j, k \in N$. Then,

$$p(ijk) = \Pr[\zeta_i < \zeta_j \mid \zeta_j < \zeta_k] \Pr[\zeta_i < \zeta_k]$$
$$= \Pr[\zeta_j < \zeta_k \mid \zeta_i < \zeta_j] \cdot \Pr[\zeta_i < \zeta_j]$$
$$= \Pr[\beta(kj) < (z_k - z_j) \mid \beta(ji) < (z_j - z_i)] \cdot \Pr[\beta(ji) < (z_j - z_i)]$$

Write this last term as $p(jk \mid ij) \cdot p(ij)$. Let $\phi_j \equiv \phi(z_j)$, etc. Then on substituting and collecting terms, we obtain

$$\Delta^\infty = p(13) \cdot \{p(32 \mid 13) \cdot [(\phi_3/(1 - \Phi_3)) - z_3)] - p(21 \mid 13) \cdot [\phi_1/\Phi_1) - |z_1|]\} + [1 - p(13)] \cdot \{p(12 \mid 31) \cdot [\phi_1/(1 - \Phi_1)) + |z_1|] - p(23 \mid 31) \cdot [(\phi_3/\Phi_3) + z_3]\}$$

Suppose $|z_1| = z_3$. Then both the terms in curly brackets, and therefore $\Delta^\infty$, equal zero. If $|z_1| \neq z_3$, this conclusion is not generally true. So, although there are cases in which $\Delta^\infty = 0$ when $|z_1| \neq z_3$, this equality typically does *not* obtain. Differentiating $\Delta^\infty$ with respect to $z_3$ (without loss of generality) and evaluating this derivative at any point at which $|z_1| = z_3$ gives

$$\partial\Delta^\infty/\partial z_3 = p(13) \cdot p(32 \mid 13) \cdot \{((1 - \Phi_3)\phi_3{}' + \phi_3^2)/(1 - \Phi_3)^2 - 1\} - [1 - p(13)] \cdot p(23 \mid 31) \cdot \{(\Phi_3\phi_3{}' - \phi_3^2)/\Phi_3^2 + 1\}$$

A sufficient condition for this derivative to be strictly negative is for the first term in curly brackets to be negative and the second to be positive (at least one of these being strict). Combining these two conditions and collecting terms gives (where the subscript *3* is dropped)

$$(*)\ [\phi^2 - \Phi^2]/\Phi \leqslant \phi' \leqslant [(1 - \Phi)^2]/(1 - \Phi)$$

Since $\phi$ is the pdf for the standardized normal, $\phi'(x) = -x \cdot \phi(x)$. Substituting and rearranging in (*) gives

$$(**)\ [\phi/(1 - \Phi)] - [(1 - \Phi)/\phi] \leqslant z_3 \leqslant [\Phi/\phi] - [\phi/\Phi]$$

It is straightforward to check that the LHS of the first—and the RHS of the second—inequality goes to plus-infinity as $z_3$ goes to infinity. Numerical calculations show, however, that if $z_3$ (and $|z_1|$) are within (approx.) 3 standard deviations of $z_2 = 0$, then both inequalities hold and we therefore have $\partial\Delta^\infty/\partial z_3 < 0$—in other words, $E[\mu]$ moves positively with $z_3$.

Finally, suppose $|z_1|$ is "small" relative to $z_3$, assumed "large," so that $p(32 \mid 13) \approx p(31) \approx 0$. In this case, $\Delta^\infty \approx -p(21 \mid 13) \cdot [(\phi_1/\Phi_1) - |z_1|]$. And this is strictly positive if and only if $[\ \cdot\ ] < 0$. This condition holds for all $|z_1| > x^*$, where $x^*$ is the unique positive solution to

$\phi(x) = \Phi(x) \cdot x$. The solution to this equation is $x^* \approx .5$.

Putting the above observations together, we conclude (1) that if the distribution of ideal points $\{z_i\}$ is symmetric about the median, then $E[\mu] = z_{i^*}$; and (2) that there exist nonsymmetric distributions for which (a) $E[\mu] = z_{i^*}$, (b) the relative extremists in outcome space have incentives to conceal information, and (c) the relative moderates in outcome space have incentives to conceal information.

## Notes

This essay has benefited greatly from conversations with Patricia C. O'Brien. Austen-Smith's research was supported by the National Science Foundation, SES-8600965.

1. Nor, for that matter, is it clear what he or she ought to do. If the long-run advantage of the individual sometimes depends on revealing information and sometimes on concealing it, then simple moral precepts, like "always reveal," are certainly unjust to those whose advantage is to conceal.

2. We use the word *coherent* to describe this particular equilibrium outcome because the invariance assures us that statutory prescriptions are as closely aligned with legislators' goals as is technically feasible (given the information available to the committee members as a group). In the absence of full revelation, legislators *may* prescribe actions inappropriate to their goals (e.g., prescribing a minimum wage too low to bring about any redistribution, though the prescription implies an intent to redistribute) or that are inconsistent with their goals (e.g., prescribing a minimum wage so high that it induces high levels of unemployment among unskilled workers, whom minimum wages are presumably intended to help). Full revelation, on the other hand, precludes such inappropriate or inconsistent policies—at least, on informational grounds per se. In that sense, therefore, full revelation and the consequent invariance over repeated readings assures a practical kind of coherence, while incomplete revelation potentially admits inappropriate and inconsistent outcomes. (Strictly, as will be made clear in the model section, our formal definition of *coherence* does not demand full revelation per se—only that the outcome be *as if* there were full revelation.)

3. In this example nature is allowed to add negative amounts of fluoride. However, this is simply an expository convenience and has no bearing on subsequent analysis.

4. Assuming that all legislators' sample sizes, *m*, are the same means that there are no "experts." So long as individual sample sizes are common knowledge, this assumption can be relaxed and all of our qualitative results (with one exception, which we identify in the text later) go through. (The details of the analytics, however, are considerably messier.) On the other hand, the implications of allowing individual sample sizes to vary and to constitute private information are not clear.

5. See Jacobs 1985 for recurrent examples of such phenomena in the debate over public policy towards the elderly.

6. See n. 2.

7. The qualification *essentially* refers to the fact that while there may exist several equilibrium sets of debate strategies, the equilibrium expected payoff to any legislator is the same in each case. See Appendix, sec. 13.

8. See n. 4.

9. There is also "behind-closed-doors" negotiation; but this can be subsumed within the debate category by permitting precommitment and cooperation among legislators.

## References

Banks, Jeffrey, and Joel Sobel. 1987. Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games. *Econometrica* 55: 647–62.

Black, Duncan. 1958. *The Theory of Committees and Elections.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Calvert, Randall. 1986. *Models of Imperfect Information in Politics.* London: Harwood Academic.

Crawford, Vincent, and Joel Sobel. 1982. Strategic Information Transmission. *Econometrica* 50: 1431–51.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy.* New York: Harper and Row.

Gal-Or, Esther. 1985. Information Sharing in Oligopoly. *Econometrica* 53:329–44.

Gal-Or, Esther. 1986. Information Transmission—Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria. *Review of Economic Studies* 53:85–92.

Jacobs, Bruce. 1985. Lies, Damned Lies, and the Income of the Elderly. Public Policy Analysis Program DP-8506. University of Rochester. Typescript.

McKelvey, Richard, and Richard Niemi. 1978. A Multistage Game Representation of Sophisticated Voting for Binary Procedures. *Journal of Economic Theory* 18:1–22.

Mill, John Stuart. 1910. *Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government.* London: J. M. Dent and Sons.

Milton, John. 1927. *Areopagitica.* London: J. M. Dent and Sons.

Ordeshook, Peter, and Thomas Palfrey. 1985. Sophisticated Voting with Incomplete Informa-

tion. Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie-Mellon University. Typescript.
Selten, Reinhard. 1975. Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Form Games. *International Journal of Game Theory* 4:25–55.

David Austen-Smith is Associate Professor and William H. Riker is Professor of Political Science, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627.

## Forthcoming in December

The following articles, controversies, and research notes have been tentatively scheduled for publication in the December 1987 issue:

David Austen-Smith. Sophisticated Sincerity: Voting over Endogenous Agendas. A Research Note.

Donna Bahry and Brian D. Silver. Intimidation and the Symbolic Uses of Terror in the USSR.

Gregory A. Caldeira. Public Opinion and the U.S. Supreme Court: FDR's Court-Packing Plan.

Thomas H. Hammond and Gary J. Miller. The Core of the Constitution.

Robert Huckfeldt and John Sprague. Networks in Context: The Social Flow of Political Information.

Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley. How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured?

Ronald Inglehart and Scott C. Flanagan. Value Change in Industrial Societies. A Controversy.

Sadafumi Kawato. Nationalization and Partisan Realignment in Congressional Elections.

Gary King and Robert X. Browning. Democratic Representation and Partisan Bias in Congressional Elections.

Robert P. Kraynak. Tocqueville's Constitutionalism.

John Langton and Mary Dietz. Machiavelli's Paradox: Trapping or Teaching the Prince. A Controversy.

Ronald Rogowski. Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade.

Robert H. Salisbury, John P. Heinz, Edward O. Laumann, and Robert L. Nelson. Who Works with Whom? Interest Group Alliances and Opposition.

# CONTROVERSIES

# LIBERALISM, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND HUMAN DIGNITY

*Do international standards regarding human rights require the existence of a liberal regime? This was the thrust of Rhoda Howard and Jack Donnelly's essay in the September 1986 issue of this* Review. *Neil Mitchell takes vigorous issue with this contention, arguing first and foremost that Howard and Donnelly have not defined liberalism satisfactorily. Howard and Donnelly present a spirited rejoinder.*

In "Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Political Regimes" (this *Review*, September 1986), Rhoda Howard and Jack Donnelly argue that human rights require liberalism: "We contend that internationally recognized human rights require a liberal regime" (p. 802). This contention is supported by a very abstract definition of liberalism, by inappropriate comparisons, by neglecting other ideological traditions that can also claim to support human rights and the integrity of individuals, and by ignoring consideration of other conditions that may be necessary for human rights.

Howard and Donnelly's definition of liberalism is tied to no particular theorist, century, or country, making it easier to produce a set of values with an article-by-article correspondence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The definition is variously defended as an "ideal type," as "a plausible standard reading of the liberal tradition," and finally with the revealing comment, "Our subject in this article is human rights, not liberalism" (p. 802). Their subject needs be both if they are to make their argument effectively. Simply stipulating a set of values and calling them liberalism and then showing that these values are compatible with a conception of human rights is not a compelling method of argument. One could as easily stipulate a floating pastiche of "socialist" values, affiliated neither with Marx nor with Tawney, grounded on no particular piece of history or society, but which also fits human rights. Without a more careful explication of liberalism, the connection Howard and Donnelly assert raises all sorts of objections. What we end up with is a philosophical hybrid that no one will claim but that is apparently created by crossing John Locke with Edward Kennedy, perhaps in the cosy confines of a British welfare state that works, presumably after having first detached Northern Ireland.

Thus, we have emphasis on the prepolitical rights of individuals that one finds in the *Two Treatises*, without the more awkward bits like the limiting of government to the protection of property. Instead we are told that liberalism means that government is required "to cancel unjustifiable market inequalities" and ensure a decent standard of life for all—so bringing it into line with Articles 22 and 25 of the universal declaration. The familiar liberal theme, going back to Locke's peculiar "title" to charity, and often espoused by Thatcher or Reagan, that these needs can be met privately is not considered by our authors. They even extend their argument to include a right to work (Article 23)—not simply the more recognizable liberal position of a chance to work—which they derive from the liberal principle of "equal concern and respect." One wonders why they stop here—why not also derive equality of condition from this principle? They do say that "a certain amount of economic liberty is also required" to "reflect free decisions based on personal values that arise from autonomously chosen conceptions of the good life" (p. 803), so rather than derive absolute equality, perhaps we should stop at the well-known liberal slogan "to each according to his need"!

This argument that liberalism is not only fully consonant with civil and political rights but also with economic and social rights crystallizes in the contrast made between liberalism and the minimal state. The minimal state which elsewhere one sometimes hears described as "classical liberalism," is for Howard and Donnelly not liberalism because "in its very essence [it] is a violator of human rights" (p. 807). But their argument does not rest on circularity alone; the authors add to this their uncertainty as to whether minimalism is logically consistent: "Beyond minimalism's obvious incompatibility with international human rights standards . . . its deep commitment to protecting private property while denying all other economic and social rights borders on logical contradiction" (p. 807). While hedging with the word "borders," Howard and Donnelly say that unlimited accumulation (which one finds in the scholarly interpretation of the *Two Treatises* incidentally) cannot be justified in terms of "enjoyment of personal autonomy" (p. 807). For "at a certain point, additional economic resources contribute nothing at all to personal autonomy" (p. 807). Who is to determine this point without infringing on the other liberal principle that they assert of "one citizen's conception of the good life being no nobler or superior to another's" (p. 803) is not made clear, and the other grounds for unlimited accumulation—found in Locke, for example—are not considered. Further, it is argued that the minimal state is "self-destructing if it recognizes equal, universal civil *and* political rights" (p. 807). People will use their political rights to destroy minimalism and institute welfare states. But, of course, there is no general requirement that I am aware of that value systems, traditions, or regimes be internally consistent; they may even contain within them the "seeds of their own destruction." Howard and Donnelly hold the conviction that Sir Isaiah Berlin warns against in "Two Concepts of Liberty," namely, "that all the positive values in which men have believed must, in the end, be compatible, and perhaps even entail one another" (1970, 167). In any case the ideal of a minimal state is electorally popular at the moment, as the elections and reelections of Thatcher and Reagan illustrate. The point is that the minimal state is not compatible with some articles of the universal declaration, as Howard and Donnelly recognize, but their claim, which is presumably essential to their thesis, that it is somehow a less "pure" form of liberalism is not convincing, given the arguments presented. Without clearly specifying the origins of liberalism, then, one is left with the suspicion that the method of constructing the "plausible standard reading of the liberal tradition" is to first read the universal declaration and then pick, choose, derive, and discard as necessary.

The authors contrast liberalism with what they call *communitarian* regimes "that give ideological and practical priority to the community . . . over the individual" (p. 808). One type of communitarian regime is communism. Their abstract, or "pure," definition of liberalism is inappropriately compared to a concept of communism based on "the structure and official ideology of contemporary communist societies" (p. 809). Not surprisingly, communism is found to fall short of human-rights standards—as would liberalism if it was constituted in a similar way by, say, the McCarran-Walter Act, the Diplock courts of Northern Ireland, and so on.

In communist societies, we are told, "one is equal not by birth or by nature, but only to the extent that one is essentially indistinguishable from one's fellow communist citizens" (p. 810). Communism, then for Howard and Donnelly, is Orwell's satire or "the dark night of totalitarianism in which all cats are grey." They go on to claim that communism is even incompatible with economic and social rights because these rights are "contingent on the discharge of social duties" (p. 810). This argument seems to forget that civil and political rights, even in liberal *theory* (let alone practice), are contingent. With John Stuart Mill, freedom of opinion is contingent on not harming others or not instigating "some mischievous act"—corn dealers starve the poor. With John Locke, toleration is contingent on loyalty (not to be extended to Catholics, for example, in his day). And in practice, of course, foreign "communists" are denied entry to the United States, and domestic communists are off and on denied free speech for national-security reasons. In short, the good of the community in liberalism also takes precedence over individual rights. What makes Howard and Donnelly's argument here extraordinary is that the penultimate article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which they say they "accept without argument," explicitly recognizes the importance of "discharging social duties" and the contingency of individual rights on these duties, despite their claim to the contrary (p. 806).

Now to move from what is included to what is omitted; Howard and Donnelly, in asserting that human rights require a particular type of liberal regime, ignore other traditions and value systems that condemn torture and political repression and provide for economic and social security. Most obvious, of course, is Marxism, not as caricatured in the Soviet constitution or Soviet practice but that form of Marxism that provides the analysis of the Paris Commune or looks forward to "an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all." We could also look at the socialism of R. H. Tawney, George Orwell, Bernard Crick, or the Swedish Social Democrats for that matter. Liberalism, then, even when it is defined as it is in this article, does not have exclusive claim to values that support human rights. There are alternative traditions and regimes, and thus liberalism cannot be said to be a "requirement" for human rights.

Finally, one is left puzzled by the wider purpose or use of the argument of Howard and Donnelly. It is remarkably barren in terms of producing empirical expectations about the variation in human-rights violations cross-nationally, except for the unexciting proposition that liberal societies will do better than other societies of the world, which, right-wing or left-wing, communist or corporatist, presumably do more or less equally badly. At least with Jeane Kirkpatrick, whose work develops some similar themes, we are provided with distinctions in terms of human rights performance in "non-democratic" countries that are empirically testable. And while the comparatively good performance—though only in terms of civil and political rights—of liberal regimes is plausibly attributed to values, no consideration is given to alternative explanations or other conditions, like the presence of a market economy or the generally superior material well-being that one also finds in these societies. Nor is any explanation provided for why human-rights violations still occur within these societies.[1] Is it the result of the inadequate diffusion of liberal values? But we are never even told who should hold these values: the people, policymakers, or both. Nor are we told why these societies, in their foreign policies, can consistently support hideous client regimes if there is such a "deep and essential theoretical connection" between human rights and liberalism. Whatever the article's purpose, the reason for this comment is the worry that in such an important and politically sensitive area this article, perhaps inadvertently, contributes to what our profession should be dedicated to fight—ethnocentrism.

NEIL MITCHELL

*University of New Mexico*

---

Neil Mitchell's major concern appears to be our definition of liberalism, particularly that a liberal regime in our conception looks like a European welfare state rather than the world of Locke, or the robber barons, or the United States in 1987. This results, he claims, from the fact that it is "tied to no particular theorist, century, or country." Even more seriously, he charges that it "is a philosophical hybrid that no one will claim" and that his "suspicion" is that our procedure was "to first read the universal declaration and then pick, choose, derive, and discard as necessary."

In "Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Political Regimes," we directly and explicitly (pp. 802–3) tie our conception of liberalism to the work of Ronald Dworkin, which stands firmly within a well-recognized theoretical tradition running back to Locke, through Paine. The implicit empirical referent for our ideal type is the modern liberal-democratic welfare state, particularly in its European social-democratic form. We connect the socialism of Tawney, Orwell, Crick, and the Swedish Social Democrats with liberal social democracy. In other words, we explicitly argue for both the theoretical cogency and historical pedigree of our conception of liberalism.

Of course, liberalism thus ends up looking more like a world of "to each according to his need" than Engels's account of early industrial Manchester. This has been precisely the direction of development of the liberal tradition, both in theory and in practice, over the last century. Our ideal type was intended to fit this real and concretely embodied tradition, rather than to maintain an anachronistic fidelity to Locke, as Mitchell would apparently have us do. We see no reason why liberals must accept every opinion of Locke—for example, nontoleration of Catholics—as dogma. Locke was certainly an important source of the liberal tradition, but he did not engrave the complete tenets of liberalism in stone. We can see no reason why liberals should be required to wear the cement boots of a three-hundred-year-old book of 243 numbered paragraphs. Mitchell's reference to Mill, moreover, seems a non sequitur; we can recall no defense of natural or human rights in any of Mill's major political or moral works.

It is true that we provided a country referent for communist states, namely Soviet-bloc countries, but not for liberal. We agree that we ought to have provided such a referent, as Mitchell appears, especially in his statement that "these [liberal] societies in their foreign policies can consistently support hideous client regimes," to think that our implicit referent is the United States. It is not. We are perfectly prepared to entertain the hypothesis that the United States more closely approximates a minimal than a liberal state (and not merely because minimalism is currently "electorally popular" under Reagan). A society that has the material capacity to provide universal health care or universal maternal benefits but nevertheless chooses not to does not strike us as one based on equal concern and respect for all its citizens (see Goldstein, N.d.). The U.S. government's lack of respect for its citizens can perhaps explain why it supports hideous client regimes such as Chile and Guatemala, whereas Norway, for example, extends its foreign aid to such countries as Mozambique and Nicaragua (Skalnes and Egeland 1986).

Thus, we proposed an ideal type of rights-protecting regime, which resembles European social democracy and which we called *liberalism.* But suppose we are wrong and this regime should not be called *liberal.* Let's call it *x* instead. Our argument remains the same: international human-rights standards require an *x* regime.

Mitchell professes to be "puzzled by the wider purpose or use of this article." This is perhaps because he entirely misses its major, and quite explicit, analytical purpose, namely, to distinguish between societies based on human rights and societies with alternative—non-rights-based—conceptions of human dignity. We do not argue that the only valuable way to preserve human dignity is through human rights; we merely argue that it is one way, and a particularly useful one in a world of state societies (p. 803). Mitchell could have challenged our definition of human rights as "*entitlements* that ground particularly powerful *claims* against the state, that each person has *simply as a human being*" (p. 802). Had he rejected our definition of rights and proposed another, he might have been able to show that *x* is not the only rights-protecting regime and substantiated his claim that there are "alternative traditions and regimes" that support human rights. But as he does not make any such argument, we can find no reason to alter our views.

Mitchell also claims that we are guilty of "inappropriate comparisons," particularly in our account of communism, which we based on contemporary theoretical works from, as well as observed practice in, Soviet-bloc countries. For neither liberalism nor communism do we rely on the original classics, neither Locke nor Marx, as Mitchell appears to wish us to. An ideal type of communist regime derived from Marx, rather than from Lenin or via Soviet practice, either is likely to look very much like our social democratic liberalism, or will have few or no empirical referents. We should also note that while Mitchell may find it unsurprising that communism à la the Soviet Union falls short of international human-rights standards, such a view is very controversial, as several works cited in our article indicate. Furthermore, we want to stress that Soviet human-rights shortcomings do not arise merely because that country has deviated from the "true" path of socialism. Theoretical concepts such as the dictatorship of the proletariat demand denial of human rights.

Mitchell finds particularly "curious" our argument that economic benefits in communist regimes are not enjoyed as human rights. He appears to believe that having the substance of a right, for example, having access to health care, is synonymous with having a claim against the state to provide it. We agree that having the substance is better than nothing at all, but it is a privilege (subject to arbitrary state removal without any kind of redress, even in principle or law) rather than a right. In communist regimes, all rights are contingent grants of the state, rather than entitlements one has simply as a human being. This difference, enshrined in practice and even in the Soviet constitution, is of monumental theoretical and empirical importance. Mitchell claims however that Article 29 of the universal declaration supports the Soviet constitution by stating that the enjoyment of human rights is contingent on the discharge of social duties. It does not; rather it holds that "everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible," and that the *only* legitimate reason to limit an individual's rights and freedoms is to secure "due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others." While in the Soviet constitution rights are contingent on the fulfillment of duties, no such contingency is provided in the universal declaration.

There are also three minor points to which we would like to respond. First, Mitchell takes issue with our description of minimalism as internally inconsistent. We readily agree that a political regime can quite comfortably adhere to an inconsistent set of political principles. But we do believe that a fundamental internal inconsistency (and one that reflects a clear class bias) is enough to remove minimalism from consideration as a plausible regime for those concerned with human rights.

Secondly, he claims that we do not clearly specify the origin of liberalism. But we did state as briefly as we could the generally accepted proposition (with which we expect he would agree) that liberalism arose with the creation of modern capitalist society, especially with the rise of the bourgeois class (p. 804). We agree that we did not explain, in this particular short article, why liberal regimes still violate so many rights.

Thirdly, Mitchell claims that our article is "remarkably barren in terms of producing empirical expectations about the variations of human-rights violations cross-nationally," and he states that we "presumably" believe that all nonliberal regimes perform "more or less equally badly." This is simply wrong. In the last half of our article, we explicitly differentiate among various nonliberal regimes. We do, in fact, provide some empirical expectations about human-rights performances. We think that traditional, communist, and perhaps developmental, regimes are more likely to provide for the substance of social and economic rights than minimalist or corporatist ones; and we also think that communist and developmentalist regimes are more likely to value equality than minimalist, traditional, or corporatist societies. From a moral point of view, we think equality is better than hierarchy, and the substance of social and economic rights is better than nothing at all, even if the regime holding these ideals is not rights based. Thus were we, for example, to be advising a U.S. president on foreign policy in Central America, we would advise supporting Nicaragua over Guatemala or El Salvador, in contrast, for example, to Jeane Kirkpatrick's (1979) minimalist preferences.

Finally, there is the charge of ethnocentrism, which Mitchell puts in a rather condescending fashion. As it comes out of the blue without any explanation, we can only ask, What is ethnocentric about taking a standard that is reflected legally in a universal document to which practically all states now pay at least lip service and that applies to everybody in an entirely universalistic fashion? Certainly, Mitchell does not appear to want to argue that any of the regimes we criticize respects human rights. Nor do we imagine that he wants to argue that simply because someone lives in a Third World Nation his or her government should be held to lower standards.

To insist on the universal relevance of international human-rights standards is not ethnocentrism. Rather, it is to insist on the liberating power, in a world of state societies, of the idea of human rights. And it is to refuse to agree that anything goes, that whatever a dictator or ruling class (of whatever ideological stripe) calls respect for human rights *is* such respect. Like so many others, Mitchell, out of a misplaced fear of ethnocentrism, would leave us unable to charge tyrants, despots, and oppressive ruling classes with violating human rights. A central objective of our article was to help lay to rest this all-too-familiar erosion of the idea of human rights.

RHODA E. HOWARD

*McMaster University*

JACK DONNELLY

*University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill*

## Notes

Neil Mitchell thanks James McCormick of Iowa State University and Karen Remmer of the University of New Mexico for their comments.

1. For Justice Thurgood Marshall, liberal documents and regimes seem to provide scant protection from repression. He said in 1978, "During most of the past two hundred years, the Constitution as interpreted by this court did not prohibit the most ingenious and pervasive forms of discrimination against the Negro" (McCluskey, 1986).

## References

Berlin, Sir Isaiah. 1970. *Four Essays on Liberty.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Goldstein, Robert Justin. N.d. The United States of America. In *An International Handbook of Human Rights,* eds. Jack Donnelly and Rhoda E. Howard. Westport, CT: Greenwood.

Howard, Rhoda E. and Jack Donnelly. 1986. Human Dignity, Human Rights and Political Regimes. *American Political Science Review* 80: 801–17.

Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. 1979. Dictatorships and Double Standards. *Commentary* November, 34–45.

McCluskey, John. 1986. Law, Justice, and Democracy. 1986 Reith Lectures. *The Listener,* December 4, p. 16.

Skalnes, Tor, and Jan Egelund, eds. 1986. *Human Rights in Developing Countries 1986.* Oslo: Norwegian University Press.

# WHY ARE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES POWERFUL?

*In "The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power" (this* Review, *March 1987) Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast made the case that congressional committees are powerful not so much because of members' deference to them as because of the committees'* ex post veto, *a potential negative committees might deliver, say, at the conference committee stage of lawmaking. But Keith Krehbiel argues that congressional committees have, in fact, never possessed an uncircumventable ex post veto and are very much constrained by their parent chambers. In response, Shepsle and Weingast defend their model of the foundations of committee power.*

In their essay on sequential decision making, Shepsle and Weingast (1987) propose that standing committees are disproportionately influential on legislative outcomes because they possess an "ex post veto" in the penultimate, conference stage of the process. I do not dispute the general observations that sequence plays a subtle but central role in legislatures and that committees have some disproportionate power attributable to "institutional foundations" (i.e., formal rules and precedents). Rather, I focus on the specific institutional constraints assumed in the ex post-veto model, question whether they are binding on members of the U.S. House of Representatives, and argue that several alternative institutions in Congress erode committee power.

## Institutional Foundations and Institutional Alternatives

The ex post-veto argument is based on a four-stage, spatial model. First, a standing committee reports a bill. Second, the parent chamber considers the bill under an open rule. Third, the standing committee, as one of two actors in a conference committee, either negotiates "ex post adjustments" in the bill or unilaterally exercises an "ex post veto" that maintains the status quo. Finally, the parent chamber considers the conference report with no opportunity to amend it or vote separately on its parts.

Shepsle and Weingast's principal substantive claim is that committee power is predominantly attributable to "institutional foundations" rather than to "deference." Members on the floor only *appear* to defer to the committee, but their decision not to "roll" the committee is actually determined by their precise expectations about conference procedures. The corresponding formal argument thus rests crucially on assumptions about institutional constraints in the last two stages of decision making. The key assumption about the final stage is that the parent body takes a single "up-or-down" vote on the conference report. The key assumptions about the penultimate stage are that a conference is appointed, that it is "dominated" by standing-committee members, and, most importantly, that its ex post-veto and ex post-adjustment powers cannot be circumvented or overridden.

The claim that these are the "institutional foundations of committee power" requires qualification in light of several related House rules and precedents. For example, the parent chamber may choose to employ any of the following procedures to circumvent or override unwanted exercises of committee power:

1. In the absence of the majority vote or unanimous consent required to send a bill to conference, the House uses a process of "amendments between the houses" (Bach 1984).[1] The House and Senate may directly report amended legislation to the other chamber, thereby avoiding conference entirely. Or they may use this procedure before and/or after conference. For example, major postconference differences were resolved via amendments between the houses on the fiscal-1986 omnibus reconciliation bill (Bach 1986a) and on the $576-billion fiscal 1987 omnibus appropriations bill (*Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, October 18, 1986, 2584–87).

2. A majority can circumvent an anticipated ex post veto by accepting the other chamber's version of a bill. Then conference is not possible.

3. Similarly, an anticipated ex post veto triggered by a single provision of a bill may be circumvented by accepting, unamended, the other chamber's version of that provision, thus rendering that portion of the bill "unconferencable." A recent case in point is the Senate's action on a military-construction appropriation bill in which controversial aid to contras was included. In spite of significant opposition to the contra provision, "supporters fought back all attempts to amend the measure. They want[ed] the Senate to approve the same bill that passed the House, in order to minimize the possibility of last-minute delays that could stop the aid package from becoming law this year" (*New York Times*, August 14, 1986, 14).

4. The prospects for an ex post veto may also be constrained by Rule X, clause 6(f), which states, "In appointing members to conference committees the Speaker shall appoint no less than a majority of members who generally supported the House position as determined by the Speaker. The Speaker shall name members who are primarily responsible for the legislation and shall, to the fullest extent feasible, include the principal proponents of the major provisions of the bill as it passed the House."[2]

5. A majority can override a suspected veto by invoking Rule XXVIII, clause 1(b) to discharge the conference committee. This rule states, "After House conferees on any bill or resolution in conference between the House and Senate shall have been appointed for twenty calendar days and shall have failed to make a report, it is hereby declared to be a motion of the highest privilege to move to discharge said House conferees and to appoint new conferees, or to instruct said House conferees. . . ." The rationale for the rule is clearly stated by the former House parliamentarian: "The purpose of Rule XXVIII, clause 1(b) is to permit the House to retain some control over the deliberations of its agents in conference where they have failed to reach an agreement within the designated period" (Deschler 1982, 33, Sec. 11.2).

6. A majority can also override unwanted "ex post adjustments" by passing a motion to recommit a conference report, with or without instructions. Two qualifications are that conferees do not have to comply with the instructions and that the motion must precede Senate action on the report; otherwise the con-

ference is officially dissolved (Deschler 1982, 33, Sec. 26.1). Recommittal is not necessarily ineffective, however. When the 67th Congress considered the Fordney-McCumber Tariff Bill, for example, majorities in both houses rolled their money committees by striking a provision for a dye embargo. Conferees from Finance and Ways and Means then flouted their parent bodies by restoring the provision. But when the conference report came to the floor of the House, a motion to recommit the report with instructions to strike the provision was passed, 177 to 130 (Chiu 1928, 96). The bill ultimately passed, too—*without* the dye embargo provision (*Congressional Record* Sept. 15, 1922, 12709-18).

7. A final and admittedly unusual example of the general absence of a certain end to the bicameral game is that a two-thirds majority can suspend the rules to negate a conference report—even one that had passed both houses. This was the effect of House Concurrent Resolution 527 in the 94th Congress (Deschler 1982, 33, Sec. 26.11).

In striking contrast to the ex post-veto model in which the parent chamber is *constrained by* the stylized conference procedure, these rules and precedents indicate that the parent chamber *constrains* postfloor decision making. Combined with the parent chamber's right to choose procedures for resolving differences, the institutional alternatives raise questions about whether the postulated constraints in the ex post-veto model are binding in the House.

## Use of Institutional Alternatives

Perhaps high costs of employing alternative procedures render the constraints in the model binding de facto if not de jure. If so, then the ex post veto may be a source of committee power even in the presence of institutional alternatives. Although these costs are not directly observable, use of the procedures is. Table 1 illustrates the possible inferences. In the top row, the alternatives are used often. Regardless of whether costs are low or high, they are not prohibitively high. Thus, the constraints in the ex post-veto model cannot be binding. In the bottom row the alternatives are rarely used, but two different inferences are possible. The rare-use-low-cost combination would not support the ex post-veto model. If existent at all, committee power would have to be attributed to *procedural deference* by floor majorities that choose restrictive conference procedures when, by definition, they could easily be avoided. Finally, only the rare-use-high-cost combination would support the conjecture that costliness of use of institutional alternatives regularly constrains the parent chamber.

Unobservability of costs precludes distinguishing between columns, but data on use can distinguish between rows. Table 2 presents evidence from the 98th Congress. For over 90% of public laws, one or more of the alternative institutions was used. Over five hundred bills avoided conference entirely via amendments between the houses or outright acceptance of the other chamber's bill. Furthermore, of the 85 bills for which conference was requested, 40% did not culminate in a final "up-or-down" vote on the whole conference report. Rather, for most of the bills using a combination of procedures, the conference reported "amendments in disagreement" (see Bach 1984) that were considered apart from the conference report and resolved via amendments between the houses. Thus, "ex post adjustments" were often made by parent bodies rather than by "committee-dominated" conferences.[3]

The unambiguous inference from these data is that for most bills, institutional alternatives to Shepsle and Weingast's

**Table 1. Are the Ex Post Veto Constraints Binding? (Inferences from the Use of Institutional Alternatives)**

| Actual Use (Observable) | Cost of Use (Unobservable) | |
|---|---|---|
| | Low | High |
| Common | No | No |
| Rare | No: procedural deference | Yes: de facto, ex post veto |

stylized conference procedure were not prohibitively costly to employ. Unfortunately, direct inferences regarding committee power are not possible even for those relatively few cases in which the stylized conference procedure was used. Was committee power exercised contrary to majority preferences in any or most of these cases? If so, did institutional foundations prohibit the parent chamber from rolling the committee, or was the parent chamber simply exercising a form of procedural deference? If the former, why in some cases but not in others?

## Institutional Erosion of Committee Power

The necessarily limited inference from the data in Table 2 accentuates the need for bill-specific evidence about preferences of the committee and the parent chamber and for examining the specific predictions of the ex post-veto model. For situations in which preferences of the committee and parent chamber diverge, the model predicts that

1. committees are not discharged or forced to report bills under duress
2. committees are not rolled on the floor
3. conference committees are appointed and are dominated by preference outliers from the committee[4]
4. bills disproportionately reflect preferences of the committee

Evidence consistent with these predictions would not unequivocally support the ex post-veto model, however. It would likewise be consistent with the fundamentally different view that committees are powerful *in spite of institutional alternatives.* This interpretation would seem more plausible than one based on institutional constraints that seem not to bind. Yet notice its similarity to the "cooperative system of reciprocated deference" that Shepsle and Weingast

**Table 2. Use of Institutional Alternatives During the 98th Congress**

| Procedures | Number of Cases[a] | Percentage |
|---|---|---|
| No conference | 540 | 86.4 |
| Combined procedures | 34 | 5.4 |
| Conference only | 51 | 8.2 |

*Source: Calendar of the U.S. House of Representatives,* final edition, 98th Congress.

[a]Number of cases = 625 (623 public laws, 2 concurrent budget resolutions).

regard as more of a description than an explanation.

Although empirical evidence cannot straightforwardly distinguish between institutional foundations and procedural deference, an alternative multistage model can be examined that yields predictions different from those of the ex post-veto model and the deference description. Consistent with the complete set of House rules and precedents, such a model permits members to choose not only policies but also procedures. Ultimately, it suggests that committees are *less* powerful than is commonly presumed precisely *because of institutional alternatives* to Shepsle and Weingast's conference procedure.

Suppose a majority on the floor wishes to roll the standing committee. Rather than passing and perfunctorily sending a bill to a "committee-dominated" conference that may exercise an ex post veto or ex post adjustments, the majority does any of the following:

1. It may roll the committee via outright acceptance of the Senate's bill.
2. It can either designate a member to object to the unanimous-consent request to go to conference or vote no on the motion to go to conference, thereby sending the bill directly to the Senate.
3. It can consent to conference but appeal to clause 6(f) of Rule 10 to encourage the Speaker to "include the principal proponents of the major provisions of the bill as it passed the House."
4. Finally, if a conference is appointed but does not comply with majority wishes, the majority can (in various combinations) discharge conferees, recommit the conference report, appoint a new conference, or revert to amendments between the houses.

The general point should be evident. Each strategy circumvents the ex post veto and undesired ex post adjustments and yields an outcome that erodes committee power. More precisely, this model of institutional choice, in competition with the ex post-veto model, predicts that

1. committees may be discharged (or compelled to report bills against their wishes)
2. when committees are discharged (or report bills out of duress), they will get rolled if a floor majority opposes the bill as discharged or reported
3. when committees are rolled, the parent chamber will either circumvent conference or carefully monitor conference behavior
4. if conferees nevertheless attempt an ex post veto or undesired ex post adjustments, alternative institutions will be used to override the veto or adjustments.

An extensive empirical test of the predictions is beyond the scope of this comment, but examples supportive of rational choice of institutions are readily available. Gun control legislation in the 99th Congress indicates that the institutional alternatives are used to circumvent the ex post veto and to roll standing committees.

On July 9, 1985, the Senate passed S. 49, a bill to weaken the 1968 Gun Control Act. The vote was 79 to 15. The bill was sent to the House, where it was referred to the Judiciary Committee. To the chagrin, but not the surprise, of the National Rifle Association (NRA), the Committee's chairman, Peter Rodino (D-NJ), pronounced the bill "dead on arrival" (*Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, March 15, 1986, 599). Many members in the parent chamber demanded relaxation of the gun controls, however. Harold Volkmer (D-MO) circulated a discharge petition to bring gun-control legislation to the floor without committee action, and it soon became apparent that the necessary 218 signatures would be obtained. Judiciary's Subcommittee on Crime thus performed an "extremely fast" markup of H.R. 4305, which became H.R. 4332 and was passed in the full committee on March 11. Although Volkmer's petition secured its 218th signature two days later, the relevant committees "beat the clock" (*Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,* March 8, 1986, 548).

On March 19, the Rules Committee met to reconcile Volkmer's anticipated discharge with the Judiciary Committee's attempt to preempt it. The product of its hearings and deliberations was H.Res. 403, a rule that allowed Volkmer to substitute the text of his bill, a close approximation to S. 49, for the Committee's bill, H.R. 4332. After brief floor consideration of H.R. 4332 on March 20, the House resumed debate on gun-control legislation on April 9 and 10. Because the signatures had convinced members that Volkmer could pass his substitute, the vehicle for amendments was the substitute rather than the committee's bill. Subcommittee Chairman William Hughes (D-NJ) circulated a "Dear Colleague" letter on March 21 urging members to support a set of "law-enforcement" amendments to the Volkmer substitute, including provisions to bar the interstate sale and transportation of handguns, to expand the category of people who must get licenses to buy and sell guns, and to allow federal agents to make unannounced inspections of gun dealers' premises. Each of these would dilute Volkmer's proposed reductions in gun control. Relative to the 1968 law, however, the Hughes amendments would still diminish gun control.

Hughes managed the bill on the floor, and his amendments consumed almost all of the allotted five hours. He was uniformly unsuccessful in his major attempts to dilute Volkmer's substitute. His first and most significant failure was the loss of his package of law enforcement amendments by 72 votes. Second, his proposed ban only on interstate transportation of handguns failed, 177 to 242. Although his amendment to retain only the existing ban on interstate sale on handguns was adopted, it was regarded as a minor victory. For example, NRA legislative director Wayne LaPierre said the NRA "could live with the handgun ban because it simply maintained the status quo"(*Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,* April 12, 1986, 784).

In the closing moments of debate, Hughes persisted in his efforts to dilute the bill. His several attempts to gain additional time via unanimous consent received objections by Volkmer proponents, who were content with the minor changes in the substitute (*Congressional Record,* May 6, 1986, H1750-52). Thus, the Committee of the Whole proceeded to pass the Volkmer substitute, 286 to 136. After the committee rose, the bill as amended passed 292 to 130. Finally, in accordance with the "hook-up" provision in the rule, a motion was made to strike the text of S. 49 and substitute the amended contents of H.R. 4332. The motion was agreed to. Then, with no discussion of a possible conference, the bill was returned to the Senate. In the ensuing off-the-floor, cross-chamber negotiations, neither of the key House actors—Volkmer and John Dingell (D-MI)—were Judiciary Committee members (*Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,* May 10, 1986, 1034–35; *Congressional Record,* May 6, 1986, S5358–68). Finally, on May 6, the "Senate concurred in the amendments of the House to S. 49" (*Congressional Record,* May 6, 1986, D529).

Given the revealed preferences of House members on the gun-control issue, the ex post-veto model predicts different behavior at every stage than that which occurred. At stage one, Volkmer and his colleagues would not have attempted the discharge had they regarded the ex post veto as a binding constraint. Furthermore, a committee armed with a credible ex post veto would have "opened its gates" without reluctance, whereas in the ex post-veto model the committee is guaranteed an outcome at least as good as the status quo. At stage two (given that the gates were opened), the ex post-veto model predicts that in anticipation of a veto, Volkmer proponents would sophisticatedly *oppose*, or not offer, the Volkmer substitute, in order to give the committee a bill it *would* support in conference. Or, for the same reason, proponents should have supported all of Hughes's weakening amendments. At stage three (given that the roll occurred), a conference committee "dominated" by preference outliers would have been perfunctorily appointed and, of course, would have exercised the ex post veto.

Instead, the subcommittee was rolled at each stage: first via discharge, second via amendments on the floor,[5] and finally via amendments between the houses. The likely reason for the third and most relevant roll is that gun-control opponents anticipated the possibility of an ex post veto but worked around it due to a readily available institutional alternative. This interpretation is supported by the following observation: "Privately, NRA officials and some of their House supporters say they are hoping the House will pass a bill so close to S. 49 that a conference with the Senate will not be necessary. They are concerned, despite Rodino's pledge to go to conference, that the two chambers could get stalled in disagreement and the gun legislation would die" (*Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, March 15, 1986, 598). In sum, the parent chamber's choice of institutional alternatives can erode committee power.

## Conclusion

The three specific aims of this comment were to highlight institutional alternatives to Shepsle and Weingast's conference procedure, to present evidence that their use in the U.S. House is frequent and may render the key constraints of the ex post-veto model nonbinding, and to illustrate that their use can erode committee power. The analysis supports the conclusion that the ex post veto is not a significant institutional foundation of congressional committee power.[6]

The restricted applicability of the ex post-veto model and its corresponding underestimate of *parent chamber* power raises challenging questions regarding the fundamental tension between standing committees and floor majorities in Congress. How do standing rules and precedents moderate this tension? Why were they adopted? How did they evolve? Existing models do not accommodate these questions satisfactorily because of their disproportionate focus on the institutional weapons in the committee's arsenal (e.g., obstruction, restrictive rules, and the ex post veto) at the expense of parallel mechanisms at the disposal of floor majorities (e.g., the discharge petition, open rules, and amendments between the houses). Shepsle and Weingast offer a promising set of tools and insights for further development of models that incorporate a more balanced set of institutional alternatives and are potentially amenable to empirical tests. Regardless of the implications of future studies for the ex post-veto argument in particular, the general effect of such studies will be to clarify the foundations of committee *and parent chamber* power and, in turn, to facilitate an understanding of the more subtle committee-floor tension that pervades congressional politics. Thus, while Shepsle and Weingast's "puzzle of committee power" persists, several of its key pieces have been identified.

KEITH KREHBIEL

*Stanford University*

---

Krehbiel has provided a thoughtful,

provocative comment on our recent paper on committee power. In putting forth an alternative point of view, providing some data, and reporting on a particular case in considerable detail, Krehbiel claims that his analysis "supports the conclusion that the ex post veto is not a significant institutional foundation of congressional committee power." Although we believe there are several important facets of his argument that need to be incorporated into future work on this subject, the main thrust of his argument and the conclusion he derives from it are, in our opinion, misplaced.

Since Krehbiel's critique goes to the heart of our original essay, we first briefly summarize our argument. Second, we try to place our work in theoretical context and suggest how second-generation modeling might proceed. Third, we take a more detailed look at the frequency distribution that constitutes the empirical foundation for Krehbiel's critique. Finally, we suggest that the real value of our approach lies in the comparative-statics predictions it permits.

## The Role of Sequence

We began our original essay with the observation that many students of congressional committees "explain" committee power by naming some of its agenda-setting concomitants (e.g., gatekeeping, proposal power). We questioned whether "naming" and "explaining" were the same thing and, more importantly, whether these named features of committee power really did confer power on committees. A theory linking named properties with influence over final outcomes was required.

In the context of a garden-variety spatial model of legislative deliberations, we demonstrated, in fact, that neither gatekeeping nor proposal power by committees, individually or jointly, could be linked to positive influence over final outcomes. Chamber majorities had sufficient tools to open any gate or alter any proposal. Once a committee made its move, the final outcome was in the hands of floor majorities. We concluded that if gatekeeping and proposal power fully characterized committee power, then committees would not be terribly powerful and, indeed, that it would be highly unlikely to find members investing their time and energy in committee careers. In short, the effective division-of-labor system that has characterized the U.S. House committee system, from the time of the overthrow of Cannonism in 1910 until at least the 1970s, would not, in our view, have been sustained. But it was sustained for more than half a century and, although significant reforms in the mid-1970s have transformed it, the system of committees and jurisdictions remains a vital feature of legislative life in today's Congress. Something in the "explanation" was missing.

Some scholars appreciated the insufficiency of gatekeeping and proposal power for committee influence, though they did not cast their doubts in the form of an explicitly theoretical argument. Their attention focused on a normative framework of reciprocal deference. In the language of the more recent theoretical formulation of Axelrod (1981, 1984), deference to committee preferences—whether in allowing the gates to be kept closed or in exercising restraint in amending committee proposals—constituted a form of cooperation within a division-of-labor institution.

We agreed that something in the old explanation was missing, but we argued that there were reasons to be skeptical of cooperative arrangements and deference-like arguments. The unenforceability of agreements and the ever changing legislative and electoral context combined to render such arrangements vulnerable to reneging and opportunistic behavior (see Weingast and Marshall 1987 for a fuller elaboration of this theme). We focused instead, on institutional features of the legislative process, on the sequence in which legislative business was conducted. Using simple game-theoretic reasoning, we demonstrated that a committee role *after* its chamber had "worked its will" (ex post powers) had the nonobvious effect of making earlier committee moves (ex ante powers) effective. In short, the sequential process provides the glue sustaining a system of reciprocal deference.

## Ex Post Power in the U.S. Congress

In our paper we developed the ex post-power theme both in the abstract (in effect, as an extensive-form game with committees possessing moves both early and late in the play) and with the U.S. Congress in mind. We argued that the conference procedure by which differences in legislation are resolved between the chambers of a bicameral legislature constituted an institutional manifestation of ex post power and, consequently, was the "missing link" in the story of committee power. Krehbiel spends the bulk of his remarks on this latter argument, and we turn to them shortly. But it must be emphasized that first and foremost, ours is a stylized argument, in which we sought to assess claims about ex ante power, to show them wanting, and then to demonstrate the remarkable consequences of a deeper sequence in which ex post committee moves played a role. In this sense, ours is an exercise in theory, in which we identified flaws in previous arguments and elaborated an improved theory that removed those flaws.

As modelers, how might we address the issue of less-than-complete implementation of ex post powers? This is not precisely the question raised by Krehbiel, but perhaps it should have been. In our stylized legislative world, a committee is *assured* the penultimate move (say, in a conference proceeding) and the legislative chamber is *restricted* at the ultimate move (a majority may only vote the conference report up or down). However, as Krehbiel correctly notes, chamber majorities may frustrate efforts to go to conference (by accepting the other chamber's version of a bill, by amending the other chamber's version and "messaging" it back, etc.). As well, chamber majorities are not restricted, at the final move, to an up-down vote on a conference report. They may, for example, accept a "partial" report and resolve remaining difference via some extraconference procedure. We report two responses here to the "imperfect-implementation" problem, leaving a third response (comparative statics) for special consideration.

### Costs and Biases

Even if it were conceded that chamber majorities are able to attenuate ex post committee powers, it is necessary to determine under what circumstances they would actually do so. A messaging-between-the-chambers strategy without the cooperation of the originating committee, as in Krehbiel's example of the 1986 gun-control legislation, is bound to be a legislatively intricate undertaking. Undoubtedly, there are times when such costs are insufficient to deter a challenge to the committee. In even rarer circumstances, a zealous proponent of a bill mistreated by the committee can rally large numbers of legislators around the cause. However, the costliness of the undertaking is not trivial and in many situations is a deterrent. Committees will try to anticipate, and possibly accommodate, these prospects; they may also try to raise the costs of opposition. For example, we suspect that the heavy workload on the floor at the end of a Congress is not only an indication of the time it takes to produce a bill but also a way in which committees raise the costs to others of nullifying their ex post powers. The spate of conferences that greets the closing days of a Congress is a reflection of the fact that, short of accepting the other chamber's version, the only practical way to resolve differences is via the conference procedure. In the rush to adjourn, committees (serving as conferees) are in the proverbial catbird seat. Opponents are severely disadvantaged because the opportunity cost of opposing a committee at this late stage is high.

Krehbiel believes that imperfect implementation nullifies ex post committee powers. We respond that the existence of such opportunities is insufficient to sustain his claim, that exercising such opportunities comes at a cost, and that ex post powers bias legislative results in the direction of committee preferences.

Although we do not believe the extreme conclusion Krehbiel draws is warranted, his general point (as we interpret it) is sound. The ability of chamber majorities to short-circuit ex post as well as ex ante committee powers undoubtedly has a sobering effect on committees. One effect (alluded to above) involves an adaptive response by committees in which they time matters for the end of a Congress. Another is partly rhetorical, partly reputational: committee rhetoric emphasizes its representational role in conference. Conferees portray themselves as defenders of the *chamber's* version of a bill, not the *committee's* version. And in many respects their behavior is not entirely inconsistent with their rhetorical claims, for they wish to acquire reputations that would further discourage efforts to short-circuit their ex post powers. This suggests some second-generation future directions for modeling imperfect implementation. Thus, Krehbiel is correct to call attention to these possibilities; insecure ex post powers will dampen committee incentives to extract all the advantage from a situation. But committees must still be reckoned with, and the ex post veto provides the institutional underpinnings of this power.

## Imperfect and Incomplete Information

Our model is one of perfect and complete information. At each stage in the process, each actor knows exactly what has transpired up to that point (legislative history) and what consequences will flow from any decision made—hence *perfect* information. Moreover, at each stage each player knows the set of feasible paths the future might take, how they depend on the choices at later stages, and what the preferences of all players are—hence *complete* information. Consequently, the legislators in this model world are capable of perfect retrospection and perfect foresight. It is a world in which rational players play error free. These characteristics, though obviously lacking verisimilitude with the real world of imperfect and incomplete information, are nevertheless standard for first-generation models. Only recently have modelers in both economics and political science begun to advance beyond these stylized features. To point out, as Krehbiel does, that mistakes occur—chairmen fail to appreciate the threat of a discharge, committee bills get amended beyond recognition on the floor, ex post powers are short-circuited—does not necessarily mean that the process has been misspecified. In our opinion the mistakes to which Krehbiel alludes are indicative of information asymmetries and imperfections. To conclude from the occurrence of mistakes that ex post committee powers are insignificant, as Krehbiel does, is much like concluding that the presidential power to veto is insignificant the first time a successful veto override is observed. Properly interpreted, however, Krehbiel's point is well taken. Models of incomplete-imperfect information are natural future steps to take. We should warn the reader, however, that models of asymmetric or imperfect information existing in the literature are extremely delicate, fragile, and specialized. Their conclusions are also subtle and nonobvious, so that while one's natural inclination might be to believe with Krehbiel that uncertainties mitigate committee powers, it would not surprise us to discover that exactly the opposite is true.

We have tried in this section to put Krehbiel's criticisms in context. Our model of ex post committee powers was a theoretical effort to salvage the view of committees as powerful agenda agents in division-of-labor legislatures. Even allowing for (costly) opportunities to short-circuit these ex post powers, imperfect information, and incomplete information, we believe our conclusion—that ex post powers bias final outcomes toward the preferences of committees—will stand.

## Alternative Procedures for Resolving Bicameral Differences

At the heart of Krehbiel's critique of our argument is the existence of alternatives to the conference procedure. If, as Krehbiel suggests, there are such alternatives and if, moreover, they are used with considerable frequency, then the import of ex post committee powers is illusory and the "puzzle of committee power" remains. Krehbiel proceeds to present data drawn from the 98th Congress on the frequency with which various procedures are employed to resolve chamber differences. His data reveal that only in 13.6% of the 625 public laws and budget resolutions passed in 1983-1984 were conference procedures employed in some form. From this Krehbiel concludes that "for most bills, institutional alternatives to Shepsle and Weingast's stylized conference procedure were not prohibitively costly to employ," thus strongly implying that floor majorities, *not committees*, were firmly in control.

We believe Krehbiel's data are misleading and his interpretations simplistic. Frequency distributions are not always what they seem and need to be interpreted in the context of a theory. Consider the parallel between ex post committee powers and the presidential veto power. A naive collector of frequency distributions might arrive at the (erroneous) conclusion that the presidential veto is unimportant. As Rohde and Simon (1985, 398) put it, "If we consider vetoed bills as a proportion of all bills passed by Congress, this characterization is supported, for only a small proportion of public bills is vetoed in any given year. Nonetheless, there are several reasons for probing beyond the conventional wisdom." The most obvious reason is that it makes no reference to the *content* of the bills that pass (and avoid the veto). Three important qualifiers emerge from just such a consideration: on some proportion of bills, Congress and president are not in disagreement; on a considerable proportion of the bills, the content is trivial, uncontroversial, or insignificant to the interest of the president; finally, the ultimate content of many bills takes into account in advance the preferences of the president.

Precisely the same reasoning may be employed to question Krehbiel's frequency distribution. Of the 86.4% of all public laws passed by the 98th Congress that avoided a conference

1. how many reflected consensus between committee and floor majorities?
2. how many were trivial, uncontroversial, or insignificant to floor majorities?
3. how many passed in a final form that reflected the wishes of committees?

This short list suggests the obvious: not all bills are the same. Comparing all the

**Table 3. Disposition by the House of Public Laws and Resolutions of the 98th Congress (in percentages)**

| Disposition | Krehbiel | Nickels | Congressional Quarterly Key Votes[a] |
|---|---|---|---|
| No conference | 86.4 | 88.0 | 13.0 |
| No messaging |  | 62.8 |  |
| Messaging |  | 25.2 |  |
| Conference | 13.6 | 12.0 | 87.0 |
| No messaging | 8.2 | 8.0 |  |
| Messaging | 5.4 | 4.0 |  |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Number of cases | 625 | 623 | 23 |

*Sources:* Krehbiel 1987; Nickels 1986; *Congressional Quarterly Almanac,* vols. 39–40, Appendix C.

[a] There were 16 key votes in each session of the 98th Congress. In both sessions two of the votes dealt with the same bill, so there were 15 distinct bills in each session. Of the 30, 7 were either defeated in the House, not taken up in the Senate, or defeated in the Senate, leaving an N of 23.

bills in one session and then noting frequencies implicitly assumes that all bills are effectively similar. Those bills over which there is little controversy—either because there is widespread agreement or because almost no one but a handful of congressmen care—may well end up in the messaging category because this is the most expedient method of reconciliation between the chambers. For major controversies over tax legislation, economic or social regulation, or important redistributive issues, however, it may not be possible to settle disputes in this manner, so the committees opt for a conference. This suggests the hypothesis that the choice of reconciliation procedures is largely (though not exclusively) a *committee* matter. This hypothesis leads to a much different interpretation of Krehbiel's data, namely that the frequencies reflect committee choices favoring simple, expedient procedures when the bill in question is not controversial and differences between the chambers negligible. The plausibility of this hypothesis means that we cannot infer from the data, as Krehbiel tries to, that end-running the committee is both easy and frequent.

In support of our interpretation, we have gathered some data on a subset of bills from the 98th Congress, namely those that exhibit substantial controversy within each chamber. The more controversial an issue, the more likely the committee-opposition within the chamber is to attempt to short-circuit the committee's veto power, that is, to avoid a conference. If the frequency of conferences were low for these bills, then Krehbiel's contention that the ex post veto is easily evaded would indeed cast doubt on the ability of a committee to exercise an ex post veto.

Our approach is simple but direct, leaving a more systematic investigation for future work. Specifically, for the same 98th Congress from which Krehbiel's data were drawn, we examined the disposition of bills designated by the *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* as involving "key votes." We took this designation as a crude indicator of the importance of a bill to committees, floor majorities, the president, and so on.

The results are reported in Table 3. In

addition to Krehbiel's tally, we have included an independent tally for the 98th Congress by Nickels (1986) of the Congressional Research Service. Although the two tabulations employ slightly different counting conventions, they are in substantial agreement. However, Nickels breaks the numbers down a bit further. Nearly 63% of all bills not only avoid conference, they avoid *any* difference resolution whatsoever. These bills pass both houses in precisely the same form. Included in this category is an occasional "important" measure—for example, H.J. Res. 364, permitting the presence of marines in Lebanon. We suspect, however, that the overwhelming preponderance of measures in this category is of the trivial, uncontroversial, or insignificant sort. Thus, we believe Krehbiel puts far too much weight on the fact that so many bills avoid conference.

This is made especially forcefully by the *Congressional Quarterly* key-votes data. On "important" bills, the proportion going to conference is almost the inverse of the numbers reported by Krehbiel and Nickels for the population of all bills. While we have not untangled those that were resolved purely by conference, as opposed to those that entailed some messaging between the chambers, the proportions are quite impressive: nearly seven of every eight "important" bills require a resolution of differences *by conference.*[7] Were Krehbiel's bold contentions true, we would expect to see, in this category of controversial measures, a number of cases in which a committee brings its bill to the floor and some floor majority successfully replaces the committee bill with that from the other chamber; or cases in which committees seeking to go to conference on a measure are end-run by noncommittee members who successfully initiate messaging. While there are undoubtedly instances of these, we suspect that an extensive study of controversial measures would confirm what our examination of *Congressional Quarterly* key votes revealed, namely that these instances are rare.

Making empirical sense of the various ways the two chambers coordinate on a particular piece of legislation requires considerably more investigation than we can provide at this time. But it should be evident that the naive population frequencies reported by Krehbiel give a distorted view of the importance of the conference institution. Krehbiel's frequencies are consistent with the hypothesis that floor majorities may short-circuit a committee's ex post powers. But they are also consistent with our hypothesis that they reflect the discretionary choices made by committees about the best method of reconciling legislative differences (if there are any). Our own examination of *Congressional Quarterly* key votes gives some additional weight to this latter hypothesis.

## Comparative Statics

One of the virtues of an equilibrium theory is the comparative-statics analysis it permits. This affords an opportunity to explore how changes in institutions affect behavior and outcomes. Our stylization of the committee process ignored key features of the congressional environment, and Krehbiel has raised some important instances. We believe that the way to think about these omissions is to attempt to model them as comparative-statics predictions, that is, to determine how they affect the results of our model.

The committee system of our model has, as its empirical referent, the House committee system of the 1950s and 1960s. By the mid-1970s, this system had experienced some substantial institutional changes as reform fever swept the House—recorded-teller votes, electronic voting, Subcommittee Bill of Rights, and growth in staff, among others. These reforms, in turn, affected the norms of apprenticeship and specialization that were so characteristic of the earlier system. As these norms atrophied, member activities were channeled and constrained less by their committee assignments than had been the case in an earlier era. To oversimplify, the effect was a general decline in the division and specialization of labor. The theoretical issue implicitly raised by Krehbiel requires that we model these changing features to determine whether a new equilibrium has resulted, one entailing an "institutional erosion of committee power."

Recently, some fine empirical work (Bach 1986b; Smith 1986) has provided us with the first comprehensive snapshots of what these changes have wrought. As the subtitle of Smith's paper, "Why Don't We Do It on the Floor?," conveys, there has been tremendous growth in the amount of legislative activity that occurs on the floor. Hints of this began to appear even earlier in the more anecdotal literature. Bibby (1983), for example, reports of the seven freshmen from the class of 1978 who participated in an American Enterprise Institute roundtable: "There was a feeling among the group of freshmen that committees were having an increasingly difficult time defending their bills on the floor of the House. That is, the committees were being 'rolled' on the floor, and deference to committee decisions was being eroded. The freshmen felt little obligation to support committee decisions. . . . There was also a feeling of general skepticism about the work of the committees and their tendency to be special pleaders for the causes that fall under their jurisdiction" (p. 23).

From these empirical regularities, we need to determine what has happened to the equilibrium of the earlier system (in which committees were hegemons), as that hegemony has (apparently) begun to erode. Krehbiel's examples, as well as Bach's and Smith's empirical work, tell a part of that story, namely, they show the extent to which committee bills of the postreform era are transformed substantially by chamber majorities on the floor of the House. But there is an important part of the story they do not tell, a corollary to the law of anticipated reactions.

This "other part" of the story is best understood by considering what behavior one might expect of a committee in two different circumstances. In the first, committees expect their bills to win, perhaps because no (or only a few) amendments are allowed; in the second, committees expect a considerable number of amendments to be offered. We claim—and this is the subject of our current research—that committee proposals will differ in these two circumstances in systematic ways. With a modest ability to forecast future action on the floor, committees will anticipate and react to the differing amendment prospects accordingly. Thus, when committees expect their bills to pass without amendment, they will bring forth their most preferred alternative from among those that command the support of a majority. In this environment, if the committee loses on the floor, then there is real meaning to the notion that the committee was "rolled." However, when committees no longer expect to win (i.e., when they expect major amendments), they do not bring forth their most preferred alternative. Rather, they bring forth a *different* proposal, an instrument or vehicle they use to manage the amendment process. They care about the final (possibly amended) outcome and may or may not have any stake in the original bill they reported. We further predict that committees will participate heavily in the amendment process, in part to fend off less-desirable amendments by others (the data from Bach 1986b and Hall and Evans 1985 show that this is indeed the case). Thus, in the second environment, it is no longer clear whether we can view floor amending activity as constituting the committee being "rolled," since the committee did not expect (or desire) its original bill to win. While committees are undoubtedly worse off under the more open procedures—"after hegemony," if you will (with apologies to Robert Keohane)—it is premature to interpret this increase in floor activity as evidence that committees have lost control of the process or that it is easy to neutralize their power.

## Conclusion

We have gone on at some length expanding our view of committee power, suggesting how it might be extended to incorporate elements of the postreform Congress. In this manner, we have responded to Krehbiel's comments by suggesting that they require the appropriate comparative-statics analysis of our model. Key here are the effects of rules that foster considerably more floor activity by noncommittee members and of rules that allow noncommittee members to end-run the ex post powers of committees. In the latter case, we have argued that these procedures are costly to use, especially for bills coming up late in the session. Therefore we do not believe that these procedures effectively negate ex post committee powers, though they may qualify them in important ways.

In those circumstances where such attempts are likely to be tried, committees may well anticipate their use so that the legislation they bring forth reflects this threat, typically by slanting the measure toward the interests of those threatening to end-run. We suspect that this is the most likely effect of these procedures and that actual end runs are relatively rare. This reveals that the real empirical issues as to the effects of these procedures may be extremely difficult to assess since it is their potential use that affects committees, not necessarily their actual use.

This type of comparative static is readily studied within our framework. The above discussion suggests that the existence of procedures that allow floor members to end-run committees under certain circumstances have predictable effects. It also suggests, however, that because they are costly, they are not always used, and hence their existence does not *negate* ex post committee powers. We reiterate our earlier claim, namely that these ex post powers form a necessary underpinning of the congressional-committee system and that without them, committees would not play the important role in the congressional process described by congressional scholars over the last thirty years.

If there is a broader message in our remarks, it is a plea for a keener appreciation of equilibrium analysis. A mature institution is, in our view, an organization in equilibrium. Changes in its environment ripple through the institution. One must appreciate the totality of these "ripples," not just the first one. In the postreform Congress, committee products are more vulnerable on the floor. But that is not the end of the story. Committees select the vehicle to take to the floor. As well, committees (and their chairs) play an active role in arranging for bills to be transmitted to the other chamber; in seeking conferences, opting for the "messaging" approach, and making other tactical decisions in the negotiations between the chambers; in debating and moving approval of conference reports; and so on. In short, committee personnel play an active legislative-management role before, during, and after floor consideration, a role assumed by others only in unusual circumstances and at very high cost. Documenting the rest of this story is an objective that Krehbiel's constructive comments have encouraged us to pursue.

KENNETH A. SHEPSLE

*Harvard University*

BARRY R. WEINGAST

*Washington University & Stanford University*

## Notes

Krehbiel acknowledges the comments and encouragement of a number of people, especially Stanley Bach, David Baron, and Jon Bendor. Shepsle and Weingast acknowledge research support by the National Science Foundation, SES 85-41121.

1. Shepsle and Weingast summarize this procedure on pp. 19-20 and n. 11 but regard it as unimportant for major legislation. Thus, it plays no role in their model.

2. Precedent indicates that the rule may afford the Speaker considerable latitude. For example, *his* judgment cannot be challenged on a point of order (Bach 1984; Nagler 1986). Thus, the effect of the rule depends upon whether the Speaker is more responsive to standing committees or to majorities.

3. If an amendment in disagreement is defeated, the whole report is defeated. Shepsle and Weingast's closed-rule characterization does not follow, however, because refusal to pass an amendment in disagreement neither ends the game nor exhausts the parent chamber's strategic opportunities (see Bach 1984, 59-74 for a long list of possibilities). A common occurrence in the 98th Congress, for example, was for the House to accept such an amendment *with further amendments* and then to revert to amendments between the houses.

4. Bill-specific data on preferences of committee and noncommittee members are essential for measuring "committee dominance." In its absence, Shepsle and Weingast's main empirical finding of "dominance" (as measured by *representation* rather than *preferences*) is consistent with an alternative hypothesis that bills go to conference only when committee and floor preferences are similar.

5. On both of the failing Hughes amendments, the parent chamber opposed a 6 to 3 subcommittee majority. On the vote of the Volkmer substitute, as amended, the House opposed a 5 to 4 subcommittee majority. Only on the Hughes amendment that passed did the House and subcommittee majorities correspond.

6. Although the focus has been on the House, generalization to the Senate is justified by strong similarities between House and Senate procedures for resolving bicameral differences. Support is found in the Senate's procedural guide for conferences, *Cleaves' Manual*, which consists primarily of precedents compiled for the House by its (former) parliamentarian, Asher C. Hinds. For example, all of the following are possible in the Senate: amendments between the houses before or after conference, discharge of an inactive conference, and appointment of a new conference. Sophisticated choice of institutions is thus possible in the Senate, too.

7. In regard to mixed procedures, i.e., those using conference and messaging, we believe that here, too, Krehbiel has overinterpreted the data. While we have not investigated this, many bills in this category are those to which the Senate has added a nongermane amendment. Here, the conferees may deal completely with the germane issues, leaving the nongermane ones to some form of messaging. The important point is that there should be no presumption that bills in this category represent cases in which floor majorities are getting around intransigent committees.

## References

Axelrod, Robert. 1981. The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists. *American Political Science Review* 75:306-18.

Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation.* New York: Basic Books.

Bach, Stanley. 1984. Resolving Differences in Congress: Conference Committees and Amendments between the Houses. Congressional Research Service, Washington. Typescript.

Bach, Stanley. 1986a. Procedures for Reaching Legislative Agreement: A Case Study of H.R. 3128. Congressional Research Service, Washington. Typescript.

Bach, Stanley. 1986b. Representatives and Committees on the Floor: Amendments to Appropriations Bills in the House of Representatives, 1963-1982. *Congress and the Presidency* 13:40-58.

Bibby, John. 1983. *Congress off the Record: The Candid Analyses of Seven Members.* Washington: American Enterprise Institute.

Chiu, Chang-wei. 1928. *The Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives since 1896.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Deschler, Lewis. 1982. *Procedure in the U.S. House of Representatives.* Washington: GPO.

Hall, Richard, and C. Lawrence Evans. 1985. The Role of the Subcommittee in Committee Decisionmaking. Paper presented at annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans.

Nagler, Jonathan. 1986. Strategic Implications of Conferee Selection in the House of Representatives: "It Ain't Over Till It's Over." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena. Typescript.

Nickels, Ilona. 1986. Guiding a Bill through the Legislative Process: Considerations for Legislative Staff. Report no. 86-48 GOV. Washington: Congressional Research Service.

Rohde, David, and Dennis Simon. 1985. Presidential Vetoes and Congressional Response: A Study of Institutional Conflict. *American Journal of Political Science* 29:398-428.

Shepsle, Kenneth, and Barry Weingast. 1987. The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power. *American Political Science Review* 81:85-104.

Smith, Steven. 1986. Revolution in the House: Why Don't We Do It on the Floor?" Governmental Studies Discussion Paper no. 5. Washington: Brookings Institution.

Weingast, Barry, and William Marshall. 1987. The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets. Domestic Studies Program Working Paper. Stanford: Hoover Institution.

# RESEARCH NOTES

# GUNS AND BUTTER AND GOVERNMENT POPULARITY IN BRITAIN

HELMUT NORPOTH
*State University of New York*
*Stony Brook*

*Britain under the government of Prime Minister Thatcher provides a unique opportunity to probe the effects of both war and macroeconomic performance on government popularity. Monthly ratings for Thatcher and Conservative-party support (June 1979 to July 1985) are examined by way of Box-Tiao intervention models. The model that best captures the impact of the Falklands War of 1982 is of the gradual-temporary variety: popularity gains accrued through the three-month war shrink in a geometric fashion. Nevertheless, they prove to be worth over five percentage points for the Conservative party a year later, in the 1983 election. Macroeconomic performance, meanwhile, is found to have an asymmetric effect on government popularity, with unemployment strongly significant but inflation not significant at all. Apparently, the British public is punishing failure (on employment) while letting success (on inflation) go unrewarded. Qualifications of the positive effect of war and the negative effect of macroeconomic performance are suggested.*

War and economics have few rivals when it comes to making or breaking governments. Many observers take for granted that prosperity spells electoral success for those in power, and bad economic times, political doom. Likewise, military victory has long been thought to augur well for the popularity of political leaders, whereas defeat may cost them more than their popular support.

On the other hand, the question of victory or defeat may be moot. There are signs that popular support for a war being conducted wanes as the costs of war mount. U.S. public opinion on the wars in Korea and Vietnam drives home the lesson that war, if anything, is more likely to erode government support in the mass public than to boost it (Kernell 1978; Mueller 1973; Norpoth 1984). From World War I up to the Vietnam War, the presidential party typically suffered severe losses at the polls after the United States went to war, win or lose. And in Britain the Conservative party lost the general election of 1945 despite the triumph over Germany only a few months earlier.

Like war, the economy, too, may be confronting political leaders with a losing, not a winning, proposition. While bad economic times appear to erode popular support for political leaders, good times may be doing little to boost it. Such an asymmetric effect of economic performance emerges in some studies of congressional elections (Bloom and Price 1975; Kernell 1977) and presidential popularity (Lanoue 1986; Mueller 1973). Prosperity, according to this school of thought, has come to be expected by the public. A government presiding over it is doing its job and will thus be judged by other, noneconomic criteria. An economic slump, on the other hand, makes the economy an "issue," with blame falling on the government in office. Voters are seen as primarily concerned with the negative side of economic performance. They punish failure but do not reward success.

Great Britain under the government of Margaret Thatcher provides a special opportunity to test those hypotheses about war and economic performance. In April 1982, Argentina and Britain went to war over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), a war that ended with Argentina's surrender in mid-June (for accounts, see Hastings and Jenkins 1983). To be sure, in the short run this war does not seem to have diminished public support for the Thatcher government (Clarke, Stewart, and Zuk 1986; Dunleavy and Husbands 1985; Mishler, Hoskin, and Fitzgerald 1986; Worcester and Jenkins 1982). But that by itself does not prove that the war made a lasting impression on the public and paid electoral dividends for the governing party.

The Falklands War occurred amidst a wrenching economic upheaval in Britain brought on by the Thatcher government (King 1986; Newhouse 1986; Riddell 1985). While inflation was slowing, unemployment rose to Depression-like levels. This set of economic outcomes presented the public with a dilemma: reward the government for the relative success on inflation, or punish it for its failure on unemployment? The public's dilemma, on the other hand, gives us an opportunity to probe for the "asymmetry" of economic effects. (For studies on economic voting in Britain, see Alt 1979; Butler and Stokes 1969; Goodhart and Bansali 1970; Hibbs, Rivers, and Vasilatos 1982; Miller and Mackie 1973; Whiteley 1986; Yantek 1985).

This paper examines the effects of the split macroeconomic performance and the Falklands War on the popularity of Prime Minister Thatcher and her party by way of an "intervention analysis" with monthly data from June 1979 to July 1985 (Box and Tiao 1975; Hibbs 1977; Lewis-Beck 1986; McCleary and Hay 1980).

## The Falklands and Thatcher's Popularity

An event like the Falklands War may leave a mark on government popularity in two ways. First, it may either lead to a *permanent* shift in the level of support or just make a *temporary* impression. Certain international events have been noted to generate "rally-around-the-flag" reactions (Brody 1986; Kernell 1978; Mueller 1973; Norpoth 1984). A boost in popularity is followed by erosion to the preintervention level. Second, the onset of the intervention impact may be *abrupt* or *gradual.* It may take some time for the intervention to register with the public. Thatcher's popularity leading up to, and following, the Falklands crisis is depicted in Figure 1.

The four intervention models have been estimated with an error (noise) specification that assumes a first-order autoregressive (AR) process. This AR(1) specification emerges from an analysis of Thatcher's popularity in the time period prior to the Falklands War (Box and Jenkins 1976; McCleary and Hay 1980). For now, we assume that the prime minister's popularity at any given time is a function of a long-term component approximately captured by the overall mean, plus short-term oscillations due to the impact of the Falklands War, autoregressive noise, and "white noise."

The results of the estimation of the various models are presented in Table 1. The abrupt-permanent model receives some support, as indicated by the significant estimate for *April.* Thatcher's popularity, according to this model, rose in April of 1982 to an equilibrium six points higher than before. The findings of the

Figure 1. Satisfaction with Thatcher's Job as Prime Minister



Table 1. The Falklands and Thatcher's Popularity

| | Models of Intervention | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Temporary | | | | | |
| | Permanent | | Abrupt | | | Gradual | | |
| Variable | Abrupt | Gradual | April | May | June | April-June | April-May | May-June |
| Constant | -3.6<br>(2.6) | -6.3<br>(3.2) | -3.2<br>(2.6) | -4.3<br>(2.2) | - .36<br>(2.9) | -4.8<br>(2.4) | -4.6<br>(2.3) | 2.0<br>(2.8) |
| April 1982 | 6.3<br>(2.8) | 6.4<br>(3.2) | 7.9<br>(3.2) | — | — | 4.5<br>(2.8) | 4.8<br>(2.8) | — |
| May 1982 | — | — | — | 15.9<br>(2.8) | — | 14.7<br>(2.8) | 15.0<br>(2.8) | 14.2<br>(2.7) |
| June 1982 | — | — | — | — | 5.5<br>(2.8) | 3.5<br>(2.9) | — | 9.6<br>(3.0) |
| Rate | — | .44<br>(.30) | .98<br>(.03) | .96<br>(.02) | - .05<br>(.50) | .95<br>(.02) | .95<br>(.02) | .48<br>(.18) |
| AR(1)[a] | .83<br>(.07) | .85<br>(.07) | .81<br>(.07) | .80<br>(.07) | .89<br>(.05) | .82<br>(.06) | .82<br>(.07) | .93<br>(.05) |
| SER[b] | 3.3 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 2.9 | 3.4 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.8 |
| Q[c] | 19 | 20 | 19 | 25 | 18 | 22 | 26 | 20 |

Note: These results were obtained with BMDP2T. Standard errors for parameter estimates are in parentheses. Estimates more than twice as large as their standard errors are significant at the .05 level.

[a] First-order autoregression specification for noise.

[b] Standard error of residuals.

[c] The Ljung-Box test of model adequacy; with 19 degrees of freedom, none of the Q estimates is statistically significant at the .05 level.

*Source:* Market and Opinion Research International, June 1979–July 1985 (74 monthly observations; for three missing values, Gallup data used).

gradual-permanent model are less compelling, by contrast. The rate-of-change parameter turns out to be insignificant.

In the temporary domain, each of the two basic scenarios, abrupt and gradual, has been examined in several versions. For the abrupt-temporary type of intervention impact we have separately estimated effects for April, May, and June of 1982. The most convincing evidence is found for the May version, which suggests a boost of 16 points in May of 1982, to be reduced subsequently at the pace of 4% per month (100%-96%). By May 1983, a 10-point gain remains, according to the model estimates. Still, how does the fit of this temporary-impact model compare with that of the *gradual*-temporary-impact models?

Here, too, we have examined three versions. The April-May-June version assumes that the buildup of the Falklands effect was distributed over those three months while the alternatives either exclude the final month or the opening month. The May-June version assumes that the Falklands impact registered among voters only after a delay, whereas the April-May version assumes that no further gain in public support registered in June, the month of victory.

The May-June version can be quickly dismissed in light of the results presented in Table 1. The AR(1) parameter is practically 1.0, which dooms the whole model. The April-May-June version is somewhat credible but fails to yield an impressive estimate for June. The inclusion of a June effect does not yield any benefit above and beyond what the April-May model, which excludes it, provides. We conclude that the Falklands War boosted Thatcher's popularity in April and May of 1982, with the lion's share coming in May, but that these gains proved temporary. No substantial rise occurred in June, when Argentina capitulated.

Does this mean that victory did not matter to the British public? that we would have found the same results in case of defeat? Of course not. The point is that victory was anticipated in Britain. The public had no doubts of victory, as shown by a Market and Opinion Research International survey in April 1982 ("How" 1982). Victory came as expected and the electorate apparently behaved in the manner of "rational expectations." No additional reward accrued the government in public support over what had been given in April and May in the expectation of victory. Had the Thatcher government disappointed its public by either losing the war or being unable to bring it to a swift conclusion, public reaction might have been quite different. Most likely, the April-May boost would have evaporated at a much faster rate.

## The Economy and Thatcher's Popularity

Rare are the opportunities for government leaders to capitalize on foreign-policy events to the degree apparently done by Margaret Thatcher in 1982. For the most part, it is domestic performance that matters for government popularity. Hardly any aspect of domestic performance has been more thoroughly scrutinized in this context than the state of the economy. Thatcher has closely tied her political fortunes to the economy by her attempts to wean the economy from much of its state tutelage (King 1986; Riddell 1985).

While many of her policies have affected some part of the British public, what is most visible to the general public is the change in overall unemployment and inflation, the two key concerns cited in public-opinion polls in response to the question about "problems facing the nation." As can be gleaned from Figure 2, under Thatcher these two macroeconomic indicators have moved in a classic

Figure 2. Two Sides of British Economic Performance under Thatcher



Phillips-curve fashion. While unemployment has surged to over three million the inflation rate has declined to roughly 5%.

How did those developments affect Thatcher's approval ratings? There probably was a time when it would have been unthinkable for a prime minister to remain in office with three million unemployed. How much popularity has it cost her? Has the decline of the inflation rate offset some or all of those losses? In modeling the way the economy influences the political judgments of the public, we assume a retrospective, incumbent-oriented calculus where the public relies on the most visible indicators of economic performance (Kramer 1971).

Specifically, we examine the effect that a change in unemployment and prices over a year may have had on public approval of government. The inflation rate is normally calculated this way, as a percentage change of the price index over a 12-month period. For unemployment, we proceed analogously, by taking the change in the number of unemployed over a year. These specifications are supported by an examination of cross-correlations, which shows popularity ratings to be most strongly correlated with 12-month changes of unemployment and prices.

So defined, macroeconomic performance joins the Falklands intervention as modeled by the best fitting specification (the gradual-temporary, April-May version) and the autoregressive component as predictors of government popularity. The overall mean of the popularity series as adjusted by the constant again captures the long-term component of government popularity.

The results presented in Table 2, column 1, make a strong case for the effect of unemployment on Thatcher's approval ratings. Based on the estimate for unemployment given in Table 2, we would estimate that the rise in the number of the unemployed from 1.5 million in the middle of 1980 to over 2.5 million one year later cost her roughly 10 points. By the same token, the drop in inflation from 20% to 5% has utterly failed to compensate for that loss. The parameter estimate for inflation in column 1 is minimal and nowhere near statistical significance.

As the asymmetry hypothesis predicted, the relative success of Thatcher's economic policy (on inflation) went unrewarded whereas the failure (on unemployment) was punished. Confronted with two bits of key economic news, the public took note of the negative bit and ignored the positive one in judging government performance. Perhaps it did so in the assumption that the decline of inflation simply restored a situation considered reasonably normal. By contrast, the rise of unemployment pushed this topic into

**Table 2. The Falklands (Gradual-Temporary Impact), the Economy, the 1983 Election, and Thatcher's Popularity: Estimates for Five Models**

| | Models | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variables | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Constant | -3.7<br>(1.9) | -5.3<br>(2.7) | -3.5<br>(1.1) | -3.5<br>(1.2) | -3.5<br>(1.1) |
| Falklands | | | | | |
| April 1982 | 4.3<br>(2.6) | 5.0<br>(2.8) | 4.2<br>(2.6) | 4.2<br>(2.5) | 4.2<br>(2.5) |
| May 1982 | 14.5<br>(2.7) | 15.2<br>(2.9) | 14.5<br>(2.6) | 14.5<br>(2.6) | 14.5<br>(2.6) |
| Rate | .93<br>(.03) | .96<br>(.02) | .93<br>(.02) | .93<br>(.02) | .93<br>(.02) |
| Inflation[a] | .03<br>(.29) | .16<br>(.37) | — | — | — |
| Unemployment[b] | - .0112<br>(.003) | — | - .0112<br>(.0026) | - .0112<br>(.0026) | - .0112<br>(.0025) |
| Election 1983 | | | | | |
| June 1983 | — | — | — | 3.8<br>(2.1) | 4.2<br>(2.2) |
| Rate | — | — | — | - .41<br>(.39) | — |
| AR(1)[c] | .60<br>(.10) | .80<br>(.07) | .60<br>(.10) | .61<br>(.10) | .60<br>(.10) |
| SER[c] | 2.7 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 2.6 | 2.6 |
| Q[e] | 21 | 26 | 21 | 17 | 19 |

Note: These results were obtained with BMDP2T. Standard errors of parameter estimates are in parentheses.

[a] Measures the percentage change of the retail-price index since a year before; entered into the analysis with a lag of one month.

[b] Measures the change in the number of the unemployed (in 1000) since the previous year; entered into the analysis with a lag of one month.

[c] First-order autoregressive specification for noise

[d] Standard error of residuals.

[e] The Ljung-Box test of model adequacy; with 19 degrees of freedom, none of the Q estimates in the table above is statistically significant at the .05 level.

*Sources:* Market and Opinion Research International, June 1979–July 1985 (74 monthly observations); for three missing values, Gallup data used; *Economic Trends; Monthly Digest of Statistics.*

the public spotlight, where it endures as the number-one problem for government to solve. Another possibility is that the public did not regard the drop of inflation as a success since prices still kept going up at something like 3%-5%.

It might also be argued that the missing effect of inflation is an artifact. As Figure 2 pointedly illustrates, unemployment and inflation run in opposite directions. The two are strongly, if negatively, correlated with one another. So to the extent that one of the two accounts for variation in government popularity, it may deprive the other one of its rightful share. Is unemployment crowding out inflation in their competition to explain popularity? To check this possibility, we excluded unemployment from the analysis. However, as shown in Table 2, column 2, inflation gets absolutely no help from this protective treatment. Its estimate gets neither larger (in the right direction) nor more significant.

As for the Falklands effect, the inclusion of unemployment in the analysis does it little harm. As before, the gradual-temporary specification yields a cumulative popularity gain in April-May of approximately 20 points, eroding at a rate of roughly 7% a month. This estimate changes little when what turns out to be a small and inconsequential effect of the 1983 election on Thatcher popularity is also taken into account (Table 2, cols. 4 and 5).

## The Falklands War and the General Election of 1983

While the election of 1983 may have added little to Thatcher's own popularity, it gave her party a landslide majority in the House of Commons. How much did the electoral victory owe to the Falklands victory? This question cannot be simply answered by citing Thatcher's popularity gains and what remained of them a year later. A leader's gains and losses do not automatically translate into gains and losses for the party. On election day, as Churchill sadly experienced it in 1945, "the British electorate tends to vote according to what a party represents rather than who represents the party" (Crewe 1981, 275). We have to ask, therefore, whether the Conservative party gained in public support as the result of the Falklands War. And if so, what was left of that gain one year later, at election time?

As Table 3 shows, the Falklands War left a strong mark on the Conservative share (based on answers to the question, "How would you vote if there were a general election tomorrow?" and if no answer to this, "Which party are you most inclined to support?"). The model that best fitted Thatcher's popularity, however, does not suit her party equally well, as one can gather from the results in column 1. The April-May gradual-temporary specification of the Falklands intervention fails to confirm an effect for April and only yields one for May half as large. On the other hand, as columns 2 and 3 make clear, the Conservative party registered a substantial gain in June 1982.

At the same time, unemployment hits the party almost as strongly as its leader, while inflation again fails to matter. With unemployment included in the model, the gradual-temporary specification of the Falklands intervention (May-June version) yields a gain for the Conservative party of 11 points, as can be calculated from the results in column 3. This gain shrinks at a rate of 7% each month. By May 1983, when the House of Commons was dissolved, a five-point gain, according to our estimate, remained.

In order to predict, as it were, the Conservative vote share in the 1983 election, we can, of course, avail ourselves only of information available in early June 1983. Reestimates of the model of Conservative support with just that information are presented in column 4. These estimates lead us to a forecast of 45.5% for the Conservative party in the June 1983 election. That slightly overpredicts the actual party share of 43.5% but stays close to the boundary of one standard error.

Our forecast, based on the effect of unemployment and the Falklands bonus plus Conservative base support, does no worse than most last-week polls, which overestimated the Conservative share by 2.5 points, on the average (Dunleavy and Husbands 1985, 81). The Falklands, according to our estimate, were worth be-

**Table 3. The Falklands (Gradual-Temporary Impact), the Economy, the 1983 Election, and Conservative Party Support: Estimates for Four Models**

| Variables | Models | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| Constant | -2.3 | -2.8 | -2.3 | -2.1 |
| | (1.0) | (1.5) | (1.0) | (.9) |
| Falklands | | | | |
| April 1982 | .8 | — | — | — |
| | (1.9) | | | |
| May 1982 | 9.2 | 8.6 | 8.4 | 7.9 |
| | (2.0) | (2.0) | (1.9) | (1.9) |
| June 1982 | — | 3.7 | 3.8 | 3.1 |
| | | (2.0) | (2.0) | (2.0) |
| Rate | .94 | .94 | .93 | .945 |
| | (.03) | (.04) | (.03) | (.038) |
| Inflation[a] | — | .11 | — | — |
| | | (.23) | | |
| Unemployment[b] | - .0093 | - .0090 | - .0093 | - .0100 |
| | (.0023) | (.0024) | (.0023) | (.0021) |
| Election 1983 | -1.9 | — | — | — |
| | (1.7) | | | |
| AR(1)[c] | .67 | .67 | .68 | .66 |
| | (.10) | (.10) | (.10) | (.12) |
| SER[d] | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1.9 |
| Q[e] | 18 | 12 | 14 | 12 |
| Number of cases | 74 | 74 | 74 | 48 |

Note: These results were obtained with BMDP2T. Standard errors of parameter estimates are in parentheses.

[a] Measures the percentage change of the retail-price index since a year before; entered into the analysis with a lag of one month.

[b] Measures the change in the number of the unemployed (in 1000) since the previous year; entered into the analysis with a lag of one month.

[c] First-order autoregressive specification for noise.

[d] Standard error of residuals.

[e] The Ljung-Box test of model adequacy; with 19 degrees of freedom, none of the Q estimates in the table above is statistically significant at the .05 level.

*Sources:* Market and Opinion Research International, June 1979–July 1985 (74 monthly observations); for three missing values, Gallup data used; *Economic Trends; Monthly Digest of Statistics.*

tween five and six percentage points to the Conservative party in June 1983. Without them, the party might have gained no more than 38% on election day. In the three-cornered race of 1983, given the desolate state of the Labour party and its unpopular leader, such a vote share might still have secured a majority in the House of Commons. But historically speaking, no party has won a majority with 38 points or less in Britain since 1945.

## Conclusions

The Falklands War may have had little strategic and international significance—the Argentinian writer Borges dismissed it as "two bald men fighting over a comb" (cited in Theroux 1984, 47)—but it stirred the British public as few events before. Of the four intervention models considered, the one that best captures the war's impact on government popularity is of the gradual-temporary variety. A surge of popularity is followed by a decline. It must be stressed, however, that what is gained in essentially two months is not gone in another two months. Though "temporary" in a technical sense, the impact erodes so slowly that it pays a handsome electoral dividend for the governing party a year later. Even two years later traces of a Falklands effect can still be detected.

Unlike other wars, the Falklands War thus did not undermine the popularity of the incumbent government. One reason, to be sure, was that Britain won the war; another, that it was provoked to take military action by what most Britons considered a blatant act of aggression. Furthermore, it allowed Thatcher to demonstrate her blend of decisiveness and perseverance (Hastings and Jenkins 1983, 355-56; Newhouse 1986, 75). As for the press, the chauvinistic tabloids as well as the sophisticated *Times* by and large supported Britain's role in the war. In ordering the military recapture of the Falklands, Thatcher could even count on broad support from the opposition benches.

Still more important perhaps, the war was brief and cost relatively little by comparison to other wars. It was over before its costs were felt by the public. The boost in Thatcher's popularity actually crested before the conclusion of the war. A protracted war with mounting casualties, we suspect, would have chipped away that boost quickly enough to leave her with little in the short run.

The successful handling of the Falklands War relieved the heavy pressure on government popularity exerted by macroeconomic conditions. Confronted under the Thatcher government with a rising tide of unemployment and an ebbing away of inflation, the British public was found to key on the negative side of economic performance. Public support for Thatcher and her party proved sensitive to unemployment but not to inflation. In this instance, then, it seems that the public punished its government for failure but refused to reward it for success.

While this finding lends support to the asymmetry hypothesis of economic effects, certain qualifications are in order. First, the inflation "success" is limited, falling short of eradicating rising prices. Perhaps zero inflation would have registered significantly in government support. Second, bringing down inflation may not yield any palpable gains for most people, although rising inflation is felt as a loss. It may be different for employment, where the gains and losses are more immediately felt by individuals. Furthermore, the rise in unemployment under Thatcher reached unprecedented postwar heights and went far beyond what might seem appropriate as a cost for curbing inflation.

It must be noted with a touch of irony that the Thatcher government set as its top economic priority the fight against inflation while eschewing responsibility for unemployment, leaving that for the private sector to handle. Viewed from that perspective, the public's reaction is not only ungrateful but also unfair. The public is punishing the government for failing to deliver what the government did not promise to deliver, namely full employment, while refusing to reward it for progress on inflation, where the government had made a pledge. No doubt, the public has not much shared the government's economic priorities, and Thatcher has resisted reordering them. It is perhaps this refusal that has especially irked the public and produced the asymmetric response to economic performance found in this analysis.

## Note

I am grateful to Robert Worcester, director of Market and Opinion Research International (MORI) in London, for making available to me the data on British-government popularity and party preferences analyzed in this paper. For the few time points (June, July, and December 1979) for which no MORI data existed, the corresponding Gallup data were substituted. Of course, neither MORI nor Gallup bears any responsibility for the analyses and interpretations of these data. The data on unemployment come from the monthly reports, *Economic Trends.* The specific measure of unemployment used here is "registered wholly unemployed, seasonally adjusted, in the United Kingdom." The data on the retail-price index, on which the inflation index is based, come from the *Monthly Digest of Statistics.* For comments on earlier drafts of this paper I am indebted to Robert Worcester, Sam Kernell, Kathy Frankovic, John Mueller, Friedheim Meier, and Jorgen Rasmussen.

## References

Alt, James. 1979. *The Politics of Economic Decline: Economic Management and Political Behaviour in Britain Since 1964.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bloom, Howard S., and H. Douglas Price. 1975. Voter Response to Short-Run Economic Conditions: The Asymmetric Effect of Prosperity and Recession. *American Political Science Review* 69:1240-54.

Box, George E. P., and Gwilym M. Jenkins. 1976. *Time Series Analysis: Forecasting and Control.* Rev. ed. San Francisco: Holden-Day.

Box, George E. P., and G. C. Tiao. 1975. Intervention Analysis with Applications to Economic and Environmental Problems. *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 70:70-79.

Brody, Richard A. 1986. A Reconsideration of the "Rally" Phenomenon. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC.

Butler, David, and Donald Stokes. 1969. *Political Change in Britain.* New York: St. Martin's.

Clarke, Harold D., Marianne C. Stewart, and Gary Zuk. 1986. Politics, Economics, and Party Popularity in Britain, 1979-1983. *Electoral Studies* 5:123-41.

Crewe, Ivor. 1981. Why the Conservatives Won. In *Britain at the Polls, 1979,* ed. Howard Penniman. Washington: American Enterprise Institute.

Dunleavy, Patrick, and Christopher T. Husbands. 1985. *British Democracy at the Crossroads.* Boston: Allen and Unwin.

Goodhart, C. A. E., and R. J. Bansali. 1970. Political Economy. *Political Studies* 18:43-106.

Hastings, Max, and Simon Jenkins. 1983. *The Battle for the Falklands.* New York: Norton.

Hibbs, Douglas A., Jr. 1977. On Analyzing the Effects of Policy Interventions: Box-Jenkins and Box-Tiao versus Structural Equation Models. In *Sociological Methodology 1977,* ed. David Heise. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Hibbs, Douglas A., Jr., R. Douglas Rivers, and Nicholas Vasilatos. 1982. On the Demand for Economic Outcomes: Macroeconomic Performance and Mass Political Support in the United States, Great Britain, and Germany. *Journal of Politics* 43:426-62.

How Britons Think. 1982. *Economist.* 17 April 1982.

Kernell, Samuel. 1977. Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting. *American Political Science Review* 71:44-66.

Kernell, Samuel. 1978. Explaining Presidential Popularity. *American Political Science Review* 72:506-22.

King, Anthony. 1986. What Thatcher Has Done to Beer. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC.

Kramer, Gerald H. 1971. Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior. *American Political Science Review* 65:131-43.

Lanoue, David. 1986. Understanding Presidential Popularity in the United States: Partisanship and Prosperity. Ph.D. diss., State University of New York, Stony Brook.

Lewis-Beck, Michael S. 1986. Interrupted Time Series Analysis. In *New Tools for Social Scien-*

*tists*, ed. William D. Berry and author. Beverly Hills: Sage.

McCleary, Richard, and Richard Hay, Jr. 1980. *Applied Time Series Analysis.* Beverly Hills: Sage.

Miller, William L., and M. Mackie. 1973. The Electoral Cycle and the Asymmetry of Government and Opposition Popularity: An Alternative Method of the Relationship between Economic Conditions and Political Popularity. *Political Studies* 21:263-79.

Mishler, William, Marilyn Hoskin, and Roy Fitzgerald. 1986. British Parties in the Balance: A Time Series Analysis of Long-Term Trends in Public Support for Major Parties. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC.

Mueller, John. 1973. *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion.* New York: Wiley.

Newhouse, John. 1986. Profiles: Margaret Thatcher. *New Yorker*, Feb. 10.

Norpoth, Helmut. 1984. Economics, Politics, and the Cycle of Presidential Popularity. *Political Behavior* 6:253-73.

Norpoth, Helmut. 1986. War and Government Popularity in Britain. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC.

Riddell, Peter. 1985. *The Thatcher Government.* 2d ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Theroux, Paul. 1984. *The Kingdom by the Sea.* New York: Washington Square.

Whiteley, Paul F. 1986. Macroeconomic Performance and Government Popularity in Britain: The Short-Run Dynamics. *European Journal of Political Research* 14:45-61.

Worcester, Robert, and Simon Jenkins. 1982. Britain Rallies 'round the Prime Minister. *Public Opinion* 5:53-55.

Yantek, Thom. 1985. Government Popularity in Great Britain under Conditions of Economic Decline. *Political Studies* 33:467-83.

Helmut Norpoth is Professor of Political Science, State University of New York, Stony Brook, NY 11794.

# NATIONALIZATION OF THE ELECTORATE IN THE UNITED STATES

LAURA L. VERTZ
*North Texas State University*
JOHN P. FRENDREIS
*Loyola University, Chicago*
JAMES L. GIBSON
*University of Houston*

*A current debate within the field of U.S. politics revolves around the extent to which the electorate is nationalized, that is, responds to national-level political forces. We provide additional evidence to help resolve this debate. Using the variance-components model of political effects developed by Stokes, we analyze presidential, senatorial, gubernatorial, and congressional races for the period 1962–1984. The results indicate that presidential races are highly nationalized, and congressional races largely localized. Senate and gubernatorial races are found to have a large state-level component to them. The analysis is also split into two segments to ascertain if a change in political effects is seen during this relatively short time frame; no such differences are found. We conclude that nationalization is not a process that can be understood from evidence provided by congressional races alone. Our results suggest that constituencies respond to political forces in a complex way, reacting to factors that are most relevant to a particular electoral contest.*

An ongoing debate within the field of U.S. politics concerns the extent to which the electorate has become more or less nationalized (see Claggett, Flanigan, and Zingale 1984 for an overview of this research). A standard method for assessing nationalization, the variance-components model developed by Stokes (1965),[1] provides for the decomposition of variance in electoral results into national, state, and local components. Based on indications of decreasing local components for party voting and strongly nationalized turnout, Stokes (1965, 1967) concluded that the U.S. electorate had become increasingly nationalized. Claggett, Flanigan, and Zingale (1984) joined the debate and took issue with Stokes's conclusion. They suggested that Stokes overestimated the amount of nationalization and that in large measure, local variation has continued to predominate in congressional elections.

Both sides of the debate have relied exclusively on evidence from congressional elections.[2] This emphasis on congressional returns raises an intriguing question: Might analyses of other races, such as presidential or important statewide races, show differential effects of national-, state-, and local-level forces on party votes for different offices? Our aim is to address this question by expanding the scope of the nationalization debate to include evidence from multiple offices. We will analyze not only congressional returns but also presidential, senatorial, and gubernatorial races. With this broader look at electoral contests, we hope to be able to identify the races in which national-, state-, and local-level effects are likely to be most operative. We further hope to draw some conclusions concerning the extent of nationalization in the U.S. electorate.

## A Multioffice Perspective

In this research, the variance-components model is used to analyze county-level electoral returns from 1962 through 1984 for the offices of president, U.S. senator, governor, and U.S. representative.[3] These races were selected because, collectively, they provide the opportunity to observe a wide range of national-, state-, and local-level forces at work. The anticipated result of the variance-components analysis is that national forces will be most operative in presidential races, state-level forces will be strongest in senatorial and gubernatorial races, and local forces will predominate in congressional elections.

While it is known that electoral outcomes for a variety of offices are at least partly a function of national forces (see, e.g., Campbell 1986), only the president and vice president are elected from a national constituency. Many of the other factors suspected of influencing electoral results are constituency specific, for example, campaign spending, constituency service, and incumbency. While these factors may influence elections in a relatively uniform fashion across races, the exact degrees to which they are operative in a given race are clearly variable. The likely salience of these constituency-specific factors underscores the importance of the multioffice perspective, resulting in the patterns of nationalization hypothesized above.

In general, these expectations are consistent with recent suggestions concerning the differentiation between types of elections by the electorate. For example, Schlesinger (1985) has found that in the "new party system" voters are able to divide their support between state and national party systems, resulting in a separation of congressional and presidential races. Similarly, Ladd and Hadley (1978) have argued that a two-tiered system of party politics exists, one in which state and national forces have differential effects on different types of elections. Both of these works point to the importance of analyzing multiple offices in order to come to a complete understanding of the U.S. party system.

## Analysis

The conceptualization of nationalization consistent with the variance-components model has been discussed at length by Claggett, Flanigan, and Zingale (1984, 81-82). The mechanics of applying the variance-components model can be briefly summarized: the model decomposes the variance in local-level vote (in our case, the Republican percentage of the two-party vote within counties) by assessing the national-, state-, and local-level variations around the mean vote for the entire period; the result is an estimate of the amount of variance seen for the average county,[4] as well as the decomposition of this variance into national-, state-, and local-level components. (A complete description of our procedures is contained in a methodological appendix, available upon request.)

Table 1 contains the results of the variance-components analyses for the four races—for president, U.S. senator, governor, and U.S. representative—for the period 1962-84. The size of the "normalized variance component" provides information concerning the relative impact of each of the levels of political forces, while the "variance component" indicates the absolute amount of variability across time for the average county during this period. As can be seen, the

Table 1. Variance-Components Analysis for President, U.S. Senator, Governor, and U.S. Representative, 1962–84

| Political Level | Variance Component | Square Root of Variance Component | Normalized Variance Component |
|---|---|---|---|
| President | | | |
| National | 87.64 | 9.36 | .56 |
| State | 40.87 | 6.39 | .26 |
| Local | 27.32 | 5.23 | .18 |
| U.S. Senator | | | |
| National | 11.33 | 3.37 | .09 |
| State | 91.26 | 9.55 | .68 |
| Local | 30.62 | 5.53 | .23 |
| Governor | | | |
| National | 7.18 | 2.68 | .07 |
| State | 63.90 | 7.99 | .63 |
| Local | 30.44 | 5.52 | .30 |
| U.S. Representative | | | |
| National | 7.64 | 2.76 | .05 |
| State | 49.64 | 7.05 | .31 |
| Local | 103.31 | 10.16 | .64 |

results conform to our expectations. For the presidency, the national component of the vote is clearly the strongest, followed by some influence for state-level factors. For senatorial and gubernatorial races, the state component is most important. In both cases, local-level factors appear to be influential in a secondary fashion. Finally, for the congressional results, the local component is the largest, with state forces also being somewhat important.[5]

These results suggest the limitations inherent in nationalization research with a single-office perspective. Looking at changes in nationalization for congressional races, even over an extended period of time, may not provide a complete picture concerning the process of nationalization. In addition to the variations in relative sizes of variance components observable for a single office over time (see, e.g., Claggett, Flanigan, and Zingale 1984), there are substantial differences among offices. Moreover, there is little reason to suspect a priori that patterns of longitudinal change are identical across these offices.

In short, the variance-components analysis shows that the U.S. electorate displays various degrees of nationalization depending on the electoral contest in question: presidential contests are highly nationalized, senatorial and gubernatorial races have largely state-level components, and congressional elections are primarily local in nature.[6] These findings lend support to the multifaceted view of the electorate discussed by Schlesinger (1985) and Ladd and Hadley (1978). When viewed from this perspective, nationalization is not a simple, unidimensional process: rather, it would appear that multiple processes of nationalization are at work.

If this portrait of the electorate is accurate, we would also expect the outcomes of the various races to be more or less closely related depending on the similarity of constituency. The variance-components procedure breaks the variation in voting results into national, state,

**Table 2. Correlations of Local Fixed Effects for President, U.S. Senate, Governor, and U.S. Representative for 1962–84**

| Office | President | U.S. Senator | Governor | U.S. Representative |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| President | 1.000 | .899 | .878 | .704 |
| U.S. Senate | — | 1.000 | .926 | .753 |
| Governor | — | — | 1.000 | .763 |
| U.S. Representative | — | — | — | 1.000 |

Note: The statistic is Pearson's r-correlation coefficient.

and local effects constant throughout the time period (fixed effects) and specific to a particular election (random effects). By looking at the correlation between the local fixed effects for the various offices, we can gain insight into the relationships among the long-term partisan tendencies for these races. We would expect the correlation among the local fixed effects to be high. The pattern of correlation between the offices will show which offices are most similar in terms of their long-term local partisan tendencies.

As we show in Table 2, all of the correlations between these long-term, county-level effects are substantial. The strongest correlation is between the fixed effects for the two statewide races, for governor and U.S. senator, while the weakest correlation is between the fixed effects for the races with the most dissimilar constituencies, those for president and U.S. representative. The local fixed effects most clearly mirror each other for the races most similar in the variance-components results, gubernatorial and senatorial. The long-term local partisan tendencies are most dissimilar for the most nationalized race (for the presidency) and the highly localized congressional races. Overall, these results offer further evidence that voters distinguish between the partisan candidates for different offices and that the geographic scope of the race appears to be an important element in this process.

Thus, we have evidence of differentiated voting patterns from two perspectives. First, the variance-components analysis shows differing amounts of nationalization for presidential, senatorial, gubernatorial, and congressional elections. Second, the pattern of correlation among local fixed effects also shows variable degrees of association between contests. In sum, responses to national, state, and local forces are not uniform for every race but, instead, are race specific.

## Conclusion

The answer to the question whether the U.S. electorate is nationalized or not would seem to be, *it depends.* Just as Claggett, Flanigan, and Zingale (1984) have shown the importance of a historical perspective in assessing recent trends, the evidence reported above suggests the additional benefit of a multioffice perspective. Our results clearly show a substantial degree of variability across offices in the degree to which electoral returns are a function of national, state, and substate forces. In addition, there is a clear tendency for the salience of a particular level of force to be linked to the geographic scope of the constituency. From a comparative-office perspective, congressional races are largely localized. Presidential races, on the other hand, are nationalized. For statewide races, such as U.S. senate and gubernatorial contests, state-level effects are the strongest.

Thus, it would appear that the electorate has the *potential* to respond to electoral forces in a highly nationalized fashion if national forces are relevant to the contest in question. However, if factors such as the *national* media are irrelevant to a race, as is usually the case with congressional elections, then the electorate responds to the more constituency-related, localized forces.

The findings also show that nationalization must be viewed within the operative political system. In a federal system with multiple levels of effects and structures that reinforce the continued existence of such effects, an electorate that responds to national forces for all races is an unlikely eventuality. A large degree of nationalization is likely to be reflected only in races national in scope. While we do not have data to further test this proposition, it is very likely for even more localized races, such as state-legislative races, that variance in returns is even more heavily localized in nature.

Finally, these results have some implications for the party system as well. Schlesinger (1985) has observed that the "new party system" is one in which each political party has developed a national geographic base, while at the same time, levels of party activities—national, state, and local—appear to be increasingly separate in terms of their impact on elections. This observation appears to fit our results well. The U.S. electorate's complex response to electoral stimuli appears to be shaped by the interaction of federal structures, a presidential system, and the variety of representational schema employed. As long as the United States remains a heterogeneous nation with multiple positions of political power, electoral patterns are likely to continue to respond to a mixture of national, state, and substate forces that match political interests with the powers of particular offices.

## Notes

Resources for the 1984 data collection were provided by the University of Texas, Dallas School of Social Sciences, the North Texas State University Faculty Research Office, and the University of Houston Center for Public Policy. We thank Steve Wright for assistance in preparing the data sets and Bob Brookshire and Claudia Lynch for their help with the variance-components analysis.

1. The variance-components model and various extensions of it have been used to assess the extent of nationalization not only for the U.S. electorate but also for many other countries (see, e.g., Browne and Vertz 1983; Bueno de Mesquita 1978; Jackman 1972; Katz 1973; and Mughan 1978).

2. Claggett, Flanigan, and Zingale (1984, 87) have indicated that they estimated the size of the national component for presidential returns, but they did not include the analysis within their article.

3. We obtained the county-level electoral data for the period 1962-82 from the historical archive of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. The 1984 election returns were collected directly from each state (generally from the office of the secretary of state). None of these sources bears any responsibility for the analysis presented in this research.

4. We are using the expression *average* in the sense of *typical,* although mathematically, the overall estimates of national, state, and local effects are, in fact, arithmetic means of the effects in individual counties. Thus, particular counties may display greater or lesser relative amounts of national, state, and local effects than the overall estimate.

5. Our congressional results accord fairly well with previous studies, except that our estimates of the size of local-level effects are somewhat larger. We would note that the previous studies employing the variance-components model did not perform any analysis over periods of redistricting. Because Stokes used district-level data, it was impossible for his analysis to extend over these periods; redistricting obviously changes the units from which district-level data are derived. For comparability, Claggett, Flanigan, and Zingale also calculated their estimates by decade. Our analysis was performed over redistricting periods and suggests that a substantial amount of variability is caused by the redistricting process. We believe that this is one important structural reason why congressional races are unlikely to display the large amount of nationalization seen for presidential contests.

6. In addition to the analysis performed for the entire 1962-84 period, we split the data into two equal periods, 1962-72 and 1974-84 and reestimated the variance components. This permits some assessment of changes in the relative strength of the na-

tional, state, and local forces over time. The results for this split analysis (not shown) are straightforward. The two periods do not differ in terms of their level of nationalization or in any other substantial respect. The pattern of findings for the relative importance of national, state, and local effects parallels the one described in Table 1 for the entire 1962-84 period.

## References

Browne, Eric C., and Laura L. Vertz. 1983. An Old People in a New State: The Problem of National Integration in West Germany. *Comparative Politics* 16:85-95.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1978. Redistricting and Political Integration in India. *Comparative Political Studies* 11:279-88.

Campbell, James E. 1986. Presidential Coattails and Midterm Losses in State Legislative Elections. *American Political Science Review* 80:45-64.

Claggett, William, William Flanigan, and Nancy Zingale. 1984. Nationalization of the American Electorate. *American Political Science Review* 78:77-91.

Jackman, Robert W. 1972. Political Parties, Voting, and National Integration: The Canadian Case. *Comparative Political Studies* 4:512-36.

Katz, Richard S. 1973. The Attribution of Variance in Electoral Returns: An Alternative Measurement Technique. *American Political Science Review* 67:817-31.

Ladd, Everett C., Jr., and Charles D. Hadley. 1978. *Transformations of the American Party System.* 2d ed. New York: Norton.

Mughan, Anthony. 1978. On Measuring National Integration in Regionally Divided Societies. *Quantity and Quality* 12:91-98.

Schlesinger, Joseph A. 1985. The New American Political Party System. *American Political Science Review* 79:1152-69.

Stokes, Donald E. 1965. A Variance Components Model of Political Effects. In *Mathematical Applications in Political Science,* ed. John M. Claunch. Dallas: Arnold Foundation.

Stokes, Donald E. 1967. Parties and the Nationalization of Electoral Forces. In *The American Party System,* eds., William N. Chambers and Walter D. Burnham. New York: Oxford University Press.

Laura L. Vertz is Assistant Professor of Political Science, North Texas State University, Denton, TX 76203.

John P. Frendreis is Associate Professor of Political Science, Loyola University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60626.

James L. Gibson is Professor of Political Science, University of Houston, Houston, TX 77004.

# BOOK REVIEWS

# BOOK REVIEW CONTENTS

## POLITICAL THEORY

Ashcraft, Richard. *Revolutionary Politics and Locke's Two Treatises of Government.* ........ Geraint Parry 973
Brown, Brack, and Richard J. Stillman II. *A Search for Public Administration: The Ideas and Career of Dwight Waldo.* ........ A. B. Villanueva 974
Cooper, John W. *The Theology of Freedom: The Legacy of Jacques Maritain and Reinhold Niebuhr.* ........ Robert Booth Fowler 975
Fiske, Donald W., and Richard A. Schweder, eds. *Metatheory in Social Science: Pluralism and Subjectivities.* ........ David Nachmias 976
Greenberg, Edward S. *Workplace Democracy: The Political Effects of Participation.* ........ G. David Garson 978
Kraus, Sidney, and Richard M. Perloff, eds. *Mass Media and Political Thought: An Information-Processing Approach.* ........ Michael MacKuen 979
Pennock, J. Roland, and John W. Chapman, eds. *Nomos XXVIII: Justification.* ........ James Farr 980
Riker, William H. *The Art of Political Manipulation.* ........ Linda L. Fowler 982
Roemer, John, ed. *Analytical Marxism.* ........ Herbert Gintis 983
Simoniya, N. A. *Destiny of Capitalism in the Orient.* ........ Donald K. Emmerson 985
Stein, Arthur. *Seeds of the Seventies: Values, Work, and Commitment in Post-Vietnam America.*
McLaughlin, Corinne, and Gordon Davidson. *Builders of the Dawn: Community Lifestyles in a Changing World.* ........ Jeff Fishel 986
Vaillancourt, Pauline Marie. *When Marxists Do Research.* ........ Scott Warren 987
White, Elliott, and Joseph Losco, eds. *Biology and Bureaucracy: Public Administration and Public Policy from the Perspective of Evolutionary, Genetic, and Neurobiological Theory.* ........ Douglas Madsen 988
Wright, Erik Olin. *Classes.*
Clegg, Stewart, Paul Borcham, and Geoff Dow. *Class, Politics, and the Economy.* ........ Michael Wallerstein 989

## AMERICAN POLITICS

Burke, John P. *Bureaucratic Responsibility.* ........ Dwight Waldo 990
Combs, Michael W., and John Gruhl, eds. *Affirmative Action: Theory, Analysis, and Prospects.* ........ Winfield H. Rose 992
Ferguson, Thomas, and Joel Rogers. *Right Turn: The Decline of the Democrats and the Future of American Politics.* ........ Charles Noble 993
Harrington, Mona. *The Dream of Deliverance in American Politics.* ........ H. Mark Roelofs 994
Hess, Stephen. *The Ultimate Insiders: U.S. Senators in the National Media.* ........ Michael J. Malbin 995
Jacobsohn, Gary J. *The Supreme Court and the Decline of Constitutional Aspiration.* ........ Stanley C. Brubaker 997

**AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW**
**VOL. 81 NO. 3 SEPTEMBER 1987**

Jennings, Edward T., Dale Krane, Alex N. Pattakos and B. J. Reed, eds. *From Nation to States: The Small Cities Community Development Block Grant Program.* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Donald B. Rosenthal 998

Jennings, James, and Mel King, eds. *From Access to Power—Black Politics in Boston.* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Toni-Michelle C. Travis 1000

Kamieniecki, Sheldon, Robert O'Brien and Michael Clarke, eds. *Controversies in Environmental Policy.* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Michael E. Kraft 1000

Katzmann, Robert A. *Institutional Disability: The Saga of Transportation Policy for the Disabled.* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Susan M. Olson 1002

Long, Samuel, ed. *Voting Behavior.* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gregory B. Markus 1003

Parker, Glenn N. *Homeward Bound: Explaining Changes in Congressional Behavior.* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . John R. Johannes 1004

Redford, Emmette S., and Richard T. McCulley. *White House Operations: The Johnson Presidency.* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Norman C. Thomas 1005

Rohr, John A. *To Run a Constitution: The Legitimacy of the Administrative State.* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Francis E. Rourke 1007

Rosentraub, Mark S., ed. *Urban Policy Problems: Federal Policy and Institutional Change.* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ruth Hoogland DeHoog 1008

Shefter, Martin. *Political Crisis/Fiscal Crisis: The Collapse and Revival of New York City.* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Michael N. Danielson 1009

Shover, Neal, Donald A. Clelland, and John Lynxwiler. *Enforcement or Negotiation: Constructing a Regulatory Bureaucracy.* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Donald C. Menzel 1010

Tanenbaum, Sandra. *Engineering Disability: Public Policy and Compensatory Technology.* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Stephen L. Percy 1012

Thomas, John Clayton. *Between Citizen and City: Neighborhood Organization and Urban Politics in Cincinnati.* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jeffrey R. Henig 1013

U.S. Department of Justice. *The Attorney General's Commission on Pornography, Final Report.* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Richard S. Randall 1014

Wright, Gerald C., Jr., Leroy N. Rieselbach, and Lawrence C. Dodd, eds., *Congress and Policy Change.* . . . . . . . . . . Roger H. Davidson 1015

COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Anwar, Muhammad. *Race and Politics: Ethnic Minorities and the British Political System.*

Grillo, R. D. *Ideologies and Institutions in Urban France: The Representation of Immigrants.* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gary P. Freeman 1016

Beck, Lois. *The Qashqa'i of Iran.*

Goodell, Grace. *The Elementary Structures of Political Life: Rural Development in Pahlavi Iran.* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Farhad Kazemi 1018

Bideleux, Robert. *Communism and Development.* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Paul M. Johnson 1019

Bresnan, John, ed. *Crisis in the Philippines: The Marcos Years and Beyond.* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet 1020

Brown, MacAlister, and Joseph J. Zasloff. *Apprentice Revolutionaries: The Communist Movement in Laos, 1930–1985.* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . William S. Turley 1021

Burgess, Michael, ed. *Federalism and Federation in Western Europe.* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Arthur B. Gunlicks 1022

Camp, Roderic A., ed. *Mexico's Political Stability: The Next Five Years.* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dale Story 1023

Castles, Francis G. *The Working Class and Welfare.*

Brugger, Bill, and Dean Jaensch. *Australian Politics: Theory and Practice.*

## 1987 Book Reviews

Scutt, Jocelynne A., ed. *Poor Nation of the Pacific: Australia's Future?* . . . . . . Robert Dowse 1024
Colburn, Forrest D. *Post-Revolutionary Nicaragua: State, Class, and the Dilemmas of Agrarian Policy.* . . . . . . Carmen Diana Deere 1025
Colvin, Phyllis. *The Economic Ideal in British Government: Calculating Costs and Benefits in the 1970s.* . . . . . . William I. Jenkins 1027
Drake, Paul W., and Eduardo Silva, eds. *Elections and Democratization in Latin America, 1980–1985.* . . . . . . Enrique A. Baloyra 1028
Gunlicks, Arthur B. *Local Government in the German Federal System.* . . . . . . Nevil Johnson 1029
Houska, Joseph J. *Influencing Mass Political Behavior: Elites and Political Subcultures in the Netherlands and Austria.* . . . . . . Lee A. Dutter 1030
Laitin, David D. *Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change Among the Yoruba.* . . . . . . Robert Melson 1031
Panitch, Leo. *Working Class Politics in Crisis: Essays on Labour and the State.* . . . . . . Robert Keith Middlemas 1032
Paterson, William, and Alastair Thomas, eds. *The Future of Social Democracy: Problems and Prospects of Social Democratic Parties in Western Europe.* . . . . . . Peter H. Merkl 1034
Safran, Nadav. *Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security.* . . . . . . Khalid Bin Sayeed 1035
Schram, Stuart R., ed. *The Scope of State Power in China.* . . . . . . Cheryl L. Brown 1036
Story, Dale. *Industry, the State, and Public Policy in Mexico.* . . . . . . Douglas C. Bennett 1037
Undy, Roger, and Roderick Martin. *Ballots and Trade Union Democracy.* . . . . . . J. David Edelstein 1038

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Calvert, Peter. *The Foreign Policy of New States.* . . . . . . Bruce E. Moon 1039
Frost, Mervyn. *Toward a Normative Theory of International Relations.* . . . . . . Jack Donnelly 1040
Hybel, Alex Roberto. *The Logic of Surprise in International Conflict.* . . . . . . John G. Stoessinger 1042
Kahler, Miles, ed. *The Politics of International Debt.* . . . . . . Richard P. Mattione 1043
Komer, Robert W. *Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict.* . . . . . . Michael P. Sullivan 1044
Krass, Allan. *Verification: How Much is Enough?* . . . . . . William C. Potter 1045
Kubalkova, Vendulka, and Albert Cruickshank. *Marxism and International Relations.* . . . . . . Robert W. Cox 1046
Muravchik, Joshua. *The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemmas of Human Rights Policy.* . . . . . . David P. Forsythe 1047
Richelson, Jeffrey T. *Sword and Shield: The Soviet Intelligence and Security Apparatus.* . . . . . . Patrick M. Morgan 1049
Schaffer, Mark E. *Technology Transfer and East-West Relations.* . . . . . . Angela E. Stent 1050
Triska, Jan F., ed. *Dominant Powers and Subordinate States: The United States in Latin America and the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe.* . . . . . . Cole Blasier 1051
Vanderlaan, Mary B. *Revolution and Foreign Policy in Nicaragua.* . . . . . . James D. Cochrane 1052

Wood, Robert E. *From Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis: Foreign Aid and Development Choices in the World Economy.* . . . . . . . . . . Michael K. O'Leary 1053

POLITICAL ECONOMY

Danziger, Sheldon H., and Daniel H. Weinberg, eds. *Fighting Poverty: What Works and What Doesn't.* . . . . . . . . . . Robert B. Albritton 1054
Elster, Jon, and Aanund Hylland, eds. *Foundations of Social Choice Theory.* . . . . . . . . . . Christopher W. Morris 1055
Maclean, Douglas, ed. *Values at Risk.* . . . . . . . . . . Donald C. Cell 1057
Morone, Joseph G., and Edward J. Woodhouse. *Averting Catastrophe.* . . . . . . . . . . Susan G. Hadden 1059
Russell, Louise B. *Is Prevention Better Than Cure?* . . . . . . . . . . Kathleen N. Gillespie 1060
St. Clair, David. *The Motorization of American Cities.* . . . . . . . . . . José A. Gomez-Ibáñez 1060

# POLITICAL THEORY

**Revolutionary Politics and Locke's Two Treatises of Government.** By Richard Ashcraft (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986. xxii, 613p. $65.00, cloth; $15.00, paper).

When major studies are long and eagerly awaited there is always a danger of disappointment when they appear. There is no such disappointment with Richard Ashcraft's monumental study of John Locke. This is an ambitious work in that it offers not merely a study of a thinker but a detailed portrayal of the political world in which he moved. Furthermore, it both contains a statement about the way in which the history of political thought should be approached and is itself a paradigm of such a study.

The theme of Ashcraft's interpretation of Locke is that he was, in a repeated phrase, a "hard-line radical." Ashcraft is not content to develop this by textual exegesis. Indeed, his point is that such a claim can only be established by detailed examination of the political context in which Locke moved. That context, Ashcraft shows, was the most extreme radical dissenting tradition, which Locke joined upon his association with Shaftesbury and to which he adhered up to the publication of the *Two Treatises.* It was a policy of opposition that tipped over into a revolutionary conspiracy, attempted political assassination (Rye House Plot), exile politics, and abortive invasion (Monmouth Rebellion), ending with the Glorious Revolution of 1688 which apparently rapidly lost its glory in the eyes of the radicals. At every step, Ashcraft demonstrates, the philosopher Locke was in the thick of it. He tells a story not of detached scholarship but of plotting, spies, mail drops, aliases, codes, kidnapping and revolutionary fund-raising in the midst of which intellectuals like Locke were formulating the campaign materials for the radical movement.

Ashcraft thus looks at political philosophy as ideology, and *Two Treatises* is ultimately the "political manifesto" of the radical movement. Its meaning is rooted in the conception of the political world Locke shared. The aim of Ashcraft's study is, therefore, to unfold that conception, which he does not merely through the writings of Locke and other radicals but through a detailed account of the personal relationships and dealings they had with one another. For Ashcraft's point is that an effective ideology has an organizational underpinning. Consequently this book has an interest not just to seventeenth-century specialists but as a model of the study of ideology and its organization and dissemination.

The story of Locke's radicalism begins with his incorporation into the Shaftesbury household. Indeed, Locke's status as "assistant pen" almost describes his entire achievement. Until this stage of his career, as is well known, Locke was no radical. Once with Shaftesbury, Locke began to tackle the intellectual issues that interested the Protestant dissenters. The first impetus to a defense came from Samuel Parker's *Discourse of Ecclesiastical Polity* with its vehement attack on dissent in politics or religion. Against this the dissenters had to develop a view of individuals as equal autonomous agents with natural liberty to use their reason. At the same time, they had to avoid the charge of moral anarchy. It was these concerns that set off Locke's thoughts on toleration as well as prompting the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (which is not Ashcraft's prime concern). They also prompted a host of other responses from the dissenters.

Politically, the major problem was the threat of royal absolutism and ultimately of the reimposition of Roman Catholicism upon the accession of James, Duke of York to the throne. Ashcraft demonstrates that the radical policy of exclusion of James from the throne was not a narrow technical matter but raised profound questions of the origin of government and of where the authority lay to change the ruler and the constitution in the face of a perceived threat to rights. The "Second Treatise" can then be seen as a specific contribution to these issues, which were to remain fundamental even after James had become king and had, in the opinion of the opposition, commenced upon his design to undermine political and religious freedom. Ashcraft's method of establishing the relationship between Locke's politics and the radical movement is threefold. He points to those textual passages in Locke that deal with the central political issues for the radicals. Secondly, he shows in rich detail how these arguments are paralleled in other literature emanating from the movement, as in the parallel ideas and career of Robert Ferguson. Thirdly, he establishes, in a way Cranston's biography only touched upon, Locke's interactions with the prominent radicals during the period of the 1670s and 1680s in England and in his exile in Holland, including his involvement with details of conspiracy and rebellion. It is fortunate for Locke that Professor Ashcraft was not one of the government security police of the time because Locke's movements from hiding place to safe house would scarcely have escaped detection to the extent that they did.

The social basis of the radical movement lay not amongst the great proprietors but, Ashcraft argues, the merchants, tradesmen, and even the artisans. Locke's defence of property is a defence of the expansion of trade rather than of accumulated capital in land that might merely be waste. In this respect Ashcraft might have said more about the implied clash of economic class interests. From this it follows that Locke was a radical on political rights and an advocate of a wide suffrage. The rights of individuals and the people meant just that; though here, too, the limits of Locke's specific comments on the franchise in the "Second Treatise" could have received greater attention.

The climax of the radical movement was to have been the Glorious Revolution. But Ashcraft suggests, using recent evidence, that Locke and his fellow radicals believed it was a revolution betrayed. The old guard crept back. The revolution was treated by the establishment more as a coup, which maintained continuity, than a revolution in which the people would employ their constituent power to set the constitution upon new principles. The *Two Treatises* appeared as the manifesto of the radical cause. But the famous argument of the "Second Treatise" that the people had the right to establish government anew was rejected.

Ashcraft's documentation of his interpretation is a piece of outstanding scholarship that leaves us, nevertheless, with a question concerning our view of John Locke. It is rather as if an admired Rembrandt were discovered to be one of many copies made by a member of his school. If Locke's politics are the politics of Shaftesbury and his school, are they of any interest to other than seventeenth-century historians? Are they of more interest than the politics of Robert Ferguson? Ashcraft rarely shows how Locke differs from, or formulates his ideas more ably than, his fellow radicals. The story of how Locke became a "master of political thought" would be another historical investigation. Perhaps once that development takes place, a masterpiece can legitimately take on a life independent of its origins. Meanwhile, Ashcraft's book remains an exceptional study of a thinker's intentions and of the nature of a political movement and deserves the widest readership.

GERAINT PARRY

*University of Manchester*

**A Search for Public Administration: The Ideas and Career of Dwight Waldo.** By Brack Brown and Richard J. Stillman II (College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 1986. vii, 196p. $22.50).

To Dwight Waldo, the search for public administration is unlike the search for the Holy Grail in that the latter does not exist at all, while the former does—"massively, centrally and often decisively for our individual and collective lives" (p. 164). But the search for public administration has been beset with difficulties and obstacles because of its organizational setting. It has been accorded the status of a stepchild in political science departments, overshadowed by management in business schools and treated as a second-class citizen in liberal-arts colleges. Consequently, it has failed to mobilize political support and obtain adequate resources to buttress its existence. In Waldo's view, the best hope for the study of, and research in, public administration—if it is to do an effective job of preparing students for public-service careers—is in a professional school similar to that of the medical profession. Public administration is too big to be a part of an academic discipline and too anachronistic to be in a liberal-arts college whose academic objective is to liberate the mind from ignorance, arrogance, and intolerance.

Waldo is not alone in advocating the medical analogy as an essential prerequisite in giving public administration an identity. Before him was Henry Reining, Jr., who, in the 1950s and 1960s, spoke strongly in favor of a separate and independent organizational setting for the public-administration enterprise. In spite of the logic of their case, the study of public administration ended up in most cases either as a mere area of interest in political science departments or as a field of study in semi-independent centers, without clout and class. Even when located in more hospitable environments, much more needs to be done to make it close to the medical model. The internship phase of the medical program is more than a preparation for a doctor's career. It is a transition to the real world of medical practice. After the internship, the medical intern is ready to put his knowledge into practical application—quite a contrast to the public-administration programs whose internship component often bears little relationship to what happens after a student completes an internship assignment. With the exception of a few programs, such as the Presidential Management Internship Program of the federal government and the Legislative Staff Internship Program of the Illinois General Assembly, where interns are offered permanent employment after satisfactory performance, very few public-administration internship programs pay any attention to the intern's future. Internship programs that are structured, supervised, synthesized, subsidized, and selective are exceptions rather than the rule.

Waldo was one of the first to recognize that the study of, and research in, public administration cannot be confined to narrow national and parochial boundaries. An organized body of knowledge in public administration cannot claim to be a science unless it is universally applied across various cultural systems. Thus, Waldo and others, like Fred Riggs and Ferrel Heady, sounded the trumpet call for the comparative study of administrative systems, not only to test the validity, utility, and applicability of U.S. theories, concepts, and techniques of administration, but also to explain what accounts for the differences and similarities between them. Much has been learned from studies of bureaucracies of Third World countries in terms of their behavior, functions, structures, and environments. Comparative public administration has broadened our perspective and enlarged our horizons about the way things get done in other nations. It has also enriched our understanding and deepened our insights on the influence of culture upon administrative realpolitik in developing nations. To the credit of scholars who took Waldo's bureaucratic model as a focus and framework of comparative research, we now know that if corruption continues to plague a Third World bureaucracy in spite of efforts to streamline its operations and reorganize its structure, it is a reflection of its people's culture.

For his vigorous defense of the public-administration enterprise in inhospitable environments, for his contributions to public-administration scholarship, and for his efforts in making public administration an exciting stimulating and challenging endeavor, Dwight Waldo deserves the heartfelt thanks and eternal gratitude of those engaged in the study and practice of public administration.

A. B. VILLANUEVA

*Western Illinois University*

**The Theology of Freedom: The Legacy of Jacques Maritain and Reinhold Niebuhr.** By John W. Cooper (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1985. ix, 185p. $16.95).

In an age in which religion and its varied connections (and conflicts) with our liberal polity and culture are as obvious as they are controversial, there has been renewed interest in the subject of political theology. Charles Dunn's pioneering work on political theology throughout U.S. political history (*American Political Theology*, New York: Praeger, 1984) is one intriguing example by a political scientist. There has also been renewed interest and writing on the political theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, for example in Ronald Stone's *Reinhold Niebuhr: Prophet to Politician* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1981).

John Cooper's *The Theology of Freedom* explores political theology by comparing Niebuhr and Jacques Maritain, undoubtedly the two most influential religious theorists of politics who have had an impact in the United States in the twentieth century. Cooper's effort is an important one because of the significance of his two thinkers, especially in the light of current concerns about the role of religion in our society. By comparing and contrasting his two subjects he is able to provide us with a much richer analysis than he would have had he merely considered each separately, and he makes full use of this opportunity. Moreover, Cooper develops, at the same time, his own analysis of political theology in his brief chapter, "Toward an Ecumenical Political Theology." As a result, the reader is able to reflect on several similar, but not at all identical, ideas about the proper relation of religion and political life. *The Theology of Freedom* not only provides us with a great deal of information about Niebuhr and Maritain as theologians of politics, but stimulates us to think on our own about the very current issues involved.

Cooper sees Niebuhr and Maritain as "complementary opposites." Both address the issues of religion, freedom, justice, and practicality in politics and both stress the balances needed between and among these values. Cooper's Niebuhr leans toward an analysis that finds ambiguity and paradox between God and the human, between freedom and justice, between the ideal and the possible. Cooper's Maritain views these relationships in a more hierarchical fashion. But both address the same concerns, see similar problems, and grope toward reconcilable resolutions.

As this discussion suggests, the approach of the book is philosophical rather than biographical or historical, though Cooper neglects neither the story of these mens' lives nor the historical setting of their thought. His approach to Niebuhr and Maritain as theorists is surely one they would appreciate. Cooper develops their thought in a fashion that invites us in to the discussion. There is little arcaneness or esoteric method cluttering his pages. He lets Niebuhr and Maritain speak for themselves through generous and apt quotation, while at the same time developing his interpretive theme.

The result is a book that illuminates these voices of modern political theology. It neither leaves their thought formless nor so overinterprets it that their own version of political theology is lost. This is a nice essay, thoughtful and thought provoking. I recommend it warmly.

ROBERT BOOTH FOWLER

*University of Wisconsin, Madison*

**Metatheory in Social Science: Pluralisms and Subjectivities.** Edited by Donald W. Fiske and Richard A. Shweder (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986. x, 390p. $35.00, cloth; $16.95, paper).

This volume of 19 papers presents the products of the conference "Potentialities for Knowledge in Social Science" held at the University of Chicago in September 1983. Unfortunately, political scientists have little representation in this timely and intellectually stimulating collection. However, the issues raised and debated are pertinent to the soul-searching activities of the discipline as a scientific enterprise, and the quality of the arguments is compelling. Indeed, several contributors, in particular Donald T. Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Lee J. Cronbach, and Donald Fiske, have strongly influenced methodological developments and substantive research in political science.

The overall contribution of the volume is in rising above the "dashed expectations," "mid-life crisis" queries on the state of the social sciences to a more general and disciplined level of discourse structured around the fundamental epistemological assumptions inherent in contemporary postpositivist research programs. Disciplined discourse, of course, is an insufficient condition for achieving consensus and none is achieved in this volume. The assumptions of epistemological relativism are diametrically opposed to those of methodological unitarianism. Philosophy of science cannot mediate because, as Rosenberg, a philosopher of science, argues persuasively in chapter 15, there is no formal way to demarcate the empirical from the metaphysical. Consensus, in turn, is an insufficient condition for scientific progress, yet a necessary one for paradigmatic developments in a Kuhnian sense. Perhaps inevitably, and in the revived spirit of evolutionary competition, pluralisms-and-subjectivities is the strategy used to bring together radically different epistemologies under one volume.

Most contributors either implicitly accept the inevitability of pluralisms or explicitly approve such pluralisms. Levin (chap. 11) even develops an explicit, comprehensive classification of the forms and functions of social knowledge and presents a strong case for "an irreducible plurality of privileged forms of knowledge" (p. 276). In a similar vein, Cronbach (chap. 4) argues for a pluralism of conceptualizations and explanations, bringing to bear multiple perspectives from different disciplines and schools of thought. D'Andrade (chap. 1) presents an ethnographic account of the ideals and the working paradigms of science. He argues that there are at least three very different scientific world views, that the of the physical sciences, that of the natural sciences, and that of the semiotic or semantic sciences. Hempel's "covering law," the positivists' ideal, is incongruent with the natural and the semiotic world views: "the emphasis on predicting or explaining individual events as a scientific activity is misguided because of the difficulties of establishing the appropriate boundary conditions" (p. 30). Rather than pursuing Hempel's unattainable ideal, social scientists are better off with the semiotic world view, which seeks to understand "imposed order."

Converse (chap. 2) agreeing with D'Andrade that there is no one ideal law or equation to express progress in science, approaches the pluralisms of science in terms of their subject matter or "texture." Each science has its own texture, the historical predicament being the distinctive characteristic of the social sciences: historical events may rearrange key parameters in social and political processes. Notwithstanding the variety of textures, "a science devotes itself to the systematic decoding of observed regularities and the reduction of the regularities to more parsimonious and general principles that account for wide ranges of phenotypic detail" (p. 52). Indeed, no scientist of the methodological unitarianism persuasion would disagree with this characterization of science in general and the social sciences in particular. Nor would scientists of all persuasions disagree with the "specificity of method" problem as presented by Fiske in chapter 3. Knowledge in the social sciences is fragmented not only because of the multitude of textures but also because of wide variabilities in methods of observation and measurement: "Each method is one basis for knowledge, one discriminable way of knowing" (p. 62). Measuring procedures do not derive from a general substantive theory; they are artifacts of pragmatic considerations and intuition. Specificity of method prevents the development of inclusive theories (i.e., knowledge), and the lack of such theories perpetuates the specificity-of-method problem and thus pluralisms and subjectivities as well. But would relativists agree with Fiske's fundamental assumption that "people's experience can be subsumed under behavior because we can know about that experience only from some behavior, usually verbal behavior" (p. 61)?

Certainly not by the relativist sociology-of-science position Gergen (Chap. 6) spiritedly and methodically presents. Grounded on the fundamental assumption that "patterns of human conduct are subject to continuous alteration across time," and on the central argument that there is "a very loose relationship between language and the patterns of conduct to which language ostensibly refers" (p. 136), he employs the principles of contextualism and deconstructionist hermeneutics to reject the correspondence theory of the relationship between language and reality and, by implication, the tenets of objectivity and rationality of the social sciences. The contrast between objectivity and subjectivity has, according to Shweder (Chap. 7), been overstated, preventing the emergence of a "science of subjectivity" in which "divergent rationalities" and a variety of meanings coexist, as is the case with cults and cultures.

Campbell's contribution (chap. 5) is fascinating. It is the only explicit attempt in this volume to bridge the seemingly unbridgable fundamental assumptions of the various persuasions. With the exception of hermeneutic nihilism, which rejects the validity of interpretation as a goal, he finds many of the hermeneutic principles (e.g., the principle of charity, the dialectic of guess-and-criticism) to be of great significance to the social sciences. However, the potential contributions of "scientific hermeneutics" can be realized only, as Campbell persuasively argues and illustrates, in the context of a unity of scientific method.

In sum, old theories never die, yet new theories are continuously being invented, the outcome of which is the coexistence of a plethora of divergent assumptions, theories, methodologies and paradigms that occasionally compete over the direction and the interpretation of empirical research. This is both the strength and the vulnerability of a science of human behavior. Social scientists of all persuasions will find this volume stimulating and challenging.

DAVID NACHMIAS

*University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee*

**Workplace Democracy: The Political Effects of Participation.** By Edward S. Greenberg (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986. 259p. $29.95).

This is a well-written book that deals lucidly with three issues of importance to students of democratic theory, pluralism, and politics of the democratic Left. Using comparative panel data from worker-owned plywood corporations and their conventional counterparts of the Pacific Northwest, Greenberg addresses whether workplace participation contributes to dealienation, enhances attributes of democratic citizenship, or increases class consciousness. Although strongly and positively assessing the workplace democracy in the critical areas of productivity, worker satisfaction, income distribution, and participative governance, Greenberg finds limited and mixed impacts where democratic and leftist theorists would have expected more in each of the three arenas cited above.

Greenberg concisely and engagingly places his research in the context of the issues popularized during the 1960s and later concerning the contention that workers' control in the workplace might have manifold positive outcomes, ranging from economic productivity to increased political participation in the community to increased worker solidarity to better mental health. The relevance to pluralist writers like Robert Dahl and critics like Carole Pateman is cogently drawn. Then data are brought to bear from samples (taken in 1978 and 1983) of several dozen workers in both worker-run and conventional plywood firms.

Greenberg tries to anticipate the criticism that his subject, the plywood co-ops, represent a special case. Though often listed, the co-ops —though well known through the studies of Berman and others twenty years ago—have not figured importantly in theoretical debate. Proponents of workers' control like Vanek have pointed to the high cost of buying into the co-ops and have depicted them as dominated by a small-capitalist investment ethic, using them as a contrast with self-management, not an illustration of it. Indeed, Greenberg's findings very much corroborate this view.

As expected, Greenberg found work to revolve around a highly automated process, leaving little room for discretion. Ten-hour days and six-day weeks were found to be the rule in an environment that can only be described as stressful, especially in the higher-productivity but lower-safety co-op environments. This is pertinent when Greenberg comes to analyze his survey results. In discussing alienation, for example, he focuses on the "stunning" finding that one-quarter of co-op workers in 1983 would *not* want to look for another co-op if they were to leave the company (compared to 10% in 1978). Greenberg interprets this as lack of "stable solidarity with their fellows" and evidence of alienation (or at least lack of dealienation). But one could argue that given the stressful objective environment, the mentally healthy and nonalienated attitude would be an openness to leaving. At all too many points, this "eye of the beholder" problem leaves Greenberg's arguments unsecured, reflecting the shallowness of the survey technique—a point long emphasized by theorists of the Left.

The subjective-objective problem comes up, for example, in survey data showing co-op workers are not significantly different from their conventional counterparts in feelings of competence on the job. Yet early chapters had documented how co-op members engaged in more job rotation, more problem solving, and management decision making. Numerous studies have shown that attitudes are often not good predictors of behavior, and vice versa. There is a danger that casual readers will miss the subtlety of discussions of alienation behaviorally defined versus attitudinally defined, particularly since Greenberg flips back and forth between the two to maintain his theme, as in his discussion of safety or lack thereof, a behavioral measure.

In the discussion of political participation, Greenberg finds "exactly contrary to theoretical expectations" that co-op workers have a greater individualistic ethic. Actually, Vanek's critique of co-ops predicts this quite well. Again, also, the "eye-of-the-beholder" problem emerges, as the indicators here could be interpreted as reflecting increased sense of power. Greenberg's analysis assumes that democratic theory predicts consensual public spiritedness resulting from participation. Both pluralist and theories of the Left have emphasized the empowerment aspects of participation as potentially leading to less cohesion and more conflict. This theoretical background would be more explanatory of both the individualist ethos and the greater nonworkplace political activity of the co-op workers.

In the section on class consciousness, Greenberg again finds little evidence. In fact, co-op workers are more likely to be Republican and less likely to support unions. On the other hand, earlier in chapter 2 Greenberg had credited them as being high in solidarity, a finding in tension with the theme of this later chapter. Co-op workers are also more supportive of a working-class party.

In the conclusion as well as at various other points in the book, Greenberg strongly argues that theorists cannot expect extraordinary impacts on working-class politics from workplace democracy alone. The context of the economic marketplace, egalitarian culture, radical education for democracy, socialist ideology, revolutionary movements, and governments committed to economic democracy explain the greater effects of workplace democracy in such settings as the Israeli kibbutz or Mondragon. Without this context, Greenberg notes, the co-ops "drift inexorably toward enterprise egoism" (p. 168). This was predicted by Vanek twenty years ago, and the prerequisites for democratic socialism with regard to workplace democracy were summarized more comprehensively a decade ago by Bernstein, on the basis of that past literature.

Greenberg has made an important contribution to empirical democratic theory. If the book has a flaw, it is that democratic theory and leftist views on workplace democracy are more complex and more sophisticated than this work gives them credit for, more was known much earlier, and Greenberg's work gives a "corrective to fifteen years of literature" (as advertised on the book jacket) much less than is claimed.

G. David Garson

*North Carolina State University*

**Mass Media and Political Thought: An Information-Processing Approach.** Edited by Sidney Kraus and Richard M. Perloff (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1985. 350p. $29.95).

A quarter century ago, social science rejected Orwell's vision of public gullibility. It became clear that when buffeted by political propaganda, individuals hang on to social and psychic anchors, with the result that they are not simply swayed by whatever winds dominate the public air. Following the main direction of the evidence, students of mass politics adopted the social-psychological paradigm of *Voting* and *The American Voter*. Having developed technological machinery and mined mountains of data, we now understand much more thoroughly the social and the psychic correlates of political attitudes, heterogeneity in the public, cross-national similarities and differences among mass citizenries, and how citizen views and capabilities may differ over time.

Our current paradigm offers a strong account of the current state of mass politics and shows why things mostly remain the same. We know less about how or why things change. A crucial, perhaps *the* crucial, need here is an understanding of how citizens take in information and change their beliefs and evaluations of the political world. During the past few years, a newly energized research effort, incorporating the ideas of cognitive psychology, has concentrated on just this problem. Not satisfied with noting the rarity of attitude change, the group has focused on the mechanisms that produce it. In this edited volume, Kraus and Perloff show off a number of today's young Turks working the field.

Miller and Asp, Iyengar and Kinder, Perloff, Lau and Erber, Schoenbach and Weaver, and Garramone look at the ways that individual motivation and skill modulate mass communication's information transmission and agenda setting, govern the robustness and the dynamics of value and belief schemas, and determine the types of schemas individuals activate in processing campaign commercials. The most striking work, that of Lanzetta, Sullivan, Masters, and McHugho on the power of television images, shows that subtle facial cues have an impact (sometimes direct, sometimes mediated by psychic state) on viewer emotions and cognitions. More generally, the survey and experimental evidence indicates that motivation and skill matter (more or less). What is significant here, though, is that the collective effort begins to test different models of cognition and thus to develop our conceptual as well as our empirical knowledge. While the result still falls short of integrated theory, this is not "minimal effects" in disguise.

Other pieces focus more directly on the nature of political cognition. Neuman and Fryling illustrate critical distinctions in individual cognitive style. Tetlock shows that the "integrative complexity" of politicians' and citizens' statements varies as a function of political ideology (political extremists, especially the authoritarian rightists, are simplistic), as well as of political role (opposition is more simplistic than current policy makers). Fishbein, Middlestadt, and Chung argue for the notion of "intention" as an intermediate cognitive step between attitude and action. Tyler and Lavrakas suggest a powerful distinction between the citizen's mental images of the world experienced by the *self* and the mental images of a society populated by *others*.

The articles blend serious reviews of recent research with bits of the authors' current work. Rather than classic pieces, these are snapshots of science in progress. The collection is a professional's view of the warm, perhaps hot, trails to follow in mass politics.

This is not social psychology but, instead, cognitive psychology. This is not a politics of the neighborhood, with its chats over fence post and bar stool, but instead a politics of the living room, with its crumpled newspaper and flickering television screen. The focus here is on how the citizen and the media interact, on how the citizen incorporates the media fantasy into a personal fantasy of politics. One might guess that Orwell's truth was simply overdrawn; it is these scientists' purpose to define its real dimensions. For those concerned with the landscape of future politics, this is the stuff.

MICHAEL MACKUEN

*University of Missouri, St. Louis*

**Nomos XXVIII: Justification.** Edited by J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (New York: New York University Press, 1985. xv, 386p. $42.50).

Like clockwork, almost every year since 1958 has seen the publication of *Nomos*, the yearbook of the American Society of Political and Legal Philosophy. *Nomos* is the Greek word for law; but, being Greek, it naturally implicates the political order and customary ways of life beyond legal edicts and institutions as such. As aptly as any single word could, it captures the interests of the three disciplines of political science, philosophy, and law that comprise the society, which was founded in 1955 by Carl J. Friedrich. Each volume of *Nomos* is issued under a roman numeral and some pithy title indicating its conceptual organization, for instance, *Community, Public Interest, Representation,* and *Human Rights.* The all-time favorite *Nomos* is *Authority,* which was volume I, later republished, and soon to be volume XXIX. Each volume bears the stamp of considerable editorial labors. In this, Friedrich's legacy has been continued by J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman. An index furthers thematic integration, already virtually assured because many essays address one another. All this conspires to produce integrated volumes of intelligent essays in analysis that, truth be told, serve the specialist better than the general reader.

*Nomos XXVIII: Justification* fits the bill and follows the tradition. There are three sections devoted to justification in ethics, law, and politics, respectively. The philosopher Kurt Baier leads off the first section with a rationalist thesis that in matters ethical "the guidelines of morality point to behavior that would satisfy what we can in reason want or ever demand of one another, in the sense that it would be contrary to reason not to satisfy these wants or demands" (p. 3). This thesis is received with utter skepticism by Felix E. Oppenheim, whose coda reads: "there can be no justification in ethics" (p. 32). Margaret Jane Radin and Michael D. Bayles finish out in two essays that address justification in terms of risk-of-error rules and middle-level principles, putting off ideal theories of justice and foundational principles.

Legal scholar Frank I. Michelman begins the second, and probably the best overall, section by shifting ground from justification to justifiability. He then offers a cautious defense of liberal legalism in the face of accusations made by critical legal studies that laws, rights, and judges' powers are riddled with contradiction. This politically sensitive accusation awaits further response until Jeffrey H. Reiman takes it up in the section's last essay, where he too defends legalism. In an essay that deserved to be longer, given its suggestiveness, Amy Gutmann anticipates a defense of liberalism along contextualist, not legalist, lines; and she would have us look beyond judges to the "unity of moral labor" (p. 166) among legislators and judges. One suspects that this is an eighteenth-century use of *moral*, the present political realities of Washington being what they are.

The question of fundamental rights as a constraint on democratic majority rule is taken up by Jeffrie G. Murphy in a deck-clearing operation for later hoped-for constructive efforts. No defense of fundamental rights heretofore offered passes muster with him; and the prospects of there being a long and ambitious list of justified fundamental rights after future efforts appear quite grim. The objectivity of law—so denounced by critical legal studies and by legal realism before that—is defended by Christopher H. Schroeder, but only after he relaxes our expectations about what objectivity is. Martin P. Golding engages in a similar sort of effort, though in his case we are asked to follow the consequences of an analogy between legal and scientific justification, once science is looked at from the postpositivist perspective of Norwood Russell Hanson and others. This analogy, by the way, occasions what is a rarity in a *Nomos* volume: the essays do not quite connect. Baier criticizes related efforts as "moral scientism"; and Murphie observes, not altogether as facetiously as he makes it sound. "One could say that this shows that morality now has a clear bill of health because it is in no worse shape than science. One could also, of course, begin to sign the death certificate on the pretensions of science by arguing that it is in no better shape than morality" (p. 160). What *would* Paul K. Feyerabend be like as chief justice of the Supreme Court?

Political scientist James S. Fishkin gets the biggest rise out of the collected authors, for no fewer than three essays in the third section (and one in the second) respond to his efforts. He charts seven ethical positions relevant to the justification of the liberal state. Rejecting subjectivism, absolutism, rigorism, and three others, he adopts a "minimal objectivism." Fearing rightly that liberalism is on the eve of self-destruction, he ends with the reasonable if plaintive call for a revision of our moral culture. We should expect (for we will surely receive) less from liberalism by way of what it can justify in absolute terms. Just how we are to secure this moral revision is discussed neither by Fishkin nor by those who take him up on other matters about justification in politics. Barbara Baum Levenbrook counters two of his skeptical arguments about the limits of jurisdiction and the "unforseeability" of future difficulties. A case for subjectivism and against allegations that it undermines liberalism is made by Gerald Gaus.

Four essays by political theorists bring the volume to a close, and collectively make for the most accessible reading. Things take a Kantian (re)turn in Richard Dagger's elegantly written defense of autonomy and a rights-based liberalism. In the face of many recent allegations to the contrary, he contends that no radical individualism need burden liberalism when it is rightly understood. In different essays, J. Roland Pennock and J. Patrick Dobel make out measured defenses of liberal democracy as a political and ethical ideal, thereby illustrating prudential justification. After recognizing the present disquiet, Thomas A. Spragens, Jr. ends his discussion—and the volume—with reminders that justification is an exercise of practical reason that may draw some solace from the Western tradition from which it issues.

As one surveys the whole of *Justification*, its steadfast commitment to analysis stands out, what with its several numbered distinctions, positions, levels, kinds, types, theses, and sorts. It is hard for a reviewer, and I expect it will be for a reader, to do justice to all the arguments because there are so very, very many of them. Attending this abundance, there is a complementary poverty of real practical examples, those in which justification is first called for and then made concrete in the defense of some particular action, law, or public policy. Analysis also tends generally to forget history. In this *Nomos*, the history of political thought is better served (thanks to Pennock, Dobel, and Spragens) than is the social and political history that has brought us to this stand in our crisis of justification. The crisis of justification is not unrelated to the crisis of authority in our time. Perhaps the practical and historical dimensions of this crisis will be dealt with in volume XXIX as *Nomos* revisits the analysis of "authority."

Finally, the volume as a whole succeeds in nothing so much as lowering our expectations and hopes in virtually every arena, whether in the matter of liberalism, fundamental rights, ideal theories of justice, legal authority, objectivity, science, reason, or justification itself. What emerges politically is an exceedingly cautious, analytical, and minimalist defense of liberalism. Long gone are the proclamations of the Enlightenment, the Revolution, the New Deal, and the New Frontier. And the prospects that liberalism might regain its lusty confidence in itself or its foundations appear about as likely as its being saved by a return to justification *sola fide*. By no means is this a criticism of the book or the intelligence contained in it. But it is a sign of just how little we are confidently prepared to justify in our time.

JAMES FARR

*University of Wisconsin, Madison*

**The Art of Political Manipulation.** By William H. Riker (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986. xi, 152p. $18.95, cloth; $6.95, paper).

Among students of politics, William H. Riker is so closely identified with mathematical theories of collective choice that some in our discipline may be surprised at the appearance of a volume of political stories bearing his name. This compilation of twelve tales, spanning the ancient Roman Senate of Pliny the Younger and the contemporary U.S. Senate of Warren Magnuson, is rich with historical detail and personal anecdote. No equations intrude on the lively accounts of Lincoln's rhetorical victory at Freeport or Chauncey DePew's sly defeat of the Seventeenth Amendment, for the emphasis is entirely on the political art of exploiting agendas and rules. If one did not know better, the appearance of this small book might be taken as a sign that the well-known positivist had renounced his faith in deduction to become a latter-day institutionalist.

But Riker's latest work is no reversion to traditional forms of political analylsis; rather, it uses historical settings to illustrate the fundamentals of social-choice theory. The examples of political manipulation assembled here reflect the author's longstanding interest in grounding theory in observation, and many of them have figured in Riker's previous writings on Kenneth Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and Robin Farquharson's exposition of sophisticated voting strategies. While this diverse collection of episodes reveals Riker's extraordinary breadth of knowledge about political behavior, it also offers vivid pictures of how leaders in democratic regimes forge agreements when no underlying consensus exists.

Social-choice theorists like Riker have endeavored to discover lawlike regularities to explain political events, but they have deduced instead a world in perpetual disequilibrium. Under democratic norms of unrestricted preferences and nondictatorial rules, voting cycles are unavoidable, and strategic calculations determine the selection among rival alternatives. This systematic chaos means that political decisions that depend on voting schemes are inherently unpredictable and offer exceptional opportunities for leadership. As Riker observed in *Liberalism against Populism,*

> The absence of political equilibria means that outcomes depend not simply on participants' values and constitutional structures, but also on matters such as whether some leader has the skill, energy, and resources to manipulate the agenda, or whether some back-bencher . . . has the imagination and determination to generate a cyclical majority. . . . These are matters of perception and personality and understanding and character. . . . [D]emocratic political outcomes . . . are an amalgamation that often operates quite personally and unfairly, giving special advantages to smarter or bolder or more powerful or more creative or simply luckier participants." (1982, p. 200)

The outgrowth of the indeterminacy Riker sees in democratic regimes is a type of political entrepreneurship he labels *heresthetic.* This is the art of creating successful coalitions by reframing alternatives, so that people are induced or compelled to join without necessarily being persuaded to the leader's point of view. Heresthetic is not scientific, but its power derives from the general laws of social choice that science has uncovered. Thus, it can be taught, and the lessons of one successful heresthetic experiment can be applied to different strategic situations whose underlying structures are similar. viewed in this context, *The Art of Political Manipulation* is not a scholarly work at all, but a manual "so that men of affairs may be instructed in this newly rationalized art" (p. xi).

Unfortunately, Riker's efforts to interest a commercial publisher in his text were rebuffed, and he probably will not reach the "men of affairs" who were his intended audience. This is regrettable at a time when the U.S. public is hungry for political leadership and the individuals who aspire to fulfill that role offer such an impoverished view of what it means to be a leader in a democratic society. As Riker's book illustrates in so many different ways, effective leaders are marked by their sense of timing, their understanding of historical precedent, and their capacity to redefine the dimensions on which public discourse takes place. More importantly, they take the trouble to master the intricacies of constitutional rules and legislative procedure in order to direct outcomes toward their political ends. Communication and persuasion are secondary to this view of leadership, and "new ideas" useful only insofar as they serve the leader's control of the agenda. One finds little in this book, therefore, to support the notion that a Ronald Reagan or a Gary Hart could be considered effective herestheticians, despite their skill in image making.

If Riker's book is unlikely to influence the general debate over the nation's political leadership, it nonetheless offers some useful lessons to political scientists. First, it is a welcome attempt to make the social-choice literature accessible to a wider audience. In addition, by presenting the problems of voting paradoxes in real-world examples, this small volume makes it more difficult for the critics of formal theory to dismiss the results of Arrow and Farquharson as mere artifacts of arbitrary and unreasonable assumptions.

In addition, Riker's stories offer a glimpse of the kinds of questions a mature theory of politics might begin to address. Instead of the sterile determinism of rational-actor models borrowed from economics, the discipline's most forceful advocate for positivist thinking in politics seems to be moving us toward a more explicit evaluation of the influence of context on political outcomes. And as part of that context, he clearly sees the importance of art and innovation, which make the study of politics not a "dismal science" but an inquiry of perpetual surprise and variation.

LINDA L. FOWLER

*Syracuse University*

**Analytical Marxism.** Edited by John Roemer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. viii, 313p. $39.50, cloth; $11.95, paper).

*Analytical Marxism* is a volume in the series Studies in Marxism and Social Theory, edited by G. A. Cohen, Jon Elster, and John Roemer. Other books in the series include Jon Elster's *Making Sense of Marx* and Adam Przeworski's *Capitalism and Social Democracy*. These authors are also included in *Analytical Marxism*, in addition to sociologist Erik Wright, historian Robert Brenner, economist Pranab Bardhan, and philosopher Alan Wood.

Several themes link these essays together. One is the aim to restore economics to the central position in Marxian theory. While the contributors are philosophers, sociologists, historians, and economists, they uniformly spurn the temptation to take refuge in literary criticism, epistemology, the theory of the state, and chronicles of popular struggles to rescue Marxism from the weaknesses of Marxian economics.

But the economics of *Analytical Marxism* is surely not the economics of Marx. The labor theory of value, the centrality of class, the privileged position of the forces of production, the focal role of material interests in motivating social transformation, and many more traditional Marxian principles crumble before their analytical gaze. And while these writers are certainly not the first to confute these doctrines, their analyses are always fresh, insightful, and point to constructive research agendas.

The contributors to *Analytical Marxism* do not form a school. But they share enough principles to allow one to detect at least an "affinity group" that might possibly set the intellectual agenda for the next wave of progressive social theory. First, they have a uniformly hostile attitude towards oppression and inequality and little tolerance for academic celebrators of the status quo and apologists for privilege. Second, they scrupulously avoid defending any particular part of Marxian theory as such and no doubt scorn those who waste their valuable intellectual resources sheltering Marx from his critics. Third, they all use modern analytical techniques, which Marxists have tended to reject as merely elegant obfuscation. Indeed, they not only use such techniques; they do so with obvious pleasure and consummate skill.

Technique in social science, like verbal skill in law, is as acutely capable of hiding as revealing. But abjuring technique is just as surely a kiss of death—one from which these "analytical Marxists" are carefully protected. John Roemer, whose major contributions to economic theory are carefully summarized in this volume, is a bold thinker whose craft could be ignored only by an economics profession in the United States dominated by an arrogant narrow-mindedness scarcely justified by the explanatory power of its cherished dogmas. Przeworski, Elster, Brenner, and Cohen are also represented by selections that, in addition to exploring traditional Marxian themes, reveal both their commitment to a research methodology little different from that of their non-Marxist colleagues and their considerable ability to work within it.

Perhaps the centerpiece of this book is Roemer's "New Directions in the Marxian Theory of Exploitation and Class," in which he creates a general category of exploitation of which Marxian exploitation and neoclassical exploitation are special cases. Others are feudal, Socialist, and status exploitation. Roemer then proves what he calls the *class-exploitation correspondence principle* (CECP), which holds for economies with linear technologies and asserts that "every agent who is in a labour-hiring class . . . is an exploiter, and every agent who is in a labour-selling class is exploited" (p. 90). For more general convex technologies, if we attempt to define labor values independent from price (a la Morishima), then the CECP does not hold. Roemer shows that in order to ensure the CECP, the value of a commodity must be defined as the minimal amount of labor required to produce that bundle among all technologies maximally profitable at equilibrium prices. This shows that Marx's political economy *logically requires* that price precede labor value in level of abstraction. Roemer proceeds to show that in a plausible array of cases, the transfer of surplus labor time through credit markets perfectly parallels the transfer through labor markets, thus undercutting Marx's assertion that capitalist exploitation occurs through the capitalist's control of the production process.

This combination of attachment to the traditional Marxian concern for "exploitation" in contrast to the more voguish notions of alienation, domination, and heterogeneous forms of power and oppression, is characteristic of *Analytical Marxism.* It carries with it certain clear dangers. First, it entails the refusal to criticize some of the most bizarre aspects of Marxian dogma. For instance, class exploitation, even in its carefully extended Roemerian form and however important, is by no means the touchstone of social injustice and can scarcely account for the varieties of social action that make the world what it is. Consideration of race, gender, religion and the authoritarian state, not to mention war and nuclear destruction, are residual categories for these thinkers. Yet to avoid the heterogeneity of power is not "analytical" but simply selectively blind.

Indeed, the authors rarely give a spirited defense of their limited palette. They simply accept the single-minded preoccupation with exploitation and class as an inviolable "rule of the game." Clearly, their silence on the broader issues means that the job of developing a political philosophy to replace traditional socialism remains to be accomplished. It is fair to say, I believe, that their willingness to borrow the *methods* of non-Marxist social theory is not paralleled by their willingness to borrow either the *moral concerns* or their *social content.* Yet I confess to being charmed by their insights, respectful of their theoretical openness despite a dedication to social justice that has led others to become hack apologists, and I am often dazzled by the sheer technical expertise that pervades these essays.

HERBERT GINTIS

*University of Massachusetts, Amherst*

**Destiny of Capitalism in the Orient.** By N. A. Simoniya (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1985. 252p. $7.95).

From Afghanistan to China, Soviet-style socialism is a bad joke. The ascent of capitalist Japan and the newly industrializing countries (NICs) of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore; the booming of China's partly desocialized economy; the stagnation of the state-controlled economies of Burma and Vietnam—for a Soviet observer bound to believe that socialism is superior and capitalism doomed, the recent history of the Asian-Pacific region is hard to explain away.

The Georgian scholar Nodari Simoniya, one of the brightest and most creative of Moscow's orientalists, resolves his cognitive dissonance by omission, assertion, and revision.

By entirely ignoring the reforms in China since 1978, Simoniya avoids the discomfort of imagining that socialism could be a reversible process. Citing stagflation and high oil prices (!), he finds world capitalism in "a wholesale structural crisis" from which it may not recover, and rules out on faith the possibility of its rejuvenation by the NICs (pp. 250–51).

The most interesting of Simoniya's methods, however, is to accommodate the reality by revising the preconception. Simoniya distinguishes between the "primary model" of capitalist development, exemplified by the earliest industrializers, such as Britain, Holland, and France (p. 117), and the "secondary model" represented by latecomers like Germany, Italy, and Japan (p. 122). In the latter case, unlike the former, "the political superstructure appears as the *chief system-forming factor*," that is, the state plays a much more active role, through revolution from above, in bringing about conditions of mature monopoly capitalism. It follows that the "tertiary model" now being forged by the Asian NICs may also reverse the vulgar Marxists' causal arrow from economic base to political superstructure.

Another of Simoniya's revisions is to blur and complicate the sharp distinctions of orthodox Marxism. He does this under the cover of an acceptably dialectical label: *synthesis*. For Simoniya multiple modes of production commonly coexist in the "compound" or "synthesized" society of a developing country, and may do so, he implies, for long periods of time.

The consequences of this admission are potentially radical. For if each historical stage through which a country "must" pass is distinguished by one dominant mode of production—Asiatic, feudal, capitalist, whatever—a synthesis of capitalist and precapitalist modes endangers the whole notion that history moves teleologically through clear-cut phases. Simoniya of course reaches no such conclusion, but the net effect of his analysis is to undercut the historical optimism of official Soviet ideology.

The ubiquity and endurance of nationalism in developing countries makes it hard to explain as an epiphenomenon of a specific class. If in a synthesized society of coexisting capitalist and precapitalist modes of production no single class is clearly dominant, nationalism cannot be the superstructural projection of the bourgeoisie alone. Nationalism in developing countries becomes, for Simoniya, "an ideological reflection of an objectively existing universal interest in consolidating the nation and the state" (p. 83)—a tertiary-model, top-down, cross-class kind of "state nationalism," as he calls it, in contrast to primary-model, bottom-up, class-specific "bourgeois nationalism."

Ethnicity is another troublesome category for materialist Marxists, given its persistence independent of class pattern or historical stage (witness the anti-Russian riots in Kazakhstan in 1986). As with the state, Simoniya is willing to grant to ethnic identity a relatively autonomous role in the nation-state-forming process of late-developing countries.

Such revisions bring Simoniya to the brink of explicitly downgrading the importance of class. But he draws back at the last moment by asserting that "state nationalism" as a "universal interest" is "nearly always" used to cover up its "class essence" (p. 87). At this point, presumably, whoever vetted this manuscript for publication breathed a sigh of relief.

To summarize: This book illustrates both the opportunities for, and the limitations upon, the rethinking of Marxist categories in an Asian context from a Soviet perspective.

DONALD K. EMMERSON

*University of Wisconsin, Madison*

**Seeds of the Seventies: Values, Work, and Commitment in Post-Vietnam America.** By Arthur Stein (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1985. 184p. $18.00, cloth; $8.95, paper).

**Builders of the Dawn: Community Lifestyles in a Changing World.** By Corinne McLaughlin and Gordon Davidson (Walpole, NH: Stillpoint, 1985. 372p. $12.95, paper).

For those who believe that the end of the 1960s and early 1970s coincided with the extinction of progressive "movement politics" in the U.S., these two books offer an alternative perspective. For others, who have traced the process by which ex-movement political activists dropped out, were co-opted, or drifted, willy-nilly, into establishment political, economic, and social institutions, these books show that many individuals chose a different path, one that sustained the best of the (old) New Left, rejecting and abandoning the worst, while simultaneously struggling to create a new, post-Vietnam, post-Marxist vision still aimed at fundamental political transformation. And, finally, for those who have lost faith in the viability of a democratic, humane, flexible, and nondogmatic U.S. radicalism, where *radicalism* means "going to the roots" (psychological and cultural, as well as economic, roots), these books counter with portraits carrying the seeds—to use Arthur Stein's felicitous term—of hope.

*Seeds of the Seventies* is highly readable, thoughtful, and provocative—useful as a supplement in a wide variety of undergraduate courses and/or as a brief guide for political scientists curious about the "new-alternatives" subculture that has proliferated in the U.S. over the past 20 years. Stein provides a series of vignettes, concentrating on groups involved in producer and consumer cooperatives, active, nonviolent peace efforts, rural resettlement communities, appropriate technology, organic farming, holistic health centers, urban decentralist social-change collectives like the Movement for a New Society (MNS), human-growth communities, "deep-ecology" education, and "New Age" spiritual activities. He is a participant-observer in many of these efforts; accordingly, his work reflects the strengths and weaknesses of this approach.

As a modern-day Gandhian, Stein is sensitive to the egoistic tendencies in some of the groups he examines, focusing on individuals and groups within the subculture who clearly are "other regarding" and politically engaged. Of the others—cultural rogues, grifters, naifs, failures—he has little to report. This bias is understandable, given the preponderance of ignorance and a Christopher Lasch-style conviction that all of it *is* egocentric and narcissistic. Still, the book is deficient in what usually is called balance. Nor does Stein seem comfortable with a more critical mode. His lengthy analysis of "The Farm," one of the largest and most clearly successful of the 1970s alternative communities, omits any but the most tepid criticism of the excesses that were going on there, and he does not provide any explanation of the community's virtual disintegration in the early 1980s. His intent is honorable—descriptive social science in the service of hope—but in his efforts to counter the largely mindless, "Rajneesh-is-coming" attitude toward the alternatives movement, his optimism undermines his capacity for detached and critical analysis.

What for Stein is only part of the alternatives movement (intentional communities), McLaughlin and Davidson examine in detail. *Builders of the Dawn* is a more comprehensive and useful study of postcommune communities available. It is well written, historically informed, and diligently researched The authors, neither of whom is a social scientist, nevertheless are gifted field researchers. They spent 10 years traveling and visiting communities, mainly in the U.S. but also abroad, and here report the results, along with solid, practical advice to would-be or ongoing communitarians. Like Stein's volume, this book is particularly appropriate for a variety of undergraduate courses and as a reference for scholars. McLaughlin and Davidson omit coverage of the large, cultlike communities of modern life, preferring to examine "mainstream" alternatives. They estimate that there were approximately 400 such communities functioning (circa 1984–85) in the U.S. They visited 105 and write in depth about 30.

Many of these communities see their role as broadly educative for people outside the community movement, and actively mount outreach programs, workshops, and the like concerned with experimental new forms in governance, ecology, energy utilization, conflict resolution, family structure, business management and so forth. The communities reflect enormous diversity, in the goals they pursue, their internal structures, and in the types of people attracted to them. In this and other ways, the authors assert, modern communities are not so much alternative as they are co-evolutionary with the more conventional institutions of advanced industrial society. Most, however, operate on the assumption of nourishing far-reaching changes in the values and behavior of people in this society, now and in the future. The seeds, as these books document, are well planted; indeed, many have long historical traditions. Whether they will continue to grow, and with what consequences, political and otherwise, is still an open question.

JEFF FISHEL

*American University*

**When Marxists Do Research.** By Pauline Marie Vaillancourt (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1986. xvii, 205p. $29.95).

Pauline Vaillancourt has tried to render a service to "non-Marxist social scientists" by providing an ambitious road map to the epistemological and methodological assumptions of, and views of science in, Marxist research. She also examines how these views affect Marxist "research strategies" and their relation to policy-making. Vaillancourt's beginning is promising: "Marxists possess a rich tradition, a body of experience, accumulated over a hundred years and more, which non-Marxists have for the most part ignored" (p. 1). Unfortunately, that richness does not emerge in the ensuing analysis.

Vaillancourt's strategy is to compare the assumptions of Marxist research with those of the "generally accepted model" in contemporary social science. She summarizes that model as materialist, determinist, empiricist, positivist, value neutral, objectivist, and atomist and as accepting the methodological priority of induction, empirical observation, direct causality, the unity of natural and social science, the fact-value split, and the ideological independence of science.

Against that model, Vaillancourt judges the efforts of four categories of Marxists: the *philosophics* (e.g., Korsch, Lukacs, Reich, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Marcuse, Adorno, Habermas); the *materialists* (e.g., Hilferding, Kautsky, Bernstein, Plekhanov, Bukharin, Bottomore, Miliband); the *structuralists* (e.g., Althusser, Lacan, Godelier, Therborn, Poulantzas, Foucault, Harvey); and the *deductivists* (mostly Stalinist theorists). This categorization is not without merit, but one might just as well distinguish dialectical, critical, humanist Marxism, on the one hand, and positivist (both empiricist and ideological) Marxism on the other.

In any event, after repetitiously summarizing the general assumptions in those four catgories, Vaillancourt's conclusion is unsurprising and simple: the materialist (read *positivist*) Marxists "do research" that is of most interest to non-Marxist (read *positivist*) social scientists. The "philosophics" are least interesting because they reject almost all the tenets of the "generally accepted model." The structuralists (at least the non-Althusserian ones, such as Wright and Poulantzas) are somewhat interesting insofar as their work becomes more empiricist and positivist. And the deductivists are without any value since all they do is dogmatically apply the doctrinal principles of Marx, Engels, and Lenin (here Vaillancourt is on the mark!). *Only* the materialists are unequivocally of value, because *only* they "accept causal explanations" or "direct causality" (p. 71), "conceive of practice as the application of theory" (p. 58), "accept the content of modern science" (p. 99), "do defensible research" (p. 148), and are "able to provide the tools needed . . . to formulate policy . . . to improve the human condition" (p. 178).

Vaillancourt's project is admirable but flawed. I will mention only a few of the book's problems. First, there is a circular, tautological (even self-fulfilling prophetic) character to the work. The standard of research is contemporary, positivist social science; only the materialist-positivist Marxists meet that standard; hence only their research is defensible and of interest to non-Marxist positivists. Second, Vaillancourt's positivist blinders narrow her vision to the point where she presents a caricature of the "philosophical" Marxists. She attributes to them such positions as that the "external world is merely an artifact of consciousness" (p. 20); it is possible to "will a situation into existence" (p. 24); research should emphasize "subjective personal experience" (pp. 33, 44); and data are an "arbitrary creation of the human mind" (pp. 55, 66). The philosophics, she says, "confound science with technology, reason and rationality" (p. 103). To characterize the thought of Gramsci, Merleau-Ponty, Kolakowski, Habermas, Marcuse, and others in this fashion is unfair and misleading. Related problems include a continual covert use of "real" or "reality" as something self-evident and indisputable (pp. xvii, 7, 18, 29, 65, 166), an unquestioned acceptance of the distinction between the normative and the empirical, and a portrayal of Meehan's instrumental conception of policy-making as beyond debate.

There is much that is worthwhile in Vaillancourt's book, such as her discussion of the materialists and deductivists, which clarifies both pragmatic and ideological Marxism. More importantly, she provides a service by subverting the myth of Marxist theory and research as monolithic. But the benefits must be measured against the problems, especially the distorted picture of nonpositivist Marxism, which has produced some of the most creative social and political theory of our century. In terms of research, we are told that non-Marxists have almost nothing to learn from deductivist, Althusserian-structuralist, or philosophic Marxists (pp. 179–80). What I fear most is that Vaillancourt's well-intentioned book might do more to close off serious dialogue in political theory than to stimulate it. And that would be a loss.

Scott Warren

*Pomona College*

**Biology and Bureaucracy: Public Administration and Public Policy from the Perspective of Evolutionary, Genetic, and Neurobiological Theory.** Edited by Elliott White and Joseph Losco (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986. xvi, 633p. $32.75).

For at least 15 years a small set of political scientists has been arguing at conferences and in print that political science—and especially behavioral political science—must pay closer attention to the research findings, methodologies, and theories of the biological sciences. Put most generally, the reason given for this exhortation is that humans, like other species, are subject to general biological processes and that their behavior and institutions reflect the workings of those processes. Among the subsidiary points commonly found in one or another version of this argument are (1) that humans have a genetic heritage that influences their politics and government; (2) that animal models have served psychology and medicine well and may play a similar heuristic role for political science; (3) that brain research is yielding findings which are of significance for all students of human behavior; and (4) that field and lab methodologies from the biological sciences can be useful in the investigation of political phenomena.

The present volume, a collection of 18 papers, in large part continues these themes. Yet, like all that has gone before, this volume seems unlikely to have much influence on the course of political research. This is not, in my judgment, because the general views expressed in this collection and in this literature are rejected by the rest of political science. Actually, the main arguments are not really controversial at all. Who can doubt that humans have a genetic heritage, that animal models may provide suggestive insights, or that neuroscience offers important behavioral findings? But a very reasonable response to such arguments is, so what? And it is at that point that this literature often falters.

I believe there are three interrelated reasons for this. First, there is in this literature a preoccupation with (biological) independent variables. Concern about (political) dependent variables, with respect both to specification and measurement, too often seems an afterthought at best. And yet it is obvious that any discipline must focus on what it wishes to explain. Hence, we should expect research in political science to be launched by political questions which then may (or may not) lead to biological answers, not the other way around. Second, the biological argument offered in this literature is usually much too general to be of even theoretical utility to those doing empirical research on political life. Typically, only a long and speculative line of reasoning connects biological argument to individual or collective political phenomena. Third, by and large the contributors to this literature have yet to lead by example. Where is the systematic work showing the empirical links between a political dependent variable and biological independent variables (other than *age*, which is of ambiguous status as a biological variable)? Where are the studies demonstrating the value of animal models? And where is the research that offers convincing evidence of the importance of embracing any of the methods of the biological sciences?

Like the earlier contributions to this literature, the present volume presents many interesting ideas. (Despite the volume's title, those ideas have less to do with bureaucracy than with organization in general and less to do with organization than with human nature in general.) But, especially when taking a new direction in research, it can be a long and very difficult journey from interesting ideas to systematic investigation. Until that journey has been made—and, given the need to overcome disciplinary habit and inattention, probably made repeatedly—in persuasive fashion, I expect that political science will continue largely to ignore volumes like this one.

DOUGLAS MADSEN

*University of Iowa*

**Classes.** By Erik Olin Wright (London: New Left Books, 1985. 344p. $25.00, cloth; $9.95, paper).

**Class, Politics, and the Economy.** By Stewart Clegg, Paul Boreham, and Geoff Dow (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986. viii, 451p. $59.95).

Toward the beginning of their book, Clegg, Boreham, and Dow highlight two predictions of Marx and Engels regarding classes in capitalist societies. The first is that the class structure will become increasingly simplified as intermediate positions between the two great classes, bourgeoisie and proletariat, disappear. The second is that the working class will inevitably evolve from a "class in itself" into an organized, self-conscious "class for itself," capable of challenging bourgeois dominance. Neither prediction has proven to be accurate in any unambiguous sense.

The failure of the class structure and class conflict to follow the trajectory anticipated by Marx and Engels sets the agenda for most current Marxist writings on class, including the books under review. Erik Olin Wright has been working on the problem of the middle class in Marxist theory throughout his professional career. How should the large and heterogeneous category of occupations located between the shareholders and the workers on the shop floor be conceptualized? In earlier work, summarized in *Classes*, Erik Wright went through a variety of classificatory schemes whereby relations of exploitation were distinguished from relations of domination in production, and occupations in which the two sets of relations did not correspond were labeled contradictory. In the present book, Wright refashions his classifications in line with John Roemer's reconceptualization of exploitation in *A General Theory of Exploitation and Class* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982; for Roemer, cf. p. 983 above). At the heart of Wright's use (and revision) of Roemer's work is a distinction between four types of productive assets: labor power, capital, organizational assets, and skills. Feudal exploitation is characterized by inequalities in the ownership of labor power; capitalist exploitation by inequalities in the ownership of capital; statist exploitation (such as exists in the Soviet Union) by inequalities in the possession of organizational assets; and socialism will still be characterized by inequalities in the possession of skills. However, while capitalist exploitation is dominant under capitalism (and feudal exploitation is illegal), exploitation based upon organizational assets and skills also exists. Contradictory locations, therefore, consist of occupations in which occupants are exploiters in terms of one type of assent while being exploited in terms of another.

The theoretical advantage Wright claims for his framework centers on his ability to define contradictory class locations exclusively in terms of exploitation as opposed to domination. Yet both organizational assets and skills present problems, as Wright acknowledges. To take the case of organizational assets, the question becomes in what sense does a position of authority in a corporation give one control over resources for personal use distinct from ownership of capital or the supply of labor. Unless Wright is willing to subscribe to the thesis of the separation of ownership and control in modern corporations, a thesis persuasively criticized by Clegg, Boreham, and Dow, it is hard to interpret organizationalasset exploitation as anything other than domination in production. Moreover, why limit the categories of assets to four? Why not add ownership of land to the list? There is less theoretical justification for the scheme than meets the eye.

So how does it do empirically? Wright contrasts his definition of the working class with two alternatives: a much narrower definition offered by Poulantzas and the commonsensical definition of workers as manual laborers. The test consists of comparing the degree to which the alternative definitions correspond to differences in income and in class consciousness (i.e., in responses to survey questions with a "clear class content" [p. 146]). Income is less relevant from a Marxist perspective: Marxists have never claimed that the poorest are the most exploited. My reading of the data on attitudes is that Poulantzas, not Wright, has the most compelling criteria for distinguishing between marginal and core members of the working class.

Nevertheless, reading Wright's book was both enjoyable and rewarding. Wright combines serious theoretical and empirical work on the class structure in advanced capitalist societies. There is, at the end, a fascinating comparative analysis of a survey on class attitudes in the United States and Sweden. In addition, Wright has the rare virtue of openly acknowledging and discussing the difficulties that appear in his analysis.

While Wright is concerned only with determining the appropriate manner of mapping occupations into classes, Clegg, Boreham, and Dow attempt a grand overview in which the organization of classes into political actors with distinctive economic programs is given equal weight with the map of empty places in production. There are chapters on Smith and Ricardo, Marx, Weber, the petty bourgeoisie, the corporate ruling class, the new middle class, the working class, the state, and economic-policy options. Much literature is surveyed, often with intelligent comments. However, the book lacks a clear theme or analytic structure to tie the disparate material together. The writing is frequently difficult to read. Most importantly, the authors are ignorant of economic theory since the Kalecki and Harrod-Domar growth models. The authors urge adoption of a policy of securing full employment and growth through "enhanced purchasing power, enhanced real wages and enhanced participation in decisions affecting the dynamics of the economy" (p. 332). A Left government might accomplish any one of these goals, but the attempt to achieve them all simultaneously is a prescription for disaster.

MICHAEL WALLERSTEIN

*University of California, Los Angeles*

# AMERICAN POLITICS

**Bureaucratic Responsibility.** By John P. Burke (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. x, 280p. $28.50).

This work addresses what in the literature of public administration has often been designated the politics-administration dichotomy, though the author does not use this term or much refer to this literature. Grounded chiefly in moral philosophy and political theory, the work seeks a joining of politics and administration in a theoretically informed and defensible manner.

Self-aware public administration developed in and after the progressive period as a body of procedures and techniques aimed at the effective and efficient realization of policies decided upon by the designated organs of constitutional and—increasingly but still limitedly—democratic government. However, by mid-century it was widely acknowledged that persons in administrative agencies "make policy" in various ways, and a varied literature was developing that sought to justify this policy role. But given the historical context, and especially a constitution that distributes power in a complicated manner and does not contain the word *administration*, the task of legitimation has been far from easy. No rationale has achieved more than limited acceptance, even within the community of public administrationists.

*Bureaucratic Responsibility* is addressed to the problem of the legitimacy and proper role of public administration—of *bureaucracy*, in its own terms. As I shall make some critical observations, I wish first to emphasize the positive. This is a work of high quality, a welcome addition to the literature and, more generally, to the stock of ideas with which we think about the part of government that is quantitatively the largest and for the most part does the governing. Unquestionably, it is a contribution.

The central argument of the book is that "individual responsibility, properly defined, offers a fruitful strategy for reconciling bureaucracy and democracy" (p. 216). Individual responsibility is "properly defined" by the "institutions and processes" (p. 216) of democracy. This mainly means representative democracy in the Western mode. In the U.S. national government, it means the predominance and authority of the three constitutionally ordained "political" organs. Beyond these, but not in contradiction to them, there is an obligation to the ethos of democracy, the "enterprise as a whole" (p. 216).

But it must not be presumed that this "background" obligation licenses a bureaucrat to act against, or even (if I understand correctly) in the absence of, the will of the political authorities. Bureaucrats have an obligation to assist and facilitate policymaking by such means as supplying information, calling attention to errors and problems, and promoting processes that embody democratic values. "The kind of intervention this conception of responsibility defines differs from the bureaucratic activism other approaches encourage. It does not seek to redefine the bounds of politics, impose some particularistic set of policy aims, or encourage bureaucrats to make policy decisions on their own. It attempts only to correct deficiencies" (p. 57).

Some themes and observations: (1) The author is at pains to distinguish his conception of democratic responsibility from the strict formal-legal approach to bureaucratic responsibility: "Unlike the conception of responsibility I will construct, a formalist approach defines democratic allegiance too narrowly" (p. 11). The responsible bureaucrat is not a defensive rule follower, but a positive democracy promoter—always within the direction and control of the proper democratic authorities. (2) The "bureaucratic activism" referred to above includes writings that emphasize the representative nature and function of bureaucrats, the writings that promote "participatory" administration, and the writings that assert a policy-determinative role for professionalism and expertise. Representation, participation, and professionalism can perform useful functions, true, but only with authorization of, and within guidelines specified by, legitimate authorities. (3) There is much that is "conservative" in the argument. Bureaucrats must restrain their impulses to promote their own conceptions of either liberty or equality as against, or in the absence of, authorized democratic policy. Claims of morality and promptings of conscience derived from nongovernmental sources cannot normally be allowed to dictate bureaucratic authority. But at the margin, yes. Notably there is the Nuremberg exception. "Political ends, even if they result from 'perfect' democratic processes, cannot justify all means. Some moral principles are still needed as a check on politics" (p. 167). (4) A fair number of "cases" and examples are used to illustrate points and reinforce arguments. Their use to illustrate problems of conduct like whistle-blowing, appeal to higher authority, and resignation in protest, is skillful, and the arguments largely persuasive.

My reservations relate to the premise that democratic theory taken as a basis for bureaucratic responsibility provides "answers" in the manner presumed. Matters are, I think, more complicated; complicated by history, by constitutional architecture, by custom, by political dynamics, by social and economic factors. Of these there is too little recognition. The "prescriptions" may be basically acceptable and may provide a guide to a better future—I should like to think so. But they often seem idealistic, unrelated to reality. Things are as they are for *reasons*, and they will not be quickly changed, if indeed they can be changed, by counseling bureaucrats to do this or refrain from that on the basis of democratic theory. As the Constitution does not contain the word *administration* (much less *bureaucracy*), it does not contain the word *democracy*.

The work does not, I think, respond to the complexities and perplexities, to the *density* of political-bureaucratic reality as it exists in the federal government (on which the discussion centers). The terminology moves easily and, to me, confusingly among *bureaucrat, official,* and *bureaucratic official.* It is not clear to me whether, for example, commissioners of regulatory agencies, the governors of the Federal Reserve system, administrative law judges, prime contractors, and the sizable throng of "in-and-outers" are part of the (democratic?) political order or are bureaucrats.

To this the author might respond that, to be sure, there are many positions in which the roles of political authority and bureaucratic function are mixed, but that the prescriptions offered will assist in distinguishing between the two and securing the proper relationship between them. Perhaps. But I have the feeling that the many "shoulds" are mostly unrealistic, rather like advising someone with sore feet to walk a little way off the ground. For example, if "political leaders" set conflicting objectives or make unreasonable demands, "bureaucrats ought not determine which of several competing demands they should follow, nor should they themselves 'scale down' impossibly high expectations. They should, however, refuse to be 'passed the buck,' and they should encourage higher authorities to make proper decisions" (p. 51). Indeed.

I leave open—as of course I must—the question whether this is another version of the politics-administration dichotomy or a promising formula for its elimination. Or, conceivably, both. In any case I reaffirm my opinion that this is a work that warrants careful reading and serious reflection.

DWIGHT WALDO

*Syracuse University*

**Affirmative Action: Theory, Analysis, and Prospects.** Edited by Michael W. Combs and John Gruhl (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 1986. 185p. $19.95).

This book consists of 10 original papers that were presented at the Eighth Annual Hendricks Symposium sponsored by the Department of Political Science at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln in 1983. Because this is not a book by one author, there are variations in style, approach, and emphasis, but more than the cover holds it together. In general, the authors support affirmative action and their papers are good.

The book is divided into four parts plus an introduction. The introduction defines *affirmative action* as a remedial process consisting of "specific and result-oriented procedures . . . to promote and achieve equal employment opportunity," a means rather than an end. Part 1 is the "theory" section and examines affirmative action in the context of economics and of "traditional" values like individual rights and the merit principle of employment. In what was for me the most thought-provoking paper in this part, Richard Young distinguishes between procedural and substantive racism as what might be termed de jure versus de facto racism and argues that "once procedural racism has been outlawed, the number of jobs available in the economy has far more influence than either applicant competency or employer bias on whether or not black workers can find decent jobs" (pp. 14-15). "Reverse discrimination" (p. 17), or goals and quotas (my words), will be counterproductive and will fail; what will work is a national economic policy "committed to the achievement of a full-employment economy and the elimination of poverty in the United States" (p. 18). In other words, a procedural solution can remedy procedural racism but a procedural solution cannot remedy substantive racism.

In another interesting paper in part 1, W. R. Newell tries valiantly, though with admittedly limited success, to reconcile affirmative action with the theory of liberal democracy, relying upon Locke, Rousseau, and Rawls. Space prohibits a synopsis of this analysis; suffice it to say that he finds Locke least amenable to affirmative action, and the others less than enthusiastic. "The American public's antipathy toward affirmative action thus has a formidable philosophical antecedent" (p. 57)—as does that of the Reagan administration, one might add.

Parts 2 and 3 are the "analysis" part of the book and are solid empirical studies that examine affirmative-action implementation at various points in time and at various levels of government. Of all the papers in the book, these are, perhaps, the most similar to other studies. They examine such variables as salary, position, local versus state versus national government, economic and population growth, veterans' preference, and the presence or absence of a centralized personnel system and an affirmative-action officer. The results are expectedly congruent with those of other studies of this genre but nevertheless represent a valuable demonstration of the multivariate nature of achieving affirmative action. Perhaps most significant is Saltzstein's finding that certain personnel policies and organizational arrangements do make a difference. Hence, the adoption of an affirmative-action plan may and often will need to be accompanied by changes in personnel policy and organization. Also worthy of note are Eisinger's findings that "the most important factor in explaining expanding black job opportunities is population growth" and that "there is no evidence . . . that reduction of unemployment would lead to more minority jobs in the public sector" (p. 124). This would not necessarily conflict with Young's advocacy of an economic solution because Young is thinking in terms of the economy as a whole rather than the public sector alone.

Part 4 is the "prospects" part of the book and deals with the future of affirmative action in light of the current political environment. It is clear the authors of these papers do not support the affirmative-action policies of the Reagan administration and that they are concerned about their residual effects after Reagan leaves office. The Plant and Thompson paper on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is a particularly insightful analysis of policy implementation by an administrative agency.

In sum, this book presents much valuable information in a concise and convenient format. It could be profitably used in courses in public policy, public personnel administration, ethnic politics, and civil rights. Its value is enhanced by good lists of references at the end of each paper and by a comprehensive index.

WINFIELD H. ROSE

*Murray State University*

**Right Turn: The Decline of the Democrats and the Future of American Politics.** By Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers (New York: Hill & Wang, 1986. 276p. $19.95).

Recent changes in U.S. politics have not been kind to conventional theories of the democratic state. According to the received wisdom, majority opinion determines what government does. But at least since the late 1970s, the Republican and Democratic parties have pushed domestic and foreign policies further and further to the right of what most citizens want. How could a policy realignment this deep and profound have happened with so little mass support? And why have the Democrats—ostensibly the party of internationalism and social reform—helped to bring it about? In *Right Turn,* Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers take on these critical questions. In answering them, they provide a powerful reinterpretation of U.S. politics and a path-breaking work of theoretically informed, empirical political economy.

The analytic heart of the book is a simple but elegant model of party politics that stands most theories of electoral competition on their head. Borrowing from, while substantially modifying, the rational-actor approach to social action, they view politics in market terms, but reject the assumption that party systems are driven by voter demands. The market for political parties in the U.S., they maintain, is not individual voters, but "major 'investors'—groups of business firms, industrial sectors, or, in some (rare) cases, groups of voters organized collectively" (p. 45); only they have sufficient resources to contest effectively for state power and sufficiently well-defined interests in doing so. On this premise the authors build their "investment theory" of politics: shifting patterns of allegiance among groups structure the environment in which public officials choose policies and voters choose parties. These allegiances, not voter loyalties, precipitate policy realignments and account for the bulk of what political parties do.

The authors carefully examine a vast array of materials, including campaign contributions, to substantiate their claims. Based on these data, they persuasively demonstrate that changing investor coalitions do, in fact, explain the rise of the Right and the decline of the Democrats. Ferguson and Rogers make clear that the United States' flight from liberalism does not derive from public antipathy to welfare, regulation, or peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union but from corporate responses to changes in the U.S. and world economies. In the late 1970s—when the right turn occurred—the relative decline of the United States in an increasingly competitive and integrated world market and growing U.S. involvement in the Third World made the multinational, capital-intensive firms and internationally oriented investment and commercial banks that had supported social liberalism and detente more cost conscious and bellicose. These corporate interests, not the mass public, moved to the right and embraced conservative politics. These same interests have driven the Democrats to ape, rather than challenge, Reaganism.

Rigorously and subtly applied, the investment theory of politics yields a host of other important insights. Several heretofore opaque aspects of the 1984 presidential campaign are clarified, including the rise of John Glenn and Gary Hart as presidential candidates, Walter Mondale's self-crippling decision to campaign on a platform of tax increases, and the Democrats' failure to mobilize, let alone widen, their potential base. Other changes, such as the success of the environmental movement in the 1960s and 1970s and revisions of the tax laws are also explained. The future of the party system is also illuminated. The authors show that efforts to revive the Democratic party as a vehicle for liberal reform are likely to fail because its business supporters are no longer willing to make the concessions to its mass base necessary to mobilize it. In the absence of a Democratic upsurge from below, or a catastrophic economic crisis, the United States' right turn is likely to continue.

*Right Turn* succeeds on every level. It tells a fascinating political story and tells it extremely well. The theoretical approach is powerful. The interpretation of recent trends in the political economy is new and convincing. It will become a standard for election books—indeed, it stands head-and-shoulders above other work in the field—and should be read by anyone who hopes to make sense out of current U.S. politics.

CHARLES NOBLE

*Rutgers University*

**The Dream of Deliverance in American Politics.** By Mona Harrington (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986. x, 308p. $19.95).

Mona Harrington has written an interesting and challenging book: interesting because of the lively way in which she treats the familiar narratives of U.S. political history; challenging for two major reasons. First is the perspective she brings to bear on these narratives, and second is her willingness to deal with these in the context of the central issues of our time: war and peace, poverty and prosperity.

Harrington's argument is that the real goals of U.S. democracy are the promises of liberty and equality. Our realization of these goals is hampered, in part, by the division of the U.S. industrialized community into permanent and conflicting interests, managers of the great corporate concentrations, wage earners, and locally fixed producers (including, especially, agricultural interests). But the problems of U.S. democracy, as Harrington understands them, arise primarily from *misunderstandings,* from the propensity in all citizens to suppose, no matter what their real interests, that through some simple arrangement of the rules of the game or some equally simple alteration in policies or of personalities at the helm of state there can be a quick and final deliverance from evil. This "dream," that for every age there is some one quick and easy way out, Harrington calls a myth, and until we can put it aside, there can be "no escape from incoherence" (p. 274) in the national political dialogue.

The prospects of this happening are small, but Harrington is not without hope. Of the three interests into which she sees the U.S. industrial community divided, one, the wage earners, constitutes a genuine majoritarian interest and, moreover, one that has fundamental commitments to both a national interest and the forms of democracy. If this interest could be unburdened of myth, if it could be brought to a realistic understanding of the limits of modern life in which there are no real winners and all must share equitably in pains and losses, then, through presidential mandates and leadership, the United States might move toward a reasonable realization of its real goals.

This argument is persuasively and fluently set out in the book's opening and closing chapters, and massively sustained in the intervening chapters that define the nation's interests and examine their influence on the nation's politics through the years of the New Freedom and the New Deal, the pre- and post-World War II days, the failures of the "war on poverty" and in Vietnam, and the reactions of Carter and Reagan. But one measure of the interest and challenge in all this material is the questions it leaves hanging.

For a book so searching, it seems strangely willing to take uncritically the forms of U.S. political institutions as they stand. The brief and undeveloped reliance on presidential government as a possible hope for the future is an admittedly small but nevertheless telling symptom of this, and it smacks of James MacGregor Burns's contention of several years ago that the nation needs a president who would govern with the Congress if it would and without it if it would not. Where does Congress, with all that it is and represents in the standing U.S. democratic scheme of things, fit in Harrington's scheme of things? And what is to be done with the fragmentation represented by the U.S. system of state and local government?

Then there is Harrington's ready acceptance of what this reviewer would term *liberal* democracy as the norm for the U.S. polity. Liberty is the core value of that democratic vision, and Harrington has a firm grasp on its dimensions. But what of equality? Is it simply another value of liberal democracy? Is it to be understood only by reference to equality under the laws that give us our liberties? What does Harrington mean by the logically incongruous phrase "maximum equality" (p. 273)? Even in the predominantly atomistic U.S. liberal tradition, is there not an ancillary context of ideas that stress egalitarianism in terms of social membership and fellowship? Is there a possibility that at the level of what Harrington terms the United States' "real" goals, there are fundamental contradictions that transcend "interests" and that give shifting meanings even to the concept of *liberty* itself (freedom *from*, . . . freedom *to*, . . . freedom *with* . . .)?

Finally, there is the problem of myth, specifically of political myth and the needs and urgencies to which it responds. Harrington defines *myth*, "in its broad sense as a general system of belief—a system of values and attitudes that define the general political norms of a nation, its fundamental goals, national conceptions of what is right, and also expectations as to what is achievable" (p. 15).

That is a reasonable definition, but it is clear that only its last clause is significant for Harrington in this book. Moreover, in the book's thematic argument, myth is mostly to be associated with misunderstandings, obscurantisms that conceal reality and truth, mental cobwebs that should be blown away. Even in this narrow sense, are we to suppose that in the range of U.S. politics, the myth of deliverance from evil is the only important myth needing to be blown away? That question raises others. If we go back and take the whole of Harrington's definition of myth seriously, can we be certain that the deliverance myth, for all its faults, does not also have important, socially constructive functions? If we rid ourselves of it, have we other myths to do its job?

H. MARK ROELOFS

*New York University*

**The Ultimate Insiders: U.S. Senators in the National Media.** By Stephen Hess (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1986. xviii, 151p. $22.95, cloth; $8.95, paper).

*The Ultimate Insiders* is a study of which senators are covered by the national media and *why*. Stephen Hess makes no pretense in this book—the third short volume since 1981 in his Newswork series for the Brookings Institution—of providing a complete analysis of the relationships between senators and the national media. The preface sets the tone with its caveat that "this book is essentially about the press, not about Congress." Despite this self-limitation, Hess's conclusions are sure to stimulate fruitful discussion among legislative specialists, as well as among students of the media.

Everyone who knows Congress will agree that power in the Senate and House is more widely dispersed now than it was three decades ago. The question Hess addresses is whether the media have contributed to this decentralization by giving today's junior Senators more coverage than their peers of the 1950s. Hess concludes, contrary to some conventional wisdom, that reporters do not run to cover every new blow-dried senator who tries to capture the press's attention. If anything, Hess says, nonleaders get less coverage now than they did 30 years ago.

Hess measured coverage with a National Media Index for 1983 that ranked senators by the number of times their names were mentioned on a network-television evening news program or in five major national newspapers. (Additional points were awarded for personal appearances on the network news and on the networks' Sunday interview programs.) The rankings showed that the top 10 senators got half of the Senate's total national press coverage in 1983, the top 20 senators got two-thirds of the coverage, and the bottom half of the Senate got barely 10%. From the rankings, Hess concludes that

1. most senators receive so little attention "that the national news media are irrelevant in affecting their elections or promoting their policies."
2. the national news media concentrate on the Senate's leaders—party leaders, full-committee chairmen and ranking minority members—the only notable exceptions being presidential aspirants.
3. "rather than being a destabilizing and decentralizing force, scattering attention among a wide range of junior legislators, the national news media focus on those Senators who seem to wield institutional power." This conclusion and the one above parallel Timothy E. Cook's for the 1977–80 House in "House Members as Newsmakers: The Effects of Televising Congress" (*Legislative Studies Quarterly* 11(2): 203–26).
4. "the coverage of the national news media from 1953 through 1983 has increasingly directed attention to the definable leaders at the expense of the nonleaders, mavericks and others"; after comparing the top 20 senators in his own 1983 ranking with the top 20 in rankings prepared by some earlier scholars, Hess concludes that nonleaders made up half of the top 20 in the 1950s and 1960s, a third of the top 20 in 1974, and only a fifth of the top 20 in 1983.

My own reading of Hess's 1983 data would lead me to state these last conclusions somewhat less starkly. The top 20 senators included 4 presidential candidates (Glenn, Cranston, Hart, and Hollings) who received 27% of the Senate's total coverage. If we remove these 4 (2 leaders and 2 nonleaders) and look at the top 20 who were covered as senators and not as presidential candidates, we find 5 (Kennedy, Helms, Moynihan, Mathias, and Laxalt) who generally were quoted for reasons unrelated to their formal leadership positions and 4 (Dodd, Tsongas, Kasten, and Metzenbaum) who held no leadership positions at all. That leaves only 11 of the 20 who clearly fit Hess's notion of a leader getting national coverage by virtue of a leadership position.

The contemporary importance of nonleaders becomes even more apparent when we look at some interview shows that appeal to a narrower audience—such as "Nightline" (ABC), "The MacNeil-Lehrer Nightly News Hour" (PBS), and the like. One of Hess's tables draws upon data compiled by the Senate Republican Conference and ranks senators according to their appearances on these shows. Four of the top 7 positions in 1983–84 were filled by the 4 presidential candidates, with the remaining 3 taken by Dole, Hatch, and Dodd. The fourth-place Dodd, a nonleader, ranked well above Howard Baker, the majority leader. Baker was tied for eighth and ninth place with Paul Tsongas, another nonleader. Positions 10 through 27 on this list included 8 leaders (counting Moynihan and Laxalt) and 10 nonleaders. The top 27, in other words, included only 8 senators who were getting national coverage by virtue of their formal leadership positions within the Senate.

This restatement of Hess's data does nothing to harm his conclusions that leaders are more likely to be covered than nonleaders, or that most senators get little national press coverage, whatever their press releases or other theatrics. But it does suggest that senators who want national reputations can get them—as Hess himself acknowledges—by becoming major players on issues the press considers to be important. The press may not be the reason why these nonleaders gain prominence; on this matter, Hess is surely right. The points, though, are (1) that gaining power inside the senate and gaining recognition outside no longer conflict and (2) that both are available to nonleaders.

When Hess tries to explain the change in press coverage from the 1950s to the 1980s, he speculates about why junior senators may no longer be as attractive to reporters as they once were. This may be the wrong place to look. Since junior members continue to gain attention when they earn it, the decrease in coverage given to junior members may not need explaining as much as the increase in coverage given to leaders.

Hess seems to flirt with this observation in a single paragraph. The Senate of the 1950s, Hess notes, was populated with a number of "inner-club" powerhouses who received, and wanted, almost no coverage in the national press. Their behavior, by default, left a news gap reporters had to fill with the nonleaders. Today's most powerful senators, in contrast, almost all fall in the top sectors of Hess's rankings. This suggests a basic change in the way leaders do their work. Why has this happened? Here are a few competing explanations:

1. The press is better at identifying who should be covered.
2. Today's leaders are either recruited from among people who have a greater personal appetite for press coverage than their peers of the 1950s or socialized to develop this appetite in the contemporary Senate.
3. The new leaders are less likely to be satisfied than the old with their current positions—that is, more of them want to run for higher party office and/or for the presidency. In addition, the national press is a more important part of the strategy for such a race than it used to be.
4. Stating one's position in the national press, and using the press to channel information or mobilize networks of support in Washington, are more important to exercising power *within* the Senate than they used to be.

All of these explanations have some plausibility. Except for the first, they go well beyond Hess's concentration on the press. Hess should not be faulted, of course, for sticking to his subject. Nevertheless, his book raises questions legislative scholars ought to pursue to help sort out the competing explanations. Hess wisely left it for others to explore these issues. It is enough for one study to open the discussion. I hope we can look forward to seeing it continued elsewhere.

MICHAEL J. MALBIN

*University of Maryland, College Park*

**The Supreme Court and the Decline of Constitutional Aspiration.** By Gary J. Jacobsohn (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1986. ix, 182p. $29.50).

This important and sober book assesses the theoretical distance that separates contemporary constitutional jurisprudence from that of the founding period. As indicated by the book's title, Jacobsohn maintains that the distance is great and the direction has been one of decline. The theme is developed through an analysis of the thought of five contemporary (or near contemporary) commentators, contrasted with that of the founding fathers. Though the five scholars selected for analysis —Pound, Dworkin, Berger, Grey, and Ely— might be thought so different as to make it perverse to insist upon their similarity, Jacobsohn does convincingly show that what is most significant and troubling in the thought of each is his rejection of the natural-rights philosophy that informed the founding generation.

Building upon a thesis of his earlier work, *Pragmatism, Statesmanship, and the Supreme Court* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), Jacobsohn finds the critical turning point in the history of constitutional analysis to derive from "paradigmatic changes in scientific understanding" (p. 13). The shift from the fixity of Newtonian principles to the fluidity of Dewey's pragmatism brought a shift in jurisprudence from the securing of natural rights to the satisfaction of social interests, a shift so fundamental that Roscoe Pound's sociological jurisprudence declares "natural rights of man deduced from a social contract [to be] an alien conception in our law" (p. 18). Although Ronald Dworkin's jurisprudence expresses itself in opposition to Pound's sociological jurisprudence, Jacobsohn finds a more significant dimension uniting them. For while Dworkin famously purports to take rights seriously, he is shown in fact to build not from nature but, as with Pound, from "the dictates of conventional political morality" (p. 50). Paradoxically, this notion of rights built upon contemporary convention lies distant from the majoritarian political processes; these Dworkin portrays as a mere summation of utilitarian interests, typically "homogeneous and hostile" to individual rights. Jacobsohn skillfully contrasts this simpleminded notion of U.S. politics with Madison's brilliant, complex understanding of an extended commercial republic, where the form of government itself and the political process it typically generates constitute a sturdy bill of rights—though not of the rights, such as free choice in sexual relations, that Dworkin would have us take seriously.

The historical works of Raoul Berger provide a powerful refutation of the claims of extratextualists like Dworkin, but according to Jacobsohn, Berger's claim that the framers were positivists is belied by their repeated statements that the Constitution was illuminated by reference to the natural rights it was intended to embody. The inability of Berger and others to understand the character of the framers' understanding of judicial authority is itself symptomatic of the distance that we have traveled since the founding. When Hamilton and Marshall spoke of judicial authority as characterized by its absence of will, they did not mean to rule out reference to natural rights, for these were a matter not of will but of discovery.

Conversely, while the historical works of Thomas C. Grey effectively refute the Berger positivist interpretation of the framers, they are equally misguided, for it was not a vague, unwritten "higher law" to which the early jurists appealed but the tradition of natural rights embodied in the text. The framer's Constitution, whose aspirations Jacobsohn finds best expressed by Lincoln, thus shows a middle course between unbounded notions of extratextual approaches and dogmatic positivism; and it is a course superior in intellectual merit and moral authority to John Hart Ely's historically and philosophically ill-informed theory of "participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing" judicial review.

Jacobsohn's style is clear, often elegant, and the argument of the book as a whole is well crafted; he succeeds in showing the decline of constitutional aspiration. Still one cannot help being disappointed that Jacobsohn's own aspirations were not higher. While he convincingly portrays the theory of the framers as superior to those of contemporary commentators, Jacobsohn does not take the additional step of showing that the framer's theory is the Constitution's. It is noteworthy that the framer's theory is hard to place in the Constitution by resort to simple notions of contract, for as Jacobsohn acknowledges, the framers sought to embody in the terms of the Constitution aspirations that the electorate and ratifiers did not fully share (p. 53); in short the framers' theory diverges from the adopters' understanding. In places, Jacobsohn even hints of a certain historical inevitability to the decline of constitutional aspiration (p. 2), and thus of an impossibility of effecting the framers' vision. He does suggest that the terms of the Constitution still can and should be illuminated by such Lockean treatises as *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* and *The Second Treatise of Government.* But the wildly divergent conclusions of two recent works relying on Locke for their constitutional exposition—Rogers M. Smith's masterful *Liberalism and American Constitutional Law* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985) and Richard A. Epstein's provocative *Takings* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985) —raise doubts that such reliance can restore the coherence of the framers' vision. Finally one must at least question the nobility of the aspiration that Jacobsohn speaks of, for the Newtonian universe in which it finds its place is a cosmos of motion, but not of purpose; it is devoid of human telos. One can still speak, I think, of the mobility of the constitution, but then one has to hold that the act of constituting the U.S. polity is larger than the Newtonian and Lockean universe in which Jacobsohn locates it.

STANLEY BRUBAKER

*Colgate University*

**From Nation to States: The Small Cities Community Development Block Grant Program.** Edited by Edward T. Jennings, Dale Krane, Alex N. Pattakos, and B. J. Reed (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986. viii, 258p. $44.50, cloth; $14.95, paper).

The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program was created in 1974 from an amalgamation of seven categorical grant programs administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), including urban renewal and Model Cities. Approximately 80% of the program's funds were allocated on an entitlement basis to cities of over fifty thousand population and to counties with populations of two hundred thousand or more. The bulk of the remaining funds were distributed on a competitive basis to smaller jurisdictions through the Small Cities CDBG program. As part of the Reagan administration's "New Federalism" design for devolving responsibility to the states, in 1981 the president proposed and Congress authorized the states to assume responsibility for the Small Cities program. By 1983, 46 states had done so.

Guided only by broad national principles that projects should be developed to eliminate slums and blight or to benefit low- and moderate-income persons, prior to 1981 CDBG was used to support such activities as the rehabilitation of housing for low- and moderate-income households and to undertake public-works projects that were supposed to improve communities. Toward the end of the Carter administration, projects to promote economic development were added to the list of preferred national activities.

When the states assumed responsibility for designing the mechanisms through which awards to local applicants would be made and then for supervising local program implementation, it was problematic how much the national framework for project design and program administration would alter. The present volume is essentially a monitoring report reviewing the experiences of seven states (Maine, Wisconsin, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Texas, and California) in that regard. The nine contributors to the study have obviously worked from a common outline, since the case studies and the three general chapters (two introductory ones treating the history of the program and the process of transferring program responsibility and a final chapter assessing the experience) read much more as a collaborative enterprise than one might have expected.

On the whole, contributors appear satisfied with the results of the transfer. While states selected somewhat different procedures for mobilizing local program participation and varied in the emphases they placed on different activities—putting less emphasis on housing-related activities (save for California) than HUD and more on public works and economic development—they evolved program approaches that appeared to be as professionally run as HUD's.

In addition to funding more communities than HUD (with consequently smaller grants), the states funded smaller communities than HUD had. Contrary to the fears of some opponents of devolution, the authors find that local winners under state programs had slightly larger poverty populations and slightly more substandard housing than HUD grantees had. Nonetheless, the level of "distress" of a local jurisdiction did not mean that as large a share of resources necessarily went into projects that benefited low- and moderate-income households. The information provided by Jennings and his associates on this issue remains somewhat ambiguous, but a shift from housing activity (where direct benefits could be more easily demonstrated) into public works and economic development (where the benefits might at best be indirect) appeared to result in some real decrease in the benefits provided to lower-income groups. At the same time, this shift was already evident at the end of the Carter administration and was consistent with the Reagan administration's preferences in the matter so that such changes in project activities might well have occurred even if responsibility had remained at HUD.

Structured in the tradition of earlier monitoring research on the CDBG program by Richard Nathan, Paul Dommel, and their associates, the Jennings volume leaves unattended questions that might have been raised in a fuller-scale evaluation of the Small Cities program. There is no information provided, for example, about what it is that local recipients of CDBG did with the funds they received. Essentially, the authors work only within project categories contained in the applications submitted by local officials. Focused at the state level as this volume is, it does not look at important questions of program impact, including the capacity of localities to deliver on the different types of projects they undertook. Nor do the contributors go beyond these data to indicate whether any gap existed between the claims made by localities about prospective project benefits and benefits actually delivered. Finally, this volume shares with others of its kind a reluctance to undertake an evaluative critique of the program itself. While it may be of some comfort to know that the states can do as responsible a job of delivering resources to localities as the federal government can, the report leaves unexamined the question whether projects carried out under the Small Cities program truly serve some national interest or whether that interest might be better served through alternate program vehicles or, perhaps, need not be served at all by the expenditure of scarce federal resources.

DONALD B. ROSENTHAL

*State University of New York, Buffalo*

**From Access to Power—Black Politics in Boston.** Edited by James Jennings and Mel King (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Books, 1986. vii, 196p. $18.95, cloth; $11.25, paper).

This collection of essays on Boston politics examines the racial dimensions of black participation from an historical and a contemporary perspective. Twentieth-century politics is analyzed by considering the ways in which the often overlooked variables of race and class have affected black participation. Using Mel King's recent unsuccessful campaigns for mayor as a framework, the authors examine the level of black participation, the need for coalition building, and the paucity of benefits received by blacks when Kevin White was mayor.

The book adds to the literature on urban governance because it addresses the fact that blacks have always played a role in Boston politics, albeit not a dominant one. The historical treatment covers the stages of black political development that culminated in the institution-building stage in the 1970s. According to Jennings and Mel King, blacks have now developed a sense of community, enabling them to mobilize around the issues of progressive politics—jobs, housing, and education.

Political development did not result in incorporation into the political process. Although blacks were mobilized, they still had to overcome class divisiveness, the fear of reprisals from Mayor Kevin White, and the longstanding habit of not fully supporting black community leaders. Although Boston's black community has not been politically passive, it has not received the scholarly attention given to other larger black communities. Yet the dynamics of political changes among Boston blacks deserve scrutiny as an understudied case of northern racism. The black struggle for access and incorporation has taken place in a political system where the reputation for liberalism has historically concealed the institutional racism. The authors should be applauded for their effort to analyze this complex situation. For example, Jennings and King seek to probe why King did not become mayor by looking at the problems of black mobilization. They go beyond a superficial view of Kevin White's machine-style politics to examine the tactics he used to control and suppress black participation to ensure his four electoral victories.

This collection of essays succumbs to the usual problem of an unevenness of quality in a collected work. Jennings provides the more insightful contributions, but he fails to connect King's stages of development to the impact that the variables race and class have on black politics. The work might have presented a broader perspective on Boston politics by giving more attention to the numerous attempts to elect blacks to the school committee and the city council, all of which were key efforts in the drive to realize a measure of black power in Boston. This work deserves consideration because it seeks to go beyond the facade of Boston's historical image to analyze the nature of the social and political fabric that shapes the black effort to move from mere access to incorporation in Boston's political structure.

TONI-MICHELLE C. TRAVIS

*George Mason University*

**Controversies in Environmental Policy.** Edited by Sheldon Kamieniecki, Robert O'Brien, and Michael Clarke (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986. vi, 322p. $39.50, cloth; $12.95, paper).

One has high expectations for a volume that promises coverage of major controversies in contemporary environmental policy. Since the late 1970s and especially during the Reagan administration, federal environmental policy has been subjected to widespread criticism for a variety of alleged failings, which has prompted some reappraisal of both policy goals and means. Increasingly, scholars have turned their attention to such issues as the use of benefit-cost analysis and risk assessment in regulation, the virtues of market-based approaches as an alternative to regulation, the impact of environmental policy on energy production, and the conflicts between environmental protection and economic development, among many others. Although the essays in this book do not provide exhaustive coverage of these controversies, they do address a fair number of them, and they may well encourage others to engage in more extended and systematic research to provide more definitive answers. As is often the case with an edited collection, some of the essays are especially provocative or insightful, and these merit careful attention.

The editors have brought together 11 essays (by 16 authors in all) and have grouped them into four major sections accompanied by a long and perceptive introduction by Dean Mann. Mann reviews and assesses the way in which the characteristics of the U.S. polity have shaped the formation of our "jerry-built structure" of environmental policy. Rejecting the more apocalyptic vision of some (e.g., William Ophuls), he finds that the U.S. political system has responded rather well to the challenge of environmental damage and resource scarcity. Most of the contributors share his confidence in present institutional and political arrangements, although a strong dissent is lodged by devotees of the "new resource economics."

In the first section, which focuses largely on the privatization issue and public lands, the argument in two of the essays (by John Baden & Dean Lueck and William Dennis & Randy Simmons) is fairly predictable: government regulation has failed and market regulation is the answer. Resources would be utilized more efficiently, they say, under the incentives of private management. Regrettably, both essays are marred by a proclivity toward unsupportable generalizations on regulatory policy and "government failure." In contrast, Howard McCurdy's essay is more persuasive in arguing that neither privatization nor the New Federalism's decentralization of program responsibility provides a sufficient response to the complexity of environmental problems and the need for intergovernmental cooperation. Michael Sheehan's essay completes the section by offering a well-deserved criticism of the inadequacies of economic approaches like benefit-cost analysis, using the case of hazardous-waste control.

The second section (policy-evaluation strategies) focuses chiefly on the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Steven Cohen finds the EPA to be a qualified success, particularly given a continuous record of underfunding, and Alfred Marcus credits the agency with more success in conflict resolution than in achieving environmental-quality goals. Both find that during Anne Burford's reign as administrator the agency suffered serious losses in funding, personnel, morale, and effectiveness. A brief yet helpful critique of benefit-cost analysis by Joseph Biniek is also included here, with special attention given to problems of benefit estimation and dealing with uncertainty.

A short third section returns to the theme of market incentives versus government regulation. In two quite different essays, Thomas Ingersoll and Bradley Brockbank—and Benjamin Walter and Malcolm Getz—critically examine the proposition that environmental quality can best be protected by increased reliance on the marketplace. Both suggest innovative ways to improve upon present regulatory approaches with careful and selective use of market mechanisms and thus reject more ideological views of the market's potential.

Essays in the last section focus on politics rather than current policy approaches and alternatives. Mark Kann offers a critique of environmental policy from an elite-theory perspective; current policy, he says, is far too responsive to corporate ideology, and he favors decentralization and increased "environmental democracy" as a solution. Although unpersuasive, his essay challenges the mainstream views of most contributors. Finally, Henry Kenski and Helen Ingram offer a useful assessment of the Reagan administration's effort to alter the direction of environmental policy in the early 1980s, concluding that the political marketplace (the continued popularity of environmental programs and strong congressional opposition to Reagan's proposals) constrained what might have been a far more damaging assault. Their faith in the political market parallels Mann's and stands in contrast to Kann's perspective.

This volume's potential as a textbook is somewhat limited by the narrow range of controversies included, the organization of the topics, and the lack of a common analytical framework or set of themes. These problems are difficult to avoid in any edited collection. In this case, Mann's introductory chapter and the editors' comments (both in their section introductions and in their brief concluding chapter) partially compensate for the inevitable disparity of approaches and perspectives. The datedness of some of the material is a further problem; although published in early 1986, the essays seem to have been written in mid-1983, prior to some significant changes in the Reagan administration's environmental policy. All of these weaknesses are unfortunate because the book is designed more as a textbook than as a contribution to scholarship. Despite these limitations, however, environmental-policy scholars may well find selected essays useful both for the classroom and for their own enlightenment. A subject index and a name index will assist readers in locating coverage of specific topics and individuals.

MICHAEL E. KRAFT

*University of Wisconsin, Green Bay*

**Institutional Disability: The Sage of Transportation Policy for the Disabled.** By Robert A. Katzmann (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1986. ix, 211p. $28.95, cloth; $10.95, paper).

Robert Katzmann traces federal policy on public transportation for disabled persons from its emergence as a public issue in the early seventies as an example of continuous vacillation in public policy. He attributes the lack of clear policy direction to a combination of a failure to define the problem precisely, inadequate mutual understanding and cooperation among the three branches of the federal government, and weaknesses in the internal operation of each.

Katzmann argues that a principal reason for the unsteady course of federal policy in the area for over 10 years was the conflict between the values of efficiency and equity latent in the issue, which caused fluctuations in the definition of the problem. On the one hand, some political actors defined the problem as one of "effective mobility"—getting disabled persons where they want to go through the most cost-effective means. On the other hand, others defined the problem as one of the right to "equal access"—making regular public-transportation systems accessible to disabled persons and thus avoiding the perceived stigma of separate service. The book is organized into chapters describing the activities in the legislative, administrative, and judicial processes.

Like many before him, Katzmann notes the fragmentation of congressional policymaking. The first statutory recognition of the transportation problems of disabled persons was, Katzmann notes, initiated not by pressure from the prospective beneficiaries but by an individual member of Congress acting as a policy entrepreneur and adding rights-oriented language during the floor debate on a general mass-transit authorization bill. After the issue had become a highly visible struggle between transit-industry forces and disability-rights activists in the late seventies, the problem arose of different committees taking conflicting approaches to the same issue.

An even more striking example of congressional action without deliberation is Katzmann's finding that staff members retroactively created legislative history without the knowledge or approval of legislators. The committee report stating that regulations were to be written to implement the provision that came to be the linchpin of the rights-based claims to accessible transportation was drafted to accompany later amendments to the act, even though the original language made no reference to regulations and the amendments did not alter that language.

The administrative process was marked by competition between bureaucrats favoring the rights-based equal-access approach and those favoring the effective-mobility approach, whose relative power in policymaking was affected by shifting external pressure from Congress, the courts, and top administrative appointees. Both direct regulation and technology forcing were tried as means to increase accessible transportation. Katzmann finds that the rule-making process was hampered by bureaucrats' inability to trust the reliability of information presented by either side and their inability to conduct informal negotiations that might have been able to break through both sides' hardened public positions to find common ground. The technology-forcing strategy —inducing the industry to develop a new bus design that would be more accessible—failed because the commitment to it was not stable enough for long enough to convince the industry to make the significant investments required.

Katzmann's portrayal of the judicial process belies the image of activist federal courts reaching out to impose a policy agenda of their own. Some lower-court judges were, in Katzmann's eyes, "fooled" by the dubious legislative history into ordering the promulgation of regulations. Nevertheless, it was ultimately the courts that pulled the rug out from under the rights-based approach to accessible transit when the DC Court of Appeals struck down the more demanding rights-based regulations following a Supreme Court ruling that the law did not require affirmative action efforts. Ironically, the courts were less inclined toward a rights-based approach to the problem than were many legislators and bureaucrats.

Katzmann's most provocative conclusion is that accessible-transportation policy represents the end of rights-based interest-group politics and its replacement by politics dominated by cost and efficiency arguments. President Reagan ended the wavering between the equal-access and effective-mobility approaches in favor of the latter and imposed that view through tighter control of the regulatory process. The decline of rights-based appeals also reduced political unity within the disabled community by making it necessary for people whose disabilities required different types of accommodations to compete against each other for scarce resources rather than being able to support each others' "right" to have all their needs met.

While Katzmann's fine book is more about the policy process as a whole than about interest-group litigation, his analysis does not bode well for those who continue to view the courts as a vehicle for social change. On the other hand, there is little support in the book for those who argue that the other branches of government have greater institutional capacity for policymaking than courts. Katzmann concludes with several recommendations for procedural changes in the legislative, administrative, and judicial processes that might help avoid such a policy morass in the future.

SUSAN M. OLSON

*University of Utah*

**Voting Behavior.** Research in Micropolitics, vol. 1. Edited by Samuel Long (Greenwich, CT: JAI, 1986. x, 301p. $26.25).

This volume inaugurates the Research in Micropolitics series. Its nine chapters review research on voting and elections, primarily research conducted within the quantitative history and social-psychological paradigms.

The first two chapters were written, entirely or in part, by quantitative historians. Peter H. Argersinger and John W. Jeffries begin the volume by taking the long view and summarizing historical research on U.S. elections, especially investigations of "critical elections" that are argued to have established new party systems and realignments of popular partisan attachments. The authors point out that however useful studies of realignments/party systems may be in some respects, such work tends to be essentially "taxonomic and descriptive" and often devotes insufficient attention to devising and evaluating generalizable theories of the causes or consequences of political system change. The second chapter, by Jerome M. Clubb, William H. Flanigan, and Nancy H. Zingale, reviews how some scholars (including the chapter's authors) have sought to mitigate this deficiency by linking partisan realignments to the concept of "political generations." Given the volume's emphasis on empirical research, the review of the political-generations literature focuses almost exclusively on investigations of the New Deal realignment, the one for which the most data are available (except, perhaps, for the post-Vietnam realignment/dealighment).

The remaining seven contributions deal primarily with research on contemporary U.S. national elections and voting, with such titles as "Primaries and Nominations" (Thomas R. Marshall), "Electoral Campaigns" (Paul A. Smith), "Money and Elections" (Anne H. Bedlington and Lynda W. Powell), "Mass Media and Political Images in Elections" (Doris A. Graber), "Partisanship and Voting" (James E. Campbell, Mary Munroe, John R. Alford, and Bruce A. Campbell), "Economic Determinants of Voting" (M. Stephen Weatherford), and "Turnout in American National Elections" (John H. Aldrich and Dennis M. Simon).

The order in which I have listed the authors' contributions is one that seemed to me to be a natural one—proceeding chronologically from primaries through the campaign and into elections and their determinants. That progression, however, is virtually uncorrelated with the chapters' actual order of appearance in the book. And because the volume contains neither introductory nor concluding commentary by the editor, the reader is left to wonder what editorial logic governed its organization. While on this subject, the reader may also wonder why these particular nine themes—important though they are—were selected for inclusion while others that would seem essential to a debut volume on voting (e.g., ideology and mass belief systems or issue voting) were not.

What about the quality of the brief review chapters themselves—by what criteria should they be judged? In my opinion, each chapter should (1) demarcate the main themes around which research in a subfield may be organized —for example, substantive, methodological and paradigmatic themes; (2) identify and describe concisely the conclusions of the most significant pieces of research in the subfield; (3) provide a reasonably comprehensive bibliographic reference to other relevant work; (4) indicate major questions or controversies most in need of further investigation; and (5) suggest why research in the subfield being reviewed is worthwhile (or not).

By these standards, the chapters in *Voting Behavior* are of high quality, and a few are exceptionally good. As examples of the latter, the chapter by Weatherford does an admirable job of synthesizing the notoriously confusing and often seemingly contradictory literature on the connections between economics and voting, and the contribution by Campbell and company provides as complete a summary of the conceptual, methodological, and empirical issues surrounding the study of political partisanship as I have seen anywhere. On the other hand, the otherwise commendable chapter by Aldrich and Simon fails to consider essential studies of U.S. election turnout conducted from a comparative perspective. And the Marshall piece on primaries and nominations risks becoming instantly obsolete as a result of the latest research stemming from the year-long 1984 National Election Studies materials (by, among others, Larry Bartels and Henry Brady).

Taking a step back, I have one reservation about the proposed Research in Micropolitics series, and that is a nagging sense that we may be nearing a point where we spend too much time "reviewing" our own work and not enough time actually doing it. Consider that the APSA has already established an annual series of papers on the "state of the discipline" that covers many of the themes in the proposed series edited by Long, as does the monograph-length chapter by Donald R. Kinder and David O. Sears in the newest edition of the *Handbook of Social Psychology*. And a brochure accompanying my copy of *Voting Behavior* announces the publication of a new *Annual Review in Political Science* to be edited by (who else?) Samuel Long and to contain in volumes 1 and 2 chapters on (surprise!) political participation, generational politics, and electoral behavior. Should someone consider editing the *Deja Vu Review*?

GREGORY R. MARKUS

*University of Michigan*

**Homeward Bound: Explaining Changes in Congressional Behavior.** By Glenn N. Parker (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986. xxi, 206p. $22.95).

*Homeward Bound* represents the culmination of Glenn Parker's diligent research on the causes and consequences of congressmen's travel to their home states and districts. Specifically, he (1) documents the mid sixties' increase in the amount of *time* senators and representatives spent in their constituencies; (2) shows that these changes can be attributed to period and, in the House, cohort (generational-replacement) effects; (3) claims that members boosted their travel in order to solidify their electoral margins and thus gain leeway from their constituents; (4) demonstrates that the change in *home style* was facilitated by increases in travel allowances and accommodative changes in legislative scheduling; (5) infers that the availability of other "perks" led to the rise of other constituency-service activities; (6) empirically tests the hypothesis that increased *attentiveness* to constituents generated greater electoral margins for a narrowly defined group of incumbents; and (7) concludes with a discussion of other consequences of the change in home styles: greater individualism, a swing of power within the parties, increased freedom from party leadership, increased policy activity, more multiple-committee assignments, and a decline in policy representation.

Parker is more convincing when documenting the rise in travel home and analyzing its proximate causes than when dealing with his other arguments. Can we be confident that *time in district* is a good surrogate for *home style* or even *attentiveness*? Does the demonstration that increases in travel allowance preceded the growth in travel time prove incumbents' intentions? Does strenuous use of the perquisites of office actually increase incumbents' freedom? By how much? Not only is there a raging dispute over the electoral effects of constituency service, but much recent literature on policy voting by constituents suggests that voters seem to cue on the aggregate policy decisions of their senators and representatives. From which constituents do members seek freedom?

Some of the key theses of the book are not fully explored. While his data clearly show no impact of redistricting on travel, might they yield different results if separated into favorable and unfavorable redistricting? The demonstration in chapter 2 that previous electoral margin does not affect travel raises the question: would *changes* in recent election results matter?

In chapter 5, Parker reopens the "Case of the Vanishing Marginals," arguing that greater constituency attentiveness, as measured by time spent back home, leads to popularity, which in turn builds increased vote margins. By framing his hypothesis narrowly (focusing only on representatives who, entering Congress in the 1960s, won elections by narrow margins and were atypical of their districts and on northern Democratic senators in certain time periods), Parker is able to show that changes in travel had an electoral consequence. But surely the important question is whether attentiveness (home style, trips to the constituency, casework, use of office "perks," etc.) pays off in general and over time. (To his credit, Parker acknowledges in a footnote that nothing more general could be found.) Moreover, might there be other explanations for his limited finding? For example, might this small group of congressmen have changed their voting behavior, or might they represent states in which the underlying political climate was changing? Are there other activities, highly correlated with travel time, that might be at work? Why should *changes* in—rather than the absolute level of—travel be so important? Finally, why would increased attentiveness improve the images of all congressmen but produce votes only for marginal atypical members?

Given its bearing on important questions and its use of important data, the book is certainly worth reading. Its drawback is not necessarily that Parker is wrong; rather, he fails to explore alternative explanations for many of his findings and to provide data for and analyses of his speculations.

JOHN R. JOHANNES

*Marquette University*

**White House Operations: The Johnson Presidency.** By Emmette S. Redford and Richard T. McCulley (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986. xii, 274p. $30.00).

This is the fifth book in a series on the Administrative History of the Johnson Presidency in which there will eventually be 10 to 12 similar special studies and an overall volume. The series is directed by Emmette S. Redford and James E. Anderson. The books in the series are based primarily on documentary materials (files and oral histories) in the LBJ library and on interviews with participants in the Johnson presidency. The authors of this study state that their objective is to produce "an authentic and adequate historical record . . . presented from a social science perspective [that] will amplify knowledge of administrative processes and of the tasks and problems of the presidency" (p. ix). They succeed admirably in the accomplishment of their goal.

Redford and McCulley provide a comprehensive view of White House operations in the Johnson presidency. Their concept of administration encompasses organizational structuring, staffing, budgeting, policy development and implementation, and management. They examine in detail the abrupt transition from the Kennedy to the Johnson administration, staffing and structuring the presidency, Johnson's management style, the development of the legislative program and executive policy, direction of the executive branch, and representation of the president to other elements of the political system.

This is, however, far more than a narrow, highly idiosyncratic case study focusing on one aspect of a presidential administration. Redford and McCulley link the Johnson material to the large body of general presidential scholarship and to work that focuses on organizing and managing the presidency. Their study is theoretically relevant. They employ as an analytical framework two alternative models for studying the organizational presidency, institutionalization and personalization. Institutionalization focuses on structure and process and regards them as the product of internal and external influences, of which the president's management style and personality are but two. Personalization regards White House organization as primarily a reflection of presidential personality and style and interpersonal relations within the White House. Closely associated with the institutionalization and personalization models respectively, are distinctions between centralized and decentralized organizational structures and formal and informal proesses. Redford and McCulley argue, correctly I believe, that both institutional and personal factors impose constraints and create possibilities in organizing White House operations. Their analysis supports this position.

Redford and McCulley also make extensive use of the concept of the *subpresidency*, which they define as "all those who serve the president, on a continuing or an ad hoc basis, in an institutional capacity or otherwise in the exercise of his responsibilities" (p. 1). They further refine the concept by identifying a "triadic" subpresidency consisting of White House assistants, executive-office units, and departments and agencies. Members of the president's inner circle hold positions in the executive branch. Another book in this series, *Managing Macroeconomic Policy: The Johnson Presidency*, by James E. Anderson and Jared E. Hazleton, makes extensive use of the concept of an economic subpresidency.) The subpresidency concept should prove useful to students of presidency as there has been no term that quite as accurately characterizes the individuals who serve and influence the president.

The portrait of White House operations that emerges from the book is a highly personalized one. Johnson's drive for accomplishment, his involvement in virtually all policy areas, his insatiable thirst for information, and his enormous capacity for work "produced a highly individualized staff operation" (p. 184). The staff was "lean in size and heavily worked" (p. 182) and the "distinction between personal and institutional staff aid," which recent analysts of White House organization have stressed, all but disappeared. That distinction, Redford and McCully maintain, is far from absolute.

Presidential assistants who were heavily involved in core policy-related functions also performed representational tasks. The areas of activity that were most effectively performed were legislative program development and legislative liaison. This is hardly surprising given Johnson's ambitious domestic-policy goals. Much less effective was the coordination of executive-branch activities and press relations. Johnson lacked an explicit strategy for managing White House functions. Relations between the president and White House aides, executive-office units, and agencies were "responsive to the circumstances peculiar to [each major policy area]" (p. 185). The steady deterioration of relations with the media resulted from rising public disenchantment with Johnson's Vietnam policy and his overinvolvement in the details of press relationships. Redford and McCulley also maintain that Johnson's ability to demand and receive total loyalty to himself and his policies saved him from the problems of public dissension within his staff and aggrandizement of staff that has plagued later administrations.

With respect to structure, Redford and McCulley found that it evolved in response to the performance of three primary White House functions—management and legal services, the core activities of policy development and implementation, and representation of the president to external constituencies—and to the personal capabilities of staff aides. The structure was flat, there was no consistent pattern of decision making, and many advisers had access to the president. Redford and McCulley summarize Johnson's pattern of operations as "one of minimum hierarchy and loose integration that distributed counsel for the president through a triadic subpresidency composed of White House, executive offices, and departments and agencies. It exhibited definite features: multiple points of integration within the White House; fusion of personal and institutional aid in executive office directorships; habitual use of specialized, coordinative, and generalist service from the three divisions of the subpresidency; and special instances of policy decision and implementation. The constitutional and political responsibility heavily concentrated on him personally" (p. 200).

Although their analysis of the Johnson presidency provides more support for the personalization than the institutionalization models of presidential organization, Redford and McCulley make no claim for its primacy. They conclude that no future system for managing the White House will conform fully to either model nor will it be either fully centralized or decentralized. What their analysis strongly suggests is that personal factors—presidential goals, work habits, and decisional styles—and a triadic subpresidency that is constantly in flux will determine the pattern of White House operations in future administrations. This means that prescriptive studies of the management and organization of the presidency should be viewed with skepticism. What works for one president in circumstances peculiar to his presidency may not be appropriate for his successors.

To conclude, this is one of the most important studies of the Johnson presidency to date. However, its value extends beyond the immediate events, the personalities, and the organizational arrangements described and analyzed in it. It provides a useful synthesis and application of much recent thinking on the organization and management of the presidency and it reveals again how deeply personal is this most important political office in the democratic world. Finally, it is an exemplary demonstration of the use of presidential libraries as primary source materials for empirical research. The authors are to be commended for their efforts.

NORMAN C. THOMAS

*University of Cincinnati*

**To Run a Constitution: The Legitimacy of the Administrative State.** By John A. Rohr (Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas, 1986. xv, 272p. $24.95, cloth; $5.50, paper).

The power that administrative agencies exert in modern U.S. society has not always been regarded as being rightfully exercised. As John Rohr sees it, the bureaucracy's illegitimate status in the eyes of many citizens stems from the misapprehension that its characteristics and mode of operation do not conform to the expectations of the framers of the U.S. Constitution as to how the governmental system they designed should work.

The topic is certainly a timely one, in light of the fact that the Constitution's bicentennial is being celebrated this year along with the somewhat less visible event that the public-administration community is itself commemorating, the 100th anniversary of the publication of Woodrow Wilson's essay on the study of public administration in 1887. Rohr's choice of this topic reflects his belief that the widespread perception of bureaucracy as an illegitimate pretender to power has had an adverse effect upon its effectiveness today. He also raises the possibility that establishing the legitimacy of administration in the U.S. governmental scheme of things might deter misbehavior on the part of bureaucrats. A bureaucracy that can trace its ancestry to constitutional principles might be less inclined to abuse its power than one with no such legitimate parentage.

The book has an admirable clarity in its design. It should not be altogether surprising in view of Rohr's very evident affection for the Constitution that his analysis of the problem of bureaucratic legitimacy has a tripartite structure. Part 1 attempts to demonstrate the compatibility of a highly administered state with the intentions of the Constitution's framers. Part 2 examines the theoretical underpinnings of the administrative state as they emerged in the heyday of civil-service reform during the late nineteenth century through the work of such notables as Woodrow Wilson, Frank Goodnow, and Thomas M. Cooley.

According to Rohr, these late-nineteenth-century theorists were founding the administrative state in words. As compared to what it has since become, public administration at that time had only a very small presence on the U.S. scene. In part 3 Rohr shifts his attention to the New Dealers in the 1930s and analyzes the views of those who founded the administrative state "in deed" rather than words.

After examining all these sources, Rohr concludes that the power and presence of bureaucracy within the structure of modern U.S. government is compatible with original constitutional principles. As might be expected, some aspects of his argument are more convincing than others. Especially good are chapters 4 and 6. Chapter 4 presents a strong case for the striking proposition that bureaucracy heals a "defect in the constitution" by making the national government more representative of the population it serves than it would otherwise be. Rohr here turns the tables on those who would challenge bureaucratic power as being antidemocratic in character. Chapter 6 first articulates a theme that is to recur later in the book—that the powers exercised by the president and other officials flow not from their election but from the authority vested in them by the Constitution. Consider, by way of contrast, the current tendency of presidents and their White House staff to see elections as providing an all-purpose mandate legitimizing even the illegal use of power.

Less compelling is Rohr's attempt in chapter 3 to justify the role of higher civil servants in national policymaking by contending that it is analogous to the part that the framers of the Constitution initially (though not ultimately) intended the Senate to play in executive deliberations. Much of the argument covered in chapters 8 and 9 on the New Deal seems less to legitimize bureaucracy than legitimize an expansion of presidential power. Indeed the Brownlow report discussed in chapter 9 spawned a White House establishment that has since taken over functions that bureaucrats might legitimately be expected to perform. Rohr might also have given more attention to the role that its expertise has played in legitimating the power of U.S. bureaucracy—especially in the eyes of the courts.

But in overall impact this book makes a very substantial contribution to our understanding of the uneasy relationship—at least in theory—between the Constitution and bureaucracy over the course of U.S. political development. It invites comparison with other distinguished books in this area: James O. Freedman's *Crisis and Legitimacy* and Stephen Skowronek's *Building a New American State*. It is also a tribute to the work of Herbert Storing, whose student Rohr was and on whose insights he frequently draws in building his own analysis.

FRANCIS E. ROURKE

*Johns Hopkins University*

**Urban Policy Problems: Federal Policy and Institutional Change.** Edited by Mark S. Rosentraub (New York: Praeger, 1986. vi, 261p. $36.95).

This volume includes an editor's introduction and 10 chapters that focus on several current urban-policy issues from various disciplinary perspectives. The editor's introduction reviews the changes in U.S. presidential domestic priorities, and then discusses the impact of the Reagan administration's policies and symbolic messages on various U.S. institutions.

The book is organized into three sections. In part 1, "Domestic Policy and Policy Images," the three articles rely on quantitative analyses to examine fiscal issues. Robert C. Rodgers and Jeffrey D. Straussman test the assertion that municipal employee unions have contributed to cities' fiscal stress, as well as testing whether fiscal stress may have moderated union activity. Using data from the mid to late 1970s, the authors find little support for the contention that unionism and fiscal stress are significantly related. David R. Morgan and Robert E. England also examine the causes of fiscal stress by developing a model that includes both long-term socioeconomic factors and short-term political factors in sequential order.

Taking a different approach to the fiscal-stress issue, James C. Musselwhite, Jr. and Lester M. Salamon argue that in recommending social-welfare cuts, conservatives fail to recognize the key role state, local, and particularly voluntary agencies have had in implementing federal programs. Due to funding reductions under Reagan's New Federalism, the nonprofit sector has been pressured to provide more services with fewer resources. Since these agencies have responded by developing user fees for services, a fundamental equity issue arises: will services for the poor and disadvantaged be made available primarily to those who can pay for them?

Part 2, "Domestic Policy and Institutional Reactions," includes four areas that have been significantly affected by recent policy developments. Myrna R. Pickard summarizes the changes in health-care delivery as part of the effort to contain costs but fails adequately to address the book's themes. Patricia A. Huckle's chapter examines the institutionalization of equal-employment programs in Los Angeles, and suggests that the Reagan administration's efforts to weaken affirmative action are unlikely to be successful where local political pressure and bureaucratic support are strong. Lyke Thompson argues that planned economic-growth centers, primarily in the Sunbelt (e.g., Research Triangle Park, Dallas-Fort Worth Airport), concentrate resources in certain areas, but also drain resources from older areas. Mitchell L. Moss discusses the impact of the reorganization of the telecommunications industry on urban governments, particularly in economic development, municipal management, and land use.

Three views of how the academic disciplines should respond to changing urban policies and priorities are offered in part 3. In one of the most interesting pieces in this collection, Scott Cummings reviews how the fiscal crisis and the Reagan program have affected higher education by enhancing some disciplines at the expense of others. The author contends that social scientists will have to support the Reagan agenda if they wish to influence the policy process and survive in the university. In a related theme, Jeffrey I. Chapman, Gary J. Reid, and Donald R. Winkler focus on two areas where applied economists have made some intellectual strides in policy analysis (i.e., research on fiscal limitations and education) but have not always had much impact.

In the final chapter, Robert Warren offers some significant insights into the issues of efficiency and equity in urban-service delivery. He argues that when citizens' consumption and participation costs are considered as the total costs of delivering services, efficiency and equity can be understood as complementary values.

In general, this collection is a solid addition to the urban-policy literature. The authors attempt to assess the impact of policy changes, but not all of them focus on the effects of the Reagan administration's policies specifically. The failure of some to develop the themes of the editor is a common weakness in volumes of this nature. However, part of this problem could have been avoided if the editor had been more general in his treatment of urban-policy changes.

RUTH HOOGLAND DEHOOG

*University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill*

**Political Crisis/Fiscal Crisis: The Collapse and Revival of New York City.** By Martin Shefter (New York: Basic Books, 1985. 270p. $21.95).

Fiscal crisis reemerged as a compelling issue in urban politics in the 1970s. For the first time since the Great Depression, major U.S. cities teetered on the brink of financial collapse. The most spectacular—and most extensively examined—flirtation with fiscal disaster came in New York City in 1975, where municipal default was avoided only by massive state and federal intervention.

Previous studies have focused largely on the immediate antecedents to New York's fiscal crisis. They have attempted to explain financial collapse primarily in terms of the response of particular political leaders to contemporary economic and social changes in the nation's largest city. Martin Shefter's richly detailed treatment is far broader in scope and much more satisfying for students of urban politics. His analysis reaches back into the nineteenth century and covers the decade following the 1975 crisis. Shefter frames the issue squarely in political terms, with fiscal crisis illuminating "the boundaries within which the game of urban politics is played and the imperatives confronting the players in that game" (p. xii).

For Shefter, recurring municipal fiscal crises are the result of political crises, which in turn arise from the periodic inability of urban political regimes to meet the imperatives of maintaining electoral support, sustaining the local economy, preserving the municipality's credit, and moderating conflict. Complicating these primary political tasks is the city's lack of control over many of the key parameters that shape its political economy. Cities depend on state and national governments for legal authority and fiscal resources. They rely on private capital markets to borrow funds. And their prospects are critically affected by social and demographic changes, trends in the national and international economy, and developments in state and national politics.

Satisfying these imperatives within a changing set of external opportunities and constraints involve what Shefter terms a process of serial bargaining among key actors in the urban political system. Dominating this process until recently were machine politicians who bargained to adjust the demands of business interests, urban newcomers, and middle-class professionals. Breakdowns in this process led to political crisis and often fiscal crisis, resulting in the election of reform administrations. To regain power in the wake of crisis and reform, machine politicians made concessions that "altered both the balance of power among the leading political actors in the city and the structure of the political organizations and institutions through which political conflicts were conducted" (p. 29).

These concessions, in turn, strengthened other participants in city politics, leading to the development of a highly pluralistic system in the years after World War II. The inability of this regime to accommodate intensifying political demands and conflicts within the boundaries of the city's financial resources ultimately produced the fiscal crisis of 1975. Shefter details these developments most skillfully, covering an impressive range of topics but never losing sight of his central theoretical and analytical concerns. Especially effective are his treatments of the emergence of public employees as central political actors, the limited political influence of blacks and Hispanics despite their growing numbers, the role of professionals and experts in city politics, and the new political equilibrium achieved under the leadership of Mayor Koch in the decade following the 1975 crisis.

Throughout, Shefter concentrates heavily on political factors, illuminating brilliantly the importance of what goes on inside the "black box" of politics. In the process, however, developments such as suburbanization and demographic change within the city are given less detailed attention than they deserve, particularly in Shefter's assessment of future political developments in New York.

Although mindful of the limitations of a study of the nation's most complex urban polity, Shefter makes a persuasive case for his general conclusion that fiscal crisis is an integral aspect of the cyclical process of bargaining and adjustment and that "the way these crises are resolved establishes the boundaries and practices of political contestation in American cities in more normal times" (p. 225). The importance of these fiscal boundaries and practices for democratic politics are underscored by New York's experience. When solvency conflicted with democracy, local self-government was temporarily sacrificed.

Shefter has produced an outstanding contribution to the literature of urban politics that deserves wide attention. Few case studies, indeed, match Shefter's accomplishment in significantly enlarging our understanding of central issues in the governance of U.S. cities.

MICHAEL N. DANIELSON

*Princeton University*

**Enforcement or Negotiation: Constructing a Regulatory Bureaucracy.** By Neal Shover, Donald A. Clelland, and John Lynxwiler (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986. xi, 193p. $39.50, cloth; $12.95, paper).

This book examines the "early development and implementation of the federal program for regulation of surface mining (1977–1981)" in the United States. More broadly speaking, the book is concerned with regulation as a process and, relatedly, how a regulatory bureaucracy (the Office of Surface Mining in particular) is constructed. Although the subject matter deals with an important environmental issue, the theme of the book is not environmentalism. Environmentalists, however, would be well served by adding this volume to their collection, because it documents in considerable detail the issues, actions, and thinking of federal regulators in the Carter administration who were responsible for this controversial program.

Students of regulation are likely to find the book less informative and suggestive, especially from a theoretical perspective. The authors, who are sociologists, tell the reader that they rely on an array of state theories, "particularly those revolving around theses of the relative autonomy of the state and the role of the state managers" (p. x), to aid in understanding regulatory bureaucracy. Chapter 1 discusses various neo-Marxist theories (e.g., state-manager theory) and non-Marxist theories (e.g., special interest–pluralism theory) that the authors believe have relevance to understanding regulation in general and, when refashioned into a typology of regulatory style, to understanding the surface-mining regulatory experience in particular. The refashioning, however, requires employing concepts drawn from the policy-implementation literature (i.e., *implementation stages*) and the organizational literature (i.e., *loosely coupled*). The result is a typological scheme that permits an analysis both of the regulatory process and (in the case of coal surface mining) of why this adversarial and conflict ridden regulatory experience unfolded as it did.

Their typological scheme has two principal dimensions: (1) stages of the regulatory process defined in terms of statute formation, the bureaucratic process, rule making, regulations, and rule application, and (2) regulatory styles defined dichotomously as enforced compliance and negotiated compliance. This framework begets a set of characteristics associated with one style or the other (e.g., the regulatory process is rigid, precise, formal, and coercive with an enforced-compliance style, whereas it is flexible, vague, informal, and educational with a negotiated-compliance style).

This framework is rather simple and, unfortunately, adds little to our knowledge of regulation. Indeed, the authors' discussion of state theories in conjunction with their eclectic use of concepts drawn from the implementation and organizational literature leaves the reader with the feeling that there is really very little theory guiding their study. The authors should have been more candid in telling the reader that this book chronicles an interesting story and if read carefully, may provide useful insight into regulatory processes and experiences.

Students of public policy may find the book equally wanting. The authors cannot seem to decide whether or not the surface-mining regulatory experience, which they argue was enforced compliance in the Carter years, worked well or poorly. They draw on a wealth of original data (interviews, surveys of inspectors, inspection/enforcement statistics, and documents) to argue that enforced compliance did not work very well. Indeed, this style had a boomerang effect as movement toward a negotiated style had begun before the Carter administration was displaced by the Reagan administration. Surprisingly, then, the authors, following a critique of the surface-mining program in which a number of deficiencies are highlighted, conclude that enforced compliance was effective (p. 146). The authors cannot have it both ways, unless what the reader is seeing here are the ideological biases of the investigators.

The authors, who are citizens of a state (Tennessee) that has turned over its regulatory program to the federal government, seem to prefer the more direct, federal-centered approach in contrast to the more accommodative, state-centered approach. But the period they studied was not kind to the approach they prefer. The Office of Surface Mining, as is amply documented in their book, became just about everyone's favorite example of how things can go wrong when the federal government is too heavy-handed in state affairs.

Political scientists, particularly those who have an interest in intergovernmental relations and/or policy implementation, will have mixed feelings about this book. The interview-based material richly portrays the anxieties and fears that federal and state regulators often have in carrying out a complex intergovernmental program. A serious-minded intergovernmental student will be disappointed, however, with the generally scanty treatment of state-by-state behaviors. Rather, the authors place a much greater emphasis on East-West regional differences which, in this reviewer's judgement, is made far more important than it deserves to be. The policy implications the authors draw are also unlikely to spark much interest. Among the key implications, the authors claim that "flexible regulations are not necessarily bad regulations" (p. 145); that "discretion is a necessary and unavoidable component of an effective implementation program" (p. 146); and that "an effective regulatory program must be based on a recognition of political forces" (p. 143).

Two final points deserve comment. First, the book is somewhat uneven and disjointed in style, no doubt the result of multiple authorship and weak editing. Second, the print is unusually small thereby making the book more difficult to read than it should be.

DONALD C. MENZEL

*University of South Florida*

**Engineering Disability: Public Policy and Compensatory Technology.** By Sandra Tanenbaum (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986. 167p. $24.95).

The relationship between public policy and the diffusion of technology is explored by Sandra Tanenbaum in the context of compensatory devices to aid disabled persons. The book's two primary premises are that (1) disability is a loss of function that reduces mobility, employability, and other opportunities; and (2) governmental disability policy, in distributing compensation for losses associated with disability, redistributes loss itself. The impact of governmental policy on diffusion of compensating technology is explored and described within the context of the Boston Elbow, a prosthetic device used to aid persons with above-elbow amputations.

Tanenbaum describes traditional models used to explain the diffusion of technology—the "life-cycle" and "communications" models—and rejects them as inadequate for explaining the diffusion of rehabilitation technology. She offers, in their place, a "contextual framework" as a means to explain technological diffusion. The framework outlines the variety of alternatives that can be employed to compensate for losses in opportunities and abilities as the result of physical handicaps. The alternatives, whose applications are heavily influenced by public policy, include financial-support payments, modifications to the environment (e.g., installation of ramps), retraining, and prosthetic devices. The framework is used to explain the diffusion of the Boston Elbow technology to various groups, including disabled veterans, workers, citizens, and privately insured persons.

Tanenbaum's descriptions of technological diffusion of the Boston Elbow make it clear that the application of technology to diminish the impact of physical disability is *not* simply a match between professional diagnosis and technology at hand. Instead, the relationship between the two is mediated by the influence of public policies, governmental institutions, and political processes. As one example, the author explains that diffusion of the Boston Elbow to veterans has been mitigated by (1) the array of compensation policies offered by the federal and state governments (e.g., cash benefits, retraining, prosthetic devices), (2) the preference of many in the Veterans Administration for a different prosthesis developed by the VA itself, and (3) the persistent pressure from interest groups representing disabled veterans for cash benefits as the primary mode of compensation for physical disability.

The real strength of the book is in documenting the multitude of ways in which public policies—including rehabilitation, welfare, and income-support programs—affect decisions about the diffusion and application of technology. It is clear from Tanenbaum's analysis that *who* receives the Boston Elbow is the complex result of many factors including the implementation of governmental rehabilitation policies and varied political pressures exerted by the disabled community.

In some respects the book might have been stronger. The framework offered by the author is a simple decision tree of the alternative responses that can be made to diagnosed disability. It does not directly establish a clear set of hypotheses relating various public policies to strategies for technological diffusion. Discussions in the book focus more on the development and application of rehabilitation technology than on how public policies were devised and how they are implemented so as to affect the diffusion of compensating technology. And, although it seems warranted, no systematic *evaluation* of rehabilitation policy and its impact on technology diffusion is offered.

Overall, readers of this book will gain important insights into the mediating influence of public policies on the distribution of technological compensations to physical disability. The findings of the book suggested that further research on this topic is warranted, both within the context of rehabilitation technology and in other areas of technological innovations.

STEPHEN L. PERCY

*University of Virginia*

**Between Citizen and City: Neighborhood Organizations and Urban Politics in Cincinnati.** By John Clayton Thomas (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1986. xii, 196p. $25.00).

The literature on neighborhood organizations can in some ways be likened to the neighborhood movement itself: both evidence much enthusiasm while marching on spindly legs. Most of those writing about neighborhood organizations have been partisans. Those associated with the political Left have portrayed neighborhood organizations, especially those in low-income and minority communities, as building blocks to a broader movement to challenge existing political and economic institutions. More recently, some on the political Right have celebrated neighborhood organizations as a self-help vehicle that may help wean needy communities from their dependence on expanding governmental aid. Regardless of ideological bent, these authors have tended to build their case on anecdote, not analysis.

This book joins a rather select cadre of serious, empirically based, assessments of neighborhood organizations. Thomas has studied more than 40 community councils in Cincinnati. These community councils, most of which were born in the years between 1956 and 1980, operate in all parts of the city and have come to play a relatively well defined role in certain types of municipal decision making. Using various data sources, including a survey of over two thousand residents and interviews with 44 neighborhood leaders, he attempts to come to grips with such questions as: What factors account for the emergence of these organizations? Are these organizations more likely to form, or to take more sophisticated shapes, in affluent areas of the city? Do these organizations emerge and operate as alternatives to government, challenges to government, or extensions of government? And do they have a demonstrable influence on urban policies?

His answers are interesting. Thomas—like others—finds that affluence is important to understanding the emergence and institutional development of community-based organizations, but he documents, more convincingly than any other analysis that comes to my mind, the considerable role of additional factors not directly associated with socioeconomic class. One such factor has to do with residents' stake in the neighborhood. In predominantly white neighborhoods, the importance of stake is revealed in the strong association between homeownership and organization, and in the tendency of organizations to form in neighborhoods confronting the perceived threat of racial change. In black neighborhoods the role of stake is tied to ownership and residents' reliance on neighborhood-level services. In addition to residents' stake in the neighborhood, Thomas finds that federal war-on-poverty programs, as well as some more contemporary efforts by private foundations, have played a major role in stimulating organizational development in neighborhoods lacking in indigenous resources.

Thomas is sympathetic—but not blindly so—to the organizations he studies. He recognizes that neighborhood organizations might threaten a city's interest by aggressively defending parochial or racially exclusionary concerns, but his reading of the Cincinnati evidence suggests that the community councils have played a generally constructive role. And he recognizes that the institutionalization of the neighborhood movement that seems to have occurred in Cincinnati potentially could co-opt neighborhood leaders, deflecting grassroots energies into symbolic or administratively burdensome undertakings, but he presents evidence that the gains of these organizations are substantial, particularly when it comes to influencing the city's distribution of discretionary funds.

In light of the fact that he considers Cincinnati a leader in the neighborhood movement, Thomas should have speculated a bit more thoughtfully about the differences that might be encountered in cities marked by sharper conflicts and histories of confrontation among neighborhoods, elected officials, and administrators. In the cities with which I am most familiar, it is not quite so easy to identify existing neighborhood organizations and neatly assign them to communities. As often as not, there are competing organizations, anchored in distinct constituencies and revealing different organizational structures and political styles. The tidiness of the Cincinnati situation surprises me a bit, and I wonder whether some messier realities may have been overlooked or underplayed. Finally, while Thomas acknowledges the possibility that federal policies of the 1980s might deflate the neighborhood movement a bit, one could build out of his own data and findings a case for a substantially more pessimistic outlook.

JEFFREY R. HENIG

*George Washington University*

**The Attorney General's Commission on Pornography, Final Report.** 2 vols. By the U.S. Department of Justice (Washington: GPO, 1986. 1,960p. $35.00, paper).

Sexually explicit themes and imagery that arouse, attract, frighten, or offend are at least as old as civilization itself. It is instructive that no society has ever been completely "free" about sexual communication and representation and equally instructive that liberal societies, freer than most, have almost always had continuing pornography controversies. Now, for the second time in sixteen years, an ad hoc federal commission has studied the problem and reported. (During the same period, similar bodies have done so in Britain, Canada, and several other Western states.) If rising public concern and rapid changes in communications technology, distributive capacity, and marketing patterns are criteria, the attention is appropriate. The present U.S. generation is probably the most communicated with and pornographically bombarded in history. What the advantages and hazards of this may be, whether the hazards are at all related to crime and other social pathology, and how, where, and when the "new" pornography should be controlled, are enormously complex questions, clearly worth asking though not at all easily answered either in social science or in public policy.

In spite of the libertarian censure and generally unflattering press the attorney general's Commission received for its post-publication activist antics, the two-volume report itself is calm in tone, measured in most of its conclusions, and generally sensitive to First Amendment concerns and the diversity of values in the country. Unfortunately and perhaps inevitably, the aspect of the report receiving most attention upon publication was its finding of a causal relationship between exposure to sexually violent representation and sexual crimes and other aggressive behavior towards women. The determination was based on the commission's analysis of existing experimental, clinical, and survey studies and on anecdotal data presented at its hearings. Unlike the 1970 Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, which reached substantially the opposite conclusion, the contemporary body was severely restricted in both time (a one-year life) and budget (a mere five hundred thousand dollars) to commission new work. Most of the existing research, however, as not designed to evaluate the possibility of a causal link between pornography and sexual crime, and the commission's reading of it is somewhat selective and often not unfree of the familiar error of interpreting correlation as causation. The studies are in fact inconclusive, often contradictory and, for the most part, lacking standardization in categories of analysis, types of stimulus material, and measurement of "effects." This has not stopped partisans on both sides of the pornography issue from seeking support from scientific investigation of effects; conclusive proof of harm or of harmlessness would presumably be the decisive hammer on the anvil of public policy. But social and psychological reality are not cooperative here. Paraphilic behavior is multicausal and complex, and even under ideal conditions of inquiry, it would be difficult to isolate pornography sufficiently to demonstrate its harmful or unharmful effects conclusively (or perhaps even tentatively). Moreover, the psychodynamics of human sexuality may be such that proof of harm would not make pornography much less attractive or compelling for those who find it so, or would proof of harmlessness make it much less offensive or disturbing for those who find it to be that.

Fortunately, most of the report is on sounder ground and makes important contributions to our understanding of the contemporary pornography explosion and aspects of its social control. Its analysis of the immensely profitable pornography industry, the latter's production, distribution, and marketing patterns, and the role played by new communications technology is detailed, and what is revealed may surprise those who have not been paying close attention to these developments. The same may be said for the probing of links to organized crime. Special attention is given to "child pornography," the very production of which almost always involves child abuse, in both a clinical and a legal sense. Its fourfold categorizing of explicit sexual theme and imagery—violent, nonviolent but degrading, nonviolent and nondegrading, and simple nudity—recognizes the complexity of the contemporary genre and offers considerable analytic utility in the study of effects as well as in possible policy discrimination.

In urging tighter controls, the report reaches a governing conclusion exactly opposite that of the 1970 commission, which was firmly in the hands of constitutional and media libertarians and faced a much different communications environment and a less widely distributed and somewhat less explicit pornography. The report offers 92 specific recommendations, including 49 on child pornography. Included are those for more vigorous prosecution under existing federal and state anti-obscenity laws, coordinated use of tax, business, and public-health laws that are often violated by proprietary intersts, a higher priority for pornography on prosecutorial agendas through larger and earmarked budgets and additional personnel, special training for prosecutors, who are often overmatched in court, and stiffer penalties for offenders, including mandatory sentences for second and subsequent convictions. New federal and state law is recommended to allow for forfeiture of any proceeds involved in the violation of anti-obscenity laws. New federal legislation and Federal Communications Commission regulation is recommended to bar the transmission of obscene communication by telephone or by cable or satellite television. State legislatures are urged to enact racketeer-influenced corrupt organizations (RICO) laws that have obscenity trafficking as a predicate act. The discussion of the social control of pornography through law and law enforcement is probably the most systematic and sophisticated we have to date.

Paradoxically, no change is recommended in the current legal doctrine of obscenity. One can well understand a reluctance to enter that formulaic labyrinth, yet the Supreme Court's work has been one of the major shaping forces of the present communications environment that the commission indicts and is the chief reason why prosecutorial control is so often moribund.

The report recognizes both the limits of law enforcement and the political and moral role that popular values and preferences inevitably play in underwriting formal rules and in filling the interstices of social control in democratic systems. Where citizens find sexually explicit materials to be offensive or believe them to be harmful, they are urged to exercise their own First Amendment rights to study, complain, lobby, lawfully boycott, directly protest and, above all, persuade. At the same time, the report cautions against "extreme or legally unsound positions or actions" (p. 1319) and urges recognition of the rights of those with opposing views. The line dividing healthy collective private action, pressure, and value articulation from coercive social conformity is often a thin one in liberal democracy, and, generally, the report treads it carefully.

Pornography probably defies any final social solution, libertarian or censorial, just as it may defy a conclusive psychological one for many, if not most, individuals. Management of the problem through public policy requires a balancing of both popular and libertarian values. In its broad though selective inquiry, the present report makes a plea for somewhat greater control in a superpermissive communications environment undergoing radical technological change. Thoughtful libertarians will find little that is reactionary in that.

RICHARD S. RANDALL

*New York University*

**Congress and Policy Change.** Edited by Gerald C. Wright, Jr., Leroy N. Rieselbach, and Lawrence C. Dodd (New York: Agathon, 1986. xii, 292p. $32.00, cloth; $15.00, paper).

With all the research and writing on the behavior of individual legislators and the intricacies of legislative structures, it often seems that policy consequences do not get adequate attention. What difference does it make whether or not, for example, members of Congress are fixated upon reelection, or whether their careers are long or short? What is the result of "subcommittee government" upon policy generation? And how can the admittedly momentous Capitol Hill innovations of the 1960s and 1970s be incorporated into a convincing theory of legislative change?

This collection of papers addresses the problem of linking individual lawmakers' behaviors, institutional dynamics, and policy outcomes. Many of the contributors are associated with Indiana University, and these papers were first presented at a 1983 conference held there (though the title page affiliates the coeditors with a nonexistent "University of Indiana.") The result is a happy mix of studies, approaches, and levels of analysis. The contributions range from theoretical frameworks (Dodd's opening essay on cyclical change of Congress and Rieselbach's closing survey of the state of research) to elaborate descriptive surveys (David Brady on electoral realignments, Wright on House elections, Barbara Sinclair on party leadership, and Roberta Herzberg on procedures). There are even some instructive case studies of policies (Edward Carmines and James Stimson on civil rights and John Ferejohn on food-stamp legislation, a textbook example of the logroll).

One virtue of the collection is its sensitivity to what I have called elsewhere the "two-Congresses" problem—complex interaction between individual and institutional forces. This problem is reflected in two interesting essays—by Richard Fenno and Roberta Herzberg—that explore learning on the part of individual senators and representatives.

In making policy, Congress is an active shaper of agendas and outcomes, not merely a reactor to external or internal stimuli. In civil rights, for example, Carmines and Stimson find Congress leading, rather than following, the public mood—an intriguing finding that stands on its head the classic 1958 formulation of Miller and Stokes.

The difficulty of linking elections to policies is that most elections are local in content and "ordinary" rather than realigning in their results. Nonrealigning elections, as in 1946, 1958, 1964, and 1974, can produce substantial policy shifts. And apart from the actual returns, how elections are reported or interpreted can alter the policy agenda, as happened in 1980 and again in 1986. The papers of Wright and of Carmines and Stimson, especially, cast light on this complex linkage between electoral results and policy outcomes.

In his useful summary, Rieselbach lays out the parameters and identifies gaps in the cumulative body of research. More attention needs to be paid to the relationships between external actors and forces on the one hand and such internal actors as leaders on the other. Also required is study of the role of public opinion or "national mood" (p. 270). We also need, as Rieselbach observes (p. 282), more probes of specific policies, preferably in some quantifiable or at least comparative fashion. My own studies of legislative "productivity" over time suggest contours that would further complicate, and perhaps illuminate, the processes of change discussed in this volume. While different analysts would doubtless emphasize things somewhat differently, the research strategy embodied in this volume—that of commissioning experts to reconsider their subject matter in light of a given dependent variable (in this case, policy change)—is extremely valuable.

ROGER H. DAVIDSON

*Congressional Research Service*

## COMPARATIVE POLITICS

**Race and Politics: Ethnic Minorities and the British Political System.** By Muhammad Anwar (London: Tavistock, 1986. x, 182p. $39.95).

**Ideologies and Institutions in Urban France: The Representation of Immigrants.** By R. D. Grillo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. xv, 328p. $44.50).

The volumes under consideration employ the diverse disciplinary perspectives of political sociology and cultural anthropology to investigate the integration of immigrants in two Western capitalist nations. The first charts the progress of New Commonwealth and Pakistani immigrants in exercising the rights of British citizenship they formally enjoy. The second identifies the ideological processes involved as immigrants without citizenship interact with the dense institutional networks of French society.

As head of research for the Commission for Racial Equality, Anwar has followed ethnic politics in Britain closely and is responsible for initiating a number of the most helpful studies he summarizes. His presentation is comprehensive, lucid, and despite the obvious sympathies of the author, remarkably balanced and dispassionate. He demonstrates that although minorities make up only about 4.2% of the British population, their impact on politics is much greater than numbers alone would indicate. Anwar estimates, for example, that the ethnic vote significantly affected the outcomes in 85 (out of 600) constituencies in the February 1974 election as a result of the combination of residential concentration and the marginality of the seats. Minorities, he shows, are slightly less likely than whites to register to vote (78% compared to 81%), but the gap appears to be closing. There are no national figures on ethnic turnout, but studies of selected constituencies show that Asians have a consistently higher turnout rate than non-Asians, though one must take into account the socioeconomic characteristics of whites living in constituencies of high ethnic concentration. Minorities vote for Labour in overwhelming numbers—usually around 75%. Anwar's book is especially valuable for its detailed account of the fate of ethnic-minority candidates (none has yet won a parliamentary seat) and its treatment of the policies of the parties toward immigration and their own immigrant members.

The chief criticism I would offer of *Race and Politics* is that it fails to address the issue of the real or potential costs to the major parties of supporting immigrant causes. The author is eager to point out the benefit parties (especially Labour) derive from the ethnic vote, but his chapter on the antiimmigrant movement deals exclusively with the National Front, which he tends to discount, and skirts the specific question of whether there has been a significant defection of antiimmigrant voters from the Labour to the Conservative party. This is part of a more general reluctance to consider how tensions over immigration may have affected the ideological context of British politics.

Grillo's absorbing study employs anthropological field methods to invetigate the integration of immigrants in the highly industrialized setting of Lyon, France. He departs from normal practice by taking as the primary subject of his study the society of immigration rather than the immigrants themselves. This leads him to systematic observation of those institutions, mostly created and run by native French, that receive, process, serve, and manage immigrants: the housing system, the schools, adult language centers, the social services, and the workplace. Notably sparse in his text, however, is discussion of the police or immigration authorities proper. Whereas Anwar may be accused of treating the integration of immigrants as an unquestioned good blocked only by the pigheadedness and occasional venality of white Britons, Grillo subtly elucidates the controversial and ambiguous meanings of the very ideas *immigrants* and *integration* and the deep ambivalence both immigrants and French exhibit toward them.

If nothing else, the book would be valuable as a virtual treasure trove of judicious observation and analysis of the daily experiences of immigrants with the institutions of the receiving society and of the behavior of street-level bureaucrats toward their clients. But the book is more than that. It sensitizes the reader to the political implications of the categories and theories employed by ordinary French persons when they think about immigrants. The most compelling section of the book is a trenchant discussion of the two modes of discourse implicit in choosing to talk about *immigrants* (*immigrés*) as opposed to *foreigners* (*étrangers*). The book as a whole produces a heightened appreciation of the complex and problematic nature of any conception of immigrant interests and the consequent difficulty of designing policies to respond to those interests. Grillo uncovers the tensions built into such seemingly innocuous and simple objectives as teaching French, or providing adequate housing and social services. These tensions arise as much out of the incompatibility of the values and goals of particular segments within the immigrant population as they do out of conflict between immigrants and their French hosts. This more or less ensures that the policies will fail, according to someone's criteria, no matter how much good will or technical and financial resources are invested in them.

Setting the British and French cases side by side, one is led to ask how important the presence or absence of citizenship is to the status of the immigrant groups included in the studies. Citizenship, one might assume, should eliminate some of the uncertainty among the host populations as to the intentions and likely role of immigrants. In fact, citizenship does not put an end to the political struggle over the terms with which immigration is discussed. The subtitle of Anwar's book provides the clue: he prefers to write of *ethnic minorities,* while most Britons continue to speak of *immigrants.*

GARY P. FREEMAN

*University of Texas, Austin*

---

**The Qashqa'i of Iran.** By Lois Beck (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986. xvi, 384p. $30.00).

**The Elementary Structures of Political Life: Rural Development in Pahlavi Iran.** By Grace Goodell (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. vii, 362p. $45.00).

Rural Iran is a rich subject of inquiry for all social scientists. It is an area of varied cultural settings, diverse forms of economic and social organization, and differing political significance. Although the rural society has rarely set the tone for national politics in Iran, it has always been of critical importance in accepting, modifying, or rejecting central-government dictates. The two books considered here are major attempts by two fine anthropologists to understand the complexities of Iranian rural life.

Beck's book is about the major tribal confederation of the Qashqa'is in southern Fars province, Iran, with an estimated membership of three to four hundred thousand. It reviews the Qashqa'is' origin, history, social organization, and their complex relationship with the Iranian state. Goodell's book is about a traditional village and a model "rural" town in the southern Khuzestan province. It is an in-depth microanalysis of these two communities and their relationships with the national political authority during the reign of the last Pahlavi monarch. Both books are based on extensive field research and varying degrees of participant observation. They also benefit from the respective authors' broad knowledge of Iranian culture and history. They have a lot to say to political scientists interested in the interaction between rural society and national government in Third World countries.

Beck begins with a long historical account of the Qashqa'i confederation using many rich and varied historical sources. This is perhaps the first comprehensive history of the Qashqa'is in a Western language. The account begins with the initial formation of the tribe in the eighteenth century and its expansion and absorption of various elements, and proceeds to deal with the confederation's role vis à vis both domestic dynasties and foreign governments with a foothold in Iran. The bulk of the historical material concerns the Pahlavi period. The book, however, ends with a detailed discussion of the Qashqa'is plight under the Islamic republic. Throughout the book and in well-organized special sections, we are provided with a highly useful analysis of the confederation's social organization, economy, customs and mores, geneology, and economic and political life. In short, this is an exceptionally rich source that sheds light on all aspects of this major tribal confederation in Iran.

Goodell begins with a description of the Dez irrigation project, which envisaged making use of waters of three major local rivers for purposes of development of the Khuzestan basin. She describes how the idea of Dez development was initiated by David Lilienthal, the architect of the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the Iranian government as a way to tap the resources of the province. The project was to be a showpiece of the shah's program to transform and even revolutionize rural Iran into something modern. Goodell then devotes several chapters describing a traditional village in an area untouched by the project. These chapters give detailed accounts of the village's corporate life, touching on its personal, socioeconomic, and political aspects. She then applies a similar overreaching framework to analyze life in one of the modern towns built by the project planners. She concludes with a long chapter that compares and contrasts the two localities and evaluates their respective place in Iranian rural life. More importantly, the chapter makes many bold attempts to discuss agriculture and rural life in Iran in comparison to the European and Japanese models. Her final and clear conclusion is that the Dez irrigation project was a colossal error.

Beck and Goodell strongly identify with the populations they study. Beck's point of reference is often how certain historical and political developments have affected, favorably or adversely, the Qashqa'is. One sometimes gets the impression that whatever is good for the Qashqa'is is also good for the country as a whole. While this may or may not be true, it tends to color the author's analysis, particularly when she discusses the Qashqa'is' relationship with the state.

Goodell's identificataion with her village is exceptionally strong. She portrays a highly successful corporate village where the values of "moral economy" predominate. Everything seems to work in the village in spite of poverty or other problems. She laments the destruction of the corporate village through the Dez or similar ill-conceived projects. Goodell's final chapter and her discussion of how hierarchy and authority can develop in a manner responsive to the base of society, are controversial. Even though one may not agree with everything that Goodell says, it is clear that she is dealing with an important subject in a very interesting manner.

Beck and Goodell have given us two valuable books on rural Iran filled with detailed information and sound analysis. They deserve credit for their successful and scholarly undertakings.

FARHAD KAZEMI

*New York University*

**Communism and Development.** By Robert Bideleux (New York: Methuen & Co., 1985. x, 315p. $39.95).

Classical Marxism identified the goal of communist revolution with the rise of the urban-based industrial working class and assumed its achievement would be possible only after lengthy capitalist development brings an advanced level of industrialization, urbanization, and technological sophistication. Yet, by an irony of history, Communist parties have thus far come to power by their own efforts only in countries still seriously underdeveloped or semideveloped, where the largest social class has been neither *proletariat* nor *bourgeoisie* but rather the tradition-bound peasantry. Communist regimes have found themselves in the theoretically anomalous position of creating the "objective" developmental preconditions for their own existence. The book under review represents an attempt both to describe the main outlines of the developmental strategies undertaken or debated in the various Communist countries and to reappraise the concrete historical consequences of these strategies from a radical Socialist (but non-Marxist-Leninist) perspective. In this analysis, the author's key variable is the political-economic role assigned to the rural sector in the various developmental strategies.

The author details at length and vehemently condemns both the theory and the practice of the widely applied Stalinist and neo-Stalinist strategies of forced-pace industrialization and coercive rural collectivization, with their fetishistic emphasis on the development of urban-based producer-goods industries at the cost of impoverishing the rural economy and suppressing the living standards of the population generally. He argues that in addition to fostering unconscionable wastage of resources, forced industrialization has inevitably made a mockery of Socialist values by entrenching new forms of socioeconomic inequality and political hierarchy and by giving free rein to both corruption and the terroristic abuse of power.

The author does not wish merely to recapitulate the familiar thesis that the human and economic costs of Soviet-style developmental policies have been exceedingly high wherever they have been employed. He wants to convince us that there were (and are) workable alternative approaches to Socialist development for mainly agricultural societies that would be *both* more economically efficient *and* more consistent with attaining the egalitarian, communitarian, and democratic ideals of classical Socialist thought. Consequently, much of the book consists of a near-encyclopedic survey and reevaluation of arguments in favor of an historical miscellany of certifiably Socialist (if sometimes obscure) alternatives to the dominant Stalinist approach.

At the level of theory, primary attention is given to two traditions: (1) decentralized "village communism" as variously elaborated by Herzen, Kropotkin, Chayanov, Gandhi and (perhaps) the elderly Marx; and (2) "market socialism," as represented in the ideas of Proudhon, Bukharin, Lange, Sik and many of the Yugoslav theoreticians. In analyzing the historical experience of actually existing socialisms, the author ranges widely indeed, offering a running commentary on the evolution of Socialist rural-development policies in the USSR, China, Yugoslavia, Poland, Vietnam, North Korea, Hungary, Cuba, and Mongolia, with frequent allusions to the experiences of rural development in such capitalist or mixed economies as those of South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Denmark, Ireland, Tanzania, and India.

The author is up against some familiar but major methodological problems, because his goal is to demonstrate the practical superiority of one or more "ideal-type" systems whose total configurations have never (yet) been closely approximated in practice over a set of Stalinist institutions and policies that are unfortunately all too historically real. It is an inherently speculative enterprise at best, and this particular effort unfortunately cannot be recommended on the basis of any special analytical rigor in its approach, which is both discursive and eclectic. Specialists with expertise on particular countries or thinkers will notice inadequacies in certain details. Nevertheless, the book is lively and at times extremely thought-provoking, while displaying considerable ingenuity in marshalling secondary source materials with a bearing on its larger comparative themes.

PAUL M. JOHNSON

*Florida State University*

**Crisis in the Philippines: The Marcos Years and Beyond.** Edited by John Bresnan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986. 284p. $30.00, cloth; $10.95, paper).

The assassination of Benigno Aquino provoked the Asia Society to commission this book. The collection went to press shortly after Benigno's wife, Corazon, became president of the Philippines, ending 20 years of the Marcos government. What happened in the Philippines during and because of the Marcos government are questions that have been addressed many times before. The usual answers are by now familiar to those who read regularly about the country's national politics and economy. Someday deeper analyses that penetrate and inspire will appear, but today is not that day.

Favorable examples of the usual accounts constitute six of the chapters in this book. They are informative reading for anyone who wants to become acquainted with this subject. Lela Noble's "Politics in the Marcos Era" is a factual chronology that begins with Marcos's first term as president (1966–1969) and ends with his demise in 1986. She touches on all the accepted high points, such as problems of governance preceding and leading up to Marcos's declaration of martial law in 1972, many people's high hopes and Marcos's big promises during the first three or four years of his "constitutional authoritarian" rule, and the economic and political decline in the late 1970s leading to numerous disasters between 1981 and 1985, the rise of opposition groups, and the growth of armed rebellion.

Subsequent essays elaborate on major events and problems. Carl Lande concentrates on legal and illegal organizations that opposed the government and its policies. Carolina Hernandez emphasizes the destruction of governing institutions and government credibility during the Marcos years. She also reports on steps President Aquino and other prominent persons are taking to reconstitute democratic political procedures. How the U.S. government began to be disillusioned with Marcos is the main subject of the chapter by William Barnds.

Two economists, Bernardo Villegas and Jesus Estanislao, separately explain the economic crisis facing the new government. Both say that one important cause was excessive government intervention in the economy. That predated Marcos but was taken to extremes during his one-man rule. A second cause on which they agree was an overemphasis on import substitution and high protective tariffs. Again, these began before Marcos but were not reversed. Their recommendations for recovery include, logically enough, reduced government interference in the market, expansion of export-oriented manufacturing, and lower tariffs and other ways of opening the Philippines to the world market.

The remaining three chapters will be useful for those trying to understand deeper forces influencing Philippine society. Coauthors Ricardo Abad and Wilfredo Arce argue that central to the problems in the Philippines—

Marcos or no Marcos—is the gaping inequality. This will continue to block progress and fuel unrest so long as the rich and powerful minority insists on having all that it now has, surrendering nothing, and so long as the government, knowingly or not, fails to do anything against such a stance or anything substantial to assist the poor and weak majority to bring fundamental changes.

The roots of this inequality, as suggested in the chapters by Theodore Friend and David Steinberg, lie in an ideology that lauds ostentatious consumption and wealth. Earlier colonial rule, and now neocolonialism in the form of ties to and influences from the U.S., have helped to perpetuate this orientation and the wealthy minority's power. Friend worries that the "illusion of American omnipotence and the reality of Philippine oppression could fuse" in a Philippine civil war. "Because of the major American bases there, a creeping [U.S.] involvement in a deteriorating situation is imaginable, and could turn into a nightmare."

BENEDICT J. TRIA KERKVLIET

*University of Hawaii*

**Apprentice Revolutionaries: The Communist Movement in Laos, 1930–1985.** By MacAlister Brown and Joseph J. Zasloff (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1986. xiv, 463p. $13.95).

This, the eleventh volume in the Hoover Institution series, Histories of Ruling Communist Parties, is Zasloff and Brown's third book on Laos and Indochina. Part 1 traces the rise of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) to power in 1975; part 2 describes the leadership, institutions, policies, and external relations of the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDP). Though focused on the Communists, the book includes enough material on other actors to serve as a concise political history of modern Laos. Thorough research, scholarly detachment, clear writing and nearly a hundred pages of appendices make this book a valuable basic source on what may be the world's most forgotten revolution.

The principal task Brown and Zasloff set for themselves was to review the special relationship between the Lao and Vietnamese Communist movements from the founding of the Indochinese Communist Party in 1930 to the present. This focus causes the authors to pose such main questions as why the Lao Communists were much more submissive "apprentices" than their Khmer Rouge counterparts, how the LPRP conducted its revolutionary struggle against the Royal Lao Government, how the seizure of power differed from that which occurred in Vietnam and Cambodia, whether the Vietnamese harbor a design to create an Indochina Federation, and whether development policies based on Marxist-Leninist doctrine can be viable in this extremely poor small country.

In answering these questions, the authors stress four "decisive elements" in the evolution of the LPRP. The first of these was the emergence of Lao *nationalism* in response to the Japanese occupation during the Second World War and expulsion of the French colonial administration in 1945. The elite nationalists who seized this opportunity to rid themselves of the French quickly found that their survival depended on allying with the Vietnamese Communists. Thus, nationalism drove the first generation of Vietnamese. The second important element was Laos's *ethnic diversity*. Although few nonethnic Lao were to attain leadership positions in the party, the Lao Communist movement successfully rooted itself among the border-straddling minorities of the eastern mountain villages. This experience imprinted the Communist leadership with a distinctive outlook and helped to consolidate ties with the Communists in Vietnam.

The third element has been the constant presence of *Vietnamese advisers*, training, economic aid, and military operations on Lao soil. Dependence on the Vietnamese has constricted LPRP foreign-policy options to those approved by Hanoi, causing Laos to suffer uneasy relations with Thailand, hostile relations with China, and the loss of U.S. aid. However, the authors speculate that the LPRP leadership is so thoroughly accustomed to collaboration with the Vietnamese that it can scarcely conceive of loosening ties to Hanoi, and Hanoi in turn neither needs nor wishes to formalize its dominance in a federation. Last, the authors argue that the *low level of economic development* actually benefitted the LPRP in wartime. The lavish U.S. effort overwhelmed existing economic and social relationships, supplying the party with issues around which to mobilize a dislocated and resentful population. But the peacetime "Socialist transformation" of a society that never had serious problems of landlordism or land shortage has alienated the support of a people still largely dependent on family-based subsistence agriculture.

The book's principal shortcoming is an effect of its strength. Primarily an internal history of the party, it makes no pretense to profound analysis of the interaction between the party and its social environment. Thus the authors maintain that the classical Asian Communist themes of anticolonialism and land-to-the-tiller had weak appeal among ordinary Lao, but they offer little to explain how, then, the Communists were able to secure broad popular support as the war progressed, despite the enormous sacrifices giving this support required people to endure. An implied thesis, that the movement drew strength from the defensive reaction of traditional rural communities to war and change more than from popular nationalism or demand for egalitarian redistribution, is not fully explored. The authors also perpetuate the stereotype of the Lao people as "gentle," "joyous," and "complaisant" yet provide contradictory descriptions of "grim, self-disciplined" Communist troops and low-level cadres who, though incompetent, are zealous and persistent in implementing their orders. This book does not really tell us how LPRP leaders, made dynamic, disciplined, and energetic by formative years spent at work and study in Vietnam, succeeded in motivating a significant number of their "complaisant" countrymen to become hardened revolutionaries. But for readers seeking a reliable introduction to the politics and problems of contemporary Laos, this book is highly recommended.

WILLIAM S. TURLEY

*Southern Illinois University, Carbondale*

**Federalism and Federation in Western Europe.** Edited by Michael Burgess (Dover, NH: Croom Helm, 1986. 227p. $31.00).

In large part a result of a workshop on comparative federalism and federation in Western Europe held at the University of Salzburg in 1984, this collection of essays is divided into two parts: "Federalism" (part 1) and "Federation" (part 2). Following a brief introduction, Michael Burgess in chapter 2 distinguishes between these concepts. Borrowing from the work of Preston King (*Federalism and Federation* [London: Croom Helm, 1982]), Burgess suggests that "federation is a specific organisational form which includes structures, institutions and techniques" (p. 17). A crucial element in the institutional arrangements is constitutional autonomy for regional units. *Federalism,* on the other hand, is related to the concept of *pluralism.* It can be "taken to mean ideological position, philosophical statement and empirical fact" (p. 20). Thus it can "mean the recommendation and (sometimes) the active promotion of support for federation" or "viewed as empirical fact to the extent that it recognises diversity—broadly conceived in its social, economic and political contexts" (p. 20). According to this distinction, federation is one means of dealing with federalism. Other means might include not only some form of regionalism, decentralization, or devolution but also corporatism and the Catholic doctrines of personalism and subsidiarity.

The remaining chapters of part 1 provide case studies of federalism in Belgium (Frank Delmartino), Spain (Antoni Monreal), France (John Loughlin), Ireland (Neil Collins), and Britain (Michael Burgess). Many readers might have expected some discussion of Belgium, Spain, or even Ireland in a book on federalism and federation, but the inclusion of Britain and especially France is surely surprising. Yet given their definitions of *federalism* and *federation,* the authors have little difficulty fitting many British ideas regarding the empire, Ireland, and Europe or French de jure centralism and de facto toleration of local cultures into their conceptual scheme. The decentralization that has taken place under Mitterrand can also be seen as a movement "toward some kind of internal federalism" (p. 93).

Part 2 deals with the three German-speaking federations in Europe: Austria (Richard Luther), Switzerland (Ulrich Kloti and Kurt Nussli), and West Germany (Tony Burkett). The chapter on the revitalization of federalism and federation in Austria is really about the Pro-Vorarlberg Movement in the westernmost *Land* and its effect, together with other factors including party conflict, on federal reform in

Austria. In contrast to many studies of Austrian parties and political economy, this chapter demonstrates the limited usefulness of corporatist theory in discussing Austrian federalism and federation. The chapter on Switzerland focuses on the efforts in recent years to reform the federal system, during which time there has been a change from an emphasis on greater cooperation, coordination, and efficiency to more task differentiation and autonomy for the cantons. Indeed, the review of recent proposals in Switzerland is strikingly reminiscent of the "New Federalism" of the Reagan administration. As in the U.S. case, however, little fundamental change in task distribution has actually occurred. Nevertheless, the centralizing tendencies found in most other federations seem to have been arrested. Following a review of important distinguishing features of German federalism, the chapter on West Germany focuses on the Bundesrat and the crucial role it plays. (For a review of Gunlicks's book on German Federalism, see p. 1029.)

In summary, this book makes an important contribution to the study of federalism/federation, both in terms of the conceptual framework employed and the quality of the individual country studies. Given the competence of the editor and authors, one wonders how and why a number of careless errors were not corrected. In the chapter on Belgium (p. 47), a two-column comparison of regionalism and federalism is made virtually incomprehensible by missing lines; a subtitle in the chapter on France has been attached to the end of a sentence (p. 78); the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) in the chapter on Germany is referred to as the "SDP" and Konrad Hesse is called "Karl." In all three chapters of part 2 there is a most irritating failure to provide umlauts or, in lieu of them, *e*s where required in numerous German terms. While there is a brief index, there are no maps, which would have been very useful to those readers not familiar with all of the regions and areas mentioned in the various country case studies.

ARTHUR B. GUNLICKS

*University of Richmond*

**Mexico's Political Stability: The Next Five Years.** Edited by Roderic A. Camp (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986. ix, 279p. $23.00, paper).

As editor Roderic Camp sets forth in his introduction, the six authors analyze the critical issues confronting Mexico by focusing on five major themes: stability, legitimacy, economic viability, societal change, and Mexican-U.S. relations. Though not explicitly recognized as such, the two independent variables are *economic viability* and *societal change*. William Glade examines the economic challenges confronting Mexico and astutely emphasizes three constraining factors: the high rate of population growth, the external-debt burden, and the collapse in oil prices. Stressing a theme found throughout the book, he describes the economic liberalization of the present administration as seen in more open trade policies and more flexible foreign-investment regulations.

Daniel Levy and Peter Smith outline several changes in societal values and elite recruitment patterns. The widespread conclusion of the growing dominance of technocrats is reiterated by Smith, though he minimizes any threats to stability this trend might pose. Levy raises a more ominous issue: a growing gap between elites and the masses (also linked to urban-rural cleavages), which has been due in part to a "denationalization" of education, that is, more emphasis among elites on private and foreign education.

Stemming from the discussion of these independent variables, one of the most attractive qualities of this book is the focus by several authors on important but often overlooked interest groups. In particular, John Bailey analyzes the private sector and its relations with the state, and Edward Williams explores the changing role of the military. Bailey's conclusion that greater business input is evidenced in current policies of economic liberalization is one of the overriding themes of the book. Williams describes the military as a more prestigious pillar of the Mexican system (due to its important functions of policing elections in the North and protecting national security along the southern border), but he also stresses the persistence of civilian superiority over the military.

The authors collectively address three

dependent variables: *stability*, *legitimacy*, and *U.S.-Mexican relations*. Though they recognize several threats and challenges to both the stability and legitimacy of the regime, they wisely refrain from dire predictions of impending doom. The decline of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) and the growth of the opposition are obviously problematic areas for the dominant coalition. But the authors argue that opposition victories (and charges of fraud) have been exaggerated by the U.S. media, that the PRI continues to be strong nationally, and that the presidential/bureaucratic alliance has the capacity to initiate changes to restore legitimacy to the ruling party. The book consistently deprecates predictions of violent destabilization or radical change. The only institution capable of forcefully challenging the existing regime is the military, but it remains subordinant to the civilian elites.

As a volume of particular interest to U.S. policymakers, several issues relevant to U.S.-Mexican relations are addressed: trade and investment, border and immigration, and Central America. While admitting the undeniable differences between the two countries on most of these issues, the contributors generally recognize the common benefit to both nations of preserving the status quo in Mexico, namely, a benignly authoritarian system under a centralized presidency and hegemonic party with a flexible approach to economic policies.

In conclusion, this is not a book for those readers wanting explosive predictions of unmanageable political and economic crises threatening the Mexican system. The authors provide a balanced, accurate, and current analysis of present problems and probable scenarios of change. Policymakers and scholars alike are much better served in our quest for understanding the Mexican dilemma by this objective presentation than by the more sensationalist efforts frequently found in the popular press.

DALE STORY

*University of Texas, Arlington*

---

**The Working Class and Welfare.** By Francis G. Castles (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1985. xxxiii, 128p. $A24.95, cloth; $A13.95, paper).

**Australian Politics: Theory and Practice.** By Bill Brugger and Dean Jaensch (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1985. xiii, 258p. $A29.95, cloth; $A15.95, paper).

**Poor Nation of the Pacific: Australia's Future?** Edited by Jocelynne A. Scutt (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1985. xii, 137p. $A19.95).

There is no shortage of good general texts on Australian politics (Dean Jaensch himself has published one), but in attempting to write of political ideas and their influence on policies and institutions in Australia, the authors of *Australian Politics* may fairly claim a first. The authors' major intellectual point is that the operative range of political ideas in Australian politics is so narrow that Burkean conservatism, classical liberalism, and coherent socialism were never serious political influences. In their stead a vaguely formulated populism has combined with an equally vague utilitarianism to produce the regulatory state. Under its aegis Australia produced "marsupial capitalism" and a regulated labor market. The first two sections—on ideology and power—are dense, but they are not the usual stuff of textbooks on Australian politics. Unfortunately the second half of the book, on institutions, is fairly routine and does not amount to an account of the influence of ideas on institutions and policies. The account the authors offer is not inadequate, but it simply does not seriously demonstrate the relationships in Australia between ideology and policies or institutions.

In that respect Francis Castles is much more successful. His focus is the weakness of the welfare state in modern Australia (New Zealand is also considered), given their relative leadership towards the end of the nineteenth century. By 1950, despite being a pioneer in enfranchising the working class, having a strong trade-union tradition and an established Labor party, Australia was well down the world list in terms of percentage of GNP devoted to public social security. This fact Castles attributes as "substantially due to the exclusion of the Left from office and to the fact that rightist parties . . . were subject to remarkably little pressure for welfare state reform" (p. 68). Castles's account of the structures leading to the failure of the Left to achieve office is brief (Brugger and Jaensch are more helpful), as is his explanation of the "failure" of labour to press for a welfare state. If brief, though, Castles's account is convincing: the unions went for "wage security for the worker rather than social security for the citizen" (p. 87). Provided one is employed, the regulatory state ensures that payment is sufficient to ensure a reasonable living standard. He is less successful, perhaps less interested, in *why* Australian labor opted for "economism" rather than "socialist doctrine, whether of a social democratic or any other kind" (p. 104). However, Castles is surely correct in one thing: whatever the past benefits for the working class of its policy of wage security via the state, the chickens are coming home to roost in an era of intense international competition and growing national unemployment. The era seems bound to produce a substantial body of unemployed workers, who will be excluded from what Castles calls "the wage earners' welfare state" (p. 103).

It is this context of a high-wage economy within "marsupial capitalism" that Scutt's team addresses without, it must be said, coming to any apparent agreement beyond the affirmation in Scutt's opening essay that "becoming the poor people of Asia would be only too easy. All Australia has to do is continue along present tracks and time will take care of the rest" (p. 16). Together with the inflexibilities outlined by Castles and detailed by Brugger and Jeansch (see especially the latters' chapters on bureaucracy and federalism), the numerous disagreements among Scutt's contributors suggest that no radical change of political course is possible. All three volumes suggest that the structural rigidities of the Australian political economy will not yield to piecemeal, incremental, change since, in Scutt's words, "Australian unions and professional and industrial organisations typically exert pressures" (p. 16) against change. One of the politicians contributing to the collection, admittedly out-of-office, concludes, "Perhaps [Australia] has now reached a point where a process of decline is irreversible" (p. 92). Relying since the mid nineteenth century on a series of lucky breaks —discovering various resources—Australia may have run out of luck.

Contrary to the general tone of all three volumes, however, the various deregulations of the last two years may indicate a greater flexibility than they suggest. The New Right has certainly added a wider intellectual dimension to the rather narrow Australian ideological spectrum. And the growing assertiveness of Japan in both international trade and politics gives added reason for Australia to awake. It requires a skill less than that of Nostradamus to see interesting times ahead in the Pacific rim!

ROBERT DOWSE

*University of Western Australia*

**Post-Revolutionary Nicaragua: State, Class, and the Dilemmas of Agrarian Policy.** By Forrest D. Colburn (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986. xi, 145p. $17.50).

The majority of countries that have attempted a revolutionary rupture in the post-World War II period have been small, trade-dependent economies, principally primary producers. As Colburn reminds us, smallness (whether in population, natural resources, or preexisting industrial base) severely constrains development options. Autarchic development strategies are out of the question.

Colburn argues that structural constraints, particularly trade dependence, not only limit policy options but make it difficult to rapidly improve the welfare of the majority of the population, the rural poor, which is the stated goal of most revolutionary processes. In the Nicaraguan case, he shows how the inherited model of accumulation, based on agroexports, forced the Sandinista government both to concentrate state resources on the generation of foreign exchange to the detriment of basic grain production and to limit wage increases. Moreover, he documents the overwhelming importance of the private sector in Nicaraguan agriculture and demonstrates how the Sandinistas were forced to offer concessions to capitalist agroexporters, particularly cotton producers, and reaffirm their commitment to private property and efficient capitalist farming. More controversial is his claim that "subsistence" producers and rural workers were "squeezed" in order to keep the revolution economically and politically solvent (pp. 1–2).

Colburn well illustrates many of the tensions involved in maintaining a mixed economy in the context of a revolutionary transition. He fails, however, to come to terms with the Nicaraguan dilemma: Will capitalists play by the rules of the game of an economic and political system being redesigned to serve the interests of the majority if Uncle Sam beckons with promises of state power on condition they join the counterrevolution?

Colburn largely disregards the role of international political and economic factors by arguing that his analysis is confined to the "intentions of the Sandinistas" and to demonstrating why "their rosy expectations were dashed even before confronted with a U.S.-financed counterrevolution" (p. 2). He all but ignores the Reagan administration's campaign of economic destabilization against Nicaragua (which began promptly with Reagan's inauguration in 1981) and the sabotage and economic impact of the Contra war (which began in 1982), as well as the influence of U.S. policies on Nicaraguan internal politics.

While Colburn's theoretical framework highlights the difficulty of structural transformation in trade-dependent economies rather than analyzing structural factors (such as the effect of falling export prices on policy options), Colburn's agenda is to demonstrate that almost everyone in rural Nicaragua was worse off before the Contra war began. Neither his data nor economic analysis are up to the task. To begin with, he often relies on 1983 data (pp. 54, 96) to make his case; by 1983 the combined effect of the war against the Contras, U.S. economic-destabilization policies, and deteriorating terms of trade were, indeed, shaking the Nicaraguan economy.

Particularly problematic is his analysis of the situation of rural workers (chap. 6). He correctly identifies a trend of declining real wages. However, he fails to investigate whether rural consumption levels might have risen through such government programs as consumption subsidies on basic goods, improved rural distribution systems or increased access to land for subsistence production of basic grains. Moreover, rather than analyzing the effect of improved health-care delivery and education on rural welfare, Colburn simply asserts that "rural Nicaraguans clearly perceive increases in public services as inadequate compensation for a deteriorating economy" (p. 119).

One of several errors in his economic analysis is his charge that besides lower real wages, rural workers faced "rising unemployment" as a result of Sandinista policies (pp. 116, 122). This is inconsistent not only with his earlier analysis of the falling profitability of coffee production (which he attributes to rising labor costs) but also with Nicaraguan reality. Witness the growing number of urban volunteers trucked to the coffee and cotton harvests each year because of severe labor shortages. Precisely as government officials feared, one of the effects of the agrarian reform—giving landless peasants access to land—was to dry up the seasonal labor market. But Colburn gives the Sandinista land-redistribution program only cursory treatment, ignoring a crucial element for a rigorous analysis of rural labor-market conditions and potential income levels, not to mention, of popular support for the revolution.

Colburn's political analysis, too, is often deficient. By dismissing the role of the mass organizations as vehicles of popular participation, Colburn misses the important ways these have influenced Sandinista policy decisions. For example, he considers the peasants' organization, Union Nacional de Agricultones y Ganaderos (UNAG) to have little political importance (claiming its lack of independence from the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional [FSLN]) and thus does not bother to analyze its growth (to seventy thousand members) or its role in creating a strong cooperative movement. But by ignoring UNAG, Colburn cannot provide a reasonable explanation of why the Nicaraguan government was forced to cancel peasants' debts in 1983 or speed up the course of the agrarian reform, favoring individual land titling over collective property —both significant departures from earlier Sandinista policies.

Even more damaging, by not taking into account the role of popular participation in the Nicaraguan revolution, Colburn is eventually left with no explanation of why the alleged "disenchantment of the rural poor" has not translated into broad popular support for the counterrevolution (p. 120). Derogatory quotes reportedly made by workers and peasants against the Sandinistas are no substitute for *analysis* of the complex interrelationship between economics and politics in shaping the allegiances of the rural poor.

By limiting his analysis to 1979-82 and treating it as if it constituted one cohesive period, Colburn fails to capture the important changes continually taking place in Sandinista agrarian policy. As a result, the book sheds little light on how revolutionary regimes, through "trial and error," attempt to face the overwhelming "structural" problems of underdevelopment. Moreover, the author's "temporal focus" makes the book outdated, and this is compounded by the annoying use of the present tense to describe institutions and policies that subsequently changed.

In sum, Colburn provides neither a very scholarly account of the transformations in Nicaragua's agricultural sector nor a very useful analysis of the interaction of economics and politics in transitional societies.

CARMEN DIANA DEERE

*University of Massachusetts, Amherst*

**The Economic Ideal in British Government: Calculating Costs and Benefits in the 1970s.** By Phyllis Colvin (Dover, NH: Manchester University Press, 1985. 232p. $30.00).

In an era when slogans like "efficiency" and "value-for-money" are fashionable, Phyllis Colvin's book stands as a salutary warning to those who would shape public policy according to these dogmas. Colvin's study focuses on two major issues, the entry of professional economists into the British bureaucracy and the impact of economic methodology on the making of public policy. The author's particular interest is in the use of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in differing policy areas; her overall concern, to investigate how economic doctrine shapes administrative practice.

The major part of this work consists of an account of the entry and uneasy integration of professional economists into the Whitehall structure in the post-World War II era (chap. 4), in the assessment of vocational training (chap. 5) and in the health field (chap. 6). Based on numerous interviews and the painstaking study of diverse literature, these case histories offer insights not only into the way CBA was introduced at the macro-organizational level but also into the detailed application of the methodology itself. Indeed one of Colvin's objectives is to expose the strengths and weaknesses of economic analysis (as applied to public-policy issues) through reference to the intellectual roots and the sociology of knowledge that underpins it (see chaps. 2 and 3).

While the case histories highlight the differences that exist among different policy areas, they also reveal integrating themes concerning the operation of economists in British government and the application of economic analysis to policy problems. Thus economists struggled to legitimate their position in bureaucratic organizations, frequently making trade-offs to achieve influence. Further economic analysis (in the form of CBA or other applications) was used by other administrative groups as a weapon in the battle for control and influence between and within government departments. Consequently economists were often politicized or trimmed their ambitions to participate in the power play of the bureaucracy. As the author forcefully points out, these factors had serious implications both in the way questions were selected and defined and in the conduct of the analysis itself. For example, a search for manageable issues often led to a sanitization of problems, while the application of economic analysis to option appraisal and policy formation proceeded with some disregard for questions of policy implementation (see chap. 6).

Phyllis Colvin is aware of the perceived advantages of a technique like CBA, especially in a climate where resources are scarce. Such a technique is seen to bring certainty and control to an uncertain administrative world. It also appears resilient as a methodology and influential in conceptualizing policy problems. Yet, these advantages may come at a price seen at its most extreme in the spurious simplification of issues and a failure to conceptualize the full complexity of the policy process (see chap. 7).

There are minor points of weakness in this book. Strong on the detail of economic analysis and the impact of economic ideas in British public administration, it often fails to give full weight to the administrative culture of Whitehall and to the political pressures that operate there. Further, good as it is on the individual case histories, the comparative dimension of the study is not developed in detail. Yet these comments should not detract from an excellently researched administrative history of significant importance for students of British public policy. What is demonstrated clearly is that here there was little "analysis of analysis" or any great appreciation of the political constraints operating in the policy sphere. The study also indicates that the very rigor developed to strengthen an academic discipline may lead to serious errors when applied to the more ill-defined arenas of the political world. In particular, the search to place a "value" on policy options remains one of the more intractable issues of applied public policy.

WILLIAM I. JENKINS

*University of Kent*

**Elections and Democratization in Latin America, 1980–1985.** Edited by Paul W. Drake and Eduardo Silva (San Diego: Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies, University of California, 1986. xi, 335p. No price listed, paper).

This useful volume consists of 14 essays on the impact of recent key elections on processes of liberalization and democratization in Latin America. The book is implicitly divided into two groups of chapters. The differences one finds between the two groups hinge on the authors' treatment of the role of the United States in these elections. The topic of the first few essays is really elections and U.S. foreign policy, and, inevitably, the demonology of U.S. foreign policy in Central America impregnates the argument.

The essays on El Salvador and Nicaragua, in particular, are long on debate and short on the analysis of election results, but despite these intricate detours, some of the contributors to this section have useful things to say. For example, Wayne Cornelius states the most important conclusion found in the book when he writes that "Mexico's experience shows that political reforms which serve mainly to create additional space for opposition parties within the political system do not really promote the democratization of the system. And the more competitive elections made possible by liberalized election laws do not even necessarily help to legitimate the government, so long as the basic authoritarian features of the system . . . remain intact" (pp. 137–38). John Booth concludes that the 1984 Nicaraguan election was "free and open" and that it was "neither sham nor fraud," but he admits to a "demonstration effect" intended for the election by the Sandinista regime (pp. 58–60). Unfortunately, Terry Karl's discussion of recent Salvadoran elections is kept at a supranational level in which domestic forces are overdetermined by a foreign-imposed script. Having assumed that only a negotiated scheme of power sharing will put an end to the Salvadoran civil war, Karl deplores that this "electoralism" has blocked the formation of a democratic compromise (pp. 34–35).

The essays in the second section of the book are more akin to psephology, that is, to the kind of treatment one expects in analyses of electoral systems and voting behavior. Contributors to this section could rely more extensively on the traditional repertoire of the discipline because they were dealing with cases in which elections were the efficacious instruments of political transition. As a result, the section is replete with valuable insights into the indeterminacy of electoral contexts in situations of political transition. The essays by Marcelo Cavarozzi and by Manuel Mora y Araujo should be read by everyone interested in postauthoritarian politics in Argentina and particularly in the mechanics of how the Radical party put a winning coalition together. The contributions by Glaucio Soares and David Fleischer on Brazil, and Howard Handelman's and Charles Gillespie's essays on the constitutional referendum of 1980 and the party primaries of 1982 in Uruguay, respectively, show how the unintended and unanticipated consequences of these contests contributed to undermine the military's blueprint for the consolidation of a "protected democracy" in both countries. The essay by Juan Rial is probably the most successful attempt to explain the outcome of one Uruguayan election in relation to the infernally complicated system of the "simultaneous double vote."

Many factors stand behind the differences in the tone and tenor of the essays contained in this volume, as many as there are differences between Central and South America. This being the case, perhaps Drake and Silva should have been more ambitious and present their own conclusions on why Mexico and Central America remain particularly impervious to peaceful transition through elections.

ENRIQUE A. BALOYRA

*University of Miami*

**Local Government in the German Federal System.** By Arthur B. Gunlicks (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986. xii, 247p. $42.50).

Municipal self-government has a long history in Germany and it is still of great interest and importance. Local authorities are the principal agents for the provision of many local services and contribute massively to the well-upholstered infrastructure of West German social and economic life. They sustain the dispersion and decentralization of political activity and influence, and fit without excessive friction into a federal pattern of governmnt that has shielded West Germans from some of the grander illusions about the capacities of transient politicians that have beset more unitary societies. For these and many other reasons, German local government deserves more attention than it has had outside the Federal Republic. Gunlicks's study seeks to make good this neglect.

The main emphasis in the book is on providing a careful account of local government structures and of the chief legal and financial conditions under which the municipalities (*Gemeinden*) and counties (*Landkreise*) operate. The author starts with a historical survey from vom Stein down to 1949, followed by some remarks on the German administrative tradition with its preference for decentralization through a hierarchy of spatial units. There is a summary of the measures of territorial rationalization effected in the period 1968–78, followed by consideration of the legal framework for local authorities, the distribution of functions at local and *Land* level, and the financing of local government. The comments on the staffs employed at local level are fairly brief, but there is rather more on intergovernmental relations. Here Gunlicks draws perhaps too uncritically on a German literature devoted to "policy interlocking" (one possible translation of *Politikverflechtung*) that tends to overestimate the novelty of this phenomenon. There is, too, a chapter on local councillors, elections, and parties.

Overall this is an admirably thorough and accurate account of contemporary German local government. The author deserves special praise for coping so successfully with the complexities of German legal terminology, and there is no doubt that as a result he presents a clear and fairly comprehensive picture of the institutional conditions of local administration. There is, however, a price to be paid for an approach so reminiscent of the style of that excellent administrative academy at Speyer from which the author has had generous support and guidance. This consists in some neglect of evaluation of results (What does the German taxpayer get for his money from local government?) and in some reluctance to get too deeply involved in an assessment of politics in local government.

It is, of course, true that analysis of the outputs of a branch of government is extremely difficult, particularly if an effort is made to go beyond general impressions. But I think that rather more should have been done to convey to the reader some indication of the service priorities of local authorities (e.g., their very major role in public transport), of the efficiency or otherwise of their service provision, and of relative costs. (I am sure German refuse collection is generally better done than in Britain, but what does it cost and how far does it all depend on legal compulsion to use standard bins or garbage cans?)

As to local politics, Gunlicks provides some basic facts and figures, but there is little life or color in his treatment of the elected member, his activity and his ambitions. Comments on particular towns or cities, on notable *Oberbürgermeister*, on party patronage and back scratching, or on the importance of local political success as a stage in the career of an upwardly mobile politician might have helped to give readers some idea of what local political life is like and of the varied characteristics it may reveal. As it is, the study is too reticent about these matters. The author, perhaps surprisingly for a U.S. political scientist, has stuck too closely to the formalism that is such a marked feature of German administrative law and science. Formal rules and powers are immensely important in the Federal Republic, but this is because the system bearers have internalized them and can live comfortably with them. Whoever writes about German institutions must certainly present the formal conditions carefully but needs also to push beyond that to the use made of them and their political effects.

In summary, Gunlicks has, with this reliable and detailed account of German local government, succeeded in filling a gap in the English-language literature about the German system of government. But his work might have gained in interest and penetration if he had just been a shade more adventurous in the choice of issues presented and material used.

NEVIL JOHNSON

*Oxford University*

**Influencing Mass Political Behavior; Elites and Political Subcultures in the Netherlands and Austria.** By Joseph J. Houska (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1985. xiv, 198p. $11.50, paper).

The study of organizational linkages between elites and masses in societies with deep ideological, cultural, or ethnic divisions is an important part of contemporary comparative politics. This book seeks to contribute to this study via an examination of the twentieth-century politics of the Netherlands and Austria. In this context, the author sets himself three main goals: (1) " to illuminate some of the historical patterns of mass organizational growth and decline in terms of both mass participation and elite activities," (2) "to delineate the effects of the organizational connection on mass voting behavior," and (3) to "analyze how changes in behavior in organizations, either by elites or masses, affect long-established voting patterns" (pp. 2-3). The key units of analysis are *political subcultures,* defined as "segments of a national population . . . [with] . . . a common political orientation and organized into separate educational and communications systems and networks of public and leisure-time groups" (p. 3). What follows is largely descriptive and focuses primarily on Dutch and Austrian elite and mass political behavior in Cathaolic, Protestant, and Socialist subcultures. This is understandable for a work by a political scientist, but unfortunately, it goes over ground largely covered by others. However, two chapters—dealing with critical theoretical and empirical issues—stand out and could have been the kernel for a much stronger work.

In chapter 3, the author asks: Why are people in the Netherlands and Austria "segmented"? In essence, his answer is that subculture elites (political entrepreneurs) form organizations that offer an array of economic, political, social, and symbolic rewards (public goods) to subculture members. However, three very important questions do not get enough attention. First, what objectives motivate subculture elites? Some mention is made of "offensive" and "defensive" goals (p. 15). The former involve obtaining political power in order to implement a policy agenda, the latter to protecting subculture strength and identity. Second, on what resources do elites draw when building subculture organizations? Occasional reference is made to church support for Catholic and Protestant elites and organizations, but the reader is not given a clear indication of how extensive or crucial such support has been. Third, do organizations segment a society or do organizations appear that simply reflect the latent divisions that already exist and thus formalize or reinforce these divisions? The author leans toward an organizations-segment-the-society explanation. For instance, he observes that if "most of an individual's acquaintances are made within subculturally sponsored organizations, most of his friends will turn out to be members of the same subculture" (p. 39). Could it not be the reverse? Perhaps most individuals join the same organizations because these are the ones joined by their family, friends, and coreligionists? Thus, an argument can be made for the reverse; that is, that in a segmented society, organizations appear that are based on its segments and that the crucial linchpin is the political entrepreneur, who recognizes the latent divisions and pitches his organizational efforts and political appeals accordingly.

The preceding discussion distracts one from the author's main theoretical contribution, namely, his development of the concepts of *education* and *encapsulation* as elite strategies designed to perpetuate subculture identity and political behavior. Subculture organizations actively seek to educate members in the "ideology" of the group and, at the same time, carry, articulate, and interpret its collective memory of important historical events, as well as organizing commemorations of these events. *Encapsulation* is defined as "a process in which elites isolate followers by attracting them to a broad network of subculturally linked organizations and thereby prevent member contact with competing organizations or even politically neutral groups" (p. 36). What does this mean? The author does not directly say so, but, as noted, subculture organizations offer public goods that exclude nonsubculture members and cannot be obtained elsewhere. What do the masses give in return? They give their consistent political support. Thus, campaigns, elections, and voting become extensions of subculture identity and simultaneously contribute to education and encapsulation. This intriguing theoretical setup is followed by a description of subculture organizations in the Netherlands and Austria (pp. 41–56) and an exhaustive documentation of the political behavior connected with these organizations.

Chapter 7, however, raises another central question: Why have Dutch and Austrian subculture organizations and their political extensions experienced a major decline in the 1960s and 1970s? The author suggests several reasons, none of which is explored in full detail. They include: (1) generational changes in the elites and masses, (2) rising costs of organizational maintenance, (3) preemption of public-goods provision by the state, (4) economic trends, (5) the hierarchical or federated nature of interorganizational relations within a subculture, (6) intrasubculture conflicts among elites on political goals and strategy, (7)actual achievement of major subculture political goals, and (8) declining elite and mass perceptions of hostility from other subcultures. In large part, these reasons and their accompanying discussion do not answer but transpose the question of decline. For example, why and how did the state(s) preempt the provision of public goods that were once the primary domain of subculture organizations? Thus, while equally intriguing, this chapter is less satisfying than Chapter 3; but it does raise a number of provocative theoretical and empirical questions.

In sum, this book's contribution to the study of organizational linkages between elites and masses in deeply divided societies is uneven. Its strongest contribution is theoretical, both in the concepts that are developed and the questions that are raised. More attention to these theoretical questions could have made this a stronger work, but, nevertheless, the present effort is still worthwhile. On the other hand, except for its thorough documentation of the consistent political support given by subculture members to their political parties, it has some difficulty developing empirical links between the theoretical constructs and the substance of recent Dutch and Austrian politics. However, to varying degrees, this is a problem with many of the works in this subfield and should not detract from this study's theoretical contribution.

LEE E. DUTTER

*University of Illinois, Chicago*

**Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change among the Yoruba.** By David D. Laitin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986. xiii, 252p. $30.00, cloth; $13.95, paper).

Some students of contemporary African politics and society have long been impressed by the persistence of ethnicity in shaping political views and allegiances. It seems that for many African societies, neither class nor ideology nor religion has displaced ethnicity as a primary focus of political identity. Intrigued by the relationship between religion and politics, the author, professor of political science at the University of California, San Diego, designed a study predicting that in certain circumstances religious identity among the Yoruba of Ile-Ife, Nigeria, would override ethnicity in shaping political views and behavior. To this end he compared the political views of Muslims and Anglicans in the town, but he discovered that there was no significant difference between the two groups. Indeed he shows in his study that there was no significant political difference that could be attributed to religion between Muslims and Christians among any Yoruba, including the Ibadan Yoruba of Adelabu's time.

Instead of abandoning his study, Laitin uses his negative results to take social science to task. What kind of social science is it, he seems to ask, that would have us believe that a religious cleavage among the Yoruba, or anyone, should have political consequences? And if no such consequences manifested themselves, perhaps there is something amiss with the state of contemporary social science.

Laitin divides contemporary social science into two traditions, one following Weber and the social-systems approach and the other following Bentham and what he calls "rational-choice" paradigm. Both approaches he finds deficient in explaining the relation or absence of relations between religion and politics in his case study.

The social-system approach, best exemplified in the works of Clifford Geertz, suggests that societies tend to homeostatic equilibrium and implies that when a social system like the Yoruba's is penetrated by a religious cleavage, certain effects must appear in other subsystems, most notably in their politics. Similarly, from the perspective of the rational-choice model, best exemplified in the works of Abner Cohen, a religious cleavage should have generated opportunities for political entrepreneurs to exploit in the context of Yoruba and Nigerian politics. From the point of view of both approaches, that no significant political differences between Muslims and Christians appeared was anomalous. This leads Laitin to suggest that both models may be deficient and that a third way is in order.

Following the works of Antonio Gramsci, the Italian Marxist theoretician, Laitin suggests that a third approach, which he calls *hegemony* (p. 19), might better explain the relationship between religion and politics. The crux of his proposal is that the social system does not work automatically to produce linkages among subsystems or equilibria but that on the contrary, these exist only when they have been forged by elites controlling the state and political power. The reasons for the origin and persistence of ethnic identity among the Yoruba and their rejection of other points of reference, suggests the author, lie in the colonial past. It was British imperial rule that helped to preserve and foster ethnic identity, and it was this rule that passed the problem of ethnicity on to the modern Nigerian state. Once such identities became forged, they came to be viewed as fundamental both by the rulers and the ruled, while other foci were perceived as illegitimate or lacking credibility. This explains why religion was not a factor in Yoruba politics: it was superceded by ethnicity.

A brief review does justice neither to Laitin's theoretical arguments nor to many of his credible suggestions. It should be pointed out, however, that a negative result questioning the Weberian and the Benthamite traditions does not provide sufficient grounds to establish a new model based on the works of Gramsci. To that end, some positive results need to be reported. It would seem that Laitin's next task is to analyze some representative cases where, in fact, elites did forge links between religion and politics.

ROBERT MELSON

*Purdue University*

**Working Class Politics in Crisis: Essays on Labour and the State.** By Leo Panitch (New York: Schocken Books, 1986. xi, 243p. $19.95).

British Labour is an integrative party, that is, one that implicitly seeks, as it has done ever since its formation, to harmonize differences and conflicts in British working-class politics in order to align the greatest number of voters behind its parliamentary-based version of social democracy. Rather than take its orientation from the class tensions in society, it has constructed its ideology and organization in a way that hampers its scope and, indeed, hampers the desire for radical change in Britain. This is the charge Panitch develops on the basis of historical deduction and as a case study in the practical problems of the struggle to revitalize a British Marxist tradition.

Nine essays spread over 15 years offer sedimentary layers for the political archaeologist, welcome as soundings in the intellectual history of the Left in Britain. Inevitably, some have become dated. The debate about corporatism has recently become jaded for lack of empirical studies, but here are useful pointers on how it might be renewed. Some read well as assessments of what was at stake in the Labour party as it emerged from its 1960s political brokerage or as the struggle for leadership developed down to its denouement in 1981. Others, however, read more as reviews of the literature or as revisitations of hallowed themes like workers' control.

The lead essay (1985) bears astringent comparison with R. H. Tawney's essay, "British Socialism Today" (in *The Radical Tradition* [London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1964]) in its analysis of how Labour responded to the mid-1970s economic crisis and to 1980s market populism in the hands of the "new liberal" Right. But where Tawney showed how far socialism had come, Panitch asks whether socialism is still possible and, if so, under what banner. It can, he argues, be recovered only if the party rediscovers its necessary working-class orientation. Otherwise the project will fail, as it did in 1976-79, not only in Britain but in Sweden and Germany and, indeed, with the failure of *autogestion*, in France.

Structures and the ideologies they embody are to blame, especially where they rest on essentially corporatist foundations, or on fallible assumptions about changes in the class composition of advanced societies, as did the Euro-Communists' dreams of building on supposedly transformed class alignments, or the Greens' hopes to do the same on cross-class issues. Hence, if Gaitskillism is not to reemerge under a future Labour government, Panitch claims (in a perceptive but tendentious account of events since 1979) that a program must emerge in tune with the working class's experience of increased deprivation at the hands of an ever more desperate capitalism.

The elements of faith rather than experience in this emerge clearly in the discussion of whether trades unions remain a central problem or are now to be seen as part of the proposed solution. The prescription appears to be a reissue of the 1970s "alternative strategy" with industrial democracy—as recommended in the Bullock Report—providing the necessary shift in the industrial balance of power. As befits an economy in deep structural decay, Panitch is cautious about the more ameliorative aspects of "market socialism," the current Fabian nostrum, as a diversion from the main programmatic task.

All the essays address in one way or another the central question of the forces and methods needed to transform the modern state. Yet there is a want of detail about, or even sensitivity to, what the state actually is as distinct from the political parties that compete to control it. The sort of corporatism that enmeshed the Labour government in the late 1960s and mid 1970s is unlikely to be revived in the same form, yet the renaissant market populism, which has, to a considerable extent, undermined the central institutions of capital and labor, is not here related to changes that have already taken place in the state since the first of these pieces were written. Consequently, just as divisions inside the trade-union movement are underplayed or papered over with talk of endemic crisis, so the potential for new connections between them and the changing state is not explored.

It is hard to see, in current patterns of trade-union behavior, anything but a confused response to deep changes in the pattern of employment, work, and class affinity; hard to see that Panitch's argument rests on any dynamic other than the leadership of a Left vanguard somehow reborn from the ruins of 1981, supported by a popular-front range of allies. The desired strategy may indeed fit with this line of historical analysis, but the fact that other interpretations of recent history do not lead to the same end suggests that very substantial problems remain.

The first concerns the mismatch between balance-of-power struggles in the Labour party throughout the period in question and actual control of the machinery of government—one essential lesson from the failure of the Left's alternative strategy. It is hard to see, on a basis of what has happened, how any program of the economic severity implied here could be implemented, given the relative autonomy of the state and the predictable resistances in civil society. Whatever else one may conclude from the story of wages policy since the mid 1960s, the outcome has not been beneficial to the lower paid but to the well organized and powerful. These historical realities have surely had a long effect in shaping the Labour party's ideology. The second problem lies in the nature of a challenge rather different from that of revitalizing democratic socialism in Britain. Unless new currents in the behavior of trades unions like the electricians and plumbers and the engineering workers are to be taken as a complete aberration, market populism in other hands than the present administration's may turn out to have a far longer life span than is envisaged here. Whether Neil Kinnock's Labour party has yet faced this conservative challenge remains unclear.

ROBERT KEITH MIDDLEMAS

*University of Sussex*

**The Future of Social Democracy: Problems and Prospects of Social Democratic Parties in Western Europe.** Edited by William Paterson and Alastair Thomas (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. xiv, 308p. $39.95, cloth; $19.95, paper).

This symposium is a most welcome addition to a growing literature comparing European parties of like hue, including Zig Layton-Henry's *Conservative Politics in Western Europe,* Roger Morgan and Stefano Silvestri's *Moderates and Conservatives in Western Europe,* Karl-Werner Brand's *Neue soziale Bewegungen in Westeuropa und den USA,* Emil Kirchner's forthcoming book on liberal parties, and the authors' own *Social Democratic Parties in Western Europe* of a decade ago. It compares favorably with all but Brand because it is more tightly focused on the special problems of Social Democratic parties in the last decade and their immediate prospects. Nevertheless, the coverage is far from uniform and most of the fine country articles are more concerned with idiosyncratic political difficulties and electoral vicissitudes than they are with the common problems of applying the Social Democratic wisdom of Anthony Crosland's *The Future of Socialism* (1956) amidst the social changes and economic crises of the seventies and eighties. The perplexities of passing from "the wave of the future" to "the future that does not work," as the editors have put it with unintended double entendre (p. 7), are explored expertly in chapters on the reemergence of mass unemployment (Douglas Webber), Scandinavian social democracy (Thomas), and the reluctant adoption of European integration by Social Democratic parties (Kevin Featherstone)—and touched upon in all the other chapters. There is the familiar scenario of successful social movements whose attractive agenda of social remedies is widely adopted, even by their enemies, at the precise moment that the changing social and economic problems have begun to outrun these remedies. Economic growth as a precondition of full employment has slowed down or come to a grinding halt. The controls of party government in general, and of Keynesian demand management in particular are working less and less well. Social Democratic political decision makers are paralyzed by doubts about the appropriateness of their goals, divided within their parties, and stymied by never-ending fiscal crises. A military Keynesianism of warfare-welfare states is hardly the answer to the breakdown of the Social Democratic consensus, however attractive it may seem to conservative opinion today, when even working-class voters have lost faith in the ability of Social Democratic governments to provide more jobs.

The editors and contributors are moving over familiar ground when they describe the diverging paths attempted by different Social Democratic governments to escape the predicaments of this last decade. Frustrated by their inability to cope with the post–oil shock economies and profoundly changed partisan clienteles, they have either turned right or left or simply ignored the obsolescence of their standard remedial approaches. Some tried to follow more than one of these paths, at least sequentially, or were faced with fratricidal dissension among Left, Right, and centrist factions of their parties. Turning to the right (James Callaghan, Helmut Schmidt) demanded discipline and austerity, emphasizing corporatist relations and incomes policy, and it often aggravated internal divisions and the problems of solidarity between the trade unions and the party. Staying the course with the same ineffective instruments of policy invited a disastrous demonstration of the governments' incompetence in the face of changing circumstances. Turning left (Mitterrand's *projet socialiste,* Labour after 1979, or the Danish party after 1982) might please the party activists but was likely to be resoundingly rejected by the electorate and might even lead to a secessionist development, as in Great Britain. Faced with these agonizing choices, the great Social Democratic parties of Western Europe have also begun to revise their ideological basis, beginning with the 1959 Bad Godesberg Program of the West German Social Democratic Party which stood at the starting point of this Social Democratic era. For the Right, this has meant challenging centralization and bureaucracy and experimenting with market economics. Codetermination, *autogestion,* and pension-fund schemes all have helped to legitimize social democracy in the eyes of all but the most left-wing skeptics, while on the other hand pacifist and antinuclear issues have tended to undermine the authority of the right-wing and centrist leadership. Environmental and life-style concerns among a far more educated and less docile membership, feminism, and increasingly independent and volatile trade unions further contributed to the softening of the ideological consensus behind social democracy.

This book plausibly explains the diversity of positions and policies of Social Democratic parties and regimes. It is less forthcoming in showing the long-time erosion of the intense sense of solidarity and social cohesion that used to hold the old labor movements together long before 1945. The disillusionment of the war and of the "end of ideology," in a manner of speaking, were only ratified by programs like the one of Bad Godesberg. The concept of the "catch-all party" left of center took on an ever more heterogeneous and fissiparous reality with the social changes of the sixties and seventies. The progressive breaking down of the old *Arbeiterhochburgen* noted from election to election, and similar signs of the disintegration of the social bases of the Right has spelled increasing dealignment and volatility in most of the party systems under discussion. Except in cases like Austria or Sweden where party-union solidarity is still high or where Right-Left polarization helps to keep the Left united, the future of social democracy in Western Europe may be as bleak as the future of its oldtime social and economic remedies, bleaker perhaps than this book would lead us to expect.

PETER H. MERKL

*University of California, Santa Barbara*

**Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security.** By Nadav Safran (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985. viii, 524p. $25.00).

Saudi Arabia's ceaseless quest for security, as Nadav Safran emphasizes, is explained by certain geopolitical compulsions. Safran has a clear perception of the geographical or strategic factors but does not have as clear an appreciation of the political factors. The Soviet Union's political and military presence in surrounding areas of Ethiopia, Syria, and South Yemen, their incursion into Afghanistan, which is so close to the Straits of Hormuz, and the emergence of a hostile Islamic revolutionary regime in Iran have obviously made the Saudi rulers extremely apprehensive about their security. Thus, the Saudis have offered a quid pro quo relationship to the United States, in which they are prepared to provide an uninterrupted flow of oil and limited Saudi cooperation with some of the strategic objectives of U.S. policy in the Middle East in return for U.S. military assistance involving the sale of some of the most sophisticated U.S. armor and technical assistance.

What dismays Safran is that given the mutuality of these interests between the United States and the Saudis, why have the Saudis followed such a zigzag course in their policies, "first tilting toward the United States then leaning toward neutralism; calling on American AWACs aircraft and personnel shortly after the outbreak of the Gulf war and then using the first opportunity to put some distance between themselves and the United States; making some attempts to isolate the Syrians and, at the first signs of failure, seeking to appease them again" (p. 431).

To a perceptive and shrewd observer of Middle East politics like Safran, it should be apparent that the political costs for the Saudis of too close an alignment with the United States, which is so committed towards supporting the fundamental interests of Israel, are prohibitive. Safran is aware of these factors but does not emphasize them, with the result that his conclusion is that U.S. long-term interests lie in a disengagement of its vital interests "from the policy and fate of the Kingdom" (p. 460). Kissinger, whose political judgement was also influenced by historical insights, displayed a greater understanding of the Saudi policy when he wrote, "The ambiguity of Saudi policy is imposed by events, not by preference" (*Years of Upheaval*, p. 659).

The book should be commended for the painstaking research that is displayed, but there are hardly any theoretical leaps flowing from such a vast array of historical and political data. Safran seems to think that the earlier Saudi client-patron relationship with the United States has been transformed into no more than a complex relationship of interdependence. But the data that he provides of growing U.S. military presence both in the form of weapons and military personnel indicates that the relationship is one of military and political dependence. Partly as a result of this military dependence, the Saudis have been pressured into becoming a part of the strategic consensus that the United States has tried to promote among moderate Arab and Muslim states under its leadership. As a result of this consensus, the United States has tried on the one hand to moderate Israeli hostility towards Arab states like Saudi Arabia and Jordan and on the other to ensure that Saudi commitments to Arab nationalism and Islamic solidarity do not lead to any military action against Israel. It is when one considers the subtle means of influence that the United States has acquired over a country like Saudi Arabia through their military assistance that one begins to discern the full implications of military dependency.

Safran has also not explored fully the Islamic dimension's potential for security. Saudi Arabia is the home of Islam's holiest places. Therefore, its security in the eyes of the Muslims throughout the world is not the security of its ruling family but the security of its holy places, and for this, Muslim regimes would cooperate fully. Some of the Pakistani officers stationed in Saudi Arabia told me that they would fight for Saudi Arabia just as fervently as they would for their own country. However, there is no question that this scholarly work is replete with rich historical and empirical data that may generate several hypotheses and theories for students of Middle East politics.

KHALID BIN SAYEED

*Queen's University*

**The Scope of State Power in China.** Edited by Stuart R. Schram (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985. xxxiv, 381p. $35.00).

This anthology of essays by 12 eminent scholars of Chinese studies stems from two conferences sponsored by the European Science Foundation at Royaumont, near Paris, in 1980 and at Schloss Reisenburg, near Ulm, in 1981. Papers presented at a third conference at the Bellagio Study and Conference Center in 1983 under the auspices of the same organization are forthcoming in a second volume. *The Scope of State Power in China,* based on the first two conferences, examines the organization and development of various state institutions, the function of the state in shaping moral values, and the economic role of the state. Although the essays share the common theme of the state's role in Chinese society, Stuart Schram informs us that the book does not purport to offer "a comprehensive survey of the problem of the state in China, from the Qin dynasty to the present day" (p. x). This volume does, however, emphasize the importance of studying China's past to understand the continuity of traditional and contemporary China or, in some cases, to assess the existence of a linkage between the past and the present. Karl Bünger's foreword, "The Chinese State between Yesterday and Tomorrow," outlines the significance of comparative studies in time (the past and present of China) and space (traditional China and Europe). Comparison with Europe, Bünger contends, should enhance scholars' understanding of the state in traditional China and make them less critical of Chinese institutions which, in some cases, preceded developments in European politics. Jacques Gernet reinforces the utility of the comparative approach in his introductory overview of the essays.

The reader who has grown weary of conference proceedings offering a glimpse of a topic in book form should not prejudge *The Scope of State Power in China.* It presents 10 carefully researched articles in two parts—"Patterns of Rule" and "The Economic Role of the State." All of the articles, with the exception of those by Schram, Billeter, and von Senger emphasize imperial China with comparative references to the Communist era. The three exceptions have a reverse focus. In the first part, Léon Vandermeersch outlines the origins of legal provisions in imperial China and examines the role of the emperor as the ruling authority. Today, the Chinese Communist party has replaced the emperor. State organs elaborate laws, but these organs, Vandermeersch contends, are subordinate to the Party. Tilemann Grimm, in his analysis of despotism in the Ming Dynasty, maintains that a state requires more than institutional structures and territorial boundaries. It is "governed by fixed legal norms, which bind those who control it and those who depend on it alike" (p. 49). He questions whether late imperial China fits this definition of a state. Marianne Bastid finds that financial institutions not only were an essential part of the organization and role of central state power in the late Qing dynasty but also have affected the "evolution of Chinese political institutions until the present day" (p. 79).

Schram's foremost contribution in his essay on state decentralization is a thorough presentation on the changing conception of *yiyuanhua* (integration) of leadership in the Communist era. He concludes that although changes may be forthcoming, the Party still prevails over the state, and the lower levels remain subordinate to the center. Jean-François Billeter studies the status system in the Maoist era and its declining significance in the Dengist period. He is skeptical of the amount of change the Party will allow. Harro von Senger reveals that Party norms dominate in the relationship between Party and state and finds no "parallel" in Chinese history.

The articles in the second part focus on the economic role of the state. Based on Yunmeng texts written on bamboo strips in the Qin dynasty, Anthony Hulsewé finds that the Qin state influenced the economy via agriculture, trade, industry, and taxation. Michael Loewe asserts that economic decisions of the state in the Western Han dynasty established precedents for "later governments" (p. 267). Paolo Santangelo's essay discusses the fiscal and political nature of textile factories of Suzhou in the Ming and Qing dynasties. In his analysis of the state and hydraulics in imperial China, Pierre-Etienne Will examines variations in central, regional, and local intervention in the hydraulic infrastructure.

Each essay presents an interesting dimension of the expansive "scope" of the state of China. This positive aspect of the book, however, simultaneously represents a shortcoming. With the wide variation on the focus of the state, the volume needs a concluding chapter to weave the authors' conceptions of *state* and summarize the changing role of the state. Perhaps such a chapter is forthcoming in the second volume.

Another omission from the book is a discussion of state power in the nationalist period following dynastic rule. This addition would permit an examination of party/state relations under the Guomindang party and fill a void in the comparisons across time.

Notwithstanding the shortcomings, *The Scope of State Power in China* provides a wealth of information based on primary sources. The book is particularly useful for scholars of comparative politics studying the role of the state in a one-party system. Moreover, it is necessary reading for specialists in Chinese studies, who will particularly appreciate the authors' use of pinyin romanization *and* Chinese characters for special terms and bibliographic citations.

CHERYL L. BROWN

*University of North Carolina, Charlotte*

**Industry, the State, and Public Policy in Mexico.** By Dale Story (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986. xii, 275p. $30.00).

In *Industry, the State, and Public Policy in Mexico*, Dale Story seeks to assess the role of industry in the formulation and implementation of public policy in Mexico and, more broadly, to assess the place of business in Mexico's authoritarian political system.

Story draws on economic data concerning production, investment, and public-sector expenditures to assess the relative contributions of the state and private-domestic and foreign capital to the pattern of industrial growth in Mexico during this century. He reports on a mail survey he conducted with Mexican and Venezuelan industrialists in 1980 to ascertain the political role and ideology of Mexican industrialists and their organized interest groups. He also provides case studies of recent governmental decisions, an extended discussion of Mexico's decision not to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1980 and briefer accounts of the debate over petroleum policy in the late 1970s, the formulation of comprehensive development plans in 1979–80, and the nationalization of the banks in 1982. This weaving together of economic, attitudinal, and decision case-study materials and the effort to establish a comparative context are a sophisticated approach to an important topic.

Story's argument has two main thrusts: first, that private domestic entrepreneurs have played a significant role in national development and second, that "the Mexican industrial sector has considerable independent influence on many policy decisions" (p. 10). Story sees these conclusions as disproving widely accepted "truths" about Mexico. With both, unfortunately, he is sparring against straw men.

The first is asserted "contrary to many conclusions of a weak national industrial sector" (p. 75), but he cites no one in this indictment. The book marshalls a great deal of useful information bearing on the roles of private domestic entrepreneurs, foreign capital, and the state in Mexico's economic development, but because Story insists on seeing them simply as competitive "rivals" (p. 32), he misses the opportunity to deepen our understanding of how complexly they relate to one another—sometimes in conflict, sometimes in cooperation.

His second argument is aimed at "the common interpretation of Mexico as an authoritarian regime in which industry, along with other political actors, is dominated by the state" (p. 195). Here, Story does have a target: an influential article by Susan Kaufman Purcell ("Decision-Making in an Authoritarian Regime," *World Politics* 26 [1973]: 28–54), but he fails to mention that even she had contended that "the business interests, or 'private sector,' undoubtedly are the most independent of all the [interest] groups" (p. 33). Moreover, the book seems innocent of even the suggestion that an authoritarian state might act to further the interests of capital. A root difficulty here is the book's lack of any conception of the state that situates it in relation to social classes. He sees the state only as a free-floating collection of roles and incumbents. In a peculiar reversal of contemporary theorizing about the state, he speaks recurrently of the autonomy of business interests from the state rather than of any relative autonomy of the state from dominant social classes.

There is a puzzle about Mexico that needs further unravelling. The business community has been formally excluded from the regime of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), and yet it has been the primary beneficiary of economic growth in Mexico over the decades since the revolution. It helps only a little to insist that the business community has substantial independence. We need to know how private Mexican capital has exerted power or influence over the state, we need to understand the limits to this, and we need to consider the interests that the state itself may have in promoting private capital formation and the strategies by which it seeks to do so—not all of which may be immediately to the liking of the business community. Story's case studies, particularly the one on the GATT decision, provide insight into all of these questions, even though they are not the focus of his discussions.

There is an impressive amount of useful information and data analysis in this book, but due to the way Story has framed its central questions, *Industry, the State, and Public Policy in Mexico* slides by the central issues it seeks to address.

DOUGLAS C. BENNETT

*Temple University*

**Ballots and Trade Union Democracy.** By Roger Undy and Roderick Martin (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984. 240p. $22.50).

How, whether, and for what purposes unions conduct ballots of their members became a political football in Britain in the late 1960s and has remained that ever since. Legislation covering union ballots was passed under the Conservative government in 1980, 1982, and 1984. Entirely apart from legislation, in some unions changes in balloting have been introduced by reformers of the Right or the Left.

Undy and Martin first outline the arguments made by the Conservatives for the promotion of the postal ballot in union elections and for collective bargaining decisions. They then devote most of their book to a description of actual practices in as many as 103 unions affiliated with the Trades Union Congress and to the actual effects of methods of balloting (or not balloting at all) through the presentation of 13 case studies. They attempt to answer such questions as, How much does the postal ballot increase participation in decision making, for example over voting at union meetings? Are officials elected by postal ballot less left-wing, and less militant? Does the postal ballot result in a greater acceptance of managements' offers in collective bargaining? Are postal ballots more likely to represent the views of the general membership? The Conservative party would of course argue the affirmative to these questions, believing that the postal ballot would clip the wings of militant, left-wing minorities. The authors point out that the

Conservatives have also used the postal-ballot issue as an entering wedge for legislation limiting industrial action (sympathy strikes, picketing) and union political levies (for the Labour party).

Discussion of union democracy often takes place without an appreciation of the practical problems that distinguish voting in very large, dispersed organizations from that in governmental elections. Undy and Martin show that what might be thought to be the relatively simple matters of casting, collecting, and counting votes are complicated by such problems as vast, dispersed memberships, and membership turnover or geographic mobility (which in effect disenfranchise large numbers of members whose addresses are not available). Where collective bargaining is concerned, the constituencies may cover many unions and many large corporations (as in bargaining with a national employers' association), and postal ballots would obviously be time-consuming, and provide less opportunity for weighing alternatives than a conference of representatives.

From their case studies, the authors conclude that there is no evidence of strong or general effects of methods of balloting (or of not balloting at all) on union political processes. Postal ballots, in particular, have no general effect on the political complexion or industrial militancy of those elected. A change to postal ballots has indeed often resulted in a change in leadership, sometimes favoring right-wingers and sometimes left-wingers. In some cases the Left rather than the Right has favored postal ballots and—more often than the Right—has favored election rather than appointment and periodic elections rather than permanent posts. Nor does the extent of factional organization seem to be related to the particular method of balloting. On the other hand, "unions with factional organization are potentially more open to political change from the introduction of postal ballots" (p. 116), and "the introduction of postal ballots is likely to reduce the effectiveness of any factions based on a small number of geographically concentrated groups of activists, as exist in some unions using branch ballots" (p. 114). Participation in elections through postal ballots is often disappointingly low, usually far lower than place-of-work balloting. There seem to be few arguments against place-of-work balloting where it is feasible and where the integrity of the process can be assured.

The authors close with a broad-ranging discussion of union democracy, going far beyond the limited focus of most of this book. While I disagree with some of their judgments, this is an important contribution to the literature on union democracy. Some of the authors' assumptions, for example, that "trade union leaders are drawn from the moral activists" (p. 188), may be less warranted for the United States; but then, of course, they are writing about Britain. Most of the practical, unavoidable problems of union democracy inherent in the logistics of balloting in very large organizations should be considered by social scientists. *Ballots and Trade Union Democracy* can provide a worthwhile, if sobering, experience in this respect.

J. David Edelstein

*Syracuse University*

# INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

**The Foreign Policy of New States.** By Peter Calvert (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986. viii, 216p. $29.00).

Despite the growing importance of the Third World, systematic treatments of the foreign policy of poor nations are rare and the determinants of their policy choices remain elusive. While the title of this thin volume suggests an attempt to fill the void, its approach will make it more appealing to the beginning student than to more advanced analysts.

Chapter 1 ("The Illusion of Foreign Policy") emphasizes the limitations of generalization in foreign-policy studies. Its too brief (three pages) exposition and critique of Allison's three models, Rosenau's pretheory, and Brecher's framework concludes with the dishearteningly vacuous lesson that "The student of foreign policy must therefore stand back from the process of policy-making and seek to understand it in his own terms" (p. 10). He then undermines the focus of the book by including among the "new states" not only countries decolonized since World War II, but also the European and Middle Eastern states created at the end of World War I and the century-old nations of Latin America. It is no wonder that he finds it difficult to generalize across a set defined less by a common element of newness—or even weakness or size—than as a residual category that excludes only the superpowers and the core European powers of the nineteenth century.

Calvert pulls from this a dubious and unsupported assertion that "foreign policy is dominated almost exclusively by internal considerations" (p. 22) and a methodological commitment "first to understand the nature of the politics of the new states" (p. 20), which together provide direction, but not focus, to Chapters 3–6.

He first digresses in Chapter 2 ("The Rules of the Game") to rehearse the classical concepts of state, sovereignty, and legitimacy, and to introduce nonstate actors, diplomatic norms, conceptions of international law, and the role of treaties and alliances. Those encountering these ideas for the first time will find the discussion clear and agreeably leavened with both historical and contemporary examples.

Chapter 3 ("The Domestic Environment") opens the comparative analysis with a superficial treatment of domestic factors including governmental structures, the armed forces, religion, public opinion, and economic structures. Surprisingly, there is no mention of many factors that make poor states distinctive, such as the penetration of external actors or the character of the state and its roots in social and economic structures.

Chapter 4 ("How Foreign Policy Is Made") is more attentive to differences between "new" states and older powers, especially in the shortcomings in personnel, resources, records, and organization common to the foreign service of new states. The resulting policy is held to be reactive, lacking in continuity, and influenced by "non-material factors such as pride, honour or dignity." Calvert concludes that the rational-actor model's view that foreign policy "should be designed in order to ensure the best interests of the state concerned . . . is in no way an adequate explanation" (p. 95). He does not proffer an alternative framework, however, though he emphasizes the contribution of the organizational-process model and acknowledges through examples the influence of the head of state and the military. Still, this is as close as the volume comes to generalization or to a theoretical statement.

Chapter 5 ("Capabilities") is loosely organized around a list of components of power: population size, territorial extent, strategic location, communication systems, and economic resources. The concepts themselves are elementary, but the maddeningly irrelevant digressions that dominate the text produce occasionally engaging nuggets like the observation that "every year more people are kicked to death by donkeys than are killed in air crashes" (p. 108). Chapter 6 ("Limitations") discusses the implications of military weakness, social cleavages, and the legacy of decolonization in a similar way.

The concluding chapter ("Playing the Game") maintains the barrage of examples and historical briefs, including the anecdote crediting a 1963 Ecuadorian coup to the actions of the president who, at the airport to greet a foreign dignitary, "was overcome by alcohol and fell flat on his face on the tarmac" (p. 155).

In sum, this volume is a readable, loosely argued, fact-filled introduction, which may appeal to the newcomer to foreign-policy studies. It offers little to those with a theoretical bent, however, and contains no systematic statement on the foreign policy of new states.

BRUCE E. MOON

*Northwestern University*

**Towards a Normative Theory of International Relations.** Mervyn Frost (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. ix, 241p. $37.50).

Frost's principal purpose is to show that normative theory in international relations is not merely possible but necessary to an adequate understanding of the unavoidably moral issues of international politics. The first two chapters are devoted to criticism of positivist social science, radically skeptical value noncognitivism, and realism, which he argues are responsible for the dearth of normative international theory.

These chapters are quite weak. The critique of positivism amounts to little more than a good but familiar summary of the *Verstehen* approach and a very brief, allusive, and wholly inadequate account of "critical theory." The alleged "positivist bias" in the study of international relations is never demonstrated; in fact, Frost quotes not a single passage from any writer, major or minor. The sources he cites for the "scientific approach" to international relations are *all* more than a dozen years old and average more than 20 years, leading one to wonder whether he is beating a dead horse. Even more serious questions are raised by the inclusion, among those with a positivist bias against normative theory, of Stanley Hoffman, whose *Duties Beyond Borders* is an important work in normative international theory. The discussions of moral skepticism and realism in Chapter 2, however, although not especially original, are competent and may be useful to some readers.

The real interest and value of the book lie in Frost's ambitious and interesting efforts to do normative international theory in the remaining four chapters. He argues, persuasively, that international relations is a settled, rule-governed social practice, with its own, state-centered "domain of discourse" (Chap. 3) and a "settled body of norms" (p. 120) that in their simplest summary hold that "the preservation of a system of sovereign states is the primary good" (p. 128). Any moral theory of the contemporary practice of international relations, therefore, must provide an answer to the question, "What is the best justification for the preservation of a system of sovereign states?" (p. 128).

Perhaps the best section of the book (pp. 128-56) is devoted to a strong attack on familiar answers to this question, resting on considerations of order, utility, and rights. Here Frost gives close attention to the work of important recent writers, especially Bull and Walzer. Although I do not find all of his arguments convincing, they are on target, powerful, and well worth careful scrutiny.

The most original aspect of the book is Frost's largely Hegelian theory of the state and the society of states. This "constitutive theory of individuality" (Chap. 5) holds that individuals simultaneously constitute both themselves, as autonomous, rights-bearing moral persons and their social institutions by their participation in mutually valuing relationships in the family, civil society, and, most importantly and most perfectly, the state. International relations and the norms of the state system are morally justified because they protect the state and the constitutive moral relations that the state alone makes fully possible.

This theory is certainly provocative, but Frost's presentation is almost fatally brief and sketchy. For example, he devotes a mere two pages (183-84) to claiming—not even seriously trying to show—that his is a good background theory for the settled norms of international relations he earlier identified (pp. 128-28). In contrast, his discussion of the family runs three pages (168-71). The one sustained application (Chap. 6) does not even deal with any of the settled norms but rather considers the notoriously difficult and relatively peripheral issue of unconventional violence. At best, Frost gives us an interesting but largely undeveloped idea.

Space precludes any serious attempt at evaluating the theory, but let me at least list two problems, one general and one specific. First, Frost simply assumes that there must be a single moral theory that justifies the settled contemporary norms of international relations. It is quite possible, however, that this set of norms represents an uneasy compromise, in which case his criticisms of Walzer in particular lose much of their force. Or many of the norms may be politically or prudentially, rather than morally, justified, in which case his entire project is called into question. Second, for the specifics of the theory, it seems on its face incompatible with the standard understanding of human rights as rights one has simply because one is a human being. For example, the International Human Rights Covenants state that human rights "derive from the inherent dignity of the human person," not from constitutive social relations. The difficulty of other theories in accounting for the norm of protecting human rights is used by Frost as a major argument against them, so this would seem to be a very serious problem.

In what increasingly seems to be a world of uniformly positive reviews in U.S. political science journals, I hope that these criticisms will not be taken wrongly. Whatever its problems, *Towards a Normative Theory of International Relations* is a book from which I learned some important things about even familiar material and a book that forced me to think seriously and critically about important issues. I recommend it to anyone interested in the problems and possibilities of normative theory in international relations.

JACK DONNELLY

*University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill*

**The Logic of Surprise in International Conflict.** By Alex Roberto Hybel (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1986. viii, 179p. $22.00).

This is a finely crafted study of surprise attack. The author contends, correctly, that most seminal works on the subject, such as Roberta Wohlstetter's classic on the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, have focused on the victim. He proposes a framework to analyze surprise with emphasis on the aggressor by examining four case studies: the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in June, 1941; the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor six months later; the Cuban missile crisis of 1962; and the Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel in 1973.

The author attempts to answer three questions about these four cases: first, Why did the aggressor opt for surprise? second, Why did he choose one strategy of surprise over another? and lastly, To what extent did his actions contribute to the achievement of surprise?

On the first question, the author suggests that an aggressor's resort to surprise is a function of the value of the interests at stake. For Yamamoto, for example, it was crucial to cripple the United States at Pearl Harbor in order to increase Japan's prospects for success in Southeast Asia. Anwar Sadat in 1973 hoped to revitalize Egypt's prestige in the world by launching a successful attack on Israel. Hitler believed that a successful Operation Barbarossa would save Germany from a two-front war; and finally, Khrushchev was convinced that the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba would tip the strategic balance in the Soviet Union's favor.

As a corollary to this central theme, the author postulates that an aggressor is likely to resort to surprise if his most valued interests are threatened by an adversary perceived as stronger than himself and if the attacker's freedom of choice is not severely curtailed by domestic or international pressures. Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor is again cited as a case in point.

In his efforts to find answers to his second and third questions, the author develops 12 further propositions, each of which assumes one basic characteristic: the aggressor's effectiveness in manipulating his victim's sense of vulnerability. Yamamoto, for example, manipulated Washington's anxiety by successfully concealing his specific target even though the U.S. leaders expected Japan to attack somewhere. Khrushchev in 1962 took numerous precautions to disguise the deployment of Soviet missiles. Egypt and Syria in 1973 manipulated Israel so successfully that Eliahu Zeira, her director of military intelligence, actually predicted that Israel would not be attacked. Hence, in the author's view, the shortest and most reliable path to surprise by a potential aggressor is to do what his intended victim is convinced he will not do.

An enormous amount of thought has gone into this valuable book. The author does not engage in facile generalizations and guards against them with dozens of nuances and shadings. The quality of his empirical research is impeccable. Yet his conclusions seem to substantiate what commonsense already tells us. And, some of the deeper questions about surprise attack seem to elude him.

Why, for example, did all the aggressors considered by the author expect a quick and easy victory and why did ultimate victory elude them in the end? Hitler and Yamamoto, for example, both came to an ignominious end in 1945, Khrushchev had to withdraw his missiles from Cuba in 1962, and the Yom Kippur War of 1973 ended in neither victory nor defeat.

I would suggest that the author's conceptualization of surprise attack may be incomplete. An aggressor's irrationality may well be a critical factor, indeed at times so crucial that psychology may be more helpful in analysis than strategic thought. Operation Barbarossa, one of the author's case studies, may provide a clue. "Since I struggled through to this decision" (to invade the Soviet Union), Hitler wrote in a revealing letter to Mussolini on June 21, 1941, a few hours before German troops poured into Russia, "I again feel spiritually free. . . . The partnership with the Soviet Union . . . seemed to me to be a break with my whole origin. I am happy now to be relieved of these mental agonies" (*The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* [Greenwich, CT: Fawcett, 1960], 1114-15). In other words, a bottomless and irrational hatred was apparently responsible for Hitler's utterly self-destructive decision to invade. And Stalin, that least trusting and most cunning and devious of men, had apparently placed his trust in the rationality of Hitler, the least rational of men.

The author is to be commended for focusing our attention on the aggressor rather than the victim. This, in and of itself, is a valuable addition to the literature on surprise attack. Yet, the deeper questions—Why the aggressor's expectation of quick victory? and Why his ultimate frustration or defeat?—need to be asked and answered.

JOHN G. STOESSINGER

*Trinity University*

**The Politics of International Debt.** Edited by Miles Kahler (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986. 272p. $9.95, paper).

The authors of these eight essays felt that the politics of international debt had not been discussed enough. Their attempt to rectify this omission resulted in this interesting volume. Miles Kahler sets the tone in the introductory article, which characterizes recent efforts at resolving the debt problem as "cooperation without reform." Kahler also provides a closing article evaluating methods of reforming the system. Both articles are well done, though sometimes overstated. In particular, his assertion (p. 245) that the arguments of other authors are pervaded by the notion that the burden of adjustment should fall on developing countries is patently untrue of some of the articles he cites.

Albert Fishlow provides a historical perspective in his discussion of the debt problems of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, distilling important works that have been neglected in recent years. He then draws out the similarities and differences in the current debt problems. Other researchers have also attempted this task, but not so thoroughly as Fishlow.

Next come two essays on bank behavior. Philip Wellons provides some of the political and cost factors that distinguish banks based in different countries. His main point, however, might best be rephrased as follows: there are no banks whose home country has no influence on their activity; however, there are many banks operating across borders. That is but a modest contribution, which should be well known to those interested in the politics of finance. Benjamin Cohen argues that bank loans have often constrained U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe and the developing countries. For example, he feels that the banks reinforced U.S. influence in the early days of Latin America's problems but were a stumbling block at later stages when they were less willing to continue lending. The argument is quite interesting, but at times comes perilously close to the simplistic notion that foreign policy is much easier when someone else picks up the tab.

Stephen Haggard offers a useful summary of lessons from past International Monetary Fund programs. He points out that authoritarian governments do not have an inherent advantage over democratic governments in successfully implementing stabilization policies. Robert Kaufman, using Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico as models, shows how weak governments can sometimes transcend their limitations when truly creative initiatives are needed. These two articles aptly display the subtle political differences needed for a full understanding of the debt problem.

Charles Lipson provides an excellent summary of the role of international institutions in solving the debt problem. He carefully sets out his thesis that the role of public institutions in handling the debt crisis "is a response to coordination failures among private creditors and is limited by the extent of those failures" (p. 240) but does not go so far as to argue that some new mechanism centered on private institutions is needed.

All the essays in this collection are interesting, and should prove valuable to political scientists and economists alike. While most were previously published during 1985 in the journal, *International Organization*, this book provides a very handy source for those who have not yet read them.

RICHARD P. MATTIONE

*Morgan Guaranty Trust Company*

**Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict.** By Robert W. Komer (Boulder: Westview, 1986. xviii, 174p. $17.50).

As an encyclopedic analysis of many of the military issues raised in the course of the Vietnam War, Komer's book is a must. He focuses on an endless number of technical, tactical, strategic, military and nonmilitary questions concerning the U.S. prosecution of the war. But nowhere is there any broader questioning of the presence of the United States in Southeast Asia. Komer does not deceive in this regard, however. In William Colby's foreord, the thrust is already clear: the Achilles heel of "so many fine policies . . . [is] their execution" (p. xiii).

"Fine" policies, in other words, to cite Colby again, were marred only by inadequate execution. In the first few paragraphs of his first chapter, Komer forecloses any serious discussion of U.S. policy—"Whatever the wisdom of U.S. intervention on the side of South Vietnam. . ." (p. 1)—and reasserts the same argument in Chapter 2: "It is important to look beyond why we intervened to the way we went about it" (p. 9). The author then proceeds to focus, chapter by chapter, on the long list of specific technical, logistic, and mostly military issues noted above. The implicit implication is that if only all of these had been handled better or differently, the war could have been "won."

Komer's book thus details the gap between policy and actual performance, taking his cue from Maxwell Taylor's observation, "One of the facts of life about Vietnam was that it was never difficult to decide what should be done but it was almost impossible to get it done." Komer reviews the inadequacies of the South Vietnamese government, the military mistakes made by the United States, and bureaucratic and institutional inertia. He then presents an extensive list of general as well as very specific policy recommendations. He notes that one constraint for the United States was the "unfamiliar" conflict environment that it found itself in, and the incremental nature of the United States' response to every escalatory move by the opponent. He holds the South Vietnamese government very much to blame for the outcome of the war, even though, as he notes, many U.S. citizens intimately involved in Vietnam knew of the graft and corruption rampant throughout the South Vietnamese government. He also criticizes the U.S. armed forces for devoting so much energy to the technological side of the conflict, when it might have been better "to have devoted a more significant portion of our research to the nature of the conflict and the enemy, his patterns of operation, and better counterinsurgency techniques" (p. 51). Of course, the "rotation" pattern of 6–12 months for command slots also comes under fire, for it was, as Komer notes, "our only war," hence the only opportunity for military officers to get combat experience and concomitant medals. And of course the type of classic example of bureaucratic decision making—probably true in so many cases in the Vietnam situation as elsewhere—is aptly illustrated by Komer: "The Navy and Air Force preferred to use expensive F-4 Phantom jets in Vietnam rather than propellor-driven A-1Es because this way they got more Phantoms for their inventory" (p. 73).

Komer concludes the way he began: regardless of the original reasons for the United States getting involved, "the underlying conclusion . . . is the difficulty encountered by conventional government institutions . . . in responding optimally to such atypical problems as they encountered in the Vietnam war" (p. 159). This difficulty, moreover, goes a long way toward explaining the disparity between the effort mounted and the ambiguous results. Komer presents a long list of "lessons" that might have been learned from the Vietnam War, like "atypical problems demand specially tailored solutions" (p. 166), and "We must select flexible and imaginative conflict managers at all levels" (p. 168). But many of these are either hopelessly vague and general homilies or are so point-specific that they may not apply to any other situation. But more important, especially given current United States' policy in Central America, they are "lessons" that policymakers should have been aware of before the Vietnam involvement.

In other words, totally to bypass the

"original reasons" for our involvement, as Komer does, and to focus instead on the endless series of specific "mistakes"—technical, military, tactical, strategic—is to identify all the dead trees but miss the forest. It is naive to act as if the "original reasons" for involvement are unrelated to or do not affect the ultimate waging of a particular conflict. Politics, ideology, motives and goals—depending on what they are, how rational and realistic they are, and how much popular support they can garner and then sustain—may serve either to constrain or to free decision makers in their prosecution of a conflict. They are directly related to the technical aspects of a war. Komer, as noted already, certainly does not try to mislead on this, and he does an excellent job of focusing on the specifics. But that can also tend to be misleading, for it implies that technical jiggling can change an outcome that may have been doomed because of the original reasons—or lack thereof—for involvement.

MICHAEL P. SULLIVAN

*University of Arizona*

**Verification: How Much Is Enough?** By Allan Krass (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1985. x, 271p. $14.95, paper).

Originally published for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Verification: How Much Is Enough?* is by far the most comprehensive book on the subject of verifying arms-control agreements. It is text that should be studied by arms-control practitioners and scholars alike. Most significant is its recognition and careful analysis of the political dimension of verification.

As a technical term in the vocabulary of arms control, *verification* refers to the process of assessing compliance with international treaty obligations. The process consists of a number of activities including monitoring (i.e., data gathering), information processing, data analysis, and identification of an observed event as a violation or not. A decision then must be made on an appropriate response.

Most prior writing on verification has focused on the monitoring stage of this process, and one can now find in the open literature a surprising amount of technical information on U.S. surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. A very useful summary of this literature is provided by Krass in a lengthy chapter, "The Technology of Verification." What sets the Krass book apart from other studies in the field, however, is the author's care in treating verification as "a complex and intimate interaction between technology and politics" (p. 12).

Both critics and supporters of prior arms-control accords acknowledge that formidable verification difficulties confront arms control today. Some of these difficulties are technical in nature and can be attributed to the fact that innovations in weapons to be monitored often outpace improvements in monitoring systems. Increased modernization and mobility of weapon systems, dual (conventional/nuclear) warhead capabilities, and greater compatibility of delivery systems with multiple launch platforms are among the technological developments that strain national verification capabilities. As Krass points out, technical advances in verification may mitigate these verification problems but are unlikely to resolve them. The benefits to be derived from more intrusive forms of verification (such as on-site inspection), too, are generally exaggerated.

The most complex and difficult-to-resolve problems of verification, Krass believes, are political and psychological in nature. As such, "they are more dependent for their solution on the creation of an appropriate atmosphere within which the compliance process can function" (p. 252). A major contribution of the Krass book is its attention to the environment in which U.S.-Soviet arms-control and verification deliberations take place. "At the root of most of the problems faced by verification," Krass notes, are deeply contradictory attempts by two powerful states to negotiate arms-control agreements even as they work diligently to maintain or enhance the credibility of their military threats against each other" (p. 252).

The picture Krass paints of the future of verification is not a rosy one. Where verification was once seen as a means to build public support for arms control, it now all too often serves as a political instrument for its obstruction. Nevertheless, by detailing the differences, as well as the points of convergence in U.S. and Soviet perspectives on verification, Krass suggests areas where verification and arms control may yet prosper.

William C. Potter

*University of California, Los Angeles*

**Marxism and International Relations.** By Vendulka Kubalkova and Albert Cruickshank (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985. 281p. $19.95).

This book addresses an important question that has not so far received an adequate answer: is there a Marxist theory of international relations? The question is important for practical as well as theoretical reasons because of the impact Marxism has had upon world politics in the twentieth century. Marxists as political leaders have been willy-nilly practitioners of international relations, however imperfect their theoretical formulations. There is a problem for theory because the classical Marxian literature did not directly address the nature of the state and interstate relations. Twentieth-century Marxist literature has made considerable efforts to fill the gap as regards the state, but it has so far done little to deal with interstate relations. Imperialism and *dependencia* have had little bearing on superpower confrontation.

The authors begin by acknowledging three main intellectual traditions in international relations: the Hobbesian, focusing entirely upon the state; the Kantian, concerned ultimately with the universal community of mankind and with the state only as a mediating element; and the Grotian, which recognizes states but sees them as restricted by law and institutions. The authors see the Marxist tradition as closest to the Kantian, insofar as Marx envisaged the ultimate withering away of the state and the attainment of a nonalienated human community. The Kantian tradition is, however, basically ahistorical, concerned with timeless natural right. Much international relations theorizing in the Hobbesian tradition is also ahistorical insofar as it attempts to make statements about interstate behavior across time and space. Marxism is, by contrast, a theory of history that sees institutions, behavior, and theories as changing products of history. There could, accordingly, be no Marxist theory of international relations but only a sociology of international relations that takes explicit account of the historical specificity of forms of state and structures of interstate relations.

So far so good. The authors have defined the problem. There are several ways it might be confronted. One would be to write a Marxist interpretation of international relations. This they do not attempt. Rather they adopt two other approaches. One is to consider as Marxist international relations the international behavior of states that have proclaimed themselves to be Marxist, or rather the doctrines of such states, not their actual behavior. The other is to give an account of the views of Marxist "professors," that is, theoreticians not responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs.

The account of Marxist state doctrines is the more interesting and useful part. What it does is underline the theoretical flimsiness of "actually existing" Marxism in this sphere. Class, which for Marx was the central category, becomes a metaphor emptied of its original substance. Initially, with Bukharin, the class struggle is projected onto the world scale, with different groups of states becoming class champions. This position, which became incorporated into Soviet thinking, still retains some semblance of a relationship between Marxian class definitions and the state system. The semblance is totally lost when the proletarian/bourgeois cleavage becomes simply a poor/rich cleavage and a virtually nonexistent proletariat is replaced by the peasantry or the more amorphous "wretched of the earth," and when even these vaguely class-related notions become replaced by that of the "proletarian nation." Marxism at this point has become nothing more than a slogan. The study of state doctrines for a clue to a Marxist theory of international relations, though interesting, has here reached a dead end.

The account of the "professors' " views is the more disappointing part of the book. It is little more than a series of summaries of the variety of Marxist or near-Marxist positions having some relevancy to international relations theory. Amongst these, Gramsci is given some prominence as one who "does appear to have widened, and smoothed the path (if not opened several possible alternative avenues) by which International Relations may 'arrive' in Marxism" (p. 204). But the authors fall short of doing justice to Gramsci and leave the reader with a sense of uncertainty (reflected in the tentative style of the above quotation) as to the answer they give to the question they confronted at the outset.

This reviewer hopes they will regard their present book as but a preliminary effort to be followed by a more analytical treatment of the problems, in both theory and practice, of bringing a Marxist perspective to bear upon international relations. In this effort, Gramsci would be a good starting point.

This book will be useful to students, given the paucity of material available. The bibliography both includes a wide range of tangential references and shows how few are the works that give a Marxist view of international relations.

ROBERT W. COX

*York University, Toronto*

**The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemmas of Human Rights Policy.** By Joshua Muravchik (Lanham, MD: Hamilton, 1986. xxii, 247p. $18.95).

A reader might reasonably expect to find a certain ideological slant in a book written by a former aide to Senators Henry Jackson and Daniel Patrick Moynihan (Joshua Muravchik), introduced by Jeane Kirkpatrick, and assisted in publication by Midge Decter. For the most part, this book on human rights and U.S. foreign policy under Jimmy Carter fits the expectation.

Muravchik starts with a superficial and incomplete overview of the Carter record, then focuses on four themes: whether the issue of human rights can transcend the East-West ideological struggle or must be part of it; whether the United States should base its human-rights policy on international law or on the U.S. tradition; whether U.S. human-rights policy can be consistent; and whether that policy should rely on punitive steps for implementation.

The best of these treatments pertains to the question of consistency. The chapter in question is nonideological, empirical, informative, and persuasive up to a point. It argues that the Carter human-rights policy was inconsistent because there was no central conception behind the policy. Thus when the human-rights policy conflicted with other interests, the conflict was resolved in an erratic way. As Muravchik writes, "In sum, of the five reason [*sic*] for inconsistency that are most often cited in discussions of human rights policy, the one whose effect was by far the most powerful on the Carter administration was the conflict between human rights and its other foreign policy goals" (p. 148).

This conclusion, however, does not fit very well with other parts of the book. In particular, it does not justify the emphasis placed on the personnel Carter appointed to the new human-rights bureau. The author argues that Carter erred when he appointed personnel from the McGovern wing of the party to the exclusion of the Jackson wing in staffing that bureau. It was not the McGovernite nature of personnel that made for problems, however, but rather the failure of any human-rights team to win policy debates systematically or within a set conceptual framework. Moreover, a number of decisions, especially on human rights and economic assistance, were made by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher in a coordinating committee given his name. Muravchik's analysis sheds little light on the decisions reached by Christopher, and it certainly cannot be sustained that the lawyerly Christopher was a McGovernite.

Muravchik argues that a policy must strive for consistency to maintain its moral integrity. Although this argument has merit, this work fails to address competing arguments that also have merit, directly. David Owen, former British foreign secretary, has argued from practical experience that any foreign policy will necessarily be inconsistent on human rights (*Human Rights* [Topsfield, MA: Jonathan Cape, 1978]). And Stanley Hoffmann has argued that beyond a minimum consistency, there should be inconsistency tailored to particular situations (*Duties beyond Borders* [Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1981]).

Beyond the issue of consistency, Muravchik is largely predictable, ideological, and unpersuasive to this reviewer. As for human rights and political systems, like his mentors in the Senate, he understands human rights basically as part of the East-West ideological struggle. Human rights means Western democracy and is thus a useful weapon in calling attention to deficiencies in Communist countries. He is critical of the Carter administration for not doing that consistently and vigorously.

Interestingly, he acknowledges that it would be reasonable to prefer Communist Yugoslavia to Idi Amin's Uganda, but he dismisses such comparisons (and does not broaden his analysis to compare Hungary with Guatemala, China with Chile, etc.). Instead, Muravchik prefers comparisons based on "level of carnage" (p. 60). Because Stalin and Pol Pot killed many, this is taken as proof that communism is the worst violator of human rights. Certain Soviet-model political systems surely have a poor record on human rights, but the Argentine junta hardly fared better. Moreover, Stalin and Pol Pot can be differentiated from Alexander Dubcek, Robert Mugabe, and other Marxist leaders in a number of ways pertinent to human rights. Still further, there are a number of ways to evaluate human rights apart from the number of political deaths.

Muravchik, like former Ambassador Kirkpatrick, is obsessed with U.S. power in the world, seeing Carter's human-rights policy as a means of weakening the United States in its struggle with Soviet-led communism—especially since Carter's policy focused heavily on anti-Communist dictators in Latin America. This concern sometimes distorts analysis in this book. Muravchik writes of members of Congress interested in human rights: "the main impetus behind the growth of punitive measures was the desire not to advance human rights but to diminish American influence" (pp. 225–26). This will come as a great surprise to many mainstream members of both parties in both houses who have insisted on U.S. attention to human rights precisely to exercise power in the world, albeit in as humane a way as possible. Likewise, the author distorts the human-rights lobbying network in Washington, focusing on a few lobbies in order to repeat the claim that they were primarily interested in reducing U.S. power. When one examines the full range of lobbying in behalf of human rights, including action by the likes of Amnesty International and Americas Watch, one cannot seriously maintain the argument that the groups were primarily or really interested in a diminution of U.S. power.

Related to his argument about political systems is Muravchik's argument about international law. Unlike Senator Moynihan, who has written powerfully in support of international law (*Loyalties* [New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1984]), the author is contemptuous of the international law on human rights, regarding it as the product of hypocrisy, unenforceable, and entailing objectionable socioeconomic rights. The most charitable thing that can be said of this section of the book is that the author is uninformed on basic information and unpersuasive in interpretation. He shows no awareness of how once nonbinding international norms can become binding over time, as illustrated for example, by U.S. federal courts (*Pena v. Filartiga*). His argument that there is no body of binding human-rights law overlooks the fact that about half of the member states of the United Nations have adhered to the Covenants on Civil and Political, and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. It strains credulity when he suggests that the Carter administration endorsed socioeconomic rights in order to court favor with the Third World and to satisfy the State Department's "clientitus" (p. 92). His attacks on socioeconomic human rights never mention that all the other industrialized democracies have found them compatible with their liberalism.

Having dispensed with international law on human rights, the author is left with a crusade in defense of U.S. tradition as a basis for U.S. human-rights policy. This becomes most clear toward the end of the book. "If we Americans cherish our human rights, and if we share with America's Founders the belief that these rights are 'unalienable' or that they are goods with which people have been 'endowed by their Creator,' then it is certainly morally permissible, probably even morally obligatory, that we do what we can within reason to help other people to secure theirs" (p. 222). A little later this becomes "America's mission" (p. 235). A reader may be forgiven for wondering at times whether the book is a justification for the Spanish-American War or Woodrow Wilson's mythical crusade for democracy, rather than an interpretation of Carter's human-rights policy.

Finally, the chapter on punitive measures is thin. The author does not like them, and, as noted above, he is critical of Congress and human-rights lobbies for pushing them. At another point, however, the author notes that Carter's threatened sanctions against the military of the Dominican Republic kept the soldiers in their barracks and preserved democracy there (p. 198). He does not analyze the impact of congressional pressures on the Guatemalan junta, which were eventually successful when joined with other pressures from public and private agencies. He entirely omits attention to the importance of the political symbolism of economic sanctions in places like South Africa. As David Baldwin has noted (*Economic Statecraft* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985]), economic sanctions can be politically useful even if they do not totally control a situation. United States disassociation from a repressive regime may be neither isolationism nor a diminution of U.S. power, but rather a useful policy tool. All of this is not to deny the author's point that there may be a place for positive approaches to promoting human rights.

In sum, *The Uncertain Crusade* will be popular reading among Reaganite ideologues. (One of them recommended the book to me during a recent interview.) They will like Muravchik's assertions that "U.S. influence in . . . countries is generally a force for liberalization" (p. 69), however much that may contradict the facts in Nicaragua, the Philippines, Guatemala, Liberia, and elsewhere. They will like his view that Carter had a "commitment to a policy of national self-effacement" (p. 70). They will like his unvarnished nationalism, as well as his acceptance of the Kirkpatrick doctrine in favor of authoritarians rather than totalitarians. They may not like the more balanced segments, where he analyzes the problem of consistency (because the second Reagan administration appears to be just as inconsistent as Carter), or where he observes that Carter policy was not single-mindedly anti-Shah, or where he notes that the Somozisdinistas are probably better than the Somozistas in terms of human rights. These balanced parts will be of use to scholars. Otherwise, one can only say that he has put forward his theses clearly. That is helpful as one formulates a reaction to his mostly unpersuasive interpretations.

DAVID P. FORSYTHE

*University of Nebraska, Lincoln*

**Sword and Shield: The Soviet Intelligence and Security Apparatus.** By Jeffrey t. Richelson (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1986. xix, 279p. $39.95, cloth; $16.95, paper).

Jeffrey Richelson has gathered information about Soviet intelligence from numerous sources into a compact yet comprehensive and well-organized volume, clearly written and crammed with details. Subjects covered include human and technical collection, counterintelligence and internal security, covert action, theft of Western technology, Soviet use of other Communist intelligence agencies, and the organizational structure of both the Committee of State Security's Main Radio Administration (KGB/GRU) and the national-security establishment they serve. It will be useful for reference, for review, and in courses needing a single volume treatment of Soviet intelligence.

For those familiar with the subject, however, there is nothing new. The book draws entirely on published accounts by others —journalists, scholars, defectors, the CIA, and so on. It is an exercise in open-source collection. Any doubts one has about the accuracy and reliability of these sources on such a murky subject must necessarily apply to this book.

Missing is any analysis of the information collected. For instance, the reason for the Soviet preoccupation with intelligence is not addressed. Is it mainly a carryover of traditional Russian insecurity or a peculiarly Soviet phenomenon? Perhaps it reflects the Soviet system's conception of politics as subterranean, that is, that everything of importance happens well beneath the surface. Or maybe the gargantuan scale of Soviet intelligence reflects a bureaucratic penchant for growth within a congenial system and political culture, the explanation so often issued for other overblown aspects of Soviet officialdom.

Weaknesses or limitations of Soviet intelligence are also not assessed. One wonders if Soviet efforts aren't damaged by their scale and ubiquity, casting suspicion on almost any Russian abroad. Russian use of Cuban and East European intelligence is marred by the compromise of Soviet operations through defectors from, and Western penetration of, those agencies. The Soviet emphasis on Humint magnifies defection, double-agent, and bad-publicity problems and seems odd in view of improvements in Soviet technical collection capabilities and the richness of open sources in the West.

Richelson is excellent on how much can be learned from those open sources but says little about their limitations—the staggering volume of information, much contradictory, much worthless. And because Soviet exposure to such information is so controlled, more "learning" from open sources must be done by intelligence agencies. This is a burden for which their organizational character and expertise are not particularly appropriate, immersed as they are (like intelligence agencies everywhere) in bureaucratic complexities, compartmentalization, and institutionalized paranoia. "Open" sources may be rather opaque to closed agencies in a closed society.

The concluding chapter does raise an important matter of an analytical sort, but only very briefly. Richelson suggests Soviet intelligence need not cause grave concern. It doesn't permit a Soviet strategic surprise attack, doesn't truly manipulate Western peace groups, can't decisively deceive Western intelligence, can't make a crucial difference by stealing our technology. Therefore we must not overreact in ways that compromise our liberties and values. This is a welcome conclusion, but it is not an analysis that the details in the book would lead us to adopt.

The paucity of analysis is not mentioned here as a reproach. The book does what Richelson obviously set out to do, namely compile information. But it is clear that we have far to go in nailing down the significance and meaning the information he has amassed.

PATRICK M. MORGAN

*Washington State University*

**Technology Transfer and East-West Relations.** Edited by Mark E. Schaffer (New York: St. Martin's, 1985. 273p. $39.95).

The product of a 1983 London School of Economics Conference, this book is one of several recent edited volumes on the economics and politics of East-West trade prompted by the dispute between the United States and its allies over the construction of the Urengoi natural-gas pipeline from the Soviet Union to Western Europe. Many of its arguments are similar to those found in volumes like Gordon Smith's *The Politics of East-West Trade* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984) and Bruce Parrott's *Trade, Technology, and Soviet-American Relations* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985). What distinguishes this collection is its uniquely European perspective and its uniformly critical evaluation of U.S. policies.

The first series of questions the authors pose concerns the impact of Western technology on the Soviet economy. Stanislaw Gomulka and Alastair McAuley agree that socialism inhibits innovation. The real deficiency of the Soviet economy does not lie in basic research, but in the systemic impediments to the diffusion of new technology. The impact of Western technology is limited, according to McAuley, because of its "failure to provoke a creative response" (p. 47) in an innovation-averse environment. Julian Cooper criticizes "Western technology fetishism," downplays the significance of Western imports in Soviet economic growth and highlights the net resource-demanding effect of Western imports. Each ruble of imported technology costs the Soviet Union an additional two–three rubles in capital investment. David Holloway shows how, despite its technological backwardness in the military sector, the Soviet Union designs around its own shortcomings to achieve good operational performance. The Western technology of most interest to the Soviet military is microelectronics. Holloway, like the others, concludes that despite the attraction of Western technology for the Soviet system, one should not overestimate its importance for Soviet economic development because of the USSR's strong indigenous research and development base. The Reagan administration incorrectly believes that a rigorous strategic embargo can bring the Soviet economy to its knees.

Stephen Woolcock addresses the question of how to frame a realistic, effective Western East-West technology-transfer policy. He lucidly details the problems but, like others who have tackled these issues, finds the answers elusive. U.S. and European approaches toward East-West economic relations are fundamentally incompatible, largely because of basic political differences over how to deal with the Soviets. Moreover, the United

States, with less at stake economically but with primary responsibility for Western security, has stressed the strategic danger of East-West economic ties that strengthen the Soviet military-industrial complex. The Europeans, with more at stake economically and less responsibility for Western security, have emphasized the mutual commercial advantages of East-West trade. There is, therefore, an inherent tension between the U.S. leadership role in policy-making on strategic issues and European desires for equality in determining commercial policy. The Reagan administration's imposition of extraterritorial pipeline sanctions, which affected the United States' allies more than the Soviet Union, was particularly destructive for allied cooperation.

Hugh Macdonald, in the liveliest and most controversial chapter of the book, attacks the policies of those in the Reagan administration "whose claims to scientific rigor are in fact rooted in deformed theology" (p. 208). In his criticism of the strategic embargo, MacDonald makes a number of questionable assertions. For instance, he states that the size of the Soviet defense effort is directly related to that of the West. How would he explain the fact that in the 1970s, at the height of detente, while the United States cut back on defense spending, the Soviets forged ahead with an unprecedented military buildup? He also claims that since the Cuban missile crisis, "everything points to an enduring Soviet sense of—circumspection" (p. 226). Are we to interpret Soviet activities in Angola and Ethiopia and the invasion of Afghanistan as examples of "circumspection"? Although MacDonald's attack on U.S. technology-transfer policy contains some provocative and valid insights, it is flawed by his refusal to concede that the Soviet Union does present a security challenge, if not a threat, to the West.

There is a consensus in this book that the United States, which has exaggerated the impact of Western technology on the Soviet Union, must modify its strategic embargo if it is ever to achieve viable cooperation with its allies. On the other hand, one might also argue (although noone in this book does) that the Europeans must be more receptive to U.S. security concerns if the West is ever to arrive at a coherent and workable policy.

ANGELA E. STENT

*Georgetown University*

**Dominant Powers and Subordinate States: The United States in Latin America and the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe.** Edited by Jan F. Triska (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986. vi, 506p. $57.50, cloth; $16.95, paper).

Here is a wide ranging and thoughtful volume skillfully edited by Jan Triska of Stanford University. Many of the contributors are international relations generalists, but there are a few specialists on both Latin America and Eastern Europe, including the USSR. In general, the authors seek neither to defend nor to attack dominance but to analyze its origins, instrumentalities, costs, and impacts cooly.

The book's most important contributions are contained in its conclusions, concisely summarized by the editor at the end of the volume. The first is that "domination, as practiced in the past, is no longer in the national interest of dominant powers." Certainly, that is true for the United States, especially when national interest is conceived as embracing the entire society. Yet that does not seem to be the view of large sectors of the U.S. public who are still enamored of the United States being "Number One" as if that had some kind of intrinsic value of its own without reference to purposes, implications, and consequences.

The U.S. public has usually been unwilling to look U.S. hegemony squarely in the face and certainly has been unwilling to discuss it in the same breath as Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. The Triska volume should help bring some reality into the public dialogue on this subject. U.S. citizens should not be surprised that Washington has dominated other countries. All great powers have done so. Hegemony, or domination, is more the result of disparities in power, that is, of the structure of relationships, than the personalities or policies of particular governments. Recognition of the history and nature of hegemony makes it neither desirable nor right but it does help various actors cope with it more effectively.

With reservations I agree with the book's conclusion that domination is no longer in the *national* interest of the Soviet Union. Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, for example, has been costly, and the Eastern Europeans' bitterness and hate of Soviet interference will some day come home to roost. But Soviet domination of the area appears essential to the security of the ruling Soviet elite and their control over their restive populations. My conversations with Soviet officials make it plain that, whatever their personal preferences, Soviet control of Eastern Europe is a sine qua non of the present regime.

The second conclusion is that "the dominant powers will eventually have to yield, however grudgingly, to the subordinate states." Certainly, that process appears to be underway in the Caribbean Basin where the United States has so far decided that armed attack by its regular forces would be too high a price for military control of Cuba and Nicaragua and possibly that military occupation of these two countries would not be viable. The question arises whether a compromise with these two governments might suit U.S. interests more than the existing situation.

Prospects for greater autonomy in Eastern Europe do not seem promising in the near term. While the USSR might like to reduce tensions and its economic burdens, the taste of greater independence might whet appetites beyond Soviet control. As Triska makes clear, greater autonomy is more likely to be wrong at great effort from the USSR rather than granted as an act of grace.

Part 1 deals with historical comparisons in chapters by Jeffrey L. Hughes, Robert Wesson, and James R. Kurth. Part 2 covers concepts and theories with chapters by David B. Abernethy, Paul Keal, Gabriel A. Almond, and Jeffrey L. Hughes. Parts 3 and 4 treat the domination powers (David D. Finley, Terry Karl, Richard R. Fagen, Condoleezza Rice, and Jiri Valenta) and subordinate states (Paul M. Johnson, Robert A. Packenham, and Jeffrey L. Hughes). Part 5 discusses spheres of influence with chapters by Paul Marer and Kazimierz Z. Poznanski, Richard Ned Lebow, and Michael I. Handel.

*Dominant Powers and Subordinate States* is the most measured, comprehensive, and authoritative book on this subject and is likely to remain so for a long time.

COLE BLASIER

*University of Pittsburgh*

---

**Revolution and Foreign Policy in Nicaragua.** By Mary B. Vanderlaan (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986. xiii, 404p. $29.95).

This volume is a useful addition to the large and ever growing body of literature on Sandinista Nicaragua. Some aspects of Nicaragua's foreign policy and international relations—its strained and deteriorating relationship with the United States, the Contadora effort, Nicaragua's growing relationship (diplomatic, military hardware and training, and development assistance) with Cuba, the USSR, and Soviet allies in Eastern Europe—have been dealt with extensively in the media, in the speeches of public officials, and in various scholarly books, as well as books aimed at a wider, more popular audience. The Vanderlaan book looks at Nicaragua's foreign policy and international relations in their totality, exploring aspects that have not been touched on by other works.

At the outset, the author makes the important point—albeit not original with her, yet still of importance—that "the Sandinista revolution was, among other things, a reaction to the history of United States–Nicaraguan relations" (p. 3). That point is not adequately comprehended in Washington. If it had been, the United States almost certainly would have taken a different tack toward Nicaragua.

The book is divided into four parts. Part 1 offers a survey of Sandinista Nicaragua's foreign policy and international objectives. It makes clear that Nicaragua's foreign-policy behavior and objectives—expanded diplomatic contacts, greater independence, diversification of relationships of dependency—is very much in line with what most Latin American countries are doing or trying to do. If the reviewer reads this and other parts of the book correctly, the Sandinista ideal would have been to avoid the substantial reliance on Cuba, the USSR, and Eastern Europe that is increasingly a Nicaraguan reality. What the Sandinistas apparently desired was a much more diversified complex of international relationships.

Part 2 explores the domestic constraints on the foreign policy of post-Somoza Nicaragua. It describes the country's new political structures and the internal policies of the new regime. Detailed attention is given to the economic constraints facing the Sandinistas and the internal opposition to the government and the internal opposition's external allies.

Part 3 is concerned with the international constraints. These are mainly U.S.-imposed: the general U.S. hostility to the current Nicaraguan government, the mining of Nicaraguan harbors, the backing of the "Contras" and their activities, and pressures on U.S. allies to withhold aid of both an economic and a military sort to Nicaragua. This part also treats the Latin American and Western European reaction to the Sandinistas. What emerges from these chapters, as well as earlier ones, is that U.S. hostility and U.S.-backed "Contra" action has hampered the Nicaraguan socioeconomic reforms. Indeed, the impact of that action has been far more socioeconomic than military.

Part 4 details the patterns of Nicaragua's foreign policy. The theme in these chapters is that Sandinista international behavior is guided by pragmatism and what might be termed the politics of survival—the latter no small task in the face of substantial and sustained U.S. antagonism. Externally, Nicaragua has *not* been guided by a preconceived leftist stance. As Vanderlaan describes it, Nicaragua has done remarkably well at both pragmatism and survival, especially for a very small, very weak state.

The book is the product of much research and interviewing in Nicaragua as well as a thorough survey of the secondary literature. It is definitely sympathetic to Sandinista Nicaragua. But the book is not an apologia, nor is it so biased as to lack credibility. The author sees flaws and problems as well as more positive factors.

Vanderlaan has produced a thoughtful, well-researched, and well-written book.

JAMES D. COCHRANE

*Tulane University*

**From Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis: Foreign Aid and Development Choices in the World Economy.** By Robert E. Wood (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986. xviii, 400p. $32.50, cloth; $11.95, paper).

The scope of this book includes not only foreign aid—as that topic is narrowly construed, encompassing bilateral government assistance—but also private loans to third world countries, and multilateral assistance from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Its survey of these topics is impressive in detail and thoroughness. It carefully narrates the evolution of financial relations between the industrialized and nonindustrialized nations beginning with the early post-World War II period of the Marshall Plan and continuing up through the debt crises of the early 1980s. If you are looking for a chronology of these topics, this is the book for you. If, on the other hand, you are looking for central themes, points, or conclusions about the profoundly important topics of aid, debt, and other international financial policies, you will have to look elsewhere.

No author should have to suffer reproach for failing to accomplish something he had no intention of doing. In the case of *From Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis,* however, the author explicitly has more in mind than pure narrative. It is, in fact, the enormity of his ambition that cripples his achievement. In the introduction, he states, "I have sought to identify the overall way that access to concessional external financing is structured and to link that structure to the issue of development options and choices in the Third World" (p. xiv). Hunting for something as illusory as "the overall way" that concessional financing takes place is bound to result in a description of "the way" so general and amorphous as to be nothing more than a thin conceptual veneer over a base of factual narrative.

The author attempts to present a coherent structure of the immensely complicated subject by drawing upon the body of concepts called "regime analysis" and "world systems" (p. xiv). Using these concepts results in unnecessarily awkward side trips. For example, one characteristic of "regimes" is that they have "norms." The foreign-aid regime does indeed, have norms, such as "regional withholding" (p. 116). The author's point, as we eventually discover, is that the U.S. government resisted giving much foreign aid to Latin America in the 1950s because, the government argued, Latin America had access to adequate capital through private foreign investment. Classifying this policy as a regime norm leads to neither analysis nor evaluation. It is just an excessively complicated way of describing U.S. policy.

Elsewhere, the author discusses the role of the U.S. government's Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), touching upon the question of just how much additional foreign investment is produced because of the availability of OPIC's political risk insurance. He refers to an apparently definitive piece of evidence: "One study of investment plans turned down by OPIC found that 97 percent of their projected value was not subsequently invested" (p. 165). Curiously, this study has no identification: no footnote, no source, no time frame, nothing. Given the author's meticulous footnoting elsewhere and given the fact that the "additionality" of OPIC's insurance remains a hotly debated policy question, the lack of a source here is frustrating, to say the least.

Similarly, at the very end of the book, Wood engages in dalliance with relevance once again. He speaks of the dynamic mutual interaction between the constraints of the international financial system (or "regime" if you will) on the one hand, and the developments of democracy or authoritarianism in the Third World (p. 326). This is, without doubt, a profoundly important question, surely worth more than a paragraph.

MICHAEL K. O'LEARY

*Syracuse University*

## POLITICAL ECONOMY

**Fighting Poverty: What Works and What Doesn't.** Edited by Sheldon H. Danziger and Daniel H. Weinberg (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. 419p. $27.50).

Taking their cue from Ronald Reagan's fascination with the *Reader's Digest* account of a welfare recipient living well in a New York hotel, a number of studies purport to reinforce this view of what is happening in the current war on poverty. Although the flawed designs of Charles Murray's *Losing Ground* or David Stockman's Office of Management and Budget report on poverty increases are transparent, there has been no important body of research seriously challenging the Reagan ideology until now.

Virtually all the studies included in *Fighting Poverty* represent profound insights into the basic issues of poverty policy—the status of welfare programs and their effects (Gary Burtless); impacts of antipoverty strategies on the poor *and the nonpoor* (Sheldon Danziger, Robert H. Haveman, and Robert D. Plotnick); welfare effectiveness and disincentives (David T. Ellwood and Lawrence Summers); health care (Paul Starr); job training (Laurie J. Bassi and Orley Ashenfelter); education (Nathan Glazer); how inflation, recession, and other features of the economy affect the poor (Rebecca M. Blank and Alan S. Blinder); family structure (Mary Jo Bane; William Julius Wilson and Kathryn M. Neckerman); legal rights (Michael R. Sosin); racial discrimination (Charles V. Hamilton and Dona C. Hamilton); and public opinion on poverty issues (Hugh Heclo). These studies also benefit from commentaries by Christopher Jenks, Edward M. Gramlich, and Daniel H. Weinberg. The reader will note that many of these contributors have well-established reputations as being among the most knowledgeable scholars of the topics addressed. Several of the less-known scholars have made stunning contributions to this volume.

Each contribution offers a review and critique of important research bearing on the various topics over the last decade. These bibliographic essays and the massive bibliography alone are worth the price of the book. Yet, in addition, many of the authors present original analyses of data and reach original conclusions that cast considerable doubt on the growing conventional wisdom of poverty policy. The research is carefully crafted and highly persuasive. It is precisely these findings that need wider dissemination and attention of the mass media if U.S. policymakers are to reach a more realistic appraisal of the true parameters of poverty in the United States.

A common theme of the work is viewing the past 10 years as a period of social experimentation in what works and what doesn't in treating the poverty problem. These experiments have been carried out largely at the expense of the poor, and the lessons purchased at such a price should not be lost:

> Although total outlays for the poor have continued to mount, all of the recent rise is attributable to inflation and rising poverty. . . . None of the rise has been due to more generous government provision for the low-income population. (Burtless, 18).
>
> The first lesson is that the income support strategy of the past two decades has worked. Providing cash and in-kind transfers has reduced the extent of both poverty and income disparities across age and racial groups. . . . Rather modest efficiency losses have resulted. (Danziger, Haveman, and Plotnick, 74).
>
> Decent health care for the poor is not a fiscal impossibility, nor a political impossibility, unless we become utterly resigned to a kind of national incompetence in public policy. (Starr, 132).
>
> There is very little justification for low AFDC benefits or for the enormous variations across states. (Ellwood and Summers, 97)
>
> Programs providing intensive (and expensive) investment in each participant, such as the Job Corps and Supported Work Demonstration, have, at least for some groups of the disadvantaged, more than paid for themselves from a society-wide point of view. (Bassi and Ashenfelter, 148).
>
> We know enough . . . to suggest that greater resources would be most usefully spent in preschools and elementary schools . . . that more poor minority youth will be able to get through high school. (Glazer, 172).
>
> Despite many denunciations of inflation as the cruelest tax, there is little doubt that unemployment, not inflation, actually bears most heavily on the poor. (Blank and Blinder, 183)
>
> To sum up, this research indicates that welfare receipt or benefit levels have no effect on the incidence of out-of-wedlock births. (Wilson and Neckerman, 251)
>
> Despite Americans' endorsement of free enterprise and many antigovernmental attitudes with respect to the economy, one of the most enduring findings is the continual public support for government guarantees of a job for all those who want to work. (Heclo, 331)

As a summary of the best research on poverty, this is an extremely important work. In addition to its profound contributions to thinking about poverty policy, it establishes an agenda for future research. It also offers a retrospective analysis of what has and has not worked in the past from a more manageable perspective toward the War on Poverty. The conclusion is that it was more successful than we have been led to believe. Students of poverty policy must be intensely grateful to the Institute for Research on Poverty for producing this book.

ROBERT B. ALBRITTON

*Northern Illinois University*

**Foundations of Social Choice Theory.** Edited by Jon Elster and Aanund Hylland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. viii, 250p. $32.50).

The editors of *Foundations of Social Choice Theory* worry that "formal theorizing in the social sciences is today in some danger of becoming baroque" (p. 1). Their hope is that this collection of essays on various topics in social-choice theory will contribute to shifting discussion towards foundational issues.

Two of the contributors, Brian Barry and Jon Elster, are especially critical of social-choice theory and find much of it misguided and mistaken. Barry's essay focuses on Amartya Sen's well-known "liberal paradox" and argues that there is no conflict between liberalism properly understood and Pareto efficiency, and that social-choice theory neglects both the rights and the duties of actors. These claims, as well as others, are criticized by Aanund Hylland and Sen in their essays. Barry's contribution suffers from a surfeit of points and claims, some of which are mistaken if intended as criticisms of the literature (e.g., a literal reading of '$x$ is socially preferred to $y$'). This is unfortunate, as some of the issues about liberty and rights that he raises are important. (The matter of the *liberal* nature of Sen's "paradox" deserves further discussion. Sen notes that the problem is at least in part one of instability [p. 227], which raises the question as to whether the paradox is a special case of a more general instability problem having nothing specifically to do, as Barry claims, with liberalism.)

Although very interesting and suggestive, Jon Elster's contribution is equally vulnerable to criticism. Most of the charges he lays against social-choice theory do not stick, as Sen effectively shows. Elster accuses social-choice theory of confusing "the kind of behavior that is appropriate in the market place and that which is appropriate in the forum" (p. 111). Sen's concluding judgment seems right: "Elster's criticism of social choice theory turns out to be inappropriate not because he is wrong in counting certain constraints as unjustified, but because he wrongly attributes these constraints to social choice theory" (p. 236).

Robert Goodin, in his essay, "Laundering Preferences," argues that social-choice theory can exclude certain preferences without having recourse to nonutility information. Sen and others have criticized "welfarism," the view that social states are to be evaluated solely in terms of utility information, arguing that reference to nonutility information is necessary. Goodin persuasively argues that perverse and meddlesome preferences can often be excluded on the basis of various "want-regarding" considerations.

John Roemer is critical of welfarism and sketches "an historical materialist alternative." He proposes ranking social states in terms of "socially unnecessary exploitation": a distribution with less socially unnecessary exploitation is better than one with more. The notion of *exploitation* is characterized in terms of the core of a game: a coalition of agents is exploited, at a given allocation, if that allocation is not in the core, that is, if the members of that coalition could better their positions by withdrawing from the economy. Different concepts of *exploitation* are defined in terms of the withdrawal rules of different games. *Feudal exploitation* is defined by the game permitting a coalition to withdraw taking with it only its endowment; *capitalist exploitation* by the game permitting a coalition's withdrawal with its per capita share of the alienable assets of society (e.g., the means of production); and *socialist exploitation* by the game permitting a coalition's withdrawal with its per capita share of society's inalienable assets (e.g., skills) as well. This conception of *exploitation* may not fully capture intuitive and Marxist notions; it nonetheless is the basis for richer notions of *efficiency* and provides an interesting alternative to existing social-choice theory. Sen claims that the theory should be able to make room for such alternatives (p. 223), although some of the requisite changes (e.g., dropping the condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives) would radically transform current theory.

Two essays, by the philosophers Allan Gibbard and Donald Davidson, discuss issues having to do with interpersonal comparisons of utility and interests. While the use of social-choice theory for the study of choice institutions (e.g., voting mechanisms) characteristically does not make use of such information, other uses (e.g., making "social-welfare judgments") do. Insofar as the question of the nature of interpersonal judgments is foundational for these uses of social-choice theory, inclusion of these papers in this collection is warranted.

Gibbard argues in favor of a concept of the good of a person or of "the intrinsic reward of life" to serve as the standard for utilitarian social-welfare judgments. He argues that alternative candidates for standards of welfare (e.g., ideally informed or self-interested preferences) are inadequate, and he consequently favors the concept of *intrinsic reward.* It is this concept, Gibbard stresses, and not that of interpersonal comparison, that is most problematic for normative social-choice theory. Without it, notions of *prudence* and even of *rationality* become problematic. Without endorsing all of Gibbard's arguments, his essay can be recommended especially to those who remain skeptical of the very possibility of interpersonal judgments.

For radical skeptics, as well as for those interested in the *basis* of interpersonal judgments, Davidson's essay, "Judging Interpersonal Interests," is required reading. Davidson argues that the very process by which we attribute beliefs, desires, preferences, and the like to others makes interpersonal judgments. Thus the basis for such judgments is to be found in these attributions. Beliefs and desires explain intentional behavior. In interpreting the beliefs and other propositional attitudes of another, one assigns propositions to those attitudes (e.g., "*A* believes or desires that *p*"). In so doing we make use, and must make use, of propositions available *to us*. Comparisons are unavoidable in the very process of attribution. (Further, these comparisons are not, Davidson argues, "normative.") The argument of Davidson's essay is subtle and makes use of ideas familiar to philosophers amongst whom his work is well known.

The collection does succeed in raising foundational issues about social-choice theory, as well as of much formal theory generally. Unavoidably some of the essays are flawed, and some foundational issues are neglected. The volume as a whole could have been better, I believe, had the editors written a lengthy introduction characterizing social-choice theory in general terms, relating it systematically to other types of formal theory (e.g., welfare economics, game theory). Such a characterization is difficult, to say the least, and the surveys and analyses provided by Hylland and Sen in their contributions are very helpful to this end. Nonetheless, something more general and systematic than the editors' brief and somewhat idiosyncratic introduction would have been useful, at the very least, to establish a common framework for the contributors (some of whom attended the conference in Ustaoset, Norway where the volume originated). With such an introduction, the volume would be useful to a wider audience; as it is, it is accessible primarily to readers with considerable familiarity with social-choice theory.

CHRISTOPHER W. MORRIS

*Bowling Green State University*

**Values at Risk.** Edited by Douglas Maclean (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1986. 168p. $28.50, cloth; $15.95, paper).

This is a collection of eight papers on the large problem of how public policy should deal with risks, chiefly risks to life. A major issue in six of the papers, written by philosophers and economists, is the calculations of costs and benefits in deciding upon life-saving expenditures and regulations. This review will focus upon these six papers.

Several of the writers, in their evaluation of cost-benefit analysis, refer to a classic problem in social-contract theory: supposing that people were to reason objectively, as though they were ignorant of their parochial interests, how would they wish government to deal with risks? Economists Leonard and Zeckhauser respond that such individuals would consent to policy based upon the cost-benefit principle because this principle aims to maximize net gains for the group as a whole. Yet they uneasily concede that the public, through the political process, reveals distrust of the use of cost-benefit analysis concerning risks to life. They do not explain this other than to imply irrationality in politics.

As if in reply to economists—there is no direct interchange—the philosophers Maclean, Baier, and Gibbard dispute this maximizing principle. These philosophers suggest why our society, for good reason, rejects a core idea in cost-benefit calculations, which is to allocate limited life-saving resources so as to maximize the number of lives saved. They observe that policymakers finance expensive rescue missions to save identified individuals even when this implies sacrificing a larger number of unidentified lives that could be saved at less expense in other ways. Such rescue policies, the philosophers argue, are rational in that they publicly affirm the value we place on particular human lives irrespective of costs, a sort of open-ended entitlement to be rescued.

But placing greater value on identified lives in this way leads us to unanswered questions concerning both fairness and efficiency. To what extent is the special sense of obligation to persons we can identify objectively grounded in principles of fairness? Suppose we were to deal with the budget constraint by maximizing life saving but only within particular categories that are considered morally different, such as identified and unidentified persons. By what criteria do we define the various categories and then assign priorities among them? Is, for example, self-care such a criterion? Is it fair to spend a lot to rescue persons who have acted recklessly while sacrificing a larger number of unidentified lives because funds run short for preventative pollution control? And is it efficient to do so considering the possible disincentives to taking precautions? Then too, what if technology continues to expand opportunities to save identified lives at increasing total cost not just through rescues but through organ transplants, and so on? How far is society to carry this particular affirmation of the value of life at the increasing sacrifice of competing values? (cf. Nicholas Rescher, *Risk* [Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1983], Chap. 14).

Leonard and Zeckhauser would cut through these problems by appropriately measuring, in order to compare and aggregate, the benefits of all live-saving programs in terms of willingness to pay. Their test of justifiable life-saving follows the model of market exchange: estimate whether those who would benefit from the proposed protection would be willing to compensate fully those who would bear the costs, though for reasons of practicality, compensation would not actually be required. Drawing on a theory in welfare economics, Leonard and Zeckhauser try to dispose of the difficult problem of distributive equity. They would have government use taxes and expenditures, as though through a separate distribution branch of the federal budget, to achieve the "appropriate" distribution of income before the benefits of protection are measured.

In the field of social ethics, especially since the appearance of John Rawls's work, *A Theory of Justice*, a literature has fluorished on the problem of distributive equity and the Kantian view of the intrinsic rights of the person as against group interests. A number of philosophers have attacked the utilitarian principle of maximizing the good, irrespective of distributive effects, which constitutes the foundation concept in cost-benefit calculations. However, as indicated by the questions raised above about affirming the value of life through rescues, the philosophers in the book under review have chosen not to pursue the problem of distributive equity regarding risks. For example, although the second paper by Maclean nicely clarifies how single measures of risk for the group conceal different ways in which the risks may be distributed, none of the papers pursues the trade-off between maximizing and equalizing protection. The interested reader can find analysis of this policy problem in the economics literature (see Carl Shoup, *Public Finance*, p. 117).

Nor is it the purpose of this set of papers to develop a theory of how governmental institutions, particularly legislatures and regulatory agencies, actually do treat risks. Such an endeavor would need to consider the forces that shape policy-making, and also agency enforcement practices, regarding environmental and other sorts of risks. Yet, the writers' ethical programs are of course influenced by their perceptions of what our institutions permit us to accomplish in the particular cases they have in mind. It is therefore fair to note the conflicting factual assumptions about policy-making, perhaps of special interest to the readers of this journal, that tend to divide the advocates and critics of cost-benefit analysis in the book.

On the one hand, Leonard and Zeckhauser tell us that the political process is "unpredictable" (that is, they lack a theory to predict it?) and "unfettered" in its tendencies to neglect the general welfare unless subject to the constraining and rationalizing effect of cost-benefit analysis. Yet if the forces that move policymakers do not favor the general welfare, why should policymakers wish to adopt a technique that, as the advocates of cost-benefit analysis assume, would promote it? On the other hand, Baier, who seems to represent the other philosophers in her more trustful view of the political process, fears giving "the rationalizers a free hand," as though any hand in government can ever be made free of political constraint. Baier would revise our moral code to apply the full force of the criminal law to polluters who knowingly poison us, but she does not pause to consider whether a view of the social welfare different from hers may constrain policymakers from restricting pollution to the extent she urges. We are left with an old question: What part of the argument over social ethics is due to disagreement in belief as to what the controlling values of the public that operate through our political institutions are?

The social scientist who is interested in the issue of conflicting values in regulatory policy, especially about life saving, will find this book, despite some unevenness in quality, worth reading. For the selective reader, this reviewer would recommend especially the discussion of the distribution of risks by Maclean, Hacking's treatment of risks that cannot be quantified, and Gibbard's wrestling over whether risks to life should be quantified. The case for a cost-benefit approach to risk policy articulated by Leonard and Zeckhauser might well be read first by those who wish to review the concept of social-welfare maximization the philosophers are questioning.

DONALD C. CELL

*Cornell College*

**Averting Catastrophe.** By Joseph G. Morone and Edward J. Woodhouse (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986. 224p. $16.95).

In an effort to go beyond the detailed case studies that have constituted most of the literature of risk policy, many recent writers have tried to explore the managerial side of risk regulation. *Averting Catastrophe* falls clearly into this management school. Its five case studies emphasize strategies for controlling risks and form the basis for the rather novel conclusion that these strategies are quite successful.

The five cases include toxic chemicals, nuclear power, recombinant DNA, threats to the ozone layer, and the greenhouse threat. Each of these has received book-length treatment in its own right, and the first three are perhaps unbearably familiar to readers of the science-policy and risk-policy literatures. Morone and Woodhouse have written no more than 20 pages about each. Nevertheless, their clear and generally fair discussions are probably the most economical descriptions of the cases available. The response to nuclear power, for example, is divided into two phases: first, prevention plus containment and second, after new scientific evidence suggested the inefficacy of containment, prevention alone. The chapter on threats to the ozone layer goes well beyond the traditional discussions of fluorocarbons to include both the SST and other chemical threats, including fertilizers. The utility of these short studies is increased by the way in which the authors elicit more general regulatory strategies from the specifics of each case.

The final chapters integrate these managerial findings into a system for averting catastrophe: (1) protect against the possible hazard, biasing early judgment against it; (2) reduce uncertainty by prioritized monitoring of experience and testing of risks; and (3) revise original precautions in light of information gained through experience with the risk.

Although neither novel nor unrecognized, the managerial strategies have seldom before been used to provide a uniform approach for assessing a wide variety of cases nor so explicitly brought forward as evidence for the overall success of risk-management policy in the United States. Unfortunately, the conclusions about the potential uses of these strategies are not as convincing as the earlier parts of the book.

According to the authors, *analysis* is an activity that consists of seeking more and more (scientific) facts in an attempt to resolve policy conflicts, while *strategy* is a procedural approach that allows policymakers to take action without actually resolving the conflict. Morone and Woodhouse want analysis to be subordinated to strategy. Yet their own case studies are clearly in the analytic camp—choice of regulatory strategy is explicitly shown to be dependent upon the level of scientific or technical knowledge in each case.

Furthermore, the level of generality of the "strategies" proposed (for example, "attack egregious risks") means both that analysis is necessary for strategy to be implemented and that the strategies are very open to political maneuvering. At the outset of the book, however, the authors argue that political matters are superficial epiphenomena irrelevant to their task of highlighting deeper, systematic managerial responses.

Finally, there is little attempt to delineate the characteristics of problems that would allow appropriate control strategies to be selected. An argument that properly exercised strategies explain the success of U.S. risk management to date (itself a conclusion that readers may well not accept) surely would be strengthened by reference to the literature relating risk characteristics to control mechanisms.

It is fashionable in the risk literature to contrast rational scientific analysis with irrational political decision making. Morone and Woodhouse are social scientists. They believe that there are rational managerial procedures, or strategies, that can mediate between the two ends of this false continuum. Their book is well suited for classroom use because of the clarity and brevity of the case studies and the emphasis on these managerial strategies, but it will only provoke, not resolve, discussions about the complex interrelationships between science, management, and policy.

SUSAN G. HADDEN

*University of Texas, Austin*

**Is Prevention Better Than Cure?** By Louise B. Russell (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1986. x, 134p. $26.95, cloth; $9.95, paper).

Increased interest in cost containment has focused attention on assessing the costs and benefits of various medical interventions. Preventive measures are seen by many as potentially cost-saving alternatives to traditional medicine. This book combines a discussion of prevention with an introduction to one method of program evaluation, cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA). The principles of CEA are explicated through discussions of increasingly complex prevention issues. The preventive measures examined are smallpox and measles vaccinations, hypertension screening, and increased exercise.

Many preventive measures do not reduce medical expenditures. By their nature, prevention programs yield future benefits which are often uncertain and difficult to quantify. So, while prevention may be preferred to cure by some individuals, cure may be cheaper in terms of medical expenditures. The author argues that advocates of prevention must demonstrate that the overall benefits of prevention outweigh the costs. The use of CEA to evaluate prevention programs would permit more rational decisions about resource allocations.

The description of CEA as a method of identifying, assessing, and summarizing the costs and benefits of any particular program is lucid and concise. This work complements other books in the area (Mishan's *Cost-Benefit Analysis*; Warner and Luce's *Cost-Benefit and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in Health Care: Principles, Practice, and Potential*) by providing a nontechnical introduction. Mathematical notation is kept to a minimum, and the use of increasingly complex examples works beautifully. The book is aimed at consumers of CEAs rather than practitioners. Instructors of health economics, public health, health administration, and health-policy courses will find this a useful supplementary text.

Inconsistent treatment of measurement issues is the principle shortcoming of the book. The author argues strongly for two measures and against a third, yet all share similar characteristics. First, quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) are advocated as potentially objective outcome measures. One QALY represents a year of healthy life, and years of less-than-perfect health receive values between zero and one. Clearly, the derivation of QALYs is subjective and involves the aggregation of preferences. Second, the cost-effectiveness ratio is advocated over the balance-sheet method of presentation because of its simplicity. However, the value of the ratio varies with the assumptions of the CEA, so that this measure is somewhat subjective. In contrast, the use of income as a measure of the opportunity cost of time is discouraged. After discussing the difficulties involved in valuing time, the author recommends simply listing the hours of time involved. This third recommendation is at odds with the previous two, and it would seem at least as difficult to define a QALY as to find the opportunity cost of someone's time.

The clear exposition and historical detail of the book more than outweigh this criticism. For example, the discussion of the development and dissemination of the smallpox vaccination is fascinating. The description of the different types of preventive programs is interesting, and an appendix provides information on federally funded prevention programs. Overall, the book is a welcome addition to this area.

KATHLEEN N. GILLESPIE

*St. Louis University*

**The Motorization of American Cities.** By David St. Clair (New York: Praeger, 1986. xi, 192p. $32.95).

St. Clair's is the latest of several recent volumes (Barrett, *The Automobile and Urban Transit*; Foster, *From Streetcars to Superhighway* [Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1983 and 1981 respectively]; and Yago, *The Decline of Transit* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984]) on the dramatic shift from mass transit to automobiles in U.S. cities during the first half of this century. St. Clair's thesis is that the automobile industry, and General Motors in particular, played an important role in hastening the demise of mass transit by first conspiring in the 1930s to finance the conversion of streetcar lines into inferior motor-bus lines, and then lobbying in the 1940s and 1950s for federal funding to build urban expressways that eventually resulted in the interstate highway system.

The streetcar conspiracy thesis has been around for a long time, fueled by the Department of Justice's successful antitrust prosecution in the 1940s of GM in the National City Lines case. General Motors established National City Lines to buy up ailing streetcar lines and finance their conversion to GM motor buses. The Department of Justice argued that in so doing GM was attempting to restrain competition among bus vehicle suppliers. St. Clair and another recent author (Yago) contend that GM had a more ambitious goal in mind: to increase auto sales in urban areas by saddling mass-transit companies with motor buses when streetcars or trolley coaches (electric buses) would have been more efficient and profitable.

The critical evidence St. Clair marshalls to support his "conversion for destruction" hypothesis is flawed and unconvincing. St. Clair recognizes that we are unlikely to ever know for sure what GM's executives had in mind when they created National City Lines, so he concentrates on trying to prove that modern streetcars or trolley buses were more cost-efficient and profitable than the motor buses GM was promoting. Despite the fact that St. Clair is an economist by training, however, his cost analysis relies heavily on national average statistics for streetcar, trolley-coach, and bus operations and thus fails to consider the importance of traffic volumes or densities on a route fully in determining the relative costs of different modes. Streetcars and trolley coaches require heavy investments in track and catenary so their average cost per passenger declines if these investments can be spread over large passenger volumes. Motor buses operating on public streets are subject to fewer scale or volume economies. Motor buses became more and more cost competitive during the 1930s, in part because transit patronage was dropping on routes (in response to increasing auto use). Since motor buses replaced streetcars on the lowest density lines first, it is extremely misleading for St. Clair to compare national average costs and profits for streetcars, which were increasingly concentrated on the remaining "cream" of the high-density routes, with those for buses, which were serving the most troubled low-density lines. St. Clair's failure to recognize the importance of the streetcar's scale economies is all the more striking since it was widely acknowledged by the industry and other observers.

The discussions of both streetcar conversions and interstate highway lobbying also suffer from too few efforts to put the potential importance of the auto industry's actions in perspective. St. Clair does acknowledge at several points that many other forces contributed to the motorization of cities, such as rapid improvements in bus and auto technology in the 1930s and 1930s, the spread of paved roads, the development of low-density suburbs (where auto use was more convenient) and the growth in per capita incomes that made suburban living and auto ownership more affordable. Other than the chapter on cost analysis described above and another chapter outlining how shortsighted local government officials contributed to transit's decline, however, St. Clair spends the bulk of his book chronicling the history of GM's involvement with National City Lines and its lobbying efforts. Although he is careful never to say that the auto industry's actions were a key contributor to motorization, St. Clair's tone and the short shrift he gives alternative explanations strongly imply that the auto industry is the major culprit.

Disentangling the relative importance of the auto industry's streetcar conversions and lobbying from other forces would obviously be difficult. St. Clair might have made some attempts, however, by comparing the fortunes of transit companies that converted to motor buses early (under GM's encouragement) with comparable companies that were late or by examining whether urban auto ownership rates increased substantially after interstate projects were completed. Even if GM was trying to sabotage mass transit instead of monopolize bus supplier markets (which I doubt), a strong argument can be made that the other forces contributing to transit's troubles were so powerful that streetcar conversions hastened the industry's decline by only a few years at most. Similarly, the auto industry was not the only politically important force lobbying for the interstate system, and in any event most of the growth in per capita auto ownership rates occurred first in the 1920s and then again in the 1950s, before most of the interstate system was opened.

St. Clair's book is particularly disappointing when compared to other recently published volumes on the same topics. Paul Barrett and Mark Foster have both recently published books that give a richer and more balanced account of the forces that contributed to the growth of urban automobile use in the United States. Similarly, Mark Rose's recent book, *Interstate: Express Highway Politics, 1941–1956* (Lawrence, KA: Regents Press of Kansas, 1979), and Gary Schwartz's article, "Urban Freeways and the Interstate System" (*Southern California Law Review* 49(1976): 406–513), offer more insight into the variety of political forces that lead to the creation of an interstate highway system. St. Clair presents his views strongly and provocatively, but his book should be supplemented with one of the other volumes if the reader is to get a balanced perspective.

JOSÉ A. GOMEZ-IBÁÑEZ

*Harvard University*

## Errata

Samuel Merrill III and Jack Nagel, "The Effect of Approval Balloting on Strategic Voting under Alternative Decision Rules" (June 1987, 509–524): On page 511, column 1, line 6 of the last paragraph should read "when one votes) as sincere if and only."

Beer, Samuel H. *Britain against Itself: The Political Contradictions of Collectivism*; King, Anthony, ed. *The British Prime Minister*; Krieger, Joel. *Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of Decline*; Studlar, Donley T., and Jerold L. Waltman, eds. *Dilemmas of Change in British Politics*. Reviewed by Gary Marx. (March 1987, 245–253): The reviewer's name should be spelled "Marks," not "Marx."

## American States of Mind

*Visions of Capitalism and Democracy among Private and Public Workers*

Craig Reinarman

Working from extensive interviews held over a five-year period, Craig Reinarman examines the political beliefs of a dozen Americans and finds that political ideologies are the result of a complex interaction of one's biography and history.

**"A landmark study of American political culture."** —Frances Fox Piven $25.00

## The 50% Solution

*How to Bargain Successfully with Hijackers, Strikers, Bosses, Oil Magnates, Arabs, Russians, and other Worthy Opponents in This Modern World*

edited by I. William Zartman

Drawing on examples ranging from the Cuban missile crisis to a strike at the *New York Times*, the distinguished contributors to this book—now reissued with an updated bibliography—deal with such questions as: Who really wins in negotiations? How do they do it? Is the negotiation process the same in all conflicts?

**"With international bargaining of increasing importance . . . we will have more and more reason to make use of this work in our courses."** —Donald Rothchild $40.00 cloth, $14.95 paper

## Psycho/History

*Readings in the Method of Psychology, Psychoanalysis, and History*

edited by Geoffrey Cocks and Travis Crosby

This anthology of eighteen definitive essays on psychohistory, written by leading psychologists, historians, sociologists, and political scientists, includes recent and contemporary arguments about the applications of psychology to history. $35.00 cloth, $14.95 paper

**Yale University Press**
Dept. 530
92A Yale Station
New Haven, CT 06520

## The Rise of American Air Power

*The Creation of Armageddon*

Michael S. Sherry

In the first in-depth history of American strategic bombing, Michael S. Sherry explores the growing appeal of air power in America before World War II; the ideas, techniques, personalities, and organizations that guided air attacks during the war; and the devastating effects of American and British "conventional" bombing.



**"An outstanding work."** —Stephen E. Ambrose 25 illus. $29.95

---

*Now available in paperback*

## A Grand Strategy for the West

*The Anachronism of National Strategies in an Interdependent World*

Helmut Schmidt

Timely, original, and hard-hitting prescriptions for U.S. and Western policy from the former West German chancellor.

**"A fascinating and totally engrossing book that abounds in wisdom and bite."** —Cyrus Vance

**"An excellent discussion of international problems, made all the better by the author's fine sense of the possible."** — Alexander M. Haig, Jr. $7.95

## Weapons of the Weak

*Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*

James C. Scott

"*Weapons of the Weak* is **a brilliant book,** combining a sure feel for the subjective side of struggle with a deft handling of economic and political trends." —John R. Bowen, *Journal of Peasant Studies* $14.95

# Scott, Foresman/Little, Brown presents the clear winners in 1987...

## THE FOLLOWING TITLES ARE AVAILABLE NOW.

**AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: Readings and Cases**
*Ninth Edition*
**Peter Woll, editor**
*paper/608 pages/Instructor's Manual*

**BEHIND THE SCENES IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: Personalities and Politics**
*Sixth Edition*
**Peter Woll, editor**
*paper/384 pages/Instructor's Manual*

**AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: Institutions, Policies, and Politics**
**Paul Dawson**
*cloth/648 pages/Instructor's Manual, Test Items, DIPLOMA, Transparencies, and Study Guide*

**READINGS ON AMERICAN GOVERNMENT**
**Fred R. Harris**
*paper/608 pages*

**CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A Reappraisal**
**Charles W. Dunn**
*paper/496 pages/Instructor's Manual, Study Guide, and Simulations*

**THE NEW AMERICAN PRESIDENCY**
**Larry Berman**
*paper/432 pages*

**THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS**
*Second Edition*
**Gary C. Jacobson**
*paper/272 pages*

**EAGLE RESURGENT? The Reagan Era in American Foreign Policy**
**Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchild**
*paper/480 pages*

**WAR, PEACE, AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS**
*Fourth Edition*
**David W. Ziegler**
*paper/496 pages/Instructor's Manual*

**FOREIGN POLICY MAKING AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM**
*Second Edition*
**James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver**
*paper/352 pages*

**UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT**
**Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington, editors**
*paper/544 pages*

**MANAGING PUBLIC POLICY**
**Laurence E. Lynn, Jr.**
*paper/304 pages*

**REGULATION: The Politics of Policy**
**Michael D. Reagan**
*paper/256 pages*

**AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICS**
**Alan Isaak**
*cloth/448 pages/Instructor's Manual*

# ...and the leading candidates for 1988...

## IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT...

### UNDERSTANDING AMERICA'S GOVERNMENT

**Fred R. Harris, Randy Roberts, and Margaret Elliston**

Traditionally organized, this text blends a political science and historical perspective to show how government is always evolving. In a concise, accessible format, the text covers essential principles, institutions, processes, and policies of American government.
*paper/480 pages/Instructor's Manual and Study Guide*
*Available in December.*

### AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: Policy and Politics

*Second Edition*

**Neal Tannahill**

Using a public policy approach, this brief introductory text carefully explains the basic institutions and processes of American government. The Second Edition offers an in-depth analysis of the U.S. Constitution, along with the latest scholarship on the Presidency, political parties, interest groups, and public opinion.
*paper/496 pages/Instructor's Manual and Study Guide*
*Available in December.*

### THE BASICS OF AMERICAN POLITICS

*Fifth Edition*

**Gary Wasserman**

Brief, basic, inexpensive, and easy to read, this core text uses an integrating theme—the comparison of politics to a complex game which revolves around the competition for power and influence—to introduce American politics.
*paper/304 pages/Instructor's Manual*
*Available in November.*

### DEBATING AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

*Second Edition*

**Peter Woll, editor**

This lively anthology pairs off an impressive group of leading political scientists, best-selling authors, journalists, and political practitioners in a debate format that addresses contemporary issues and controversies in American government.
*paper/352 pages/Instructor's Manual*
*Available in December.*

**Scott, Foresman/**
**Little, Brown**
COLLEGE DIVISION

## IN PARTIES...

### THE PARTY'S JUST BEGUN: Shaping Political Parties for America's Future

**Larry J. Sabato**

Professor Sabato examines the rejuvenation of the two major political parties in the late 1980's, and considers possible strategies for regenerating partisan loyalty among the voting public and reviving the American party system.
*paper/288 pages*
*Available in December.*

### MONEY IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS

**Frank J. Sorauf**

This overview of campaign finance defines and analyzes the new era in the funding and regulating of electoral politics—and deals systematically with the attendant political issues that trouble many Americans.
*paper/256 pages*
*Available January 1988.*

### PARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA

***Sixth Edition***

**Frank J. Sorauf and Paul Allen Beck**

This comprehensive, best selling text analyzes the historical development and the present role of parties in the American political system. The Sixth Edition examines recent changes in the status of political parties, and integrates current research and examples throughout.
*paper/480 pages*
*Available in December.*

### AMERICAN POLITICIANS AND JOURNALISTS

**Charles Press and Kenneth VerBurg**

A provocative look at the relationship between politicians and journalists, this new supplementary text examines the state of guarded cooperation that exists between two groups who depend on one another to advance their own careers.
*paper/256 pages*
*Available in November.*

### AMERICAN PARTIES IN DECLINE

***Third Edition***

**William Crotty**

This intriguing scholarly analysis and summary of the current state of party politics in America examines the factors that have influenced party decline and the context in which these changes have taken place.
*paper/288 pages*
*Available January 1988.*

write:
Meredith Hellestrae,
Department SAP-APSA
1900 East Lake Avenue
Glenview, Illinois 60025

## IN STATE/LOCAL AND URBAN/ METROPOLITAN...

### THE DEPENDENT CITY: The Changing Political Economy of American Urban Politics Since 1789

**Paul Kantor with Stephen David**

This new text describes how the three major areas of city governmental policy—economic development, social welfare, and routine public services—have been powerfully shaped over time by changes in capitalism, federalism, and democratic institutions.
*paper/288 pages*
*Available in February 1988.*

### POLITICS AND POLICY IN STATES AND COMMUNITIES

*Third Edition*

**John J. Harrigan**

With an emphasis on both political process and public policy, this highly respected text analyzes the reassertiveness of American states and communities within the federal system. The Third Edition includes a new chapter on economic development policy.
*cloth/512 pages/Instructor's Manual*
*Available in November.*

### THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN CITIES: Private Power and Public Policy

*Third Edition*

**Dennis R. Judd**

The close relationship between public authority and the private sector is the unifying theme of this highly regarded core text. This thorough revision includes new material on the decline of party machines, the rise of the Sunbelt cities, city finances, and much more.
*paper/428 pages*
*Available in December.*

### POLITICS IN THE GOLDEN STATE: The California Connection

*Second Edition*

**Terry Christensen and Larry N. Gerston**

By focusing on personalities and power struggles, this lively and timely introduction gives students truer insights into how California's political institutions actually work, into the motivations behind individuals' political actions, into the effects of those actions, and into the institutions themselves.
*paper/304 pages/Instructor's Manual*
*Available in December.*

**Scott, Foresman/**
**Little, Brown**
COLLEGE DIVISION

## IN FOREIGN POLICY/ INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS...

### COMPARATIVE POLITICS TODAY:
### A World View
*Fourth Edition*
**Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr.**
Featuring Almond's well known structural/functional model of comparative analysis, this new edition provides both theoretical analyses and up-to-date, detailed studies of diverse countries—all written by respected specialists in the field.
*cloth/592 pages/Instructor's Manual*
*Available in November.*

### NEW FORCES, OLD FORCES, AND THE FUTURE OF WORLD POLITICS
**Seyom Brown**
This new text examines the dominant features of contemporary world politics, asking which are durable and most likely to play a large role in shaping the future and which are declining or only transitory in their influence. It shows that the most dangerous threats to the well-being of the human species are the result of a lag between world politics and economic, technological, and cultural realities—and prescribes policies and institutional reforms to overcome this lag.
*paper/352 pages*
*Available in December.*

### NO COMMON POWER:
### Understanding International Relations
**Robert J. Lieber**
This new, superbly crafted introduction to international relations offers a balance of theory and empirical analysis, historical and current topics—from a lucid, neorealist perspective.
*paper/448 pages/Instructor's Manual*
*Available in November.*

### PEACE IMPOSSIBLE—WAR UNLIKELY:
### The Cold War Between the United States and the Soviet Union
**Joseph L. Nogee and John W. Spanier**
From the combined expertise of two well known scholars comes this balanced analysis of post-World War II U.S.–Soviet relations. The text covers the complex origins and long evolution of their conflict, the effects of the nuclear age and the arms race on their strategies, the nature of their rivalry in the Third World, their interactions with China, the collapse of detente, and the authors' general theory of U.S.–Soviet relations.
*paper/320 pages*
*Available January 1988.*

### THE LOGIC OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
*Sixth Edition*
**Walter S. Jones**
This new edition of the most successful international relations text maintains its perceptual analysis approach and focuses on how national ideologies, concepts, values, and interests influence a nation's point of view. A new chapter on international political economy is included.
*paper/688 pages/Instructor's Manual*
*Available in December.*

write:
Meredith Hellestrae,
Department SAP-APSA
1900 East Lake Avenue
Glenview, Illinois 60025

## IN LAW/JUDICIAL PROCESS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION/ PUBLIC POLICY...

### POLICY PARADOX AND POLITICAL REASON

**Deborah Stone**

This innovative and powerful work develops a new concept of political reasoning which significantly advances our ability to explain the many paradoxes of political reality. It views society as a political community where policy is produced, and holds that policy making is a struggle over images as the constituent elements of policy goals, problems, and solutions. The struggle of political reasoning uses metaphor and analogy to categorize and differentiate, to construct and maintain boundaries, and to thus argue in strategic portrayals for policy's sake.

*paper/288 pages*
*Available in December.*

### THE NEW POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS

**Aaron Wildavsky**

This entirely *new* book (except for one chapter and a few pages on the nature of budgeting) by a distinguished expert looks at the increasingly important role of the budget in national politics today. Wildavsky describes how the budget is made, examines historical influences, entitlements, and defense budgeting; and explains the reasons for the stalemates between the president and Congress on budgetary issues.

*paper/448 pages*
*Available in November.*

### REASON IN LAW

***Third Edition***

**Lief H. Carter**

Updated throughout to reflect the latest legal developments, the Third Edition of this highly respected text continues to introduce a broad range of jurisprudential issues—in a readable and accessible style geared to undergraduates with no background in law or the legal system.

*paper/336 pages*
*Available in November.*

### THE CONTOURS OF JUSTICE: Communities and Their Courts

**James Eisenstein,**
**Roy B. Flemming, and**
**Peter F. Nardulli**

This new text describes the actual workings of criminal courts in nine middle-sized counties. Using the metaphor of courts as communities, the authors examine the interaction of various elements: the larger community, the technology used to schedule and assign work, local legal culture, and customary ways of disposing of cases. The twin concepts of court community and jurisdiction size provide a framework for understanding the differences among criminal courts in the U.S.

*paper/304 pages*
*Now available.*

**Scott, Foresman/**
**Little, Brown**
**COLLEGE DIVISION**

## Paths to Peace

Exploring the Feasibility of Sustainable Peace

**Richard Smoke** with **Willis Harman**

A primer on thinking about peace in the nuclear age. Describes and compares nine basic ways—ranging from deterrence to nonviolent resistance—in which people or governments have tried to achieve peace.

Aug. 1987 • ca. 106 pp. • $16.95 (hc) • $9.95 (pb)

## The Strategic Defense Initiative Shield or Snare?

**Harold Brown**

The former U.S. secretary of defense gathers a wide range of views on the SDI debate, including those surrounding the program's possible objectives, the availability and limits of technology, the survivability of a defense against attack, the cost-exchange ratio for the defense, and the direct and opportunity costs to the nation. In addition, Soviet perceptions of ballistic missile defense and the potential of a Soviet breakout from the ABM Treaty are considered.

Sept. 1987 • ca. 292 pp. • $29 (sc)



Reforming American Government

The Bicentennial Papers of the Committee on the Constitutional System

edited by Donald L. Robinson

## Reforming American Government

The Bicentennial Papers of the Committee on the Constitutional System

ed. by **Donald L. Robinson**

*"These 'papers' are reassuring evidence that the creativity and sagacity of the original framers are still alive in this country. I hope they will help to stimulate a vigorous national debate over the best ways to meet the challenges of self-government in these difficult years."* ***—Robert S. McNamara***

1985 • 334 pp. • $41.50 (hc) • $14.95 (pb)

## Introduction to Marx and Engels

A Critical Reconstruction

**Richard Schmitt**

*"One of the best introductions to the thought of Marx and Engels. . . . destined to become a standard in the field. . . . surveys virtually all of the central themes in the vast Marx-Engels body of writings. . . . accessible to the introductory student and a pleasure for the scholar."*

***—Edward S. Greenberg***
***University of Colorado, Boulder***

Aug. 1987 • ca. 212 pp. • $32.50 (hc) • $12.95 (pb)

## Administering the New Federalism

ed. by **Lewis G. Bender** and **James A. Stever**

*"The 14 articles, of uniformly high quality, explore a broad range of issues. . . . The book's thorough review of the fiscal and administrative effects of the early Reagan years will make it a useful reference."*

**—Choice**

1986 • 369 pp. • $22 (sc)

TO ORDER OR TO REQUEST A CATALOG, PLEASE WRITE OR CALL:

**Westview Press**
*Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher*
*5500 Central Ave • Boulder, CO 80301 • (303) 444-3541*

**1987 Undergraduate Faculty Directory**

The 1987 Directory of Undergraduate Political Science Faculty contains listings for 525 undergraduate departments of political science. Departmental name, address, and telephone number are given.

The Directory lists political science faculty members by name, with their highest degree, fields of specialization and current position. The Directory also contains an alphabetical faculty index.

The price is $10.00 for APSA members and $14.00 for nonmembers. (Please include $1.00 postage with your order.)

*ORDERS MUST BE PREPAID.*

Order from:

**Publications/APSA**
**1527 New Hampshire Avenue NW, Washington, D.C. 20036**



**The Creation of Our Constitution**

**THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES:**
**An Introduction**
**Updated Edition**
By Floyd G. Cullop. This illuminating guide to the document that is the backbone to the American nation is updated to include coverage of the 26th Amendment and other changes to the government since 1969. Helpful quizzes are spaced throughout the text.
**MENTOR** 0-452-62431-9 $2.95/$3.50*

**THE LIVING U.S. CONSTITUTION**
**Second Revised Edition by Jacob W. Landynski**
By Saul K. Padover. This study of constitutional law takes into account the judicial issues raised by Watergate, the Supreme Court ruling on abortion, and a number of landmark decisions. Also included are a complete text of the Constitution, appendices, and chronology.
**MENTOR** 0-451-62174-3 $4.95/$4.95*

*Prices in Canada. Prices subject to change. Write to the Education Department at the address below for a free History & Political Science catalog.

**THE FEDERALIST PAPERS**
**Edited and with an Introduction by Clinton Rossiter**
Written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. Based on the original McLean edition of 1788, this volume is designed especially for classroom use and examines the three Federalists' defense of the Constitution. The complete Constitution with marginal notes and an index of ideas are included.
**MENTOR** 0-451-62541-2 $4.95/5.95*

**THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES**
Edited and with an Introduction by Ralph Ketcham. This complete collection of original documents gives full voice to the dissenting opinions of statesmen such as Patrick Henry and DeWitt Clinton, who felt the proposed Constitution threatened individual rights and liberties.
**MENTOR ORIGINAL** 0-451-62525-0 $4.95/5.95*

**WITNESSES AT THE CREATION**
**Hamilton, Madison, Jay, and the Constitution**
by Richard B. Morris. The author, one of the most respected Constitutional historians in the country, describes how these three founding fathers collaborated on writing *The Federalists* and promoted the passage of the Constitution.
**PLUME** 0-452-25867-7 $9.95/13.95*

**NEW AMERICAN LIBRARY** **NAL**
1633 Broadway, New York, NY 10019

## THE FOURTH EDITION OF. . .


CAREERS
and the study of
POLITICAL SCIENCE
a guide for undergraduates
mary h. curzan, editor
4th edition

*Careers* discusses the relationship between the study of political science and careers in law, government, interest groups and associations, international *organizations, business, journalism, and teaching.*

Single copies are available for $2.00 each; orders under 50 copies must be PREPAID.

| **Bulk Orders** | **APSA Departmental Service Member** | **Non-Member** | **Postal Rate** |
|---|---|---|---|
| 10 copies | $ 7.50 | $10.00 | $1.00 |
| 50 copies | $30.00 | $40.00 | $2.50 |
| 100 copies | $50.00 | $70.00 | $4.00 |

*Order from:*

**Publications/APSA**
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

# Books that matter are Basic


AND WE ARE NOT SAVED

## And We Are Not Saved

The Elusive Quest for
Racial Reform
DERRICK BELL

The tragedy of civil rights—an intellectual and literary *tour de force* by a brilliant Harvard Law Professor. $19.95
September


BEYOND AMERICAN HEGEMONY
The Future of the Western Alliance
DAVID P. CALLEO

## Beyond American Hegemony

The Future of
the Western Alliance
DAVID P. CALLEO

A path-breaking reassessment of the Western Alliance and a compelling case for greater European involvement. $20.95
October


Breaking the Impasse
Practical Approaches to Resolving Public Disputes
LAWRENCE SUSSKIND and JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK

## Breaking the Impasse

Practical Approaches to
Resolving Public Disputes
LAWRENCE SUSSKIND &
JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK

Tested, concensus-building strategies for resolving public disputes by one of this country's top mediators. $18.95
November


CONTESTED TRUTHS
KEYWORDS IN AMERICAN POLITICS SINCE INDEPENDENCE
DANIEL RODGERS

## Contested Truths

Keywords in American
Politics Since Independence
DANIEL T. RODGERS

A compelling challenge to the myth of a concensus. $19.95
September


Gregory F. Treverton
COVERT ACTION
The Limits of Intervention in the Postwar World

## Covert Action

The Limits of Intervention in
the Postwar World
GREGORY T. TREVERTON

Our postwar experience with covert action and what we can learn from it by a leading intelligence expert. $19.95
October


THE VELVET PRISON
ARTISTS UNDER STATE SOCIALISM
MIKLÓS HARASZTI

## The Velvet Prison

Artists Under State Socialism
MIKLOS HARASZTI

This urgent message to the West from one of Hungary's leading dissident writers is a major contribution to our understanding of the modern totalitarian mentality.
October $14.95

If I Had a Hammer
MAURICE ISSERMAN

## If I Had a Hammer...

The Death of the Old Left
and the Birth of the New Left
MAURICE ISSERMAN

A probing search for the roots of rebellion in an age of political conformity. $18.95
September


SOCIAL SECURITY
THE SYSTEM THAT WORKS
Merton C. Bernstein and Joan Brodshaug Bernstein

## Social Security

The System that Works
MERTON C. BERNSTEIN &
JOAN BRODSHAUG BERNSTEIN

A vivid, insiders' account of social security—how it works, what was behind its recent "crisis," and why it can be counted on, unlike private pensions. $21.95
November

*now in paperback*

## Democracy and Capitalism

Property, Community, and the
Contradictions of Modern Social Thought
SAMUEL BOWLES & HERBERT GINTIS
$8.95 September

## The Party Goes On

The Persistence of the Two-Party System
in the United States
XANDRA KAYDEN & EDDIE MAHE, JR.
$8.95 September

## The Rise of the Trading State

Commerce and Conquest in
the Modern World
RICHARD ROSECRANCE
$9.95

## A World of Secrets

The Uses and Limits of Intelligence
WALTER LAQUEUR
$11.95

**Basic Books, Inc.**
10 East 53rd St., New York, NY 10022

# St. Martin's Press Presents Its Candidates

## American Government:
### READINGS ON CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

ROBERT HARMEL, Texas A&M University

This text offers a collection of 60 readings—articles, documents, and cases—all by leading authorities in the field. The readings are tied together by the theme of "continuity and change," and the book's organization parallels that of all the major American government texts.

Paperbound. 600 pages (probable).
Publication: January 1988
Instructor's Manual available



## American Government and Politics
***Second Edition***

JOHN C. SHEA, West Chester University of Pennsylvania

A basic yet comprehensive introduction, this book provides an in-depth description of the foundations, influences on, and institutions of American government. The author uses pertinent examples throughout to help students connect today's headlines to the principles and history of American government and politics. The second edition features new or expanded coverage of such topics as political culture, the media and PACs, civil rights, and public policy.

Paperbound. 544 pages. 1987
Instructor's Manual and Test Item File available



## American Constitutional Law
### CASES AND INTERPRETATION
***Second Edition***

RALPH A. ROSSUM, Claremont McKenna College
G. ALAN TARR, Rutgers University, Camden

This topically organized text for the American constitutional law course focuses on constitutional interpretation in order to help students analyze the activity of the Court. Included are introductory essays, selected court cases, headnotes and endnotes for each case, and a glossary. New to the second edition are constitutionally significant Court decisions and Congressional pronouncements since 1982.

704 pages. 1987

# for American Government Courses. . . .

## The Road to the White House

### THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

***Third Edition***

STEPHEN J. WAYNE, George Washington University

This third edition was written with the 1988 presidential campaign in mind. Like its highly successful predecessors, it begins with the earliest preprimary candidate strategies and takes the reader all the way to election day. The third edition incorporates recent political science literature and a discussion of the new *Democratic party rule changes* and their likely impact on the 1988 campaign as well as revised, updated, and expanded chapters.

Paperbound. 319 pages.
Publication: November 1987
Prepublication examination copies now available



## The Public Agenda

### ISSUES IN AMERICAN POLITICS

***Revised Second Edition***

LAWRENCE G. BREWSTER,
San Jose State University

A thorough analysis of seven key current issues in American politics—the economy, energy, health care, immigration, toxic wastes, crime, and the arms race. New to this edition is the chapter on immigration as well as revised and expanded coverage of all the other issues.

Paperbound. 304 pages 1987



## Democracy for the Few

***Fifth Edition***

MICHAEL PARENTI

A provocative book for American government courses that challenges the status quo; all the standard topics of the American government course are covered—but from a radical perspective rather than the conventional pluralist stance. The reader is drawn into a critical analysis of a system that the author believes favors the powerful and the rich. Virtually every chapter in this Fifth Edition has been updated, and new material has been added on topics ranging from public bureaucracy to nuclear power.

Paperbound. 350 pages (probable).
Publication: November 1987
Prepublication examination copies now available

To request an examination copy of any of these titles, please write us on your college letterhead, specifying the title of your course, present text, and approximate enrollment. Send your request to:

St. Martin's Press

College Division • Department JR • 175 Fifth Avenue • New York, N.Y. 10010 SMP

# St. Martin's Press Brings You Politics . . .


Religion
Politics
KENNETH D. WALD

## Religion and Politics in the United States

KENNETH D. WALD, University of Florida

This brief but inclusive text examines the impact of religious values, institutions, and communities on the conduct of political life in the United States. The author puts forth hard data and perennial questions in order to further understanding of traditional conflicts in church-state relations and recent debates over such issues as abortion and nuclear disarmament.

Paperbound. 301 pages. 1987


We the People
DAVID C. NICE
Federalism
THE POLITICS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

## Federalism

### THE POLITICS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

DAVID C. NICE, University of Georgia

A brief but wide-ranging text that analyzes both the relationships among the national, state, and local governments in the American federal system and the ways in which individuals and groups pursue policy goals within that system. The author uses case studies to provide real-world illustrations of the interplay between levels in the federal system as well as presenting and evaluating various theoretical models of how this system works.

Paperbound. 226 pages. 1987


Parties and Elections in Corporate America
Howard L. Reiter

## Parties and Elections in Corporate America

HOWARD L. REITER, University of Connecticut

Written from a provocative, radical perspective, this comprehensive textbook emphasizes the place of parties in the broader social and economic context of corporate capitalism. The author offers unique coverage of the rationale for political parties and the differences between the Republican and Democratic parties.

384 pages. 1987

# at Home and Around the World



## At Issue
### POLITICS IN THE WORLD ARENA
***Fifth Edition***

Edited by STEVEN L. SPIEGEL,
University of California, Los Angeles

An anthology of 35 articles, 32 of them new to this edition, that explore current issues in world politics. Opposing viewpoints are offered on several controversial issues, including arms control and Nicaragua. All of the articles are by experts or well-known writers in the field.
Paperbound. 560 pages (probable).
Publication: November 1987
Prepublication examination copies now available



## Soviet Politics
### CONTINUITY AND CONTRADICTION

GORDON B. SMITH, University of South Carolina

Comprehensive and up-to-date, this analysis of the formal and informal forces that shape the Soviet political system illustrates the continuities and contradictions that have consistently pervaded that system. Drawing on his extensive experience in the Soviet Union, the author provides detailed discussion of policy areas such as local politics, the arts, science, technology, education, religion, and dissent as well as coverage of the 27th Party Congress and the first year of the Gorbachev regime.
Paperbound. 400 pages.
Publication: November 1987
Prepublication examination copies now available

## National Security
### ENDURING PROBLEMS OF U.S. DEFENSE POLICY

DONALD M. SNOW, University of Alabama

A concise, nontheoretical analysis of the need for national defense that examines the evolution of our security policy from conventional to nuclear forces. The text provides a rationale for military strength as a basis of national security and then summarizes debates over national policy and the issues of nuclear deterrence and arms control.
Paperbound. 272 pages. 1987

To request an examination copy of any of these titles, please write to us on your college letterhead, specifying the title of your course, present text, and approximate enrollment. Send your request to:

St. Martin's Press

College Division • Department JR • 175 Fifth Avenue • New York, N.Y. 10010 SMP

AUBURN HOUSE

**Child Care**
**Facing the Hard Choices**
Alfred J. Kahn and Sheila B. Kamerman
**273 pages / $26.00 cloth**

**Financing Health Care**
**Economic Efficiency and Equity**
Steven R. Eastaugh
**720 pages / $34.95 cloth / $17.95 paper**

**Student Loans**
**Risks and Realities**
Joseph Marr Cronin and Sylvia Quarles Simmons, Editors
**200 pages / $24.95 cloth**

**Unions in Crisis and Beyond**
**Perspectives from Six Countries**
Richard Edwards, Paolo Garonna, and Franz Todtling, Editors
**340 pages / $35.00 cloth**

**China and the Third World**
**Champion or Challenger?**
Lillian Craig Harris and Robert L. Worden, Editors
**174 pages / $29.00 cloth**

**The Defense of Western Europe**
Lewis H. Gann, Editor
**320 pages / $32.50 cloth**

**Securing Europe's Future**
**Changing Elements of European Security**
Stephen J. Flanagan and Fen Osler Hampson, Editors
**336 pages / $32.50 cloth**

**The Soviet Far East Military Buildup**
**Nuclear Dilemmas and Asian Security**
Richard H. Solomon and Masataka Kosaka, Editors
**301 pages / $29.95 cloth / $16.95 paper**

AH
**Auburn House Publishing Company**
**14 Dedham Street, Dover, Massachusetts 02030-0658**
**(617) 785-2220 Toll Free 1-800-223-BOOK**

# New from Cambridge University Press

## The Political Economy of Central America since 1920
***Victor Bulmer-Thomas***

Explores economic and social development in the five Central American republics from 1920 to the present. Examines the variations in economic policy between the countries, which helps to account for differences in performance. Major political developments are linked to internal and external changes.

*Hardcover about $39.50*  *Paperback about $12.95*

## Political Parties
*Organisation and Power*

***Angelo Panebianco***

***Marc Silver, Translator***

"...an excellent study of political parties, combining historical data and theoretical analysis in a manner rarely found." —*Peter Lange, Duke University*

*Hardcover about $54.50*  *Paperback about $16.95*

## Human Rights and International Relations
***R.J. Vincent***

About the impact of human rights on the relations among states in which Vincent recommends that provision for subsistence rights has a strong claim to priority over other human rights.

*Hardcover $34.50*  *Paperback $8.95*

## Germany Between East and West
***Edwina Moreton, Editor***

Examines the contemporary role of Germany in international politics, and shows how the German question will continue to affect east-west relations and the politics of the western alliance in the future.

*About $37.50*

## Disabled Policy
*America's Programs for the Handicapped*

A Twentieth-Century Fund Report

***Edward D. Berkowitz***

"...An extremely thoughtful and persuasive history of disability policy in America...must reading for all those interested in programs for the handicapped, social welfare history, and public policy-making in America." — *Walter I. Trattner, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee*

*$24.95*

## The Field of Social Investment
***Severyn T. Bruyn***

"This is a work reflecting much current interest and concern. I've read it with real advantage; so, I am sure, will others who are concerned with corporate government and its social effects."
—*John Kenneth Galbraith, Harvard University*

*$34.50*

At bookstores or order from

**Cambridge University Press**

32 East 57th Street, NY, NY 10022.
Cambridge Toll-free numbers for orders only:
800-872-7423, outside NY State. 800-227-0247, NY State only.
MasterCard and Visa accepted.

**Pergamon Government & Politics Series**

NEW TITLES TO WATCH FOR:

**THE PRESIDENTIAL BRANCH**

John Hart, Australian National University

"By providing a deep historical and a broad contextual analysis of THE PRESIDENTIAL BRANCH, Hart's outstanding book gives us exactly what we need to place the Iran-Contra affair in perspective. Its scholarship is as good as its timing." **Aaron Wildavsky, University of California, Berkeley**

In this original study, Professor Hart traces the history of the White House office from the development of a rudimentary staff system in 1789, through the suggested reforms of 1937. He then follows the fluctuations in size and power of the cabinet, the impact of Watergate and post-Watergate presidencies, and analyzes the nature and form of congressional oversight. In conclusion, the author assesses reform proposals that have been generated during the last decade, and discusses the ambivalent position of the Presidential branch in the structure of American government.

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Available July 1987 | 240 pp (approx.) | 030938 0 | Softcover | $13.95 (approx.) |
| | | 030939 9 | Hardcover | $34.00 (approx.) |

**BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION:**
**Law and Policy in Federal Regulatory Agencies**

Gary C. Bryner, Brigham Young University

"Gary Bryner speaks on the federal regulatory process with one of today's most authoritative scholarly voices. This is a timely book on a topic that is already hotly controversial and will become more so, and all parties to the debate will find his views wise and insightful." **James L. Sundquist, The Brookings Institution**

Through four case studies—based on interviews with agency officials, documents, and other materials—different methods of bureaucratic regulation are explored, including administrative law, scientific and technical policy analysis, and congressional oversight. The author concludes with a discussion of the kinds of efforts that can direct and limit administrative discretion and at the same time contribute to the ability of agencies to accomplish the policy tasks delegated to them.

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Available June 1987 | 240 pp (approx.) | 034493 3 | Softcover | $14.95 |
| | | 034494 1 | Hardcover | $32.50 |

**THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL REORGANIZATION:**
**Creating the Department of Education**

Beryl A. Radin, University of Southern California Public Policy Center, Washington, DC, and Willis D. Hawley, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN

The realization of the federal Department of Education illustrates a series of complicated actions relating to policy implementation and presidential use of power. Authors Radin and Hawley unravel many political themes and motives which underlie the formation of a new government department in general and the issues specific to the Carter administration. The politics of the executive branch, as well as bureaucratic response to change, are examined in depth, using the case study of the Department of Education to follow a policy proposal through the multiple forms and arenas for decision making, where each stage creates new opportunities and imposes new sets of constraints.

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Available August 1987 | 225 pp. (approx.) | 033977 8 | Softcover | $12.95 (approx.) |
| | | 033978 6 | Hardcover | $29.50 (approx.) |

Send Orders To:
**PERGAMON PRESS** Maxwell House, Fairview Park, Elmsford, NY 10523

**With the Presidential election just around the corner, where can you find key biographical information on all the players?**



WHO'S WHO IN AMERICAN POLITICS 1987-88

**Who's Who in American Politics** provides complete biographical information on each of 23,814 men and women currently active in politics at every level. Each individual's concise, informative entry will show you offices held, books and articles written, educational background, current mailing address, and much more.

There's simply no better way to locate up-to-date information about federal, state, and local politicians and other policy-makers throughout the U.S. and its territories.

**Whos' Who in American Politics** can help you:

- write articles
- answer reference questions
- carry out research and consulting projects
- introduce speakers
- campaign
- work on government projects
- and answer a broad range of political inquiries

**Who's Who in American Politics** is available exclusively from R. R. Bowker, so order your copy today. Our customer service representatives are standing by to take your order. Better yet, place a standing order and receive this edition and all subsequent editions with a 5% discount automatically deducted.

**Who's Who in American Politics**
0-8352-2219-5 Sept. 1987 1,800 pp. cloth
Published every two years.
$149.95 Standing Order Price $142.45

**To Order Toll Free: 1-800-521-8110**
**In NY, AK or HI: Call Collect: 1-212-337-6934**
**In Canada Call Toll Free: 1-800-537-8416**

Prices are applicable in the U.S., its territories, and in Canada. All invoices are payable in U.S. dollars. Prices and publication dates are subject to change without notice. Applicable sales tax must be included. Except as noted, shipping and handling will be added to each order at the following rate: 5% of the net invoice amount, excluding tax. Minimum shipping and handling charge: $3.50. U.S. Telex: 12-7703. U.S. Fax: 1-212-337-7157. Please allow 4-6 weeks for delivery by Book Rate or Library Rate. Rest of world: R.R. Bowker (U.K.) Ltd., P.O. Box 88, Borough Green, Kent TN15 8PH, England. Telex: 95678. Fax: 0732 884079.

R.R. BOWKER
THE INFORMATION REFERENCE COMPANY

# Announcing 5 Instructional Units On Comparative Politics

## with print and audio components

Each unit consists of a monograph and 60 minute audio cassette that provides a comparative perspective on a specific topic taught in courses on American government and politics. A unit can be used singly or in combination with others in the series in order to introduce students to other countries' institutions and policies. The units can be adapted for an introductory American government and politics course or for upper division courses.



**The Administrative State in Industrialized Democracies**
by Joel D. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman

**Coordinating International Economic Strategy**
by Stephen Cohen and John Zysman

**Comparative Political Parties**
by William Crotty

**The Welfare State in Hard Times**
by Hugh Heclo

**Preserving Peace: The Difficult Choice of International Security**
by George H. Quester

Each monograph includes an essay, a bibliography and notes for the instructor.

Each cassette dramatizes the issues in the monograph through interviews with scholars and political leaders and citizens in other countries.

This series is based on material from two audio/print college courses entitled, "Global Understanding," developed and produced by National Public Radio, in conjunction with the University of California at San Diego and Columbia University, New York.

The Annenberg/CPB Project supported the development of these units.

The units are $4.50 per copy with a 20% discount for orders of 20 or more. Twenty copies of a title are accompanied by the audio cassette at no charge.

To order, write to:

**The American Political Science Association**
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

*The ins and outs of government—from Johns Hopkins*

## The In-and-Outers

*Presidential Appointees and Transient Government in Washington*

edited by G. Calvin Mackenzie

"This is must reading for anyone who wants to understand the presidential appointment power and the dynamics of executive branch leadership."
—Thomas E. Cronin, Colorado College

Known in the federal bureaucracy as "in-and-outers," presidential appointees are individuals for whom government service is neither a profession nor a career. *The In-and-Outers* offers unprecedented insights into the presidential appointment process; the backgrounds, work lives, satisfactions, and frustrations of the appointees themselves; and such issues as conflict of interest, Senate confirmation, and post-employment experiences. **$26.50**

*In Paperback*

## The Confidence Gap

*Business, Labor, and Government in the Public Mind*

REVISED EDITION

Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider

"Lipset and Schneider adeptly organize and supplement the findings of the many studies that have examined the low levels of trust and confidence in American institutions, and they offer their own provocative conclusions."
—Robert Y. Shapiro, *Political Science Quarterly*

Now in paperback—with additions and revisions that incorporate data through 1986—*The Confidence Gap* provides a sweeping analysis of Americans' changing perceptions of their institutions, their leaders, and their country. **$14.95**

*In Paperback*

## The Regulation of American Federalism

Donald F. Kettl

"[The book] should be required reading for all students of contemporary federalism. . . . [It] is both wise and exceptionally well written." —Diane D. Blair, *Journal of Politics*

Now in paperback with a new epilogue on the Reagan years, *The Regulation of American Federalism* explores the intricate relationships and political conflicts that have transformed American federalism into a regulatory arena dominated by the central government. **$8.95**

**THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PRESS**
701 West 40th Street, Suite 275, Baltimore, Maryland 21211

*Three new titles in*

## *Studies in International Political Economy*

***Stephen D. Krasner, Editor***
***Ernest B. Haas, Consulting Editor***

### *THE POWER OF IDEOLOGY*

*The Quest for Technological Autonomy in Argentina and Brazil*

***EMANUEL ADLER***

Adler addresses the hotly contested issue of how developing nations can emerge from the economic and technological tutelage of the developed world.

"A very significant contribution to our understanding of a suprisingly broad range of scholarly issues now widely debated."
—Robert C. North, Stanford University

$45.00 cloth

### *BANKER TO THE THIRD WORLD*

*U. S. Portfolio Investment in Latin America, 1900-1986*

***BARBARA STALLINGS***

"In the the flood of books on the Third World debt crisis, Barbara Stalling's volume stands out for its historical perspective, useful collection of data, sound economic analysis and cool understanding. ...An excellent contribution!"
—Charles P. Kindleberger, author of *The World in Depression*

"The book will be read and reread by any serious student of 20th century international economy and politics."
—Michael Edelstein

$45.00 cloth, $12.95 paper

### *RULING THE WAVES*

*The Political Economy of International Shipping*

***ALAN W. CAFRUNY***

"This work takes a central question of political economy a stage further by a detailed and masterly analysis of the political economy of world shipping."
—Susan Strange, London School of Economics and Political Science

"The most thorough study of how and why the international shipping industry has evolved along certain lines. It provides a very insightful analysis of how the policies and power of the Western nations, whose interests were often quite divergent, shaped the character of the industry and certain 'rules of the game'."
—Mark Zacher, co-author of *Pollution, Politics, and International Law*

$40.00 cloth

*At bookstores or call toll-free 800-822-6657. Visa and MasterCard only.*

**University of California Press**
***Berkeley 94720***

*Three new titles in the*

## California Series on Social Choice and Political Economy

***Brian Barry, Robert H. Bates and Samuel L. Popkin, Editors***

### POLITICAL SURVIVAL

*Politicians and Public Policy in Latin America*

**BARRY AMES**

"*Political Survival* is that rarest of books in comparative politics: a theoretically innovative work with an empirical, cross-national focus....A good read. 'Raises the ante' in comparative studies of public policy by bringing sophisticated, systematic thinking to the analysis of decision-making in the Third World."

—Peter McDonough,
University of Michigan

$38.00 cloth

### THE CAUSAL THEORY OF JUSTICE

**KAROL EDWARD SOLTAN**

Soltan provides an exciting, original, and fresh examination of the issue of justice.

"A fine work on the theory of justice and liberal thought. The writing is bold and clear. The framework of the argument goes together as though made of structural steel."

—Charles W. Anderson,
University of Wisconsin

$30.00 cloth

### PRINCIPLES OF GROUP SOLIDARITY

**MICHAEL HECHTER**

"An important contribution to our understanding of group action and solidarity."

—Douglass C. North,
Washington University

"A very important book. It is, by far, the clearest and most forceful effort in this area....It should and will be read by all social theorists."

—Jonathan Turner,
University of California,
Riverside

$28.50 cloth

### THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF QUASI-EXPERIMENTS

**CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN**

Contemporary social science makes routine use of statistical methods. However, the quantitative techniques were originally developed for natural science applications, and they make strong assumptions. Achen explains why quasi-experiments are inevitable and why conventional statistical analysis of them has failed. $32.00 cloth

HBJ
COMMUNIQUÉ

## HBJ Political Science: Exciting choices for 1988

**PUBLIC POLICY IN AMERICA**
**Government in Action**

**DENNIS J. PALUMBO**
Hardcover. 416 pages.
**JUST PUBLISHED.**
A comprehensive basic textbook for courses in public policy, PUBLIC POLICY IN AMERICA features an innovative two-part organization for fuller, clearer coverage of both policy making and policy issues. Part I describes the various stages of the policy cycle. Part II covers how the policy cycle is applied to specific issues.

**AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW**
**Essays and Cases**

**OTIS H. STEPHENS, JR., AND JOHN M. SCHEB, II**
Hardcover. 992 pages (tent.) 1988
These two distinguished authors and scholars have written a major new text for the constitutional law course. They offer comprehensive introductory essays, a broad selection of cases, substantial excerpts, and extensive coverage of all major constitutional topics current through 1987. The text offers more attention to property rights and economic issues than competing texts do.

**AMERICAN JUDICIAL POLITICS**

**HARRY P. STUMPF**
Hardcover. 512 pages
**JUST PUBLISHED.**
AMERICAN JUDICIAL POLITICS is a new text intended for courses in judicial process, judicial politics, and law in society. It offers coverage of the entire field of judicial politics with discussion of every major subtopic. Emphasis is on the jurisprudential grounding of the field.

HBJ

HARCOURT BRACE JOVANOVICH, INC.
College Sales Office
7555 Caldwell Avenue
Chicago, IL 60648

**Professions and the State: The Mexican Case**

A PROFMEX book by Peter S. Cleaves

This new monograph examines how a relatively foreign concept, professionalism, is superimposed on cultural, historical, and political patterns in Mexico, and considers conflicts affecting professional nationalism, university training, unemployment, prestige, and public policy-making. Cleaves' study focuses on the self-images of the professions in historical and political context and on the way in which the professions and the state seek to influence one another. While lawyers have traditionally held positions of considerable political influence, members of other professions—agronomists, engineers, physicians, and economists—are now vying for power and gradually displacing lawyers in the upper echelons of power. Cleaves describes the possible changes this trend may bring about in the way the state manages potentially disruptive economic and social pressures.
*175 pages, $19.95.*

**The University of Arizona Press**
1230 N. Park, #102, Tucson, AZ 85719

*New!* **DENIAL OF EXISTENCE: Essays on the Human Condition** *by* **Brij Mohan.** This stimulating and thought-provoking work conceptualizes the human condition, examines oppression and the need for social development, and offers a new perspective on existential intervention. The author also explores the relationship between human behavior and social policy, aspects of human aggressiveness from family violence to nuclear war, the necessity for critical assessment of human conditions, and the ultimate relevance of peace and justice. *'87, $19.50*

**THE ECONOMICS OF PROSTITUTION** *by* **Helen Reynolds.** Starting from the premise that it will exist regardless of its legal status, the author provides an economist's perspective of prostitution. She applies incentive/disincentive principles and identifies the types of environments in which prostitution exists in the U.S. Analyses and recommendations for government officials conclude the text. *'85, $27.25*

**THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY ON PROCEDURAL JUSTICE** *edited by* **Martin F. Kaplan.** This volume reports on applications of social science to legal systems, policies and practice. Noted authorities on the interface between law and psychology describe pertinent research and show how it has been used to improve trial conduct and relevant legal policies. Among the areas thus examined are substantive contributions to federal court policy and procedures, eyewitness research, voir dire, trial consultation, jury instructions and sentencing. *'86, $32.50*

**THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: A Continuing American Dilemma** *by* **Earl R. Kruschke.** Ongoing controversies surrounding the right to bear arms receive clear and thoughtful explication in this text. The author probes both the collective and individual sides of the issues, and he excerpts judicial opinions that support both viewpoints. He also proposes possible solutions to the dilemma. *'85, $27.00*

***Order direct for fastest results • Write or call (217) 789-8980 • Books sent on approval***
*MasterCard, Visa & prepaid orders sent postpaid • Catalog sent on request*

**CHARLES C THOMAS • PUBLISHER**
**2600 South First Street • Springfield • Illinois • 62794-9265**

**S**UPPLEMENTARY
**E**MPIRICAL
**T**EACHING
**U**NITS IN
**P**OLITICAL
**S**CIENCE

# *in American Politics*

## *Elections*

Voting Behavior: The 1984 Election
by Charles Prysby and Carmine Scavo

Campaign '80: The Public and the Presidential Selection Process
by Richard Joslyn and Janet Johnson

Elections and the Mass Media
by David Blomquist

## *Political Behavior and Institutions*

Political Socialization Across the Generations
by Paul Allen Beck, Jere Bruner and L. Douglas Dobson

Presidential Popularity in America
by Stephen Frantzich

The Dynamics of Political Budgeting
by Marvin K. Hoffman

The Supreme Court in American Politics, 2nd ed.
John Paul Ryan and C. Neal Tate

SOLD OUT

Policy Strain and Fiscal Responsiveness in 51 American Communities
by Paul David Schumaker, Russell W. Getter and Terry Nichols Clark

---

A SETUPS monograph includes a descriptive essay; instructions on methods of anaylsis; exercises based upon a data set; the code book for a data set and a bibliography. The data set is provided, at no charge, when 25 or more SETUPS are ordered.

---

SETUPS are $6.50/ea. or 5.20/ea. on orders of 25 or more. All orders must be prepaid. Write for a price list, with shipping charges to:

**SETUPS/APSA**
1527 New Hampshire Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20036

# GET READY

## ▪▪▪FOR NEW SPSS SOFTWARE.

- SPSS-X Release 3 — featuring expanded statistics and end-user facilities
- Time series analysis for both SPSS-X and SPSS/PC+

## ▪▪▪FOR NEW SPSS PUBLICATIONS.

- SPSS-X Release 3 editions of:
  SPSS-X User's Guide
  SPSS-X Introductory Statistics Guide
  SPSS-X Advanced Statistics Guide
  SPSS-X Tables™

SPSS data analysis software systems and publications for mainframe, mini and micro computers are used in thousands of academic environments around the world. For teaching, learning and conducting research in a variety of disciplines including marketing, statistics, science and more. Besides our soon-to-be released products, here are a few of the many titles available now.

### SPSS-X™ USERS GUIDE

Second Edition
SPSS Inc. 1985 (918469-18-X)
988 pages — softcover
Designed to be both a guide and reference text, this manual contains full documentation for SPSS-X through Release 2.1.

### SPSS-X INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS GUIDE

Marija J. Norusis
1983 (0-07-046549-5)
276 pages — softcover
A review of basic statistics and how to calculate them with SPSS-X, including descriptive statistics, hypothesis testing, nonparametric procedures, correlation, analysis of variance and regression. With numerous output examples and exercises for each chapter.



### THE SPSS GUIDE TO DATA ANALYSIS

Marija J. Norusis
1986 (918469-24-4)
402 pages — softcover
An introduction to the research process from questionnaire design and sample selection through data analysis. Free supplementary diskette (available for textbook adoptions) includes product, health and social science data.

### SPSS-X ADVANCED STATISTICS GUIDE

Marija J. Norusis
1985 (07-046548-7)
432 pages — softcover
A software reference for researchers and a text for the multivariate statistics course. Explains statistical concepts and SPSS-X procedures for factor, discriminant, cluster and loglinear analysis as well as multivariate analysis of variance. Includes exercises and an appendix that reviews basic operations.

### SPSS/PC+ PUBLICATIONS

Publications available for the SPSS/PC+™ family of software products include SPSS/PC+ — the basic guide and reference to SPSS/PC+, SPSS/PC+ Advanced Statistics™, SPSS/PC+ Tables™ and SPSS/PC+ Data Entry™.

**To order SPSS publications or find out more about our soon-to-be released products,**

**CALL 1/312/329-3327**

**SPSS inc.**

SPSS Inc. • 444 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 3000 • Chicago, Illinois 60611
**In Europe:** SPSS Europe B.V. • P.O. Box 115 • 4200 AC Gorinchem, The Netherlands • Telephone: +31183036711 • TWX: 21019

SPSS-X, SPSS-X Tables, SPSS/PC+, SPSS/PC+ Advanced Statistics, SPSS/PC+ Data Entry and SPSS/PC+ Tables are trademarks of SPSS Inc. for its proprietary software.
© 1986, SPSS Inc.

# ANNOUNCING A NEW AMERICAN GOVERNMENT PAPERBACK TEXT.

## American Government

**Alan Gitelson,** Loyola University
**Robert Dudley,** George Mason University
**Melvin Dubnick,** University of Kansas

About 450 pages • paperback • Instructor's Manual • Test Bank • Study Guide • Transparencies • MicroStudy Plus: Computerized Study Guide • LectureBank: Computerized Lecture Outlines • MicroTest: Computerized Test Bank • Call-in Test Service • GPA: Grade Performance Analyzer • December 1987

Gitelson, Dudley, and Dubnick's new paperback text uncovers essential topics in American government through a unique format. Each chapter opens by discussing a common myth in American politics—for example, that of the all-powerful president. Students then discover basic facts about government and the role myths play in our understanding of political events.

Also of Interest...

**The Challenge of Democracy: Government in America**

**Kenneth Janda,** Northwestern University
**Jeffrey M. Berry,** Tufts University
**Jerry Goldman,** Northwestern University

*NEW*

**Public Administration: Concepts and Cases**
**Fourth Edition**

**Richard J. Stillman, II**
George Mason University

**Global Politics, Third Edition**

**James Lee Ray,** Florida State University

For adoption consideration, request examination copies from your regional Houghton Mifflin office.

**Houghton Mifflin**

13400 Midway Rd., Dallas, TX 75244-5165
1900 S. Batavia Ave., Geneva, IL 60134
989 Lenox Dr., Lawrenceville, NJ 08648
925 E. Meadow Dr., Palo Alto, CA 94303

# *Guides to understanding the issues of church and state... new from Macmillan*



## Caesar's Coin **Religion and Politics in America**

RICHARD P. McBRIEN

Richard McBrien goes right to the heart of the passionate debate: from abortion rights and gay rights to school prayer and the new political clout of the clergy, he tackles controversies and gives us a valuable new primer about the role and limits of religion in public life.

"Anyone interested in the fundamental questions of church and state, religion and politics, morality and government, will welcome [this] intelligent, clear treatment."—Mario Cuomo "...a work of exact, prudent scholarship...thoughtful and excellent."—*America*

*ISBN 0-02-919720-1 • $19.95*

## The Catholic Challenge to the American Economy

**Reflections on the U.S. Bishops' Pastoral Letter on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy**

Editor: THOMAS M. GANNON, S.J.

The Bishops' Letter is both a critique of policies that work against the needs of the poor, unemployed, homeless, and oppressed, and a new agenda for peace and economic justice. Here, in 18 original essays, is the first analysis of its meaning and significance. Contributors include economist Milton Friedman, theologian Charles E. Curran, sociologist Norman Birnbaum, and Sen. Albert Gore, Jr. Includes the complete text of the letter. "A much needed and thorough evaluation, from many points of view."—Leon H. Keyserling

*ISBN 0-02-911260-5 • $24.95 ISBN 0-02-911270-2 • $14.95, paper*

## The Believer and the Powers That Are

**Cases, History, and Other Data Bearing on the Relation of Religion and Government**

Editor: JOHN T. NOONAN, Jr.

This remarkable sourcebook contains nearly 200 documents from the changing course of church-state relations throughout history, ranging from Biblical passages to recent Supreme Court cases. Divided into three sections—"Roots," "The American Experience," and "Contemporary Controversies"—the material includes letters, speeches, manifestos, legislation, and cases, each placed in context with extensive notes by the editor, who provides many fresh, first-time translations. Incisive introductions and commentary provide the historical settings and raise important critical questions.

*ISBN 0-02-923161-2 • $35.00*

MACMILLAN PUBLISHING COMPANY
866 THIRD AVENUE • NEW YORK, NY 10022 • ATT: KAREN STAUBI

# Oxford

## Hard Judicial Choices

**Federal District Court Judges and State and Local Officials**

PHILLIP J. COOPER, *State University of New York, Albany*

In controversial court cases involving civil rights, schools and housing, prison reform, and other social issues, federal district-court judges are often called upon to make some of the most difficult judicial decisions. How do these cases arise? How are they prosecuted and remedies fashioned when federally protected rights are violated? How can relations between federal judges and state and local officials be improved?

This book—the first to attempt to look at such cases from the district court judge's point of view—examines some of these questions through five comparative case studies involving open housing in a Cleveland suburb, school desegregation in Detroit, mental health reform in Alabama, prison conditions in Ohio, and alleged police misconduct in Philadelphia. Cooper presents a clear overview of the remedial decree process and prefaces each of the case studies with a full chapter that sets the case in its legal, administrative, and political context.

Taking a close look at the interactions between federal district court judges and state and local officials, this volume produces a model of remedial decree litigation that challenges widely-held assumptions about the role of district judges in such controversial cases.
December 1987 400 pp.; 4 linecuts paper $12.95 cloth $29.95

*Winner of the American Political Science Association's*
*Woodrow Wilson award for 1986*

## Governing the Economy

**The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France**

PETER A. HALL, *Harvard University*

Analyzing the evolution of economic policy in postwar Britain, this book develops a striking new argument about the sources of Britain's economic problems. Through an insightful, comparative examination of policy-making in Britain and France, Hall presents a new approach to state-society relations that emphasizes the crucial role of institutional structures.
*(Europe and the International Order)*
1986 340 pp. paper $14.95 cloth $36.00

*Prices and publication dates are subject to change.*
*To request an examination copy, write on school letterhead giving full course information, including course name, level, expected enrollment, and your decision deadine, to:*
*College Humanities & Social Sciences Marketing Dept.*

## Journeys Among Women

**Feminism in Five Italian Cities**

JUDITH ADLER HELLMAN, *York University, Toronto*

This book examines the growth of feminism in five strikingly different settings: Turin, Milan, Reggio Emilia, Verona, and Caserta. Tracing the development of the Italian women's movement from the 1960s through the 1980s, the author focuses on the ways in which the specific social and political traditions of the five cities shape the development of a new social movement.

*(Europe and the International Order)*

1987 224 pp. paper $13.95 cloth $39.95

## The Mitterrand Experiment

**Continuity and Change in Modern France**

Edited by GEORGE ROSS, *Brandeis University,* STANLEY HOFFMANN, *Harvard University,* and SYLVIA MALZACHER, *Center for European Studies, Harvard University*

Taking a sober, detailed look at the successes and failures of Mitterrand's Socialist government, these essays by leading international experts examine crucial topics such as the macroeconomic policies of the left, the left and the media, and the politics of the private sector.

*(Europe and the International Order)*

1987 240 pp. paper $15.95 cloth $39.95

## Studies in Power and Class in Africa

Edited by IRVING LEONARD MARKOVITZ, *Queens College, City University of New York*

"In conceptualization and analysis, in presentation and comprehensiveness, this book is excellent for pedagogical purposes."—Alaba Ocunsanwo, *Rutgers University.* Unified by the basic concepts of all politics—who gets what, when, where, and why, and who gets left out—these wide-ranging essays address problems of major concern in the daily lives of African people during and after the colonial period.

1987 400 pp.; 2 maps paper $14.95 cloth $32.00

## Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Decline

JOEL KRIEGER, *Wellesley College*

"Joel Krieger stakes out his own position boldly, elaborating a critique of new right governance that is both emotionally charged and intellectually stimulating."—*American Political Science Review.* In this incisive comparative study, Krieger cogently analyzes recent trends toward conservatism in both the United States and Britain under the Reagan and Thatcher governments and assesses their impact on the future of Western democracies.

*(Europe and the International Order)*

1986 247 pp. paper $11.95 cloth $29.95

**Oxford University Press**

200 Madison Avenue • New York, NY 10016

A GUIDE TO

# Professional Ethics in Political Science

Richard F. Schier
Editor

A handbook of principles to guide the professional conduct of political scientists.

**Order Form**

Orders of 1–9 copies are $3.00 for each copy.
Orders of 10 or more are $2.00 for each copy.

*Price includes postage.*

Enclosed is a check for $______ for ____ copies @ $______ each.

Send to: ________________________________________

________________________________________________

________________________________ ZIP ______________

*Return this form with check to:*

Publications Office
American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

# READING:
# THE ESSENTIAL POLITICAL ACTION.

## New in the POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL CHANGE Series

### Trade Wars
The Theory and Practice of International Commercial Rivalry
***John A. C. Conybeare***

Why do trade wars occur? And why do some escalate while others reach cooperative solutions? In *Trade Wars*, John Conybeare applies game-theory interpretation to actual trade wars throughout history.
352 pp., 7 graphs, $35.00

### Penetrating International Markets
Theoretical Considerations and Mexican Agriculture
***David R. Mares***

Using U.S.-Mexico trade as an example, Mares explains how third world entrepreneurs are able to penetrate protected markets and export to advanced industrialized countries.
296 pp., $35.00

---

## POWER AND PRODUCTION
A remarkably original four-volume study considering power relations in societies and in world politics from the standpoint of the social relations of production.

### Production, Power, and World Order
Social Forces in the Making of History
***Robert W. Cox***

Offers a new approach to the study of power by identifying the connections between production, the state, and world order. Cox classifies world production not by country, but rather by patterns of production relations.
392 pp., $45.00

### Power, Production, and the Unprotected Worker
***Jeffrey Harrod***

An innovative approach to the questions of social and economic power, particularly as they apply to those at the lowest reaches of a production hierarchy.
336 pp., $40.00

### Space Resources
Breaking the Bonds of Earth
***John S. Lewis and Ruth A. Lewis***

"A crisp, hard-hitting account of our present difficulties in space, backed by a history of how we got here, and of contrasts with what the Russians are doing. It describes in an exciting way the new technologies and new resources which can start us moving forward again."—James R. Arnold, Director, California Space Institute
384 pp., photos, graphs, $30.00

### The Politics of Environmental Mediation
***Douglas J. Amy***

Environmental mediation—is it politically neutral? Will it supplant litigation as a means for resolving disputes? Here Douglas Amy looks at the promise and the pitfalls of this new method.
288 pp., $30.00

### Under the Shadow of War
Fascism, Anti-Fascism, and Marxists, 1918-1939
***Larry Ceplair***

Charts the rise of Fascism in Italy and Germany, and the failures of the left to impede it. Ceplair adds significantly to our understanding of Fascism and anti-Fascism, providing crucial insights on the interwar period.
272 pp., $32.50

### Datawars
The Politics of Modeling in Federal Policymaking
***Kenneth L. Kraemer, Siegfried Dickhoven, Susan Fallows Tierney, and John Leslie King***

Computer models are fast becoming a permanent feature of American policymaking, but, as *Datawars* demonstrates, they can be potent instruments of politics and power.
*Computing, Organizations, Policy and Society (CORPS)*
326 pp., tables, figures, $35.00

*Now in paperback*
### Still the Golden Door
The Third World Comes to America
***David M. Reimers***

319 pp., $14.50 pa

### Rosa Luxemburg
A Revolutionary for Our Times
***Stephen Eric Bronner***

A Morningside Book
130 pp., $10.00 pa, $25.00 cl

### Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1950
***Robert A. Pollard***

*The Political Economy of International Change*
*John Gerard Ruggie, General Editor*
378 pp., $14.50 pa

***A Choice Outstanding Academic Book***
### In Pursuit of Power
Southern Blacks and Electoral Politics, 1965-1982
***Steven F. Lawson***

*Contemporary American History*
*William E. Leuchtenburg, General Editor*
391 pp., $14.50 pa

## TAKE ACTION.
Send check or money order, including $3.00 for postage and handling to:

COLUMBIA
UNIVERSITY PRESS
Dept. JN, 136 South Broadway
Irvington, NY 10533

# CLAIMING THE DREAM

## To Redeem the Soul of America

### The Southern Christian Leadership Conference and Martin Luther King, Jr.

*Adam Fairclough*

Peering beyond the towering figure of Martin Luther King, Jr., to reveal the full workings of the organization that supported him, Adam Fairclough examines the role of such strong-willed strategists as Andrew Young, James Bevel, and Wyatt Walker in building a bridge from the black proletariat to the halls of Congress and the White House.
*Illustrated* $35.00 cloth; $17.95 paper

## Cause at Heart

### A Former Communist Remembers

*Junius Scales and Richard Nickson*
*Foreword by Telford Taylor*

A memoir by the only American ever convicted under the Smith Act of 1940, *Cause at Heart* provides a rare, candid look at the Communist Party in America during its most embattled years.

"A powerful indictment both of economic and racial injustice in the twentieth-century South and of a radical organization more concerned about the Soviet Union than about the problems and aspirations of the American working class"—*Georgia Historical Quarterly.*
*Illustrated* $24.95

## Confronting the Color Line

### The Broken Promise of the Civil Rights Movement in Chicago

*Alan B. Anderson and George W. Pickering*

"A most engrossing treatment of the civil rights movement in Chicago in the mid-1970s. . . . The author's major premise is that politics constitute an inescapably moral enterprise"—*Washington Book Review.*

"A rewarding, challenging work. . . . It is a model explication of strategy, conflict, and leadership on race issues. After showing the promising Chicago movement's collapse, the book returns to the broader issue of race in American society"—*Library Journal.*
*Illustrated* $40.00 cloth; $17.95 paper

## Federal Law and Southern Order

### Racial Violence and Constitutional Conflict in the Post-*Brown* South

*Michal Belknap*

Probing the federal government's failure to respond to the racial violence that raged through the South in the wake of *Brown,* Michal Belknap shows that only after white southerners themselves suppressed the night riding and terrorism that threatened to plunge their region into anarchy did Washington move to protect black's constitutional rights.
*Illustrated* $35.00

The University of Georgia Press Athens, Georgia 30602

# New from MIT

## PROSPECTS FOR PEACEMAKING

A Citizen's Guide to Safer Nuclear Strategy

***edited by Harlan Cleveland and Lincoln P. Bloomfield***

*Prospects for Peacemaking* demystifies the critical issues of war, peace, and national security and clears the way for a security policy based less on outmoded premises and more on a purposeful strategy for peace in a nuclear world. It demonstrates one model of a creative interaction between citizens and specialists, one that can be replicated in any community.

$15.00

## TOWARD A LIVABLE WORLD

Leo Szilard and the Crusade for Nuclear Arms Control

***Leo Szilard***

***edited by Helen S. Hawkins, G. Allen Greb***

***Introduction by Barton J. Bernstein and Gertrud Weiss Szilard***

*Toward a Livable World* documents Szilard's energetic attempts to influence public policy on arms control and disarmament issues, both through behind-the-scenes contacts with Washington power sources and a remarkable exercise in personal diplomacy with Nikita Krushchev.

$50.00

*New in Paperback*

## HOW PEACE CAME TO THE WORLD

***edited by Earl W. Foell and Richard A. Nenneman***

"*How Peace Came to the World* is an arresting and evocative compendium of scenarios that imagine a sustainable future for our planet. Almost all of [the essayists] agreed on a central point: that Americans and Soviets must accommodate themselves to each other. They will either coexist or not exist. The book is a superb reminder that people everywhere owe a duty to the children to safeguard the future."

*—International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, winners of the 1985 Nobel Peace Prize*

$7.95 paper

WILLY
BRANDT
ARMS AND
HUNGER

## ARMS AND HUNGER

***Willy Brandt***

In this strongly worded book, Brandt goes beyond the diplomatic role he has formally played and describes the major problems plaguing the globe today, as well as solutions for them. From Brandt's personal observation and personal experience, he demonstrates that the West has failed to meet today's challenges and delivers a frank criticism of the Reagan administration's policies—or lack of them.

"Brandt's findings, like his suggestions, are realistic and discriminating.—*The New Yorker*

$7.95 paper

**The MIT Press**

55 Hayward Street, Cambridge, MA 02142

# The best in Political Science

## BETTER A SHIELD THAN A SWORD

**Perspectives on Defense and Technology**

EDWARD TELLER

These personal reflections reveal the public and private Edward Teller—one of the most eminent and controversial scientists of the 20th Century—who offers his frank appraisal of the development of the hydrogen bomb and his role in the Oppenheimer controversy, and his influential views on arms control, the Strategic Defense Initiative, and nuclear policy.

*1987 ISBN: 0-02-932461-0 $19.95*

## GOVERNING PRISONS

**A Comparative Study of Correctional Management**

JOHN J. DIIULIO, JR.

Widely believed to be a breeding ground for crime rather than a punishment for it, corrections expert John J. DiIulio argues that the American prison can be governed in ways that encourage civilized behavior, and constitute punishment that is just as well as merciful. "An insightful analysis of the complex problems involved in managing our burgeoning correctional systems."—Norman A. Carlson, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons

*1987 ISBN: 0-02-907881-4 $24.95*

## THE QUESTION OF PORNOGRAPHY

**Research Findings and Policy Implications**

EDWARD DONNERSTEIN, DANIEL LINZ, and STEVEN PENROD

This analysis of the scientific findings to date on the impact of media sex and violence reveals that sexually-explicit material—in itself—does not foster negative behavior unless it is combined with images of violence. Rejecting censorship, the authors recommend realistic strategies to offset the negative effects of all violent sexual images—from prime-time TV to pornography. "Will not be the last word in this constantly evolving controversy, but no thoughtful discussion can ignore its findings." —Alan M. Dershowitz, *Harvard University*

*1987 ISBN: 0-02-907521-1 $24.95*

## A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

RALPH CLARK CHANDLER, Editor

"Chandler has done the field of public administration a great service by putting together... a who's who of virtually every leading public administration scholar in the country. Should be exciting reading and a significant reference document to all of those who study, practice, or teach public administration."—H. George Frederickson, President, *Eastern Washington University*

*1987 ISBN: 0-02-905301-3 $45.00*

## HOLLYWOOD GOES TO WAR

**How Politics, Profits, and Propaganda Shaped World War II Movies**

CLAYTON R. KOPPES and GREGORY D. BLACK

"Has the tremendous virtue of being at once highly entertaining, impeccable in scholarship, and provocative in the larger themes it illuminates. It will appeal not only to film buffs and students of World War II, but to everyone concerned with the mass media, with issues of censorship, and with the interaction of popular culture and political ideology."—Paul Boyer, *University of Wisconsin-Madison*

*1987 ISBN: 0-02-903550-3 $22.50*

## KOREA

**The War Before Vietnam**

CALLUM A. MACDONALD

"Exhaustively researched, well-written, and intelligent...a real achievement."—William O'Neill, *Rutgers University*

*1987 ISBN: 0-02-919621-3 $24.95*

## AIR BATTLE CENTRAL EUROPE

ALFRED PRICE

"A first-rate introduction to tactical air warfare in the European theatre...must reading for anyone interested in understanding NATO air operations."—Allan R. Millett, *Ohio State University*

*1987 ISBN: 0-02-925451-5 $17.95*

# from THE FREE PRESS FP

## TO RAISE AN ARMY

### The Draft Comes to Modern America

JOHN WHITECLAY CHAMBERS, II

"The first authoritative account of one of the miracles of recent history—the raising of a great army within a little more than a year. Prodigiously researched, objective and fair, and beautifully written—a notable contribution to American historical literature."—Arthur S. Link, Editor of *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Princeton University*

*1987 ISBN: 0-02-905820-1 $24.95*

## THE FOUR DAYS OF COURAGE

### The Untold Story of the People Who Brought Marcos Down

BRYAN JOHNSON

"Clarifies one of the most myth-ridden events of recent times...May well be the best book on the Ferdinand Marcos-Corazon Aquino election campaign and on the "People Power" that toppled a tyrant, a narrative reminiscent of that Vietnam-era classic, Michael Herr's *Dispatches*, but without the hallucinations."
—*The New York Times Book Review*

*1987 ISBN: 0-02-916571-7 $19.95*

## GEORGE WASHINGTON

### The Making of An American Symbol

BARRY SCHWARTZ

"In this solidly researched yet sparkling book, Mr. Schwartz, venturing into an apparently almost exhausted field, manages to deal freshly, shrewdly, and also affectionately with George Washington as the prime example of American hero-worship."—Marcus Cunliffe, *The George Washington University*

*1987 ISBN: 0-02-928141-5 $22.50*

## THE PRIDE AND THE FALL

### The Dream and Illusion of Britain as a Great Nation

CORRELLI BARNETT

"Brilliant...chilling...debunking...a formidable book, essential reading."—*Financial Times*

*1987 ISBN: 0-02-901851-X $22.95*

## REMAKING JAPAN

### The American Occupation as New Deal

THEODORE COHEN, Edited by Herb Passin

In this fascinating, behind-the-scenes story, occupation-force insider Theodore Cohen chronicles the six crucial post-war years when a handful of Americans, governed by New Deal tenets, laid the foundation for modern Japan—transforming it from a feudalistic society to a nation of middle class consumers.

*1987 ISBN: 0-02-906050-8 $27.50*

## SAVING THE REVOLUTION

### *The Federalist Papers* and The American Founding

CHARLES R. KESLER, Editor

In honor of the Constitution's bicentennial, thirteen of America's preeminent scholars—including Edward C. Banfield, Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., and Jack N. Rakove—offer fresh insights into *The Federalist Papers*: its ideals, arguments, and enduring effects on American political life.

*1987 ISBN: 0-02-919730-9 $29.95*

## LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS

### Myth and Reality

RANDALL P. BEZANSON, GILBERT CRANBERG, and JOHN SOLOSKI

Based on the pioneering Iowa Libel Research Project, three media experts challenge traditional beliefs about the intent and consequences of libel law—and present overwhelming evidence of a faulty libel system that protects no one. Offering practical suggestions that could significantly reduce costly litigation, this study points the way toward profound libel law reform while protecting the rights the law originally sought to secure.

*1987 ISBN: 0-02-905870-8 $40.00*

TO CHARGE BOOKS BY PHONE to your VISA or MasterCard, call toll-free 1-800-257-5755 (In NJ, AK, or HI, dial direct 1-609-461-6500).

**FP THE FREE PRESS**
*A Division of Macmillan, Inc.*
866 THIRD AVENUE, NEW YORK, NY 10022

# A new SETUPS — with a data set for microcomputer users or mainframe computer users . . .



Supplementary Empirical Teaching Units in Political Science

VOTING BEHAVIOR
THE 1984 ELECTION

By Charles Prysby and Carmine Scavo

SETUPS: AMERICAN POLITICS
January 1986

The SETUPS includes a monograph for students and a data set.

## The monograph features:

- a description of the 1984 election
- an introduction to voting behavior and survey research
- a set of data analysis exercises
- a codebook for the data set
- a bibliography

## The data set is available for:

- mainframe computers, on tape, in an SPSSX export file and OSIRIS data and dictionary files
- microcomputers — IBM-PC compatible machines, on diskette, in an ABC data set

The SETUPS monograph is $6.50/copy, $5.20/copy on orders of 25 or more. All orders must be prepaid. The data are free with orders of 25 or more monographs. To order write:

**SETUPS / APSA**
1527 New Hampshire Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20036

LEXINGTON BOOKS
THE PUBLISHER OF CHOICE ON POLITICS AND POLICY

NEW TEXT!

**American Defense Annual, 1987-1988**

Joseph Kruzel, Mershon Center, The Ohio State University, editor

The third volume in the widely acclaimed series sponsored by the Mershon Center at the Ohio State University. Top defense experts bring a wide range of political views to their stimulating discussions of American security policy. Collectively, they provide readers with a balanced overall perspective on the issues.

15091-6 1987 416 pp. $45.00 (cl)
15090-8 $16.95 (pb/text)

NEW TEXT!

**Democracy, Strategy, and Vietnam**

Implications for American Policymaking

George K. Osborn, Asa A. Clark, IV, Daniel J. Kaufman, and Douglas E. Lute, all professors at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, editors

Has American national security policy changed substantially as a result of the Vietnam experience? This book examines that vital question and answers it primarily in the negative.

16340-6 1987 400 pp. $35.00 (cl)
16341-4 $16.95 (pb/text)

NEW TEXT!

**Financing the 1984 Election**

Herbert E. Alexander and Brian A. Haggerty, Citizens' Research Foundation

A detailed look at the role money played in the campaigns of each of the major contenders for presidential nomination in 1984. It also describes Congressional efforts to develop appropriate finance legislation from 1983 to 1986 and discusses the activities of the Federal Election Commission.

14885-7 1987 448 pp. $45.00 (cl)
16256-6 $14.95 (pb/text)

**Dealing with Drugs**

Consequences of Government Control

Ronald Hamowy, University of Alberta, editor

Experts explore drug policy and control in the U.S., its numerous failures, and suggest new approaches to managing our illegal drug problems.

*"Another step forward in our understanding of drug problems and government's responses to them. This is an incisive book for all those who want to understand the real issues we are facing."* — **John Kaplan, Professor of Law, Stanford University**

15678-7 1987 400 pp. $40.00 (cl)

**DC Heath**
A Raytheon Company

**Lexington Books**
THE PROFESSIONAL'S PUBLISHER

125 Spring Street
Lexington, MA 02173

800-235-3565

**Excellence in Political Science**

**Introduction to Politics**
Vernon Van Dyke, University of Iowa. ISBN 0-8304-1089-9

**The Supreme Court in the Federal Judicial System (revised)**
Stephen L. Wasby, SUNY, Albany. ISBN 0-8304-1175-5

**Politics, Parties, and Elections in America**
John F. Bibby, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee. ISBN 0-8304-1060-0

**Introduction to Social Science**
Wesley M. Bagby, West Virginia University. ISBN 0-8304-1146-1

**Political Theory: A Thematic Inquiry**
James L. Wiser,
Loyola University, Chicago.
ISBN 0-8304-1069-4

**The American Presidency: A Policy Perspective from Readings and Documents**
David C. Kozak, National War College, and Kenneth N. Ciboski, Wichita State University, editors.
ISBN 0-8304-1053-8

**★★Forthcoming★★**

**Introduction to International Relations**
David Farnsworth, Wichita State University.
ISBN 0-8304-1101-1, Spring 1988

**The American Bureaucracy**
Richard J. Stillman, II, George Mason University. ISBN 0-8304-1052-X

**Atlantis: Role Playing Simulations for the Study of American Politics**
W. Robert Gump and James R. Woodworth, Miami University.
ISBN 0-8304-1137-2 spiral, Instructor's Resource Manual

**Policy Analysis in Political Science**
Randall B. Ripley,
The Ohio State University.
ISBN 0-8304-1058-9

**Ethics and Politics: Cases and Comments**
Amy Gutmann, Princeton University, and Dennis F. Thompson, Harvard University, editors.
ISBN 0-8304-1115-1

**Introduction to Comparative Politics: Comparing Political System Performance in Three Worlds**
John D. Nagle, Syracuse University.
ISBN 0-8304-1042-2

**Law and Justice**
Howard Abadinsky, St. Xavier College, Chicago.
ISBN 0-8304-1188-7

To request exam copies, please state course title, present text, and enrollment on your letterhead and send it to Nelson-Hall College Division.

**Nelson-Hall Publishers**
111 N. Canal, Chicago 60606

Series Consulting Editor: Samuel C. Patterson, *The Ohio State University*

# Harvard University Press

## China Watch

*John King Fairbank*

America's top China-watcher here presents his most extensive writings on post-revolutionary China, providing an unrivaled overview of that nation and of Chinese-American relations.

$20.00

## Political Ethics and Public Office

*Dennis F. Thompson*

Thompson surveys ethical conflicts of public officials over a spectrum of political issues, developing a conception of political ethics that respects the demands of both morality and politics.

$25.00

## From Deterrence to Defense

The Inside Story of Strategic Policy

*Michael Charlton*

Candid interviews with the architects of American nuclear policy.

"Excellent . . . Charlton's line of questioning could hardly have been bettered."
—*Times Literary Supplement*

$20.00 cloth, $8.95 paper

## Whose Votes Count?

Affirmative Action and Minority Voting Rights

*Abigail M. Themstrom*

"This book is a perfect event. . . . It is necessarily the 'standard work' for anyone seriously interested in the politics, law, and modern history of the Voting Rights Act."
—William Van Alstyne,
Duke University School of Law

*A Twentieth Century Fund Study* *$25.00*

## The Chinese Army After Mao

*Ellis Joffe*

"An excellent study . . . [Joffe] is superbly equipped to provide a sophisticated understanding of a highly elusive matter: China's military modernization and the politics of civil-military relations."
—Allen S. Whiting, University of Arizona

$20.00

## Another Liberalism

Romanticism and the Reconstruction of Liberal Thought

*Nancy L. Rosenblum*

"A highly original work—beautifully written, brimming with insights, and a real pleasure to read . . . A major contribution to the debate about the nature and origins of liberalism."
—Stephen Holmes,
University of Chicago

$25.00

## Liberalism and American Constitutional Law

*Rogers M. Smith*

"This is a very challenging and important book. Impressive in scholarship and ambitious in scope, Smith's volume represents a sophisticated attempt to develop from our limited tradition a purposive theory for reorienting contemporary constitutional debates."
—*American Political Science Review*

$22.50

available in paperback

## Fighting Poverty

What Works and What Doesn't

*Edited by Sheldon H. Danziger and Daniel H. Weinberg*

"For those who want an informed, balanced, and realistic, but not despairing, consideration of anti-poverty policy, this is the book."—*Perspective*

*$10.95 paper*

***79 Garden St.***
***Cambridge, MA 02138***

## Announcing the 36th Annual, 1988–89

## American Political Science Association

# CONGRESSIONAL FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM



## Political Scientists

**Opportunities for young and mid-career political scientists to learn more about the legislative process by working as congressional aides for nine months.**

---

**Qualifications:** Scholarly interest in Congress and the policy process and a Ph.D. completed within the last fifteen years (or near completion). Stipend: $20,000, plus travel allowance. The fellowship stipend may be supplemented, at the fellow's initiative, with university support.

**Fellowship Year:** Orientation begins in November 1988; office assignments run from December 1988 through August 15, 1989.

**Applications:** Application materials must be submitted prior to December 1, 1987. Awards will be announced by March 16, 1988.

## Application Procedures

**For Political Scientists** who have completed their Ph.D. within the last fifteen years or are near completion, submit six copies of:

- A detailed curriculum vitae;
- A personal statement of about 500 words explaining how the Congressional Fellowship Program relates to your professional career goals;
- A sample of your best professional writing (one published or unpublished manuscript or paper.)

In addition, applicants should submit the names of three professional references who will send letters of recommendation to our office by December 15, 1987, (You are responsible for seeing that these letters are sent.)

*By December 1, 1987 send to:*
Director
Congressional Fellowship Program
American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

### Program activities include:

- A comprehensive 3-week orientation period, beginning in early November 1988, in preparation for work assignments,
- Full-time work assignments in the House of Representatives and the Senate, and
- Weekly seminar meetings with leading congressional, governmental, and academic figures.

### Chairman of the Congressional Fellowship Program Advisory Committee

**Nelson W. Polsby**, University of California, Berkeley

### Former Congressional Fellows include:

**Charles Bullock**, University of Georgia
**Richard Cheney**, *Chairman, U.S. House Republican Conference*
**Lawrence Dodd**, Indiana University
**Murray P. Dry**, Middlebury College
**Delmer Dunn**, University of Georgia
**Ada W. Finifter**, Michigan State University
**Alton Frye**, Council on Foreign Relations
**Robert Healy**, Atlantic Richfield Company
**Charles Henry**, University of California, Berkeley
**George Kundanis**, Office of Rep. Thomas S. Foley
**Eve Lubalin**, Office of Senator Frank R. Lautenberg
**David B. Magleby**, Brigham Young University
**Thomas E. Mann**, The Brookings Institution
**John Manley**, Stanford University
**David Mayhew**, Yale University
**Bruce Oppenheimer**, University of Houston
**Norman Ornstein**, American Enterprise Institute
**Bruce W. Robeck**, Texas A&M University
**David Rohde**, Michigan State University
**Alan Rosenthal**, Rutgers University
**Mark A. Siegel**, Mark A. Siegel and Associates
**Barbara Sinclair**, University of California, Riverside
**Terry Sullivan**, University of Texas, Austin
**Howard Swearer**, President, Brown University
**Marcia L. Whicker**, University of South Carolina
**Raymond Wolfinger**, University of California, Berkeley
**Charles E. Young**, Chancellor, UCLA

*Designed by MOSES JACKSON*

# New in the Pitt Series in Policy and Institutional Studies

## PESTICIDES AND POLITICS: The Life Cycle of a Public Issue

*Christopher J. Bosso*

Traces the long battle over the control of pesticides through forty years of technological and political change. 1987/312 pages/$29.95

## AGENCY MERGER AND BUREAUCRATIC REDESIGN

*Karen M. Hult*

Explores the aftermath of merger in three community development agencies, providing significant insights into why mergers do or do not succeed. 1987/235 pages/$28.95

## POLICY ANALYSIS BY DESIGN

*Davis B. Bobrow and John S. Dryzek*

Examines the analytical approaches to public policy taken by those who teach it, write about, and influence it through analysis.
November 1987/Approx. 240 pages/$27.95 cloth, $13.95 paper

## CONGRESS AND ECONOMIC POLICYMAKING

*Darrell M. West*

An illuminating new study of congressional decision making on economic policy during the Reagan administration.
December 1987/Approx. 176 pages/$22.95 cloth, $9.95 paper
(tentative prices)

*Also of Interest*

## AUTHORITARIANS AND DEMOCRATS: Regime Transition in Latin America

*James M. Malloy and Mitchell A. Seligson, Editors*

A collection of case studies by leading Latin American scholars addressing the recent revival of democracy in Latin America.
1987/278 pages/$25.95 cloth, $12.95 paper

Pittsburgh
University of Pittsburgh Press
Pittsburgh, PA 15260

CQ PRESS

# CQ Press . . . the frontrunner in political science in 1988

**JUST PUBLISHED**

**The Politics of the Presidency**
Second Edition
Richard A. Watson, University of Missouri-Columbia
Norman C. Thomas, University of Cincinnati
547 pages. $17.95.

**The Presidency and the Political System**
Second Edition
Michael Nelson, editor, Vanderbilt University
498 pages. $17.95.

**Parties, Politics, and Public Policy in America**
Fifth Edition
William J. Keefe, University of Pittsburgh
300 pages. $14.95.

**Government by Proxy**
(Mis?)Managing Federal Programs
Donald F. Kettl, University of Virginia
170 pages. $10.95.

**Polling and the Public**
What Every Citizen Should Know
Herbert B. Asher, Ohio State University
168 pages. $11.95.

**State Government**
CQ's Guide to Current Issues and Activities 1987-88
Thad L. Beyle, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill
editor
App. 220 pages. $9.95.

**CQ's Guide to Current American Government**
Fall 1987
App. 165 pages. $9.95.

CQ PRESS

## NEW FOR 1988

**The Presidential Contest**
Third Edition
Richard A. Watson, University of Missouri-Columbia
Available for examination and adoption October 1987

**The Elusive Executive**
Discovering Statistical Patterns in the Presidency
Gary King, Harvard University
Lyn Ragsdale, University of Arizona
Available for examination and adoption December 1987

**American Foreign Policy Since World War II**
Eleventh Edition
John Spanier, University of Florida
Available for examination and adoption January 2, 1988

## NEW FOR 1987

**Governing**
Readings and Cases in American Politics
Roger H. Davidson and Walter J. Oleszek, editors
Congressional Research Service

**Games Nations Play**
Sixth Edition
John Spanier, University of Florida

**Change and Continuity in the 1984 Elections**
Revised Edition
Paul R. Abramson, Michigan State University
John H. Aldrich, Duke University
David W. Rohde, Michigan State University

**Energy, Politics, and Public Policy**
Second Edition
Walter A. Rosenbaum, University of Florida

**Basic Cases in Constitutional Law**
Second Edition
Duane Lockard (emeritus) and Walter F. Murphy, editors
Princeton University

**The Politics of Shared Power**
Second Edition
Louis Fisher, Congressional Research Service

*CQ Press* ● *College Services* ● 1414 22nd Street, NW ● Washington, DC 20037

**New York University Press**

## The Making of Modern Society

ROBERT NISBET

"An excellent book and a valuable source of reference. The autobiographical information is particularly fascinating."
—Tom Bottomore, author of *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought*

*224 pages ISBN 0-8147-5761-8 $40.00*

## Conflict Management and Problem Solving

**Interpersonal to International Applications**

DENNIS J. D. SANDOLE and INGRID SANDOLE-STAROSTE, Editors

Includes state-of-the-art theory, research, and practice of conflict management in family, community, and labor relations and also deals with hostage-taking situations and with international relations.

*320 pages ISBN 0-8147-7866-6 $40.00*

## Centre Formation, Protest Movements, and Class Structure in Europe and the United States

SHMUEL NOAH EISENSTADT, L. RONIGER, and A. SELIGMAN

This collection of original studies analyzes various aspects of the configuration of modern Western European nation-states and the United States.

*220 pages ISBN 0-8147-2171-0 $30.00*

## Manhattan Water-Bound

**Planning and Developing Manhattan's Waterfront from the Seventeenth Century to the Present**

ANN L. BUTTENWIESER

"Ann Buttenwieser...has deftly traced three centuries of history.... *Manhattan Water-Bound* describes the glory of the port's past, and offers a look into its future." —Henry J. Stern, Commissioner, *New York City Department of Parks and Recreation*

*192 pages ISBN 0-8147-1093-X $30.00*

**NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS**
WASHINGTON SQUARE • NEW YORK, N.Y. 10003

*New from Wisconsin*

SOVIET-EAST EUROPEAN RELATIONS
Consolidation and Conflict, 1968–1980
*Robert Hutchings*
$12.50 Paper

SECTIONALISM AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, 1880–1980
*Richard Franklin Bensel*
$14.95 Paper

DEMOCRACY AND PUNISHMENT
Disciplinary Origins of the United States
*Thomas L. Dumm*
$40.00 Cloth/$15.75 Paper

THE FRANCO REGIME 1936–1975
*Stanley G. Payne*
$30.00 Cloth

THE ORIGINS OF MODERNITY
The Origins of Modern Social Theory from Kant to Marx
*John Rundell*
$36.00 Cloth

THE POST-INDUSTRIAL UTOPIANS
*Boris Frankel*
$35.00 Cloth/$12.50 Paper

THE ORGANIZATIONAL STATE
Social Change in National Party Domains
*Edward O. Laumann*
*and David Knoke*
$45.00 Cloth/$19.95 Paper

POLITICAL EDUCATION IN THE SOUTHERN FARMERS ALLIANCE, 1887–1900
*Theodore Mitchell*
$39.50 Cloth/$16.50 Paper

**Wisconsin**
*University of Wisconsin Press*
*114 N. Murray St., Madison, WI 53715*

# Congress in Action



For more information about how you might use **Congress: We The People** call 1-800-LEARNER. For review copies of the Study Guide and Faculty Guide which have been designed to accompany the series call the American Political Science Association, 1-202-483-2512.

Educational Excellence
Through Telecommunications

An Annenberg/CPB Project

**Congress: We The People** is an exciting new resource for political science courses on Congress and the legislative process.

The series includes 26 half-hour video cassettes that show the day-to-day activities of Congress and provide analysis and commentary by leading political scientists.

Faculty are finding that **Congress: We The People** is an excellent supplement to existing courses. Among the topics addressed are: congressional elections; committee leadership; lobbying; constituent relations; lawmaking; budgeting; ethics; and congressional relations with the President, courts and the media.

The series is also being used as a complete broadcast telecourse for students who complete most of their study off-campus, and as a resource for noncredit and informal study.

**Congress: We The People** is hosted by Norman Ornstein, Catholic University, and Edwin Newman, noted journalist. It was produced by the American Political Science Association and WETA, the public television station in Washington, D.C.

A special feature of **Congress: We The People** is its adaptation for use with any of following three commonly used textbooks:

- **Congress and Its Members** by Roger H. Davidson and Walter J. Oleszek, Congressional Quarterly Press, Washington, D.C. 1985.
- **The United States Congress: People, Places and Policy** by Charles O. Jones, the Dorsey Press, Homewood, Illinois, 1982.
- **Congress: Process and Policy** by Randall B. Ripley, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, 1983.


The Classic Slave Narratives
LAY BARE THE HEART: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
THE TWILIGHT OF THE PRESIDENCY FROM JOHNSON TO REAGAN GEORGE E. REEDY
THE REAGAN FOREIGN POLICY WILLIAM G. HYLAND
FOREIGN AFFAIRS READER

Chronicles of American power and powerlessness—past, present, and future

THE CLASSIC SLAVE NARRATIVES

**Edited by Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Ph.D.** These autobiographical narratives offer insight into the slaves' struggle for recognition as human beings entitled to dignity and freedom. In addition to the works of Frederick Douglass and Olaudah Equiano, this original anthology includes the writings of Mary Prince and Harriet Jacobs (a.k.a. Linda Brent), never before available in paperback.
**MENTOR** 0-451-62564-1 $4.95/$5.95*

LAY BARE THE HEART
An Autobiography of the Civil Rights Movement

**By James Farmer.** The founding director of CORE eloquently recounts the excitement and turmoil of the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 60s. Unsparing of himself and forthright about others—Martin Luther King, Jr., John F. Kennedy, Malcolm X—Farmer has created "an invaluable contribution to the history and literature of the unfinished civil rights movement."—Julian Bond, in *Atlanta Magazine*
**PLUME** 0-452-25803-0 $8.95/$11.95*

THE TWILIGHT OF THE PRESIDENCY
From Johnson to Reagan
Revised Edition

**By George E. Reedy.** Hailed by *The New York Times* as "one of the most thoughtful, stimulating, and alarming essays on American government," when it was first published, this landmark book has now been completely revised to provide fresh insight and analysis into the current structure of the Presidency. From Johnson to Reagan, Reedy describes the virtually unchecked power that works to corrupt the office of the President. A new afterword addresses the Iran-Contra scandal and its probable effect on future Presidents.
**NAL BOOKS** 0-453-00567-5 $17.95/$24.95*

THE REAGAN FOREIGN POLICY
A *Foreign Affairs* Reader

**Edited and with an Introduction by William G. Hyland.** From the pages of *Foreign Affairs* comes this sharp look at the promises, accomplishments, and disappointments of the first six years of Reagan's administration. Such authors as George Shultz, Richard Nixon, Senator John Tower, James Schlesinger, and Caspar Weinberger discuss South Africa, Star Wars, Central America, the Middle East, human rights, and other controversial issues. Published for the Council on Foreign Affairs.
**MERIDIAN** 0-452-00889-1 $9.95/$13.95*

*Price in Canada. Prices subject to change. Write to the Education Department at the address below for a free History & Political Science catalog.

**NEW AMERICAN LIBRARY**
1633 Broadway, New York, NY 10019
NAL

# Oxford

## Politics and Vision

**The ADA and American Liberalism, 1947-1985**

STEVEN M. GILLON, *Yale University*

Here, Steven Gillon traces the history of the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) from its inception as one of the most forceful advocates of liberal ideals following World War II to its redefinition during the Vietnam era, concluding with an analysis of the ADA's influence in liberal politics today.

1987  306 pp.  $24.95

## Democracy, Liberty, and Equality

ROBERT A. DAHL, *Yale University*

Here, esteemed political scientist Robert A. Dahl reflects on the continuing confrontation of three different theoretical visions—capitalism, socialism, and democracy—and assesses the relative merits of each system.

*A Norwegian University Press Publication*

1987  286 pp.  $32.50

## Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament 1987

STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (SIPRI)

*On the 1986 Yearbook:* "Consistent with SIPRI's high standards, the book is an authoritative source of data….With its new publisher, it is noticeably more handsome and accessible than in past years."—*Bulletin of Atomic Scientists.* This collection of timely data on world armaments—nuclear and space weapons, chemical and biological warfare, military expenditure, and the arms trade—also covers issues such as the Chernobyl accident, South Africa, and test ban treaties.

*(SIPRI)*

1987  450 pp.; figs. and tables  $55.00

## The Uncertain Course

**New Weapons, Strategies and Mind-Sets**

Edited by CARL G. JACOBSEN, *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*

A comprehensive analysis of the strategic, military, and technological forces changing the nature and likelihood of war, this book confronts the dangers that exist in a world with 21st-century weapons and a 19th-century mind-set.

*(SIPRI)*

1987  374 pp.  $54.00

*Now available in paperback*

## The Decline of the British Economy

**An Institutional Perspective**

BERNARD ELBAUM, *University of California*, and WILLIAM LAZONICK, *Barnard College*

"A useful quarry for students of 20th-century industrial and economic history."—*Albion.* Focusing on specific industries and issues, Elbaum examines the decline of the British economy in terms of its structural rigidity and historic changes in the world economy.

1986 (paper 1987)  272 pp.  cloth $49.95  paper $17.95

## The Politics of Neocorporatism in France

**Farmers, the State, and Agricultural Policy-making in the Fifth Republic**

JOHN T.S. KEELER, *University of Washington*

"Keeler's study is an invaluable and indispensable contribution to our understanding of the complex relationship between the state and society in France's Fifth Republic."—Stanley Hoffmann, Harvard University. Keeler's study of the politics of neocorporatism in France introduces an original, sector-oriented theoretical framework suitable for analyzing the corporatization process in any democratic polity.

1987  384 pp.; 32 illus.  $39.95

*Prices and publication dates are subject to change.*
*To order, send check or money order to:*
*Humanities and Social Sciences Marketing Department*

**Oxford University Press**
200 Madison Avenue • New York, NY 10016

# PENN STATE PRESS

## Involvement by Invitation

*American Strategies of Containment in Iran*

***Kuross A. Samii***

Based on extensive archival research, this book is a perceptive analysis of the historical events that led to America's untidy encounter with the Iranian revolution. Engaging and forthright, it examines American-Iranian relations against the backdrop of American-Soviet rivalry.

"*Involvement by Invitation* tells the story of America's tangled relation with Iran with great authority, meticulous research and literary grace. Reading Kuross A. Samii's remarkable book one understands what came to pass between the U.S. and Iran: the attraction, the entanglement, and then the feud. A book that merits praise and attention." — Fouad Ajami

*208 pages 10 illus. $24.95*

## The Coal of El Cerrejón

*Dependent Bargaining and Colombian Policy Making*

***Harvey F. Kline***

This study of two contracts the Colombian government made for coal development in the early 1980s goes beyond the literature on *dependencia* and on bargaining to closely examine the power struggles between "Nationalists" and "Reactionaries" in the decision-making process. A fascinating study of contract-bargaining and its political, economic, and social effects.

*224 pages $23.50*

## The Origins of Nonviolence

*Tolstoy and Gandhi in Their Historical Settings*

***Martin Green***

The lives of Tolstoy and Gandhi began at widely separate points — of time, place, social origin, and conviction. In the course of their lives they became, respectively, military officer and novelist, and lawyer and political organizer, but in the last two decades of their lives, they occupied the same special space — that of ascetic/saint/prophet. At first agents of modern reform, both men rebelled against it and led a profound resistance.

*264 pages $27.50*



## The Athenian Republic

*Democracy or the Rule of Law?*

***Raphael Sealey***

Renowned author Sealey discovers continuity in the constitutional history of ancient Athens, where previous scholars have stressed change. This examination of the legal and social conditions of the inhabitants of Attica, of the sources of Athenian law, and of the sanction of the law — that is, the courts and procedures for administering justice — concludes positively that the Athenians evolved a concept of the rule of law and sought to achieve it by codification and by a system of courts independent of the organs which made policy.

*192 pages $22.50*

## *Coming Soon*

## Federal Social Policy

*The Historical Dimension*

***Donald T. Critchlow and Ellis Hawley, Editors***

A penetrating examination of the development of social policy in 20th-century America, seven original essays explore the historical context for understanding the formulation, implementation, and administration of social policy as it has emerged. Specific essays focus on social policy and women and the aged, social security in the New Deal, and interest group lobbying and the politics of policymaking; others address the broad meaning of the state and the American policy of the 19th and 20th centuries.

* * *

**PENN STATE PRESS**
215 Wagner Building
University Park, PA 16802
(814) 865–1327

# THIS CONSTITUTION

## A HISTORY

## NEW RESOURCE

For courses in constitutional law or to
supplement American government courses—

*This Constitution: A History Course Guide*
*This Constitution: A History Anthology*

Complemented by five half-hour color
television programs . . .

Designed by an interdisciplinary team
of nationally known scholars:

● Herman Belz ● Michal R. Belknap
● Michael Les Benedict ● Richard C. Cortner
● Thomas E. Cronin ● Don E. Fehrenbacher
● Tony Freyer ● Kermit L. Hall
● Ralph Lerner ● Peter Onuf

For information:

International University Consortium
The University of Maryland
University College
College Park, Maryland 20742
Telephone: 301-985-7811

Project 87

INTERNATIONAL
UNIVERSITY
CONSORTIUM

# POLITICS and Right Left

## THE LIFE OF THE PARTY

**Democratic Prospects in 1988 and Beyond**

***Robert Kuttner.*** Part reportage, part manifesto, this timely examination of Democrats past and present traces the party's history from its heyday as the voice of the people to the infighting and lack of focus that characterize its present state. Calling for a return to the traditional Democratic platform, Kuttner outlines a progressive agenda for the 1988 presidential election and for the next decade. Elisabeth Sifton Books.

0-670-81564-0 256 pp. $18.95 hardcover

## A FAREWELL TO MARX

**An Outline and Appraisal of His Theories**

***David Conway.*** This thought-provoking study examines the conflict between Marx's rationally derived, even brilliant, philosophical, political, and economic theories and the less-than-sound presuppositions about society and the world on which they are based. Stripping away layers of preconceived devotion to Marx, this critical reappraisal reveals the most challenging of philosophical thinkers as a man unable to free himself from optimistic illusion.

0-14-022365-7 224 pp. $6.95 paperback

## THE *FEDERALIST* PAPERS

***James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay.*** *Edited and introduced by Isaac Kramnick* (Cornell University). Considered by Thomas Jefferson to be "the best commentary on the principle of government ever written," the *Federalist* papers—fully collected here in the first edition texts—represent the definitive exposition of the American Constitution. Isaac Kramnick's introduction traces the genesis and growth of the *Federalist* papers and the controversy they spurred over two centuries of varying interpretations.

0-14-044495-5 528 pp. $7.95 paperback

## THE BURGER YEARS

**Rights and Wrongs in the Supreme Court 1969-1986**

***Edited and introduced by Herman Schwartz.*** Fifteen essays by expert observers of the Burger Court and leading public affairs activists make up this comprehensive study of the wide-ranging effects and influence of the Court's rulings on such areas as freedom of the press, civil rights, criminal justice, and national security. "Anyone interested in this crucial era will learn much from the kaleidoscope composed by these distinguished authors"—Laurence Tribe, Harvard Law School. Elisabeth Sifton Books.

0-670-81270-6 320 pp. $22.95 hardcover

## AMERICAN LAKE

**Nuclear Peril in the Pacific**

***Peter Hayes, Lyuba Zarsky, and Walden Bello.*** Drawing from previously classified Pentagon files, three journalists reveal the precarious—and reversible—state of the American and Soviet nuclear stand-off in the Pacific, dramatically bringing to light a situation on the brink of a third World War.

0-14-009396-6 576 pp. $6.95 paperback

## THE GREENING OF AFRICA

**Breaking Through in the Battle for Land and Food**

***Paul Harrison.*** A positive response to an environmental crisis plagued with pessimism, this timely survey of Africa's mounting ecological challenges by the author of *Inside the Third World* provides authoritative background on the continent's struggles with population growth, poverty, and agricultural stagnation and offers workable—and necessary—solutions.

0-14-010192-6 384 pp. $6.95 paperback

## GEORGE C. MARSHALL

**Statesman 1945-1959**

***Forrest C. Pogue.*** *Foreword by Drew Middleton.* This fourth and final volume of the definitive, authorized biography of one of America's greatest military and civil leaders is "a perfect match between subject and author....The great biography not just of the year, but of the decade"—Stephen E. Ambrose, University of New Orleans. Illustrated. **Also available:** Volumes I-III

0-670-81042-8 640 pp. $29.95 hardcover

## FIGHTING FAITHS

**The Abrams Case, the Supreme Court, and Free Speech**

***Richard Polenberg*** (Cornell University). This superb history vividly recounts the imprisonment and subsequent deportation of four immigrant anarchists whose conviction touched off landmark legal and political debates about the repression of civil liberties. "Definitive...marked by a thoroughness of research, clarity of expression, and soundness of judgement" —Paul Avrich, Queens College. **November 1987.**

0-670-81373-7 480 pp. $24.95 hardcover

## THE END OF THE THIRD WORLD

**Newly Industrialized Countries and the Decline of an Ideology**

***Nigel Harris*** (University College London). Tracing the rapid transformation of Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Brazil from peasant societies to advanced economies, this insightful study calls for a reassessment of cliché-ridden and immutable Western ideologies which underestimate the challenge posed by those more adaptable Third World countries.

0-14-022563-3 240 pp. $6.95 paperback

**VIKING PENGUIN INC.**
**Academic Marketing Dept.** 40 West 23rd St., New York, NY 10010

# Political Science: New titles from Chicago

## THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION

*In Five Volumes*

*Edited by* **Philip B. Kurland** *and* **Ralph Lerner**

"A singularly valuable offering in this bicentennial year." — Paul A. Freund, *New York Times Book Review*

***Cloth, 5 volumes 3,260 pages $300.00***

## THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION

*Major Themes*

*Edited by* **Philip B. Kurland** *and* **Ralph Lerner**

Originally published as volume 1 of *The Founders' Constitution* (a five-volume set)

***Paper $24.95 728 pages***
***Library cloth edition $49.95***



PHOTO: AMY ROTHBLATT

## THE HISTORY

**Herodotus**

*Translated by* **David Grene**

Grene captures the peculiar quality of Herodotus, the first Greek historian.

***Cloth $30.00 710 pages 8 maps***

## CITY AND REGIME IN THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC

**Stephen L. Elkin**

"This well-written [book] offers an impressive examination of the American city, and breaks important new ground by embedding that examination in a discussion of the American Founding and the ethics of citizenship and participation." — J. David Greenstone, University of Chicago

"A landmark book. Elkin transforms the study of urban politics." — Edwin T. Haefele, University of Pennsylvania

***Paper $11.95 232 pages***
***Library cloth edition $35.00***

## *In paper*

## THE NEW SCIENCE OF POLITICS

***An Introduction***

*With a new Foreword by Dante Germino*

**Eric Voegelin**

***$9.95 207 pages***

© THE BRITISH LIBRARY

## THE SHADOW OF GOD AND THE HIDDEN IMAM

***Religion, Political Order, and Societal Change in Shi'ite Iran from the Beginning to 1890***

**Said Amir Arjomand**

***$14.95 368 pages 1 halftone***
***Publications of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies #17***

## CONSTRUCTING SOCIAL THEORIES

**Arthur L. Stinchcombe**

***$14.95 320 pages***

## PARTICIPATION AND POLITICAL EQUALITY

***A Seven-Nation Comparison***

**Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie,** *and* **Jae-on Kim**

***$15.95 416 pages***

## PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA

***Political Democracy and Social Equality***

**Sidney Verba** *and* **Norman H. Nie**

***$15.95 456 pages***

## NEWS THAT MATTERS

*Television and American Opinion*

**Shanto Iyengar** *and* **Donald R. Kinder**

"The most important work on media efforts in the political field since the classic research of the 1940s and '50s. Elegantly combining experimental and survey methods, it demonstrates what observers of the media have long suspected without knowing how to test: that if one looks for the right kind of effects, the impact of television on public opinion is profound." — Daniel C. Hallin, author of *The "Uncensored War": The Media and Vietnam*

***Cloth $19.95 200 pages 46 tables***
***American Politics and Political Economy series***

## HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

*Third Edition*

*Edited by* **Leo Strauss** *and* **Joseph Cropsey**

The first new edition in fifteen years.

***Paper $19.95 992 pages***
***Library cloth edition $75.00***

## BEYOND MONOPOLY

*Lawyers, State Crises, and Professional Empowerment*

**Terence C. Halliday**

A pathbreaking study of the legal profession.

***Cloth $29.95 440 pages***

## THE PUBLIC DEFENDER

*The Practice of Law in the Shadows of Repute*

**Lisa J. McIntyre**

"McIntyre challenges conventional wisdom and substitutes compelling new perspectives on the role of the institutional defender." — Milton Heumann, author of *Plea Bargaining*

***Cloth $24.95 208 pages 13 line drawings***

## THE STATE AND THE CITY

**Ted Robert Gurr** *and* **Desmond S. King**

A masterful examination of how policies at the local and national state level have a major impact on urban well-being.

***Paper $14.95 272 pages 5 line drawings, 14 tables***
***Library cloth edition $35.00***

## THE SOUND OF LEADERSHIP

*Presidential Leadership in the Modern Age*

**Roderick P. Hart**

"An arresting analysis of the uses, and misuses, of presidential speech." — Daniel Schorr, Senior News Analyst, National Public Radio

***Paper $14.95 296 pages 42 line drawings, 51 tables***
***Library cloth edition $39.95***

## JOHN LOCKE'S LIBERALISM

**Ruth W. Grant**

"A judicious and balanced work in the analytical tradition of Locke studies." — Geraint Parry, University of Manchester

***Cloth $24.95 232 pages***

---

**THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS** *5801 South Ellis Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637*

*New in cloth and paper—A brilliant, state-of-the-art analysis*

## The Political Economy of Japan

VOLUME I: THE DOMESTIC TRANSFORMATION

**Edited by Kozo Yamamura and Yasukichi Yasuba.** This is the first of three volumes that evaluate the political economy of Japan as it approaches the 1990's: the country's phenomenal economic rise, its society, and its place in contemporary world affairs. The result of the joint efforts of 19 Japanese and American scholars, these 13 papers provide accurate descriptions of changes since 1945—and especially since 1973—in the Japanese polity and economy, balanced analyses of the reasons for postwar Japan's performance, and credible predictions about Japan's political economy in future years. Cloth $37.50; paper, $12.95

## Born Arming

DEVELOPMENT AND MILITARY POWER IN NEW STATES

**A. F. Mullins, Jr.** Concentrating on 46 countries that have achieved independence in the last 25 years, this book is a rigorous quantitative investigation of the relationship between military capability and political and economic development. It addresses the questions suggested by such a relationship: What conditions promote or inhibit the acquisition of military capability? Do these conditions change with time or geographical circumstances? And most important, how does growth in military capability itself affect the rate of development? $28.50

## U.S.-Mexico Relations

AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

**Edited by Bruce F. Johnston, Cassio Luiselli, Celso Cartas Contreras, and Roger D. Norton.** The product of extensive collaboration between U.S. and Mexican scholars, these 18 papers provide a truly binational perspective on the structure, growth, and interrelationships of the farm systems of the United States and Mexico. The book examines the history of agricultural developments in the two countries, their agricultural trade, and such major policy issues as Mexico's Sistema Alimentario Mexicano. $42.50

*New in cloth and paper*

## Taking Japan Seriously

A CONFUCIAN PERSPECTIVE ON LEADING ECONOMIC ISSUES

**Ronald Dore.** Taking Japan seriously means more than being impressed by bits of Japanese social technology and seeking to borrow them. It means asking what is behind this social technology and what changes Britain and the United States must make in their industrial relations to move toward the economic successes of Japan. This book examines features of Japanese economic organization and policy-making that reveal alternatives not usually considered open to Western democracies. In many cases the Japanese system could be profitably imitated or reproduced in new forms, and Western economies have much to gain by taking these possibilities seriously. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $12.95

**Stanford University Press**
STANFORD, CA 94305

# New Contributions to the Debate Over Socialism

## from Greenwood Press and Praeger Publishers

**World Socialism at the Crossroads**
An Insider's View
by **Silviu Brucan**

Brucan, a former Romanian Ambassador to the United States and the United Nations, contends that socialist countries are at a crossroads and must adapt their political ideology to the scientific-technological revolution.

October 1987. ISBN 0-275-02782-2 $35.00 est.
*Praeger Publishers*

**Prospects for Change in Socialist Systems**
Challenges and Responses
edited by **Charles J. Bukowski** and **Mark A. Cichock**

Recent changes and upheavals in the Soviet bloc suggest a growing potential for systematic restructuring within Eastern European socialist states. The contributors to this book examine the sociopolitical and economic systems of individual socialist countries and speculate about possible future developments.

1987. ISBN 0-275-92434-3 $34.95
*Praeger Publishers*

**Neighborhood Justice in Capitalist Society**
The Expansion of the Informal State
by **Richard Hoftricher**

Using a Marxist interpretation of recent developments in state-sponsored alternatives to courts for the resolution of disputes, this book explores the relationship between disruptions in reproducing the social order of American capitalism and transformations in the capitalist state that make these dispute resolution mechanisms possible.

1987. ISBN 0-313-25677-2 $35.00 *Greenwood Press*

**The French Socialist in Power, 1981-1986**
edited by **Patrick McCarthy**

The only full-length study of the subject yet written, this book looks at the realities behind the French Socialist Party's coming to power — how it happened, what the Socialists achieved in the way of social change, where they failed, and what lasting impact their brief tenure is likely to have on French and European politics.

September 1987. ISBN 0-313-25407-9 $39.95
*Greenwood Press*

**Socialist Authority**
The Hungarian Experience
by **Peter A. Toma**

This study differentiates between the theory and practice of socialist authority in a vivid and lively analysis of how the people of Hungary learned to circumvent the restructions imposed by the regime and survive both internal and external pressures of socialism.

November 1987. ISBN 0-275-92602-8 $40.00 est.
*Praeger Publishers*

**Class In China**
Stratification in a Classless Society
by **Larry M. Wortzel**

This work presents one of the first comprehensive analyses of the class system in socialist China as it exists in practice rather than as conceived in theory. It then looks beyond China to draw more general conclusions about the structure of socialist political systems.

1987. ISBN 0-313-25498-2 $32.95 *Greenwood Press*

## Available in Paperback

**The Soviet Union Under Gorbachev**
Assessing the First Year
edited by
**Arthur B. Gunlicks** and **John D. Treadway**

This concise anthology assesses the Soviet leader's first year in power and considers the prospects for economic reform, challenges and changes in social policy and the arts, and initiatives in foreign policy.

October 1987.
ISBN 0-275-92702-4
$13.00 est. *Praeger Publishers*

**Soviet Politics from Brezhnev to Gorbachev**
by **Donald M. Kelley**

This work focuses on the political and institutional realities that shape contemporary Soviet politics by looking at individual leaders from Brezhnev to Gorbachev.

September 1987.
ISBN 0-275-92732-6 $9.95
*Praeger Publishers*

**Recapturing Marxism**
An Appraisal of Recent Trends in Sociological Theory
edited by
**Rhonda F. Levine** and **Jerry Lembcke**

This collection of essays focuses on current efforts to revitalize Marxist analysis in sociology and examines the emerging "new" establishment within the discipline.

September 1987.
ISBN 0-275-92638-9
$14.00 est. *Praeger Publishers*

**Greenwood Press / Praeger Publishers**
Divisions of Greenwood Press, Inc. • 88 Post Road West, P.O. Box 5007 • Westport, Conn. 06881

# Vital Issues

## Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance

*Richard K. Betts*

In numerous crises since WWII, the U.S. has resorted to vague threats to use nuclear weapons to deter Soviet or Chinese action. Betts suggests that U.S. presidents were neither consciously bluffing when they made these threats, nor were they prepared to face the consequences if their threats failed.
Paper $10.95/Cloth $28.95

## Perspectives on a U.S.–Canadian Free Trade Agreement

*Robert M. Stern, Philip H. Trezise, and John Whalley, Eds.*

This timely volume offers a broad analysis of the current negotiations for a mutual free trade agreement between Canada and the United States.
Paper $12.95/Cloth $32.95

## Federal Tax Policy
## Fifth Edition

*Joseph A. Pechman*

One of the major architects of comprehensive tax reform has revised his widely acclaimed book on tax policy to reflect the changes brought about by the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
Paper $10.95/Cloth $28.95

## Creating the Computer
## Government, Industry, and High Technology

*Kenneth Flamm*

The launching of the first electronic digital computers in the 1940s signaled the beginning of a distinctive, new industry. Flamm traces the development of this industry—its emphasis on innovation and extensive research and development and its effects on international relations.
Paper $10.95/Cloth $28.95

## Space and National Security

*Paul B. Stares*

Stares concludes that long before the Strategic Defense Initiative can demonstrate the feasibility of ballistic missile defense, it will foster a costly arms race with the Soviets and breed a new generation of more deadly antisatellite weapons. He argues instead for meaningful limitations on space weaponry.
Paper $10.95/Cloth $28.95

## Mergers, Sell-Offs, and Economic Efficiency

*F. M. Scherer and David J. Ravenscraft*

Between 1950 and 1975 U.S. corporations achieved a two-fold increase in diversification, principally by acquiring other corporations. The authors examine how successful were those mergers and what are the implications of mergers for economic efficiency, productivity growth, managerial motivation, and public policy.
Paper $12.95/Cloth $32.95
*Available in October*

# FROM
# BROOKINGS

## What Should Banks Do?

*Robert E. Litan*

Continuing technological advances, decontrol of deposit interest rates, and the removal of barriers to interstate bank expansion have ushered in a new age of competition. Litan offers a new and controversial proposal for carefully circumscribed diversification.
Paper $9.95/Cloth $26.95

**The Brookings Institution**
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 797-6258

***INTRODUCING TWO IMPORTANT NEW BOOKS IN THE***

**SUNY series in AFRO-AMERICAN STUDIES**

John Howard and Robert C. Smith, Eds.

- **Black Presidential Politics in America: A Strategic Approach**

by RONALD W. WALTERS

*and*

- **Black Political Mobilization: Leadership, Power & Mass Behavior**

by MINION K.C. MORRISON

***Black Presidential Politics*** argues that blacks use the electoral system differently from other groups to achieve their social, political, and economic goals. Walters examines black participation in the politics of the primaries, party conventions, and general elections, showing the results of both traditional behind-the-scenes bargaining (dependent leverage) and the more recent direct entry into the presidential selection process as candidates (independent leverage). A veteran political scientist and an active participant in Jesse Jackson's 1984 presidential campaign, Walters deals with the most significant topics in black politics studies and electoral studies in general.

**Ronald W. Walters** is Professor of Political Science at Howard University.

CONTENTS

*• Evolution of Black Electoral Theory • Balance of Power and Dependent Leverage • Strategy of Political Integration • Black Agenda-Building Process • Independent Leverage Strategies • Inter-Party Scenarios: The Black Independent Party • Intra-Party Scenarios: The Jackson Campaign for the Democratic Party Presidential Nomination • Leverage Strategies and the Future*

$14.95 pb. / 0-88706-547-3
$44.50 hc. / 0-88706-546-5

In ***Black Political Mobilization,*** Minion Morrison returns to Mississippi, the center of much of the political activism of the 1960s, to analyze the remarkable improvement in black electoral participation in the years following passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Through in-depth study of three rural towns, the author presents examples of the character and process of minority electoral politics and mobilization in the South: a new class of black leaders is nurtured and installed in office in an environment where a newly and highly mobilized constitutency takes advantage of its minority status in the electorate.

**Minion K.C. Morrison** is Associate Professor of Afro-American Studies and Political Science and Chairman of the Afro-American Studies Department at Syracuse University.

CONTENTS

*• The American Political System and Mobilization Politics • Black and White in the Southern Regional Context • Neo-Populism in Bolton • Heroine in Mayersville • Agrarian Townsman in Tchula • The Electorates: Politics, Economics and Ideology • The Political Economy of Rural Black-American Mobilization*

$19.95 pb. / 0-88706-516-3
$49.50 hc. / 0-88706-515-5

**STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK PRESS**
P.O. Box 6525 • Ithaca, NY 14850 • (607)277-2211

**1987**

Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.
*The Army and Vietnam*
The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1986

**1986**

Bruce G. Blair
*Strategic Command and Control*
Brookings Institution

**1985**

Barry R. Posen
*The Sources of Military Doctrine*
Cornell University Press

**1984**

John J. Mearsheimer
*Conventional Deterrence*
Cornell University Press

Harry G. Summers
*On Strategy*
Presido Press

**Announcing the 1988 Edgar S. Furniss Jr. National Security Book Award**

A $1,000 cash prize will be awarded to the author of a book published in 1987 that makes an exceptional contribution to the study of national security or the role of the military in society. The award, which commemorates the first director of the Mershon Center, is restricted to an author's *first published book*. Nominations by authors, publishers, or third parties must be made by February 29, 1988.

For more information, contact:
Carole Dale
Mershon Center
The Ohio State University
199 West 10th Avenue
Columbus, OH 43210-2399
614-292-1681

MERSHON CENTER

# Princeton University Press

## Multinationals, The State, and Control of the Nigerian Economy

*Thomas J. Biersteker*

Thomas Biersteker evaluates the sources of Third World economic nationalism and assesses the significance of the changes that have taken place worldwide since the early 1970s. Neo-classical and neo-Marxist approaches to international and comparative political economy are explored to develop methods and select criteria for the assessment of major change. The book is based on extensive interview material, access to previously unpublished documents, and data assembled on every large company incorporated in Nigeria.

Paper: $12.50 Cloth: $45.00

## Meeting Needs

*David Braybrooke*

Every day, throughout the world, the concept of needs works to sort out social policies. Yet the idea is in disrepute with many thinkers who, led by economists, accuse it of being too fluid, or too narrow, or of serving no purpose that the concept of preferences does not serve better. David Braybrooke refutes these charges by providing a model of how the concept of needs works. Ascribing needs across whole populations at once and tying them to a criterion of adequate functioning, the model allows for variations among people in minimum standards of provision and expands or contracts to deal with conventional aspects of needs.

*Studies in Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy*
*Marshall Cohen, Editor*
Paper: $12.50 Cloth: $35.00

*At your bookstore or*
**Princeton University Press**
41 William Street, Princeton, NJ 08540
(609) 896-1344

# Chatham House
Publishers, Inc.

BOX ONE, CHATHAM, NEW JERSEY 07928 TELEPHONE: (201) 635-2059

## THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY REVISITED

VOL. 1, THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE. VOL 2, THE CLASSICAL ISSUES.

**Giovanni Sartori**

"Everyone seriously interested in democratic theory will welcome the appearance of *The Theory of Democracy Revisited.* His earlier *Democratic Theory* made a vigorous, vital, and distinguished contribution to our contemporary understanding of democratic theory. In the new book Sartori takes later discussions into account where they are appropriate. I expect to readers a generation from now the revision will still be a fresh and lively interpretation of democratic theory." **Robert A. Dahl,** *Yale University*

"Democracy is, in part, a debate about what democracy is. With *The Theory of Democracy Revisited,* Sartori offers an overview of classical and contemporary issues. All students of politics will find his arguments provocative, whether or not they agree with his conclusions."

**Jean Bethke Elshtain,** *University of Massachusetts, Amherst*

0-934540-46-2 *cloth* 0-934540-49-7 2-volume set, *paper*

## MEDIA AND MOMENTUM

THE NEW HAMPSHIRE PRIMARY AND NOMINATION POLITICS

**Edited by Gary R. Orren and Nelson W. Polsby**

"It is said that we do have a national presidential primary. It's just that it occurs in New Hampshire. Orren and Polsby have collected excellent, insightful papers on this extraordinarily important contest. Political scientists, journalists, maybe even candidates and their staffs will profit from reading this book." **Charles O. Jones,** *University of Virginia*

"Everything you might want to know about the history, significance, and *yes,* the foolishness of the New Hampshire primary. And, for your favorite candidate there's even an appendix that outlines the political demography of this tiny, but mighty, electorate."

**Michael J. Robinson,** *Georgetown University*

0-934540-66-7 *paper* 0-934540-67-5 *cloth*

## CITIZEN POLITICS IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES

PUBLIC OPINION AND POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES,
GREAT BRITAIN, WEST GERMANY, AND FRANCE

**Russell J. Dalton**

Will serve as a core text for undergraduate courses in West European politics, comparative parties, and comparative public opinion. Dalton explains how citizens perceive political parties and the political system, how they try to influence the political process, and how voting decisions are made. The book is structured around the theme that the values and political sophistication of Western publics have undergone a major transformation over the past 20 years, leading to declining trust in government, an increase in protest and other forms of direct political action, and the decay of party alignments.

0-934540-44-6 *paper* *Forthcoming*

For further information about these and forthcoming titles, please contact Edward Artinian, publisher, CHATHAM HOUSE PUBLISHERS, Box One, Chatham, N.J. 07928. Telephone: (201) 635-2059.

# INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTRIBUTORS

The *American Political Science Review* aims to publish scholarly research and writing of exceptional merit. Contributions must demonstrate the highest standards of excellence in conceptualization, exposition, methodology, and craftsmanship. Because the *Review* reaches a diverse audience of scholars and practitioners, contributors must demonstrate how their analysis or exposition illuminates a significant research problem, or answers an important research question, of general interest in political science.

## Article Manuscripts

Article manuscripts should be submitted to the Managing Editor, Professor Samuel C. Patterson, *American Political Science Review*, Department of Political Science, Ohio State University, 112 Derby Hall, Columbus, Ohio 43210-1373. Four copies must be submitted, and none can be returned. Manuscripts must be typed double-spaced, on only one side of the paper. The author's name and affiliation should not appear on the copies submitted, but only on a separate covering sheet. An abstract of no more than 150 words must be sent with the manuscript. In general, the *Review* considers manuscripts of up to 30 pages in length. Moreover, the *Review* does not consider manuscripts submitted to other publications.

Manuscripts should be prepared following the guidelines of the *APSA Style Manual*, a publication of the American Political Science Association's Committee on Publications. It is available from the Managing Editor's office. Otherwise, authors should follow the *Chicago Style Manual* and the example of recent issues of the *Review*. Graphs and tables should be presented on separate pages, with their location in the manuscript indicated, e.g., the notification "Table 1 about here," at the proper places.

## Book Reviews

Books intended for review and all book review correspondence should be sent to the Book Review Editor, Professor Robert H. Salisbury, *American Political Science Review*, Department of Political Science, Washington University, Campus Box 1063, St. Louis, Missouri 63130.

## Other Correspondence

Information, including news and notes, for the Association's news-journal, *PS*, should be sent to Dr. Catherine E. Rudder, Editor, American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Advertising, reprint, and circulation correspondence should be sent to the Executive Director at the Washington office. Domestic claims for nonreceipt of issues must be made within four months of the month of publication; overseas claims, eight months. Advertising information and rates are available from Norinne Hessman, Advertising Manager, APSA, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

## Indexing

Articles and notes appearing in the *Review* before the June 1953 issue were indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. Current issues are indexed by *International Political Science Abstracts*, *United States Political Science Documents*, and *Social Sciences and Humanities Index*. Microfilm of the *Review*, beginning with Volume 1, may be obtained from University Microfilms, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. A *Cumulative Index of the Review*, Volumes 1–62, 1906–1968, also may be obtained from University Microfilms. Articles appearing in the *Review* are listed in *ABC Pol Sci* and *Current Contents: Behavioral, Social & Management Sciences*. Book reviews are indexed in *Book Review Index*.

# CONTENTS

ARTICLES

War Cues and Foreign Policy Acts
**Francis A. Beer, Alice F. Healy, Grant P. Sinclair & Lyle E. Bourne, Jr.** . . . . . 701

Crisis Bargaining, Escalation, and MAD
**Robert Powell** . . . . . 717

Fleeing the Iron Cage: Politics and Culture in the Thought of Max Weber
**Lawrence A. Scaff** . . . . . 737

The Individual Political Economy of Federal Tax Policy
**Michael R. Hawthorne & John E. Jackson** . . . . . 757

The Dynamics of Structural Realignment
**Stuart Elaine Macdonald & George Rabinowitz** . . . . . 775

State Political Culture and Public Opinion
**Robert S. Erikson, John P. McIver, & Gerald C. Wright, Jr.** . . . . . 797

Television News and Citizens' Explanations of National Affairs
**Shanto Iyengar** . . . . . 815

Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-theoretic Analysis
**Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour** . . . . . 833

Bureaucratic Politics in Radical Military Regimes
**Gregory J. Kasza** . . . . . 851

Stacking the Deck: Bureaucratic Missions and Policy Design
**Jonathan Bendor, Serge Taylor & Roland Van Gaalen** . . . . . 873

Asymmetric Information and the Coherence of Legislation
**David Austen-Smith & William H. Riker** . . . . . 897

CONTROVERSIES

Liberalism, Human Rights, and Human Dignity
**Neil Mitchell, Rhoda E. Howard & Jack Donnelly** . . . . . 921

Why are Congressional Committees Powerful?
**Keith Krehbiel, Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast** . . . . . 929

RESEARCH NOTES

Guns and Butter and Government Popularity in Britain
**Helmut Norpoth** . . . . . 949

Nationalization of the Electorate in the United States
**Laura L. Vertz, John P. Frendreis & James L. Gibson** . . . . . 961

BOOK REVIEWS

Political Theory . . . . . 973
American Politics . . . . . 990
Comparative Politics . . . . . 1016
International Relations . . . . . 1039
Political Economy . . . . . 1054